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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In recent years, the topic of Sanskrit’s cultural significance has become 
increasingly subject to discussion as its high visibility in the identity politics of 
the modern Indian nation has combined with a general questioning of philological 
methods to generate a demand for revised approaches to historiography and 
textual analysis. The resulting developments successfully demonstrate the 
potential of retrieving a wide diversity of previously unsought information from 
Sanskrit texts, utilising these findings to grapple with the identification of the 
language with closed models of cultural elitism, and thereby establish the 
foundation of a wider understanding of Sanskrit in historical context. What these 
developments do not address, however, is the matter of how the composition and 
reception of linguistic materials are influenced by culturally specific 
understandings of language that are not universally applicable across cultures, 
and may indeed be incompatible with those familiar to modern scholars and 
around which a number of leading hermeneutic approaches have been built. 
This work argues, firstly, that the parameters currently ascribed to Sanskrit 
– the justifications of its specialised status, the focus on structure and style in 
definitions of genre, the treatment of revelation as static and non-subjective – are 
markedly narrower than those demonstrated in Vedic texts, and as such obscure 
the possibility of alternative phenomenological, language-based and non-elite 
explanations for Sanskrit’s ongoing appeal in South Asian religious culture. 
Secondly, it contends that understandings of language, ancient and modern alike, 
implicate deeply embedded conceptions of the relationship between language and 
the human subject, particularly as relates to the formation and refinement of 
personal identity – a matter which draws revelation and embodiment together in 
the provision of a living context for self-transformation. These two considerations 
will be explored through a close examination of the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas, since 
they provide an exemplary instance of the way that familiar approaches to 
Sanskrit must be adapted in accordance with the demands of texts if we are to 
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retrieve their internal integrity and thereby reach a deeper understanding of what 
it means to become saṃskṛta. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
For reasons that have as much to do with India’s classical śāstric expositions on 
language as with the expectations of recent scholarship, a particular vision of 
Sanskrit’s social history has come to occupy prevailing depictions of its cultural 
significance. Under the influence of the gravity of language politics and identity 
in the modern Indian nation, the contours of this history are inevitably political. 
Moreover, to the extent that they have been filled in with themes, concerns, and 
vocabulary drawn from Sanskrit’s textual traditions, these contours are now a 
driving force in the concomitant creation of historiographies of this language, its 
literature and employments, that are radically narrower in their scope than what 
the evidence itself suggests may have been the reality on the ground. Such, then, 
is the complexity that has been buried beneath the weight of recent leading, 
indeed, paradigm-shifting interpretations of Sanskrit as elite, a discourse unto 
itself: the primary evidence for Sanskrit’s wider employments in religious and 
other practices is largely belied by the primary evidence for its self-
representation. These representations – the themes, concerns, and vocabulary 
mentioned above – have been recognized and repeated by scholars, both 
Indological and indigenous, because they characterize the relationship between 
Sanskrit and other languages in a way that is nothing short of programmatic: they 
are crafted in accordance with the epistemological requirements of the Sanskritic 
intellectual culture that emerged around the turn of the Common Era, and they 
intentionally reinforce the axiomatic equation of Sanskrit with transcendent 
authority and the exclusively Brahmanical right to it. 
When viewed from the vantage point of the present, these self-
representations are easily mapped against the counter-arguments and non-
Brahmanical voices that arise from within the broader, affiliation-neutral context 
of South Asian social and intellectual developments. As such, they are recast as 
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points of contestation stemming from the vested interests of the Brahmin elite 
with respect to the cultural and geographical distribution of their power, 
coterminous with the spread of Sanskrit’s influence through the same overlapping 
domains. What is particularly interesting are the stakes involved in this modern 
characterization, for, rather than offsetting the literary representation of Sanskrit 
against its variegated employments both within and at the margins of 
Brahmanical practice, and in this way retrieving a wider picture of its 
understanding by indigenous participants, it is instead the literary representation 
that is retained and allowed to speak for Sanskrit as a whole. This raises the 
pertinent questions of whether the image of Sanskrit that is deployed by critical 
historiographers and other academics is a spectre or a reality, and of how this 
shapes the way texts are interpreted. 
 While the production of critical historiographies undoubtedly carries 
weight as a corrective to the role of scholarship in the reification of charged 
accounts of India’s history, the practice of reigning in so-called traditionalist 
perspectives through the presentation of conflicting views should be seen as a 
method involving certain interpretative manoeuvres that cannot be explained 
without recourse to twentieth-century categories and dialectics. These do not 
share conceptual terrain with the cultural phenomena studied, and need, I believe, 
to be distinguished as such. Thus, the depiction that ensues of an equable 
historical situation, in which the value attributed to Sanskrit by native scholars is 
considered to bring the same instigating force to modern identity politics as to 
involvement in the ritual culture of the mid-Vedic period, depends largely upon 
the treatment of religion as an institution that enforces control through the 
repression of individuality with its own self-authenticating symbols and 
suggestive arrangements of knowledge. Such a retrieval of evidence in favour of 
a dialectical relationship between language and religion, addressed in Chapter 1, 
reconceives of Sanskrit in secular terms. Moreover, it locates new justifications 
for Sanskrit’s enduring appeal by means of revisionist interpretations. In 
accordance with these interpretations and conceptualizations, the discourses that 
can be extracted from religious texts tend to be of central importance to the 
consolidation of modern critiques, but the internal or actual religious coherence 
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of the perspectives and practices they articulate is concomitantly eschewed. This 
disinclination is similarly expressed in the tendency to leave widespread 
dynamics in South Asian religious culture unaddressed, some of which, like the 
pan-Indic phenomenon of spirit and deity possession, permeate the boundaries 
that separate the elite from the “folk.” Following these considerations, it is 
apposite to question the way that a context for Brahmanism has been generated. 
 A common feature of many critical studies is their extrapolation of an 
origin for the exclusivity of the classical Sanskritic literary and intellectual 
traditions from the preoccupation with ritual minutiae and sacral restrictions that 
first appears in the Vedic revelatory texts of the first millennium BCE. It is of 
note that this theorists’ approach to recovering patterns of continuity sits at a 
marked distance from the philological methods utilized by Vedicists, under whose 
purview the specialized study of these ancient materials typically falls. Restated, 
the question of Sanskrit’s cultural significance, on one hand, and the texts that are 
specifically considered to focus this question against ideologies of ancient 
pedigree, on the other, are each aligned with starkly different lines of enquiry, 
methodological approval, and disciplinary affiliation within the realm of modern 
academic research. 
Given these circumstances, in which the examination of the same group of 
materials yields differing results for the conceptualization of Sanskrit as a cultural 
phenomenon, Chapter 2 discusses the textual basis for current perspectives on 
developments in Brahmanical religious culture during the Vedic period. In this 
respect, attention is paid specifically to the matter of how the sources of these 
current perspectives implicate highly particular understandings of language and 
the influence of these upon textual analysis and its outcomes. Here, recent 
scholarship on the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas with their eclectic style and contents 
provides an exemplary instance of the way that attempts to reach definitions of 
genre can lead to a superimposition of modern ideas over the received form of 
texts, rupturing their internal integrity and occluding it from considered 
examination. This immediately raises the interpretative problematic of what 
adaptations would need to be made to our familiar approaches in order to prevent 
such patterns of coherence in the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas from becoming obscured. 
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These adaptations, discussed in the latter half of Chapter 2, touch on concerns 
such as orality and the sonic dimensions of texts, internal and external viewpoints 
regarding the experiential validity of language, and the very possibility of 
studying mystical statements. All of these implicate deeply embedded – and 
frequently unchallenged – preconceptions about the relationship between 
language and the person. 
After these considerations of the way that such inherited, and primarily 
Western-influenced, models of language and its analysis can be traced behind the 
difficulties and limitations that are characteristic of the study of the Āraṇyakas, 
Chapter 3 attends to the Sanskrit texts themselves. These are examined in relation 
to the contention that they demonstrate a broader engagement with language than 
what can be accommodated by the parameters that are currently ascribed to 
Sanskrit. Following a postulation made in the preceding chapter, namely, that 
language is conceptualized in culturally specific ways because it is inseparable 
from cultural understandings of the body, I turn firstly to the phenomenon of 
embodiment as it appears in these texts – as a primordial archetype, as a context 
for soteriological practice and recurrent point of reference in revelatory 
teachings, and as an underlying implication of the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas’ 
conservatively orthodox and ostensibly magical passages alike. In the attempt to 
consistently maintain this perspective throughout the various stages and 
dimensions involved in textual analysis – or, more precisely, to negotiate the 
challenge that is presented by the internal diversity of these texts – I implement a 
working methodology that is grounded in the principles of a polythetic approach. 
Hopefully, this allows the coherence of the texts’ eclectic and chronologically 
diverse contents to be highlighted. In addition, this methodology also explores the 
advantages of a literal reading of Sanskrit passages; this permits the revelatory or 
ontologically veridical status of their statements to be maintained, as opposed to 
reconceived as literary strategies whose meaning is derived from external sources 
of importance. Without claiming freedom from the constraints of established 
academic paradigms, the flexibility of this approach facilitates a relatively easy 
adaptation of familiar methods to the demands of these Āraṇyakas’ internal 
worldview. This is because it elucidates – and thereby helps to prevent the 
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importation of – interpretative problematics that originate from outside of the 
Vedic tradition and which run the risk of implicitly valorising or de-valorising the 
texts’ teachings regardless of the scholar’s intentions. At the very least, such an 
approach encourages self-reflexivity in the matter of one’s inherited assumptions 
and expectations, thus providing the necessary platform for critique, adaptation, 
and an arguably deeper engagement with the primary sources. 
What emerges from this shift in the underlying terms of interpretation is a 
picture of personhood that transcends the divisions that modern scholars and 
native commentators alike have introduced into the interpretation of the Ṛgvedic 
Āraṇyakas. According to this picture, personhood is the vital state resulting from 
a collocation of diverse and shifting entities, referred to as deities (devatā) and 
including language and speech, that penetrate the boundaries of the corporeal 
body (śarīra). Thus pervading the body with the host of their respective functions 
and substantialities, the deities altogether give rise to the person (puruṣa) as a 
dynamic and composite identity that challenges the notion of individual autonomy 
and reveals a vulnerability that follows on the heels of the openness to 
transaction, the introduction of external elements into personal constitution, and 
the fundamental changes of state these herald. Although lacking here is an exact 
lexical equivalent to “embodiment,” the Sanskrit vocabulary that is employed to 
describe the movement of deities into and out of the body shares substantial links 
with the phenomenon of possession. By virtue of thus opening textual 
interpretation to directions suggested by anthropological and ethnographic 
research, this lexicon provides the concept of the deities’ movement and 
contributions with a precision that draws attention to the puruṣa in its capacity as 
the immediate context of soteriological transformations. 
While indicating a marked break with the normative Vedāntic equation of 
the ātman and brahman that is characteristic of the commentarial tradition 
associated with the Upaniṣads of the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas, the positive emphasis 
placed on the puruṣa as an embodiment of the deities suggests not only that 
language is literally established in the body, but that qualities introduced through 
language significantly affect changes within the composition of personhood. 
Saliently, this includes both the experience of subjectivity and its expression. The 
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implications of these cultural understandings for the understanding of Vedic 
revelations are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, with particular focus on the entry of 
Sanskrit into the body and its repercussions for the personal attainment of a 
textually-specified identity. Given the tendency to define the Upaniṣads over 
against the Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas through reference to an increased 
inwardness of focus and commensurate disinvestment in sensory experience, the 
physicality of knowledge suggested by the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas’ model of the 
puruṣa and the reconfigurations of identity it informs form an essential 
component of the discussion in Chapter 3. 
The openness of embodiment, the composite nature of personhood, the 
role of the deities as external forces, and the connection between the hidden and 
visible dimensions of reality all point to the need for an expanded notion of 
revelation and must be considered together as a functioning whole in accordance 
with their depiction in these texts. Chapter 4 presses this model of a creative 
intersection between the puruṣa and external forces into the service of śruti, 
Vedic revelation, which is examined in the sense of a disclosure of truth via an 
heightened or modified use of language, taking into account both the full diversity 
of these Āraṇyakas’ contents and the additional considerations that are introduced 
by the oral culture of Vedic transmission and study. It is in this connection that 
bandhus, a prominent feature of the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas, come into their own as 
an employment of language that is dynamic, creative, and affective. Despite the 
ubiquity of their utilization in Vedic texts, scholarly disagreement over how 
bandhus function generally and thence ought to be interpreted has led to their 
being adduced as evidence of three conceptually isolated, and even conflicting, 
spheres or stages within Brahmanical religious culture, namely, sacrificial ritual, 
mystical realization, and magical rites. In an attempt to retrieve the underlying 
cohesiveness of bandhus, Chapter 4 examines the suggestion that it is the 
numerous dynamic processes of grammar that give language its generative force 
and in this attest to the veridical nature of hidden connections by bringing them, 
and the truth of identity, into perceivable existence. 
As with the employment of a polythetic approach, this examination 
responds to the contention that the parameters currently assigned to Sanskrit need 
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to be expanded if they are to accommodate the employment of language 
demonstrated by these texts. To the extent that grammar is arguably both cultural 
and cosmological, and not merely an arbitrary system of reference, it is especially 
suited to the expression of the subtly manifest connections that underscore 
identity and whose discernment is a leading preoccupation of Vedic tradition 
generally. As such, it allows the “magical” creativity of language to be addressed 
without its discussion being hindered by either the pejorative overtones or the 
complex attempts at justification that beleaguer much scholarship on magic, and 
at the same time makes it unnecessary to resort to a default analysis of signs, 
symbols, and referential associations. 
 These considerations raise the germane question of whether it is viable to 
suggest the existence of a complement between magic and revelation, the 
interpretative extremes between which the internal coherence of these texts has 
most often become fragmented. To this end, Chapter 4 turns to a close survey of 
passages taken from across the Aitareya and Śāṅkhāyana texts that suggest 
grammar is the coded substance that language contributes to the puruṣa. If this 
reading is accurate, and I argue that it is, then the movements of grammar can be 
interpreted in accordance with the vision of open and permeable embodiment that 
is at once the basis of the subject’s vulnerability to the influences of their 
environment and the prerequisite to soteriological transformation. It comes as no 
surprise that the grammatical reordering of the puruṣa’s interior structures is most 
visible in passages that address either revelation (saṃhitā) and the aim of putting 
oneself together (sam-√dhā), or the rites used to protect against harm by 
endowing the subject with the power of speech. A comparison of these passages, 
their claims and injunctions, indicates that self-cultivation and self-preservation 
are part and parcel of the Āraṇyakas’ worldview, wherein the constantly shifting 
grounds of personhood have soteriological repercussions both before and after 
death. Furthermore, the common locus these passages share with accounts of 
creation – which detail the god Prajāpati’s collapse and subsequent reintegration 
through saṃhitā – identify these mutual imperatives with the pre-existent tensions 
and relationships threaded throughout the cosmos. At the same time, they suggest 
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an extension of revelation to worldly practices that have generally been excluded 
from conservative assessments of Vedic practice. 
 This movement away from the treatment of language as a referential 
scheme, to the treatment of it instead as a sensorily perceived phenomenon whose 
meaningfulness arises from multiple active – and primarily ineffable – internal 
phenomena, introduces a certain conceptual elasticity into the way that revelation 
is contextualised. Firstly, it begs a re-evaluation of saṃhitā in light of the 
evidence for the involvement of human subjectivity in the unfolding disclosure 
and personal realization of truth. Secondly, the cultural contours of embodiment 
finally suggest new directions in the study of Sanskrit and necessitate a 
reconsideration of the employment of sam-√kṛ and its derivatives in relation to 
the substantial contributions made by language to the reshaping of personal 
identity. As shall be seen, this occurs particularly through the intentional and 
heavily ritualized introduction of revelation into one’s person. To the extent that 
the occurrences of sam-√kṛ all point to a processual continuity between the 
cultivation of the identity and the evolution of the cosmos – not to mention the 
integral place of language in both – the discussion of what it means to become 
saṃskṛta opens the way to an analysis to some of the most challenging, for 
ostensible unorthodox, rites detailed in these texts. 
 The final chapter draws out some extended conclusions and implications 
for the understanding of Vedic revelation and Brahmanical practice and the 
further study of these and other South Asian texts; it also identifies a few more 
questions and difficulties that at present constrain the study of the Āraṇyakas as a 
formal corpus. First, I return to the matter of language as a phenomenon whose 
employments accord with the basic assumptions that underpin the given 
worldview of those who engage with it. Because these perspectives have practical 
repercussions for textual interpretation, they increase in gravity with respect to 
revelation, in which instance language must attune fundamentally to the reality 
disclosed if it is to truly bear witness to the existence claims made therein. As this 
observation obtains specifically in the teachings and practice of the Ṛgvedic 
Āraṇyakas, it suggests – or, indeed, demands – a model of subjectivity that differs 
significantly from the one at play in classical Sanskritic discourses on the self, but 
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which nonetheless reveals a point of undeniable consistency throughout these 
texts. 
Such divergence with the methods and findings of established scholarship 
does not, however, set back our understandings of early Brahmanical culture, but 
rather opens it to directions that promise comprehensiveness and the type of thick 
descriptions that cannot be found in the primary texts themselves. This is 
particularly evident in the relevance of subjectivity to the question of what 
precisely is involved in the Brahmanical emphasis on self-control, an emphasis 
that is documented both textually and ethnographically, but which extends 
beyond the conservative parameters that characterize śāstric injunctions on 
personal conduct. By thus casting light back onto a tradition that has long been 
locked within the sacrificial enclosure, these observations have immediate 
repercussions for the textuality of the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas, in particular, by 
elucidating the dangers inherent in the impact of revelation upon subjectivity and 
in this way drawing attention to the substance behind the restrictions on the 
performance of the texts. Without overturning the philological methods 
traditionally utilized in the study of the Veda, this suggestion of the close 
proximity between theory and practice, revelatory claim and transformative 
experience, is a practical addition to scholarly understanding that should facilitate 
further developments in the study of Vedic revelation in the broader context of 
South Asian religious culture. 
 A note on the structure of this work is in order. Given the fact that the 
difficulties involved in the question of Sanskrit’s cultural significance result 
equally from the challenging nature of the primary sources and from the peculiar 
tendencies of modern scholarship, this examination moves continually between 
discussions of theory and close observations of the texts themselves. The sheer 
amount of space thus dedicated to questions of an highly contemporary and 
theoretical nature may seem out of place in a study centring on the literary 
analysis of ancient materials, and certainly parts ways with the more usual 
approaches taken in the study of the Veda. Nonetheless, it is justified by the need 
to more clearly see our own influences in creating depictions of Sanskrit’s 
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megalithic authority and likewise in the absence of research into its active role in 
processes of self-transformation. 
 Secondly, a comment on translation and the editions employed in this 
study. While the passages presented may appear irregular in their shifting back 
and forth between the two Āraṇyakas of the Ṛgveda – and likewise between the 
genres of Āraṇyaka and Upaniṣad – this movement is informed by the argument 
that these texts need to be considered as wholes, in accordance with the form of 
their transmission. If we are to gain any sense of the internal continuity of these 
Āraṇyakas, then such a prioritization of their transmitted form over the 
classification of their contents in accordance with pre-given categories is a basic 
prerequisite of a more comprehensive approach to examination. This marks a 
particular type of orientation to their composite nature, and not a disregard for the 
differing chronological strata of the materials from which they have been 
compiled. In response to the relatively unknown status of the Āraṇyakas and the 
lack of recent scholarly editions, I provide the Sanskrit text and English 
translations in parallel. Hopefully, this is more of an help to understanding than 
an hindrance to reading. 
With respect to editions, the materials available provide a good starting 
point for the study of the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas, but are characteristically unreliable 
and leave much to be desired. In the case of the Aitareya Āraṇyaka, the edition 
and translation prepared by Arthur Berridale Keith remains a major resource 
despite the evidence that suggests his unnecessary “correction” of the reading of 
the text gleaned from manuscripts; in many cases, such suspected interference is 
confirmed through comparison with the earlier edition produced by Bābāśāstrī 
Phaḍke, which is also helpful in its presentation of Sāyaṇa’s interlinear 
commentary. If Keith’s translation of the Aitareya is notable for his occasional 
insertion of words and suggested meanings that are not attested in the Sanskrit 
and irregular ascription of value to lexical items, thus deadening the subtle 
progressions that are evident in the text, it is nonetheless a far healthier specimen 
than his translation of the Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka. With respect to the latter, the 
quality of the translation is entirely summarized in Keith’s own statement that the 
text is “not of special importance” and that it is important to “observe some 
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proportion between the effort expended and the value of the result.”1 While I have 
not been able to locate any other translations of the Śāṅkhāyana, the edition 
produced by Śrīdhar Śāstrī Pāṭhak is an invaluable resource for the study of this 
text and is on the whole far less subject to orthographic errors than the more 
recent edition by Bhim Dev. Given the very high degree of inconsistency 
demonstrated by the manuscripts of both the Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka and the 
Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad which it contains, it comes as no surprise to find some 
variation between the numbering of passages given by these editions and Keith’s 
translation; where relevant, these differences have been given in the footnotes. 
Finally, as is characteristic of all such Vedic texts, the Aitareya and 
Śāṅkhāyana contain a large proportion of material cited from the Ṛgveda 
Saṃhitā; they also each contain Upaniṣads that are better known as independent 
texts and which have their own traditions of transmission and commentary. When 
the Āraṇyaka indicates that a certain number of verses in a hymn are to be recited 
in full, I provide the expanded text of the recitation from the Ṛgveda; this practice 
not only conveniences the reader, but is necessary if we are to see the continuity 
and interplay between these recitations and the teachings of the Āraṇyaka. In such 
cases, I refer to the Sanskrit text of the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā prepared by Van Nooten 
and Holland. In the majority of instances, however, it is apparent that it is the 
abbreviated form of the citation itself that is intended by the Āraṇyaka and built 
upon in the surrounding text; here, I translate in accordance with the citation in its 
given form, resisting the larger grammatical context provided by its original 
positioning in a Ṛgvedic verse. Similarly, I follow the text of the Upaniṣads as it 
is given by their corresponding Āraṇyakas, that is, without the numbering of 
passages that is typical in translations and editions of the Aitareya and Kauṣītaki 
Upaniṣads but which is not a feature of either the Aitareya or Śāṅkhāyana 
Āraṇyakas. Only where indicated do I follow the translations of the Ṛgveda by 
Joel Brereton and Stephanie Jamison and of the Aitareya and Kauṣītaki Upaniṣads 
by Patrick Olivelle; in all other cases, the translations are my own. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Keith 1908: v. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Looking for a Language Named Sanskrit 
 
 
 
 
As a source of information and a driving force behind developments in 
interpretative method, language has long occupied a determinative position in the 
study of Indian culture. While factors such as a vast premodern literary tradition 
with an influence extending across Asia and the overwhelmingly textual nature of 
the evidence for India’s ancient period contribute objectively to these 
circumstances, the appeal of language as a focus of study is often motivated by 
the intersection between linguistic and political identities and the peculiar 
reflexivity of postcolonial South Asia’s role in the evolution of modern academic 
ethics and expectations. It is in light of the latter that the marked distinction 
between the fact of India’s immense linguistic diversity and the almost exclusive 
dominance of Sanskrit literary culture comes into view not as a specialized 
occurrence but rather as a situation of extreme incongruence informed – and even 
enforced – by the social agenda of those in power. Although ardent versions of 
this perspective often stem from outside of the disciplinary interchanges that are 
relatively conventional within the overarching category of Indology, and may 
even be seen as belonging to broadly discrete academic disciplines and 
arrangements of knowledge such as political science or area studies in their 
concern with highly modernist and political frameworks, a somewhat more 
moderate articulation of the same is often felt in the automatic equation of 
Sanskrit texts and language with the narrowly conservative interests of the 
Brahmanical intellectual elite. And while this equation has been criticised for an 
over-reliance on śāstric literature that reduces the activity of the Brahmins’ to 
textual exegesis by ignoring alternative texts and complementary data from other 
fields, thereby setting the stage for its own failure to produce a non-elitist reading 
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of classical Indian religion,2 it is of equal significance that such opposition has not 
been extended to the question of how a reconsideration of Brahmanical religious 
culture should inspire a corresponding reconsideration of Sanskrit’s cultural 
significance. 
Although the increasing utilization of cross-disciplinary findings responds 
positively to criticisms that have been levelled at the truncating disjunctures that 
can arise from an examination of textual data alone, I posit that what has been less 
commonly addressed is the matter of how our very understanding of language 
shapes the reception and subsequent study of linguistic materials. In the words of 
Greg Bailey’s incisive assessment of practices of textual analysis in contemporary 
Indology, “the relationship between the contents of the texts and the use made of 
those contents is necessarily an arbitrary one which can and has been determined 
by factors sometimes having little relation to the objects of investigation 
themselves.”3 Assuming for a moment the viability of suggesting that it is the 
granted status of language – its a priori familiarity as a medium of critical 
analysis, and acceptance as a biological universal of human communication – that 
prevents scholars from making further enquiries into the culturally understood 
network of interactions that frame linguistic activities, then the fact that 
arguments for the inescapability of the sensory dimensions of language have not 
motivated a reinvestigation of Sanskrit’s meaningfulness vis à vis Vedic models 
of embodiment mark a serious oversight in the study of ancient Brahmanical 
texts. If understandings of language implicate understandings of the body, of 
whatever constitutes a natural relationship between an individual’s cognitive and 
physiological functions, on one hand, and self-expression through the pre-existing 
structures of grammar and poetics, on the other, then it is imperative to ask in 
which ways our prevailing interpretative paradigms might be flexibly adapted to 
better accommodate the emic perspectives underpinning Sanskrit’s revelatory 
force. 
 Without arguing for the superiority of any one hermeneutic paradigm, this 
chapter examines some of the leading conceptualizations of language, culture, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 White 2003: 3. 
3 Bailey 1995: 15. 
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identity at play in contemporary Indology and raises the question of what has 
been involved in defining Sanskrit, what has been excluded, and at what cost. 
Restated, these concerns point to the larger complexity of how modern scholars 
have understood Sanskrit to exist in the world, as a phenomenon, especially with 
respect to the way its status as a religious language undergoes critical 
transformations in light of the doubts cast over the validity of experience as an 
interpretative framework and the treatment of religion as an institution of 
questionable relevance to reality on the ground. In order to comprehend the 
scholarly retrieval of Sanskrit’s cultural significance, then, we need firstly to note 
that the important questions occupying recent scholarship are those that address 
its employment as an historically situated practice: a matter of how people have 
engaged with the language and its texts, expressing identity through literature at 
the same time as encoding it as a pre-existing cultural system, and the way that 
this informs potentially convertible notions of tradition. As shall be seen, this 
bears upon the very use of the name “Sanskrit” and its value-laden reverberations, 
in both practice and theory, through the historical process referred to as 
Sanskritization.4 In this connection, it is also imperative to raise the spectral 
matter of language’s ontology and the implications of its absence from both 
revisionist histories of Sanskritic culture and philological analyses of Vedic texts 
themselves. While the latter and its influence on the creation of definitions form 
the major focus of the next chapter, the secularization of Sanskrit is necessarily 
addressed here, in the context of how scholars have attempted to locate attributes 
and associations that would account for its literary and cultural profile. 
To this end, we begin with the dialectics involved in the identification of 
Sanskrit and Brahmanism, considering the historical basis of this identification 
and its invocation in response to the conflict that has become synonymous with 
religious nationalism and identity politics in the Indian nation. These 
characterizations of Brahmanical culture are not only literary – being drawn from 
Sanskrit texts, vocabulary, and themes, and shaped to fit the paradigms of modern 
literary criticism – but are self-reflexively so, caught in a feedback loop in which 
standing notions of Brahmanical social agenda cast a shadow on the primary texts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Charsley 1998. 
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from which such notions are ostensibly extrapolated. We then turn to 
sociolinguistic perspectives, and discuss the authoritative materials adduced in the 
effort to account for the circumstances surrounding the diglossic binary between 
Sanskrit and Prakrit as reflected not only in the grammatical and poetic, but also 
epigraphic traditions. These considerations of what is taken to constitute 
authoritative evidence, alongside the scholarly renegotiation of traditional claims 
for Vedic infallibility, lead us to an examination of the wider impacts of the 
modern intellectual secularization of language on our understanding of middle to 
late Vedic social developments, particularly the rejection of Sanskrit by the early 
Buddhist and Jain communities as an impetus behind the increasingly 
conservative demands of orthodox Brahmanism. Following this, we conclude 
with some final reflections on how the inclusion of materials and cultural 
considerations that typically go unaddressed have the potential to expand the 
parameters currently assigned to Sanskrit in historical perspective. 
 
 
The Language of the Gods 
 
Until relatively recently, the study of Sanskrit by Western-trained scholars has 
been characterized by the internal division of the vast and diverse array of texts 
composed in the language into smaller areas of specialization in accordance with 
considerations such as chronology, textual typology or genre, affiliation, and 
discipline. While altogether these studies generate a comprehensive picture of the 
language and its materials, a lack of intra-disciplinary dialogue within the 
philology-based tradition of Indology has allowed certain dimensions of 
Sanskrit’s broader history as a cultural phenomenon to go largely unaddressed 
until now. One of these – called by Renou “le grande paradoxe linguistique de 
l’Inde”5 – is the fact that, after being almost entirely absent from the epigraphic 
record for the first three centuries of literacy in India, Sanskrit exploded onto the 
cultural scene as a fully-fledged literary language, a mode of non-sacral 
employment for which no earlier evidence exists. The detailed examination of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Renou 1956: 84. 
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this issue, which has arguably become influenced by the particulars of Sheldon 
Pollock’s approach to literary criticism, identifies two momentous 
transformations in the structural formation of culture and power in premodern 
India and asks how “newness entered the world” in each of the historical events 
examined, namely, the reinvention of Sanskrit from a highly restricted sacred 
language to “a code for literary and political expression” around the turn of the 
Common Era, and its challenging and eventual displacement by the raising of 
local dialects to languages of poetry and polity in the early centuries of the second 
millennium.6 Such critique of the dialectical relationship between poetics and 
politics, kāvya and rājya, appropriates the theory of Sanskritization from its origin 
in the fieldwork-based practice of social anthropology for the purposes of an 
historical reconstruction that instead relies heavily upon modernist themes, 
especially as respond to the event of European vernacularisation, in a marked 
shift of emphasis away from the close documentation of empirical materials.7 In 
another development of the concept as it was first outlined in the works of M. N. 
Srinivas, Pollock’s approach also moves from the treatment of Sanskritization as 
a confluence of historical processes that were, and are, by no means strictly 
identified with Brahmins, to a theoretical framing of Sanskrit in history as a 
secular institution.8 This relocation of cultural significance, or attempt to retrieve 
such significance in isolation from cultural understandings of language’s 
metaphysical dimensions, resonates with a broader tendency toward 
secularization and the mainstream abandonment of questions of ontology in 
academic studies of language outside of theology. It is possible to ask, however, 
whether a theory of Sanskrit based in the twin characteristics of ritualization and 
discursive monopolization can realistically produce a comprehensive and 
balanced history of the same when undertaken in isolation from the study of 
South Asia’s religious culture.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Pollock 2006: 1; also 2003, 2005. See Bronner, Cox, and McCrea eds. 2011; Gould 2008; 
Hatcher 2007. 
7 Pollock (2006: 33) criticizes “philology in general and Indology in particular” for the failure to 
engage theory as part of the examination of empirical materials. 
8 Srinivas 2002: 200-235; also Charsley 1998. 
9 Pollock 2006: 39-40. 
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 Considered from the vantage of the present, the formal edifice known as 
Sanskritic tradition stands in contrast to, though not in isolation from, the 
astonishing diversity of languages, texts, and practices that account for the major 
part of South Asia’s ambient cultural environment. As such, the aesthetic and 
intellectual commitments – or constraints – that are identified with the 
employment of Sanskrit are now treated by many as a control against which to 
critique the accuracy of both traditional and traditionalist depictions, emic and 
etic alike, of an authoritative Sanskritic monoculture. Whilst thus becoming a 
point of intellectual debate with a seemingly unavoidable political thrust, the 
attempt to piece together a neutral picture of Sanskrit in context has opened the 
doors to new directions in scholarship that benefit from increasing levels of cross-
disciplinary interaction, brought into dialogue with both classical Sanskritic 
discourse on language and non-classical evidence of other modes of practice. If, 
however, a prerequisite feature of most such studies is their renegotiation of the 
place of Brahmin intellectuals in the creation of a cultural hegemony composed in 
Sanskrit and founded upon its formidable pedigree, then the question that 
immediately arises is one of how the religious status of this language is 
interpreted and engaged with, firstly, in light of its larger equation with the self-
interests and ideologies of those socially privileged by varṇa; secondly, as 
inseparable from procedures of textual analysis; and thirdly, with respect to its 
relationship to a far broader set of concerns and practices than those encompassed 
within the parameters of classical orthodox culture. 
The evidence that provides the historical backdrop to this equation and 
brings the issue of Brahmanical involvement into full view is so well known as to 
not require detailed recounting here, but may rather be summarized as a matter of 
mutual exclusivity and self-limitation: as the right to engage in yajña was 
coterminous with the right to study the hymns, let alone the language, from which 
yajña was considered fundamentally inseparable, the Vedic texts establish the 
nucleus of what has become a persistent link between intellectual authority, 
Sanskrit, and the control of knowledge. Discussing the orthodox Brahmanical 
stratification of society into varṇas, the four-tiered hierarchy for which the 
indigenous tradition locates a cosmological origin in the form of the Puruṣasūkta 
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(Ṛgveda [ṚV] 10.90), but for which the opposite order of historical precedence 
may be nearer the case,10 Brian K. Smith presents the critical view succinctly: 
 
a classification system like that of varṇa is ultimately the invention of a 
specific group of people whose power and privilege were in part based on 
their very ability to “seize the enunciative function” (as Michel Foucault 
might say) and expatiate on how the universe is organized. But more than 
this, since human beings are themselves inevitably implicated in their own 
classificatory schemes, those who generated the categorical system also 
placed themselves in an advantageous position within it. I assume, in other 
words, a social and political dimension to a classificatory system which is 
presented as pure knowledge.11 
 
Thus the concern with the programmatic perfection of yajña extends fully and 
paradigmatically through these associations and demonstrates clearly a set of 
relationships which spiral between the sacred and the social, entangling matters of 
perspective as they go: varṇa is an ontological reality revealed in the Veda and 
can only be truly known by one who has a deep understanding of Vedic language, 
which, now according to the exclusivism encoded in varṇa, means only by a 
Brahmin. Given the circularity of the orthodox claim for Vedic infallibility in 
contrast with the empirically retrievable impacts of caste on social equality, varṇa 
is attributed neither intrinsic nor extrinsic validity, but rather acquires 
significance within the socio-political sphere where it is subject to modern 
notions of rationality and sits radically, unnegotiably at odds with contemporary 
ethical standards. Herein, the association between religion and hierarchy is 
conceived of as an invention playing into the distribution of power and influence 
in society while the converse association between hierarchy and religion is seen 
to reinforce the elitism, and even artificiality, of yajña. This allows traditional 
religious materials that draw upon or otherwise anticipate the authenticity of 
Brahmanical formulations to be readily interpreted as heading toward a single, 
secular goal.12 
Setting aside for a moment the question of the internal validity of a 
correlation between Sanskrit and cultural power, its outward appearance as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See discussion of the interpretation of this hymn in Brereton and Jamison 2014: 1538 (vol. 3). 
11 B. Smith 1994: 4. 
12 For example, see Heesterman 1985 and 1993; also Houben 2004: 385-393 
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contested ideology is strongly suggested by the fact that when alternative voices 
do begin to emerge in the historical record, around the 5th century BCE, they are 
voices of social and metaphysical dissent speaking Middle Indo-Aryan languages 
in the public domain, thus forwarding an argument against the Brahmins’ closed 
ritual world that is simultaneously and substantially an argument against the 
metaphysical underpinnings of the Vedic language itself. As the stark contrasts 
perceived in this differing employment of language cannot be separated from the 
presumed interactions between religious figures, such as priests and ascetics, and 
the wider community, a picture of the sociality of Sanskrit appears in which its 
monopolization of the ritual domain is matched by its isolation from the real 
world of ordinary human experience. Following this, the question of a 
relationship between the interests that occupy the priestly texts of the Vedic 
canon and the culture of the period has more often than not been answered in the 
negative; these texts, it appears, like their later śāstric counterparts, are not in a 
position to give reliable insights into the way that people perceived their world.13 
While the issue of these late Vedic disagreements and the possibilities of a 
different interpretation is returned to below, it also needs to be noted here that to 
the further extent that the later Brahmanical traditions position the Vedic 
language as eternally and incontrovertibly independent of human activity, 
Sanskrit’s sacred and social roles in history become quite tidily conflated. More 
precisely, at the same time as the early sacerdotal culture of Sanskrit is identified 
as the backdrop to its later emergence into the public spheres of literature and the 
aestheticization of political power, a binary interplay between laukika and 
alaukika, this-worldly and other-worldly, comes to retrospectively delineate the 
interpretative parameters surrounding the Vedic revelation. 
 
Literature, Religion, and Politics 
 
In its recreation as a scholarly category, Sanskrit has been structured along 
secular lines in an approach that generates a profile restricted to what can be 
mapped through historical analysis, and in doing so implicates certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Pollock 2006: 49-50; Deshpande 1993. 
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understandings of what is meaningful about the human relationship to language. 
Although in keeping with broader hermeneutic developments in the modern 
approach to linguistic analysis (discussed below in relation to sociolinguistics), 
this has the effect of making its cultural significance available to examination in 
isolation from its religious coherence – and creates a challenging interpretative 
scenario in which the success of attempts to undermine the authoritative self-
representations of Sanskrit literary culture depend in large degree upon the very 
reinforcement of its religious gravitas. Put otherwise, rather than producing 
information that pushes toward a reconsideration of Sanskrit’s elitism by 
tempering the epistemological desiderata of Sanskritic intellectualism against its 
employment in a variety of non-elite practices, these depictions simultaneously 
reify the elite status of the language and bring its integrity into question as a 
phenomenon involved in the establishment and enforcement of human inequality. 
This is particularly evidenced in hard-line critiques of Sanskrit from the 
perspective of religious nationalism and identity politics in the events of the 
modern Indian nation. An exemplary instance of this approach is offered by 
Robert King, who asserts: 
 
[There is] a significant fact about language on the subcontinent that 
enlarges its role as mischief maker in south Asia. What is alluded to here 
is what one might call the spiritual importance of language in South 
Asia… 
 There is hardly any force in human society more tricky than 
religion. If language is perceived in folk consciousness to be “endowed 
with religious purpose,” then language becomes a force that touches 
people in secret and dangerous places. This quasi-religious role of 
language easily turns what could be a rational, unemotional discussion 
about, say, whether newly independent India should be divided into 
linguistic states into a bitter, protracted, and tormented struggle.14 
 
Despite the explicitly modern tenor of the conflict identified, King connects these 
observations on modern South Asian language politics to a far older phenomenon 
that he describes as Aryanization, or the “imposition of the Sanskrit language and 
Aryan religious and cultural practices [carried] out through the use of Sanskrit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 King 2008: 313. 
	   21	  
and Prakrit rather than the local dialect.” 15  Although not offering detailed 
information about his sources, King’s reference to “religious and cultural 
practices” seems to point beyond the canonical languages associated with the 
dissemination of Brahmanism, Buddhism, and Jainism, as also the formalization 
of traditions of Hinduism, to a linguistic classification established by the early 
thinkers of the grammatical and exegetical traditions, in which Sanskrit and 
Prakrit are positioned as the opposite poles of a linguistic spectrum arranged 
around the capacity of language to activate or reveal dharma in the context of 
ritual activity. 16  By the turn of the Common Era, this classification had 
commenced upon the track to its literary apotheosis as a formal typology of the 
few languages in which kāvya could be produced, and the Sanskrit imaginaire 
thereby participated in.17 From the point of view of the modern commonsense 
assumption of a universal poetic potential and right to literary participation, the 
restriction around kāvya registers as an ethical aberration in its non-recognition 
and nullification of the participatory status of both the developing vernacular 
traditions and the non-dramatic Prakrits, namely, Pali and Ardhamāgadhī.18 
 Although it is not difficult to see how the alternatively validating and 
proscriptive outcomes of these traditional classifications of language appear to 
bear traces of an embedded Vedic episteme, King’s assessment merges the 
anthropological categories of elite and folk in its correlation of Sanskritic 
discourses with what it depicts as an irrational sentimentality surrounding 
language in the modern South Asian populace generally. Rather than pointing to 
Sanskrit’s inflammatory role as a tool of exclusion, King implies that inherited 
religious views of language have been extended to modern linguistic groups and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid.: 314. 
16 See the introduction to Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya, Paspaśā 12-13 (Bhattacharyya 1991); also 
Jaimini’s Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.5 (Jha 1916) and 2.1.1 with Śabara’s commentary (Josi 1971-
80). 
17 I follow the discussion of ‘imaginaire’ in Collins 1998: 73-78. For examples of formal 
classifications of language in the early tradition of Alaṅkāraśāstra, I refer the reader to the 
typologies by Daṇḍin, Kāvyādarśa 1.32-38 (Belvakar and Raddi 1920) and Dhanaṃjaya, 
Daśarūpa 2.97-99ab (Haas 1962). Bhāmaha’s classification is paradigmatic of the early Sanskrit 
poetic tradition; see Kāvyālaṅkāra 1.16: śabdārthau sahitau kāvyaṃ gadyaṃ padyaṃ ca tad 
dvidhā / saṃskṛtaṃ prākṛtaṃ cānyad apabhraṃśa iti tridhā // Reproduced from Rama Sastri 1956. 
18 Pollock 2006: 64: “When the Sanskrit theoreticians inform us that kāvya is composed in three 
languages, they mean what they say: three languages alone are fit for literary expression, and 
others are not.” 
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are thereby more than superficially involved in the ongoing conflict that 
surrounds the question of what authentically constitutes Indian identity. With 
respect to working assumptions, this interpretation implicates a highly specific 
notion of language that privileges its modern conceptualization, foremost as an 
arbitrary referential system and medium of communication, whose ideal practical 
employment is rational to the degree of transcending any relation to a socially 
delimited identity and, at the very least, is treated as prospectively and universally 
value-neutral – an attainment which would place communication beyond either 
ideological distortion or deformation through the exercise of power.19 
A defining feature of Sanskrit to its critical observers is the appropriation 
of texts and vocabulary in what Viswesaran et. al. describe as “the construction of 
a history that renders India as “Hindu,” and collapses the distinction between 
history and religious myth.”20 While many of the events and reforms related to 
this historicist reinvention of India’s past have been sufficiently dramatic to 
capture attention globally, a number of scholars have drawn focus to the insidious 
dimensions of political sectarianism inspired by hindutva – “Hindu-ness” – the 
central ideology of the Sangh Parivar, or collective of Hindu nationalist 
organizations (a point that may be illustrated by these modern Sanskritizations 
themselves). In the words of Nandini Sundar: “The Sangh’s appeal lies in its 
ability to conceal its own warped and petty version of Hinduism within Hindu 
culture at large.”21 With respect to this picture of a manipulation of Indian identity 
achieved through education reforms centred in the rewriting of curricula and 
introduction of state-level policies disfavouring the subcontinent’s heterogeneous 
Muslim, Christian, and ādivāsī (indigenous) communities, Sanskrit is now 
instrumental to a “language heist” – to paraphrase Arundhati Roy – that 
marginalises all who do not fit the Sangh Parivar’s vision of Aryan origins.22 To 
the extent that such deployment of the language correlates with the tendency of 
political secularism to “institute a social and political grammar that works against 
the flourishing of precisely those forms of religion that should be preferred by all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 J. Thompson 1981: 182-213. 
20 Visweswaran et. al. 2009: 103. 
21 Sundar 2004: 1611. 
22 Roy 2009: 37. 
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who oppose communal strife and religion-based varieties of violence and 
injustice,” Sanskrit’s modern role in the suppression of religious freedom and 
positive inter-faith dialogue is clear.23 
If this entanglement in current religious affairs can make the issue of 
Sanskrit’s documentation and analysis relatively straightforward for those with a 
focus on modern political ideologies, for Sanskritists and scholars of the history 
of religion it can equate to an inherent collision of perspectives that raises the 
predicament of how – and whether – to respond.24  In a discussion of the 
Rāmāyaṇa, the text that has arguably received the greatest attention as a source of 
Hindu nationalist appropriation following its role as a legitimizing symbol in the 
events leading up to the anti-Muslim riots that swept across India from December 
1992 to January 1993, Pollock has stated that it “not easy…to sustain a claim for 
literary-critical or historiographical intervention in the face of problems that are 
not, in fact, literary critical or historiographical but something else… One should 
think that our target should be the “denunciation-text” rather than the object-text 
to which the former refers by what are often most tenuous representations.”25 He 
continues: 
 
If the grand Rāmāyaṇa continues to be a language of mythopolitics – not 
because it is inherently such a language but because there is now a history 
of its doing that specific symbolic work – available for encoding the 
pained forces of xenophobia and theocracy, one way to begin to neutralize 
those forces is through analysis of the construction and function of such a 
meaning system, and of its contemporary redeployment.26 
 
The response described here is characterised by a broadening of focus, from the 
internalist study of texts as autonomous contexts, to the study of texts through the 
history of their representation and appropriation over time and in connection to 
modes of expression that empower and disempower alternately. Because this 
“new kind of historical understanding and genealogy of Sanskrit”27 sees the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Sikka 2012: 289. 
24 For a comprehensive outline of the various terms and dimensions of this conflict, see Nussbaum 
2007: 211-263. 
25 Pollock 2003b: 292. 
26 Ibid.: 293. 
27 Dirks 2011: xiii; Gould 2008; cf. F. Smith 2006b and Gellner 2008. 
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desacralization of the language as prerequisite to the formation of a Sanskrit 
cosmopolis – i.e., the premodern Sanskrit imaginaire in its geopolitical 
dimensions – such interpretations build primarily upon kāvya and the 
aestheticization of power, and pay little attention to the spread of soteriological 
practices and perspectives that give Sanskrit another kind of ontological value 
and cultural appeal.28  
In Simona Sawhney’s literary critical study The Modernity of Sanskrit, the 
author’s focus on the play of such aesthetics in events driven by religio-
nationalist agenda, in particular, the devastating violence that hallmarked the 
destruction of the sixteenth-century Babrī Masjid in the Ram Janma Bhoomi 
(“Birth-ground of Ram”) conflict, and the framing of such events as a reclamation 
of the utopian Ayodhyā, leads her to the observation that “nothing has been so 
detrimental to the life of Sanskrit literature in our times as the appropriation of 
the Sanskrit tradition by Hindu nationalists.”29 In this respect, however, Sawhney 
takes a harder line than others, asserting that this appropriation should be seen as 
nothing more than a “reinstatement of Sanskrit as the mark of orthodoxy” because 
“as we know, Sanskrit has always carried the stamp of orthodoxy; it might be 
more appropriate to say that it is the stamp of orthodoxy.”30 Sawhney explains 
this interpretation by invoking the existence of an epistemological taxonomy – 
none other than the comparative characterization of Sanskrit and Prakrit 
forwarded by the early grammarians and Vedic exegetes – which, she argues, has 
enabled the ostensibly divine and eternal Sanskrit language to remain shielded 
from the movement of history in a way that has made it readily available 
throughout history as an instrument with which to shape and legitimize competing 
and compelling historical narratives. 31  It is thus Sanskrit’s traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Pollock 1996: 199: “Constituted by no imperial power or church but in large part by a 
communicative system and its political aesthetic, the Sanskrit ecumene is characterized by a 
transregionally shared set of assumptions about the basics of power, or at least about the ways in 
which power is reproduced at the level of representation in language, and Sanskrit’s unique 
suitability for this task.” 
29 Sawhney 2009: 5. For a discussion of Ayodhyā as an imaginary landscape of irrevocably 
sociopolitical consequences, see Lutgendorf 1997. 
30 Sawhney 2005: 5; emphasis original. 
31 Sawhney 2009: 7. Cf. Pollock 1989: 610: “History…is not simply absent or unknown in 
Sanskritic India; rather, it is denied in favour of a model or “truth” that accorded history no 
epistemological value or social significance.” Pollock here argues that, by denying the historical 
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cosmological status as much as its employment in the hands of modern politicians 
that is assigned responsibility for these recent violations of human rights. 
Sawhney concludes: 
 
Today, when these texts elicit attention, they elicit not reading as much as 
passion: the love of those who are driven by fidelity to an origin, for 
whom Sanskrit becomes a prop in the staging of a violent drama of 
cultural continuity, and the hatred of all those to whom both origin and 
history appear as a relentless saga of injustice. Indeed, the very question of 
what India is – a question that has, from the moment of its first murmur, 
given rise to not only unease and disagreement but also repeated horrific 
violence – is deeply connected to the status and place of Sanskrit texts in 
the live of the modern nation.32 
 
Where the epistemological agenda of the Brahmanical intellectual and 
philosophical traditions are given precedence over the culture and concerns 
demonstrated by sacred texts, it is not unusual to find the Sanskrit corpus 
represented in total, across both time and genre, as monocultural and preoccupied 
with the singular aim of instilling control. This tends to be a persistent theme in 
studies that rely on śāstras as indicators of Sanskrit’s authoritative involvement in 
social formations, and is a predilection not only of colonial-era narratives, but 
also and significantly of critical, post-colonial historiographies that aim to reveal, 
and thereby destabilize, the discourses tied to Sanskrit by spotlighting the actual 
terms of its sociality.33 As described by Gould, an enthusiastic supporter of this 
methodology, such scholarship is “devoted to examining the naturalization of 
stark power differentials by the śāstric texts of much Sanskrit Brahmanical 
tradition.” 34  To whatever degree these affiliations between language and 
formations in cultural power are borne out by the textual and linguistic 
taxonomies of Sanskrit’s intellectual traditions, or indeed by the geopolitical 
patterns underscoring the spread of the language through Southeast Asia during 
the Common Era, the point remains that these treatments of Sanskrit as an overtly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
transformation of the past, the vision of ahistoricity that underscores Pūrvamīmāṃsā’s 
interpretation of Vedic language thereby denies historical transformations for the future, and thus 
serves “to naturalize the present and its asymmetrical relations of power.”  
32 Sawhney 2009: 5. 
33 See comments in Rao, Shulman, and Subrabrahmanyam 2007: 415-416, 422. 
34 Gould 2008: 538. 
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sociopolitical entity have been disinclined to consider it through the prism of 
religion as a metaphysical phenomenon of intrinsic validity, rather than as an 
imposing institution that constrains and disqualifies an equality of expression. 
Such evaluations of Sanskrit do not consider its influence in the lives of 
countless millions who have a positive and personal relationship to the language, 
engaging with it in aesthetic, devotional, contemplative, ascetic, and other 
affective and transformative ways in the composition of a community of people 
whose history of relating to Sanskrit too can be mapped across more than three 
millennia. The difficulty here is that, in allowing sociopolitical interpretations to 
speak for the coextension between language and belief, Sanskrit’s cultural 
specificity and significance must be sought in its secular uses, and whatever else 
this picture holds to give Sanskrit its internal coherence and enduring appeal is 
lost from sight. Thus, while the convergence of traditional śāstric and peculiarly 
postmodern concerns helps illumine an undeniably important strand of Sanskrit’s 
history, we are yet forced to ask whether this is only one strand in the story and 
not a comprehensive history of the same. Furthermore, while it is true that many 
of Sanskrit’s sacred texts are Brahmanical and, as such, prioritize normativity, 
they also display evidence of historically situated and widespread cultural 
epistemes that firstly indicate their situating in – and not above – the laukika 
practices of South Asian religious culture, and secondly insist upon different 
ways of reading the language that gives these texts their form and vitality in 
practice.35 
Determining the reasons for which mid-Vedic worldviews are seen not as 
worldviews but as heavily ritualized institutional configurations is an unavoidable 
part of this study. It is only by exploring the dialectics involved in the divide 
between viewing language as the substance of ideology and viewing language as 
an intrinsic component of a dynamic cosmology that the ground is set for 
understanding the context of the question “what is Sanskrit?” 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See discussion in F. Smith 2006a: 13. 
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The Relevance of Grammar: Sociolinguistic Interpretations 
 
Viewed through the lens of methodology and its conceptual underpinnings, 
language presents itself as the logical object of investigations into a wide array of 
specifically human concerns by lending form to phenomena that evade structured 
analysis.36 Although certain questions are raised by the fact that a condition of 
such language-centred study has been the separation of language from 
subjectivity, the legitimacy of the apparent relationship of language to social 
power and its formations is commonly accepted. Language is here seen not only 
as the medium through which ideas about reality or society or human worth are 
articulated, but as the means by which those ideas come to be disseminated and 
realized in the actual organization of a people, with the learned practices 
surrounding language – grammar, etymology, poetics, and so on – holding a 
determinative position in a culture’s ideational and pragmatic modes of self-
expression. Rather than pursuing the elusive matters of how sensory experience 
informs what a language means to its people or how language itself exists in an 
ontological sense prior to its breaking down into analysable units, it is thus the 
correlation between internal linguistic characteristics and the external 
circumstances of how and by whom it is employed that generates a sociolinguistic 
picture of Sanskrit’s cultural significance. 
 While there is an absence of evidence to indicate that prior to its 
emergence from the ritual sphere Sanskrit functioned as anything other than a 
sacred language,37 it is in broad agreement with the conceptualization of language 
just outlined that the term saṃskṛta has also come to facilitate the development of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Harpham 2002: 235-236: “Not worth thinking about but excellent to think with, the unqualified 
term language commends itself to us primarily as a proxy for a host of concerns, questions, and 
anxieties – our position in the order of things, our rights and obligations, our relation to law, our 
beginnings and ends, the relations between faith and knowledge, the scope of our agency, the 
extent of our responsibilities, the origin of evil, the sexual divide (the Word as “he,” the “phallic” 
signifier), the laws of our being – that otherwise frustrate the desire for a formulation that would 
satisfy rationalist sensibilities.” 
37  With respect to epigraphy, Salomon follows Burrow (1955: 59) in cautioning that the 
inscriptional evidence for the early period gives “a very one-sided picture of the contemporary 
linguistic conditions” and asserts “Sanskrit was always, even when the use of Prakrit was most 
flourishing, the primary literary language of India” (1998: 94). Pollock (2006: 48) offers an 
opposing perspective, stating “it is not easy to believe that virtually every scrap of early evidence 
of such a [non-sacral] usage has been lost.” 
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a perspective that sees the restricted status of Sanskrit carried over into its 
worldly employments. The likelihood of this continuity has been reinforced by 
the close linguistic similarity between so-called Classical Sanskrit, the language 
described as saṃskṛta (“completely formed, perfected”) by the emergent literary 
milieu, and the earlier language known as Vedic, which the ritual texts 
themselves refer to simply as vāc (“speech, language”). Houben’s account of 
Sanskrit gives a clear description of the historical dimensions involved in 
sociolinguistic assessment, and is paradigmatic in taking the Common Era 
associations of saṃskṛta as sufficient explanation of its gravitas in the religious 
worldview: 
 
Unlike most other language names, the name ‘Sanskrit’ is not the name of 
a people or country or nation. The name saṃskṛta, which literally means 
“polished, well-formed”, points to its socio-linguistic position throughout 
the ages: it was the cultured language of the well-educated, of the social 
and religious elite. The term Sanskrit properly applies to the regulated 
language which developed some centuries after Pāṇini’s grammar. By 
extension, however, it refers to the closely related earlier forms of Old-
Indo-Aryan which are used in the Vedic texts.38  
 
This assessment exemplifies the determinative influence of the parameters within 
which modern approaches to language are conducted. By separating language 
from subjectivity – in phenomenological terms, meaning from being – saṃskṛta is 
addressed purely as an adjectival description that denotes the identity of the 
Sanskrit language relative to the social positioning of those with whom its 
employment is most immediately associated. 
 It is in this respect that Vyākaraṇa’s attractiveness to sociopolitical 
reconstructions of South Asian society goes beyond the glimpses it offers of 
Sanskrit in relation to other languages in the wider, non-ritual environment (a 
vantage point that does not appear in either revelatory texts or those pertaining to 
the mastery of liturgical skills). Rather, through their reiteration of the 
grammatical refinement of the ritual language and the discursive restrictions 
placed around its employment, the major texts of the early grammatical tradition 
are seen to make available a further selection of data with which to point out that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Houben 1997: 53. 
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Sanskrit has long been used to put a rational face on irrational beliefs. Here again, 
because the question of whether saṃskṛta indicates a veridical phenomenon is not 
considered, and the possibility of a correspondence in sense between Vedic and 
later employments of the term not explored, the religious gravity of the language 
is readily subordinated to its social appearances. This section attempts to address 
the issue of whether the modern interpretation of these restrictions can in fact 
maintain the objectivity of its primary focus – the self-representation of 
Vyākaraṇa – once religious validity is taken out of consideration. 
 The Paspaśā or introductory section of the Mahābhāṣya, Patañjali’s 
“Great Commentary” on the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, is the primary textual basis 
used by modern scholars in the retrieval of early sociolinguistic attitudes within 
the orthodox Sanskrit tradition. Evidence of these attitudes is typically sought in 
the form of assertions comparing the merit of the grammatical speech (śabda) 
used in ritual over against the ungrammatical or fallen speech (apaśabda) 
common in demotic practice. The appearance of these assertions is also often 
taken to be indicative of Patañjali’s cultural positioning relative to historical 
events, such as the emergence of Buddhism and Jainism, in the centuries before 
the turn of the Common Era and shortly prior to the first employments of Sanskrit 
as a literary language. In many regards, then, Patañjali appears as the last arbiter 
of the vaidika grammatical tradition: not only is it in the Mahābhāṣya that we find 
preserved the Vārttika of his predecessor, Kātyāyana, which lends a multi-storied 
quality to Patañjali’s scrutiny of his inherited tradition, but this scrutiny is 
coloured by its composer’s singular focus on ritual performance. This latter 
characteristic exemplifies both Patañjali’s description of grammar as belonging to 
the six auxiliary sciences of the Veda (ṣaṭsu aṅgeṣu vyākaraṇam) and 
distinguishes his interests from the variety of sectarian matters at play in later 
grammatical works.39 
 Considered together with statements such as that, in his time, the earlier 
practice of learning grammar before studying the Veda had lost favour, the 
guiding principle of Patañjali’s arguments for the study of grammar (“Grammar 
is to be studied for the sake of the preservation of the Vedas,” rakṣārthaṃ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Paspaśā 3 (Kielhorn 1962). 
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vedānām adheyaṃ vyākaraṇam40) seems to indicate an original, emic connection 
between the intellectual content and ideological purpose of the Mahābhāṣya. 
While the precise historical dynamics of the Mahābhāṣya’s surrounding 
environment cannot be reconstructed on the basis of the textual evidence 
available, what is clear is that the language which Patañjali and Kātyāyana 
consider to be the object of grammar, śabda, is a textual language of recitation 
and transmission whose sphere of application is said to be the magnificent 
universe with its seven divisions of the earth and three worlds – but the extent of 
which is comprised solely of Sanskrit knowledge, namely, the fourfold Veda 
together with the auxiliary sciences and the esoteric knowledge of the priests, the 
dialogue portions of the Vedic canon, historical narratives and accounts, and 
medical learning.41  Quotidian applications of śabda are notably absent, and 
references to those known as śiṣṭas – educated Brahmins, and quite probably 
priests, whose close familiarity with Vedic language makes them reliable guides 
to correct usage – are ambiguous evidence at best for a spoken form of the 
language. 
In addition to these delineations characterising śabda, Patañjali and 
Kātyāyana further distinguish grammatical language by its elevation (abhyudaya) 
of the speaker in equal measure to what is stated in Vedic passages and in 
accordance with the dharma, an unseen esoteric outcome, contained in the 
knowledge of grammatical forms.42 This distinction is confirmed by the equation 
of ācāre niyamaḥ, a restriction in regard to procedure, with yājñe karmaṇi, 
sacrificial activity.43 But should it be taken to mark a discursive restriction in 
Brahmanical society, developing in reaction to external pressures, responding to a 
diminished social relevance of Sanskrit, and instantiating the suppression of 
Prakrit languages and literatures? In this matter, many scholars proceed in their 
analysis from the fact that the restrictions around śabda are elucidated not only by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ibid. 
41 Paspaśā 12: mahān hi śabdasya prayogaviṣayaḥ / saptadvīpā vasumatī trayaḥ lokāḥ catvāraḥ 
vedaḥ sāṅgaḥ sarāhasyaḥ…vākovākyam itihāsaḥ purāṇaṃ vaidyakam iti etāvān śabdasya 
prayogaviṣayaḥ / 
42 Paspaśa 13. 
43 Paspaśā 13, line 49: yat api ucyate ācāre niyamaḥ iti yājñe karmaṇi saḥ niyamaḥ / In this 
instance, Bhattacharyya (1991) gives the alternative reading: …yājñe karmaṇi saḥ niyamo 
’nyatrāniyamaḥ / 
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what they include but by what they deny, namely, the possibility that 
ungrammatical forms (apaśabda) might be positively related to dharma, and 
thence that those who speak ungrammatically might be subject to elevation 
(abhyudaya) through language. The tendency here is to read deeply into these 
apparent prohibitions by postulating alignments between apaśabda and Prakrit, 
and between those who do not possess grammatical acuity and the vast majority 
of the ancient Indian population.44 
Deshpande presents an archetypal instance of how a thesis based on such 
interpretations can become reliant upon the generation of historical perspectives 
that are only tendentiously supported by primary source material and which, in 
fact, can even obscure the consistency of this material’s internal logic.45 The 
observable pattern of distinction between śabda and apaśabda, and the 
qualification that this distinction based on dharma is only tenable within the 
context of the activities of yajña, is thus given a boost by Deshpande, who 
suggests that Patañjali’s grammar should be understood on the terms of its 
underscoring by social agenda. It is in accordance with this methodology that the 
establishment of Sanskrit within a sphere that is markedly narrower than that of 
the ungrammatical forms used in worldly communication is seen not to indicate a 
veridical co-extension of Sanskrit with the sacred, but as a testimony to conflict 
between the speakers of these apparently different languages. Deshpande 
summarizes: 
 
From even a casual reading of the Mahābhāṣya, a fact clearly emerges, 
namely that there was a fierce competition between Sanskrit and Prakrit, 
and that in this competition the Prakrit had already surpassed Sanskrit as 
the language of the world (loka). Under these circumstances, the Sanskrit 
grammarians defended Sanskrit as the language of dharma, rather than as 
a language of worldly communication. The grammarians openly 
acknowledge that the function of communicating meaning is done equally 
well by Sanskrit and Prakrit. However, the grammarians stipulate that one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 This interpretation is not limited to studies of the Mahābhāṣya. While writing on Pāṇini, 
Deshpande (1993: 2) asserts that although “literally the term bhāṣā stands for “language,” in fact, 
it actually refers to the upper-class language, in relation to which other forms of Indo-Aryan and 
non-Aryan languages were viewed as being substandard, as those peoples themselves were placed 
lower in the social hierarchy.”  
45 See Aklujkar 2003: 2: “[Deshpande] provides a good case of how even a very capable and 
conscientious scholar reads the evidence problematically when he reads it under the influence of 
dominant tendencies in present-day Indology.” 
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should communicate by using Sanskrit rather than by using Prakrit. Such a 
restriction is called a dharmaniyama, “a religious restriction,” and further 
Patañjali admitted that such a restriction applied only in the context of 
sacrificial performance.46 
 
As Aklujkar accurately observes in an important contribution to our 
understanding of Vyākaraṇa, one of the difficulties in Deshpande’s interpretation 
lies in his translation of dharma as amounting to religion in the sense of 
institutionalized and rule-bound norms of behaviour, which can then be read 
simply as indication of Brahmanical preoccupations with control and self-
preservation.47 It is of note that the possibilities raised by an alternative reading of 
dharma have not been considered by scholars dealing with the historical aspects 
of Sanskrit grammar; indeed, it appears to be the case that when metaphysical 
explanations are raised at all in this regard, it is the patent etymological link 
between saṃskr̥ta and saṃskāra, ritual purification or initiation, that is turned to. 
Pollock, for example, thus postulates that the sacerdotal associations of the 
language are in “complete harmony with grammar’s self-understanding” because 
Sanskrit “like other instruments or objects of liturgical practice [was] rendered 
and kept ritually pure” as a result of its grammatical segregation.48 Van de 
Walle’s interpretation differs slightly, though it is constructed on similar grounds: 
“puritanism – a ‘sacred’ language should not be tampered with – was [the 
Brahmans’] answer to both the external and internal threats” posed by alternative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Deshpande 1993: 25-26; cf. 1979: 10-11: “Another significant factor involved in this view is 
that Buddhism and Jainism were not only opposed to Vedic religion, but they were also opposed 
to the Sanskrit language in an attempt to undermine the authority of the Brahmins and to align 
themselves with the non-Brahmanical masses. …Only on this hypothesis can we fully understand 
why Kātyāyana claims that only the use of Sanskrit leads to Dharma, while the ‘subnormal’ 
languages lead to Adharma.” Deshpande fails to note Patañjali’s views on this topic: namely, that 
the knowledge of ungrammatical forms does not lead to spiritual demerit but, presumably, is 
neutrally void of dharma. See Paspaśā 13: nanu coktaṃ jñāna dharma iti cet tathādharma iti / na 
eṣo doṣaḥ /…/…śabdaś ca śabdajñāne dharmam āha nāpaśabdajñāne ’dharmam / 
47 Aklujkar 2004: 693-701; 724 n.6. Cf. Van de Walle 1993: 14: “The brahmins, the losers in the 
power game, clung to the ‘brahmanical perspective’ no matter what the socio-political reality 
was…. Furthermore, the prestige the brahmins accorded to Sanskrit was inversely proportional to 
its actual status. The more prominent the Prakrits in public life, the more extreme the views they 
held on Sanskrit.” Van de Walle relies heavily on Deshpande’s interpretation. 
48 Pollock 2006: 45-46. Cardona, who Pollock follows here, explains that the activities of 
grammar were seen as a saṃskāra in two ways: “as a derivational explanation of correct speech 
forms” and “as a purification of speech, since correct speech forms are thereby segregated from 
corrupt ones” (1988: 653-655). 
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cultural developments during this period.49 Whilst acknowledging the exception 
provided by Houben, it is hard not to note that, as in the case of dharmaniyama, 
the recognition of saṃskāra serves the tactical end of contributing to hermeneutic 
agenda other than the retrieval of an emic view; despite its centrality to religious 
practice, it is not accorded integrity independently of external sources of 
meaning.50 
Such interpretations should not, however, be taken to indicate that the 
pursuit of these religious concepts fails to yield convincing evidence of other 
ways of understanding the grammarian’s emphasis on dharma.  Aklujkar notes 
that of the three senses in which this term is used in the Mahābhāṣya, the meaning 
that is most salient to Patañjali’s discussion of dharmaniyama is that of “a 
positive and unseen, non-mundane effect generated by sticking to a norm.”51 
Through a comparative investigation of the Mahābhāṣya and the circa fifth-
century works of Bhartṛhari, and considered also in light of evidence drawn from 
an array of Vedic, grammatical, and exegetical texts, Aklujkar reaches the 
conclusion that dharma is indeed closely bound with the imperatives contained in 
the Veda, but, to the degree that it is something activated by particular 
recommended actions, it does not so much refer to a rigid and instantiated order 
as it does to the cosmological potency thus uncovered.52 Dharma is implicit in 
brahman and kin to ṛta; and from this embedding in the thick complexities of the 
Vedic cosmos, it refers further to both the extramundane properties of objects in 
the physical world and to the Vedic textual injunctions themselves, which are 
seen as extensions of dharma’s world-sustaining quality.53 Aklujkar cautions that 
Patañjali’s references to metaphysical phenomena should not be automatically 
understood as an implication of religious strictures into intellectual texts to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Van de Walle 1993: 14. 
50 Houben 2004: 396-397: “Knowledge of Sanskrit is so closely connected with Vedic ritual, its 
study and performance, that it can be regarded as part of the extended phenotype of Vedic ritual.” 
51 Aklujkar 2004: 693. The other two senses of dharma identified by Aklujkar are (2) what the 
śāstra or agama (viz. Veda) advises one to do; and (3) an attribute, property, or quality. 
52 Ibid.: 701: “In the present context, dharma is spoken of as directly leading to some kind of 
elevation and, indirectly, to attainment of brahman or spiritual liberation (mokṣa). It clearly then 
has the ability, probably dependent on how much of it is acquired and for how long, to affect 
one’s surrounding and one’s own personality or being. It seems to be a force or an unseen item 
resembling energy or potency that is conducive to one’s welfare, particularly spiritual welfare.” 
53 Ibid.: 705-706.	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ends of forcing a sociolinguistic divide when these concepts validly contribute to 
the analytical frame that the Pāṇinian grammarians work within. He asserts: 
 
metaphorical language cannot be avoided at all levels of rigorous logical 
thinking, especially when one is dealing with cosmogony. As for the 
possible impression of ‘sectarian mystic talk,’ we should not allow it to be 
formed simply because entities like dharma and Veda are mentioned. 
Although these entities figure in religio-spiritual discussions, it behooves 
us to explore them for the function they serve in the world of philosophers 
who otherwise appear to be as much given to logic, reasoning, rationality, 
etc., as we or the philosophers from any other tradition.54 
 
The defining feature of dharma for this intellectual context and metaphysical 
worldview would thus be its markedly cosmological status, upon which the ritual 
activities prescribed by the Veda are grounded by extension. 
This observation is accompanied by a perceptible hermeneutic shift from 
treating the Mahābhāṣya in isolation from its object, its objective, and its cultural 
embedding, to preserving the existence claims made in the text and allowing them 
to inform the nuances of interpretation.55 Restated, the approach modelled by 
Aklujkar does not attempt to separate the actual referential meaning of Patañjali’s 
statements from the existence claims which they contain; as such, it is a shift at 
the level of how religious language is conceptualised, rather than a change made 
to philological methods of textual analysis, that permits a statement such as “there 
is dharma in grammatical words and their knowledge” to hold substantial 
nominal integrity.56 Working from within this framework, then, it is possible to 
press forth the following with respect to the vaiyākaraṇas’ characterization of 
grammatical language. Firstly, the category apaśabda, commonly translated as 
ungrammatical or corrupt language, is not confined to Prakrit words but includes 
attested Sanskrit forms.57 The identifications śabda and apaśabda are positioned 
on a single linguistic continuum; and it needs to be noted that the grammarians 
address language at the level of individual word-forms, rather than arguing for 
the existence of a strict and unbridgeable opposition between Sanskrit and Prakrit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ibid. 
55 Paspaśā 4, 11. 
56 The theoretical implications of this shift and its grounding in religious phenomenology are 
discussed at length below. 
57 Bhandarkar 1914; Aklujkar 2004: 713. 
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languages, their speakers and affiliated social echelons. This strongly suggests 
that it is not a binary opposition between Sanskrit and Prakrit that the 
grammarians are concerned with, but a latent and qualitative potential of language 
that is in force when language is śabda. Following this, secondly, there is a lack 
of evidence to indicate that the Brahmanical composers of these texts associated 
Prakrit languages and, by extension, the speakers thereof with spiritual demerit, 
adharma, as asserted by Deshpande. Such distinctions in language are made on 
the soteriological, not social, grounds of what possesses the capacity to activate or 
reveal dharma; and the nature of these grounds and this concern is reinforced by 
an explanation to the effect that seers (ṛṣayaḥ) of the Veda use ungrammatical 
forms of speech (apa-√bhāṣ) quite appropriately and without negative results in 
non-sacral settings, i.e., outside of the immediate context identified by yājñe 
karmaṇi, sacrificial activity.58 
 
 
Religious Language as an Interpretative Context 
 
The emic characteristics of the vaidika grammarians’ treatment of language have 
hermeneutic repercussions that can be imputed immediately into the study of 
Sanskrit’s cultural significance and the approach to India’s ancient religious texts. 
As a preliminary step in this direction, which forms an ever-present undercurrent 
of the following chapters, it is worthwhile considering Aklujkar’s conclusions at 
some length: 
 
…until we have good evidence to stand on, we should not think only in 
terms of self-serving strategies on the part of groups of characters 
populating ancient Indian history. Being hardnosed about the evidence or 
reading between the lines of evidence are procedures that a good historian 
should always practice, but these procedures should not be applied only to 
one group or tradition or by going beyond the contextually supported 
meanings of the words in our evidence. The Pāṇinians’ conception of the 
relationship between grammar and dharma is not as outlandish or self-
servingly brahmanical as it may seem at first. The conception fits quite 
well with the other features of the dominant mode of ancient Indian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Paspaśā 13. 
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intellectual life. This mode is different. It is quite out of fashion in our 
times. But it cannot be inferior just for those reasons. It has not been 
proved that it lacks validity, and it may in fact be the case that we can 
learn something valuable from it.59 
 
This raises two points, which, I argue, are imperative to the advancement of 
modern knowledge about Sanskrit, its textuality, and its evolving interactions 
with other languages and religious communities on the subcontinent. The first is 
that, as a religious language inseparable from practices of self-transformation, the 
metaphysical value of Vedic or Sanskrit derives from more than either a simple 
relationship to the Veda as canon or the high expressivity made possible by 
grammatical sophistication – or the social affiliation with Aryan origins which 
these might suggest. As much as śāstric culture, for example, made full use of 
Sanskrit’s potential for technical minutiae and Vedic associations in its 
establishment of rigorous epistemological standards and prioritization of 
normativity, this is neither representative of the spectrum of ends to which 
Sanskrit has been employed nor exhausts its metaphysical significance in vaidika 
milieux. This observation, together with its concomitant shift of attention to the 
retrieval of what might be termed the indigenous parameters of engagement with 
language (vāc) demonstrated by the Vedic revelatory texts, sets the ground for the 
examination undertaken in the following chapters. 
 With respect to the second point raised by Aklujkar’s conclusion, this 
same change in the way religious language is conceptualized should be extended 
to the employment of Prakrits by Buddhism and Jainism, a key event in India’s 
linguistic history that is often interpreted a sign of resistance to orthodoxy and 
which, therefore, has come to provide the empirical basis on which to 
contextualize Brahmanical characterizations of Vedic language in terms of a 
reaction to social pressures. While it is undeniable that such responses played a 
significant part in the evolution of both Buddhist and Brahmanical self-
identification in the centuries just prior to the Common Era, what has not been 
established is whether a paradigm based on reactivity and mutual exclusion is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Aklujkar 2004: 723. 
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most appropriate backdrop against which to view these cultural developments, or 
even representative of their participants’ most pressing concerns. 
 The notion of a collision of interests grounded in disparate social 
ideologies has long held popularity as a touchstone in the study of Indian society 
during the second urbanization period in the latter half of the first millennium 
BCE, and is portrayed as an inseparable condition of the flourishing of renunciant 
movements that is seen to account for the rise of non-orthodox movements, on 
one hand, and the metaphysical developments represented in the orthodox 
Upaniṣads, on the other. For Bronkhorst, Kulke and Rothermund, and Witzel in 
particular, conflict between Brahmins and Buddhists is not limited to an historical 
event, but rather describes an ancient sociological formation that can first be 
glimpsed in the Brāhmaṇas, the mid-Vedic ritual revelations.60  This approach 
builds upon the concept of a schematic division between two cultural complexes, 
Kuru-Pañcāla and Kosala-Videha, that are respectively characterised by their 
geographical (western, eastern or central gangetic) and social positioning (Vedic, 
non-Brahmanical). More important, however, is the fact that this historiography 
establishes the collision between Buddhist and Brahmanical perspectives in the 
essentializing terms of altogether different cultural origins. As Hopkins describes 
the situation: 
 
To say that there was tension between these two worlds – the non-
Aryan/Buddhist/Jain world on the one hand, and the 
Aryan/Brahmanical/Vedic world on the other – is to understate the case. In 
the sixth century BCE they were really two different world, at least as 
perceived by their main representatives, or perhaps – as seen especially by 
the Brahmans – two opposite worlds.61 
 
Expressing a sentiment that he shares with Bronkhorst, another leading scholar in 
this area of study, Witzel asserts that passages in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa that 
make mention of an eastern culture are not mythological accounts, but records of 
the historical arrival of “Vedic (Kuru-Pañcāla) orthopraxy in the east.” 62 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Bronkhorst 1997; Kulke and Rothermund 1998; Witzel 1997a, b. 
61 Hopkins 1999: 53-54 (unpublished manuscript cited in Samuel 2008: 50).  
62 Witzel 1997a: 311; 1997b: 50-51. The primary sources that Witzel employs are Śatapatha 
Brāhmaṇa 3.2.1.23, 13.8.1.5, and 1.4.1.14-17; he also cites Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa 1.337-338. 
Bronkhorst (2007: 8) sees the latter as evidence of Brahmanical prejudice against the eastern 
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Although these accounts draw attention to the presence of significant historical 
information in texts that have often been portrayed as dealing exclusively with 
ritual minutiae, the practice of searching for articulated points of differentiation 
here obscures the cultural intuitions inherited by Buddhism and Brahmanism 
alike, and which would provide the grounds of a deeper appreciation of the ways 
in which their respective textual practices differ.63 
 Turning now to Buddhist materials, the theory of ideological conflict 
provides one of the two leading explanations for early sentiments against the 
employment of Sanskrit, with the other being that local languages were preferred 
for pragmatic, pedagogic purposes.64 Vinaya Piṭaka II 139 records the Buddha as 
instructing two monks, Brahmins by birth, that his teachings (buddhavacana) 
should not be disseminated in the style of the Veda (chandaso) but using his own 
words or language (sakāya niruttiyā).65 Where this account is notorious for the 
ambiguity of what precisely is intended by the reference to chandas, Vedic 
metrics, Aṅguttara Nikāya I 72-73 66  draws a more evidently pejorative 
comparison between the deeply meaningful sūtras spoken by the Buddha (ye te 
suttantā tathāgathabhāsit gambhīrā gambhīratthā lokuttarā…) and the ornately 
embellished ones crafted by kavis, Vedic poets, and stemming from outsiders (ye 
pana te suttantā kavikatā kāveyyā cittakkharā cittabyañjanā bāhirakā…); 
furthermore, this text states that the superficially seductive power of the latter 
should be avoided by right-thinking people.67 The Bhūridatta Jātaka continues the 
rejection of the Brahmanical use of language and contextualizes it within the 
wider scope of denounced practices, thereby linking what appears to be an 
implicit rejection of Sanskrit vis à vis the speeches (vācā) of the Brahmins to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cultural complex of Magadhā. Kulke and Rothermund (1998: 48-49) similarly see the primary 
sources as recollections of “events of great significance.” 
63 The topic of a shared Indo-Aryan heritage is discussed in DeCaroli 2004; also Samuel 2008: 61. 
64 Houben 1997: 54-55: “[Restrictions on who could perform rites] has given Brahminical [sic] 
culture the conservative outlook which was also reflected in their attitude towards language. The 
Buddhists and the Jainas, on the other hand, were intent on expanding their numbers by 
convincing people to accept their message, which they tried to express in the language of the 
masses.” Although Houben indicates in the direction of a metaphysical explanation for the 
brahmanical adherence to Sanskrit, he does not raise the matter of corresponding metaphysical 
bases for the Buddhist and Jain orientations to language. 
65 Oldenburg 1879-1883. My discussion follows the interpretation of Levman 2008-2009: 39; cf. 
Brough 1996, Hoffman 1992. 
66 Morris and Harvey 1888. 
67 See discussion of attitudes to kavis and kāvya in Middle Indic sources in Jamison 2007: 144. 
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larger diatribe against Brahmanical practices with attention drawn specifically to 
animal sacrifice and the study of the Veda.68 
These early Buddhist sentiments identify the Brahmins’ relationship to the 
Veda as a point of clearly articulated disagreement and back up this position 
through their own literary practices. Following this, it comes as no surprise that 
the differences in Buddhist and Brahmanical self-representation and the practical 
implementation of their respective ideologies should inform the development of 
an hermeneutic binary, nor that this should be drawn upon in literary critical 
studies of Sanskrit.69 Yet it is viable to suggest that given the complexity of 
language from a cosmological perspective – a contention reinforced by the very 
existence of these debates – the Buddhist and Brahmanical arguments involve far 
more than a simple rejection or acceptance of the institutions associated with 
Sanskrit’s sway.70 The issues at stake, prior even to reflecting an humane concern 
with people’s soteriological equality, touch profoundly upon foundational 
metaphysical notions of what constitutes reality. Therefore, given the primacy 
attributed respectively to veda and buddhavacana, it appears that a cornerstone of 
South Asian thinking about revelation is the understanding that language must 
function in fidelity or otherwise conform to the underlying principles that are 
definitive of reality if it is to truly reveal that truth. With respect to Buddhism, 
buddhavacana necessarily embodies the cosmological principles that form the 
vanishing point of the Buddha’s dharma, namely, pratityasamutpāda, dependent 
origination, or the idea that all phenomena continually arise in dependence upon, 
and hence cannot be conceptualized in strict isolation from, other phenomena; 
anātman, “not-self,” which proposes that all phenomena lack any substantial or 
essential dimension of existence, such as a soul or spirit; and anitya, the 
impermanence that results from the absence of an independent, constant, or 
substantial aspect of being that might abide eternally. On this, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Bhūridatta Jātaka 6.924 [VI 213]; see in particular vācā kata giddhikatā gahitā, dummocayā 
kavyāpathānupannā (Fausbøll 1896: 213). 
69 As Pollock (2006: 54-55) states with reference to Vinaya Piṭaka II 139: “The resistance to 
Sanskrit, which had a very rich later history, is perceived for the first time in the Buddha’s 
rejection here.” 
70 Aklujkar 2013: 8, 12-13; see especially his statements on page 12: “It is more instructive that 
the Jain and Buddhist mode of claiming a special status for their canonical languages is 
Brahmanical than the fact that a special status is claimed.” 
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Mahāhatthipadoma Sutta is clear: “One who sees dependent origination sees the 
Dhamma; one who sees the Dhamma sees dependent origination” (yo 
paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati; yo dhammaṃ passati so 
paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passatī ti).71 
To the extent that the Buddha’s revelations must be subject, like 
everything else, to the principles outlined, they must not be mistaken as eternal, 
unchanging, or independent of external influences – the phenomenological 
properties most immediately ascribed to the Veda.72 In the terms of a sheer 
metaphysical imperative, this raises a number of issues of perception, of which a 
few are particularly salient to the present discussion. Firstly, it is ostensible that, 
from the Buddhist perspective, the Brahmanical attitude to Sanskrit was an 
exercise in misplaced faith and mindlessness, encouraging sensory grasping, and 
which ultimately arose from ignorance (avidyā). It seems fitting that the Buddha 
would discourage monastics from teaching the dharma in Sanskrit, especially 
given that a significant percentage of Buddhists comprised converts from the 
Brahmanical community. This point comes into sharper focus when we bear in 
mind the Buddha’s repeated emphasis that it is direct perception, and not 
unquestioning deference to tradition, that gives a teaching authenticity. The 
authority of a teaching or a text is inseparable from the matrix of “right” (Pali: 
sammā) bodily, mental, and verbal behaviours that come together in the 
articulation of a discourse; and these determining factors cannot be learned by 
rote but necessarily rise in dependence upon an individual’s direct experiences of 
the dharma. These concerns do not speak well of the Buddhist apprehension of 
vaidika practices, but they do indicate the existence of a solid metaphysical 
ground for the rejection of Sanskrit, which appears to be rather more complex 
than what is suggested by a sociopolitical interpretation, and also preserves the 
soteriological integrity of the claims made by the Buddhist texts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Majjhima Nikāya I 190-191 (Trenckner and Chalmers 1888-1902) translated in Ñāṇamoli and 
Bodhi 2005: 284. 
72 Cousins 1983: 3: “What is envisaged for sutta is not then a set body of literature, but rather a 
traditional pattern of teaching. Authenticity lies not in historical truth although this is not doubted, 
but rather in whether something can accord with the essential structure of the dhamma as a 
whole.” 
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Secondly, as from the Buddhist perspective of anātman language cannot 
contain any essential core of meaning, the relation between a word and its 
referent is simply a practical matter of social convention and is liable to change, 
both from place to place and over time.73 An extreme degree of flexibility in 
choice of language and the structure of teaching is an upshot of this metaphysical 
position: the matter of which language was used to teach in was simply no matter 
at all, but instead bears upon the notion of skilful means (upāya), which permits 
of a broad range of actions providing they serve the dharma. Again, there is a link 
here between authority and specifically Buddhist soteriology, with the 
relationship between language, meaning, and precision in teaching being 
established upon the prerequisite of direct perception, following which a speaker 
possesses an heightened awareness of their audience and what is needed to ensure 
effective communication. While this orientation contains social values which are 
markedly more egalitarian than the hierarchical structure of varṇa, it is once 
again important to note that the use of regional or vernacular languages reflects 
basic metaphysical premises and is not solely an outcome of reaction to, rejection 
of, and competition with Brahmans. A third point reinforces the significance of 
metaphysical interpretations but introduces a somewhat different dimension: 
Buddhist texts of all time periods, from the conservative Pali canon to the more 
open and fluid Mahāyāna output, contain numerous instances of language as an 
agent in the manifestation of extraordinary powers (siddhi) by consummate 
meditators.74 These ubiquitous references not only attest to a matter in which the 
Buddhist and Brahmanical traditions agreed despite the vast difference in their 
metaphysical views, but make for a significant link between each of these cultural 
juggernauts and the ambient environment within which they were embedded.75 
Indeed, the pan-Indian character of the belief in the power of language – 
alongside widespread practices of affective embodiment, attainment of 
supernatural abilities, and spirit worship/placation – highlights the restrictive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Levman writes: “recognizing that words lacked a center of denotative meaning, [the Buddha’s] 
teachings are a study in circumlocutory play” (2008-2009: 33). See also p. 46: “For [the Buddha] 
words were not eternal and unchangeable as the Veda was for Brahmins; words were simply 
social conventions. His teachings reflect this view, using a “decentered” approach to language 
with synonymic and near-synonymic word repetition being a constant feature of his style.” 
74 Cabezón 2008; Fiordalis 2012. 
75 For example, see discussion in DeCaroli 2004: 15. 
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nature of theoretical models which view Sanskrit and its place in Vedic ritual in 
isolation from phenomena that can be identified as characteristics of South Asian 
religious culture more broadly. 
To this must be added that the evidence provided by Vedic texts – as 
Olivelle has pointed out – does not support the cleaving of India’s ancient 
religious culture into a categorical distinction between orthodox and heterodox 
traditions, but rather indicates that the emergence of new practices of self-
transformation were grappled with within Brahmanical culture itself and can 
viewed within a context of mutual entanglement that can be traced back as far as 
the Ṛgveda.76 Not only, then, do the above findings strongly suggest that there is 
much to be gained from a reconsideration of Sanskrit’s cultural significance in 
light of its metaphysical encoding, but it appears that the boundaries assumed to 
exist between Brahmanical orthodoxy and ambient culture also merit 
investigation. In the words of Frederick Smith: 
 
folk culture by definition preceded Sanskritic culture and continued to 
flourish alongside it without operating in opposition to it. However, 
Sanskritic culture was never very far behind or far removed from folk 
culture. Indeed, one can argue that early Sanskritic, which is to say Vedic, 
culture is nothing more than a poetic or literary redaction of folk culture. 
Folk culture was part of Sanskritic culture from the outset.77 
 
Although this reframing of Vedic texts and culture may seem unlikely to some 
given the popular force of received Mīmāṃsāka and Vedāntin views on the Veda 
and human experience, the sheer amount of data retrieved from the Saṃhitās, 
Brāhmaṇas, and Upaniṣads demonstrates otherwise. Language (vāc) in these texts 
has more to say about the dynamic intersection of speech and person in Vedic 
soteriology than it does about the employment of Sanskrit in the engineering of 
Brahmanical orthodoxy.78 Moreover, the interdimensional affectivity of language 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Olivelle 2011: 14; see also Samuel 1998: 153-172. Some recent publications that discuss salient 
features of “non-orthodox” phenomena in Vedic literature include Deeg 1993, F. Smith 2006, and 
White 2003. 
77 F. Smith 2006a: 147. 
78 Ibid.: 199: “No doubt, brahmanism was an increasingly conservative intellectual and cultural 
movement that denied many of the less-Sanskritic elements of Indian social, intellectual, and 
spiritual culture. It also exploited its custody of literature and literacy in order to tilt Indian culture 
to the social and material advantage of the brahmans. And, in no small measure, this required the 
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– its transforming effect on humans and their world across the multiple and 
overlapping layers of mantra, sacrificial performance, ontology, and the 
unfolding revelation that each canonical text is itself an instance of – appears to 
resist the notion that the coextension of Sanskrit and yajña was something that 
divorced Sanskrit from the life-world of laukika practices. This phenomenology 
of language, whose study forms the major part of this work, argues for the 
legitimacy, if not centrality, of human experience and embodiment states in Vedic 
religious culture in the middle of the first millennium BCE. It also hints at a 
porous – though perhaps precarious – relationship between Brahmanical and folk 
cultures in this time period, prior to the development of intellectual Brahmanism 
in later śāstric circles.  As suggested above, if we are to begin retrieving language 
as an indigenous category from the Vedic texts, we must firstly expand the 
parameters currently assigned to Sanskrit. 
 
 
Vāc: A Case for Language 
 
To the extent that the mid-Vedic period has played a central role in the 
development of sociopolitical critiques of Brahmanical orthodoxy and ritualism, 
it is practical to raise the matter of emic perspectives on language (vāc), and not 
only because it is a consideration that provides an interesting counterpoint to the 
modern hermeneutic reliance on language that is already implicated within the 
development of these interpretations. To do so is also practical because, in a 
philology-based discipline that inevitably has language as its vanishing-point, the 
awareness of differences empowers us to reconsider the way we work with 
Sanskrit – and it is immanently practical because it is more than theoretical: 
through these reconsiderations, we are hopefully able to bring our analytical 
methods closer to the practices of engaging with vāc that are revealed through the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
denial of public forms of self-expression and empowerment, including possession. However, 
before the philosophy and theology of the Vedas and Upaniṣads devolved into brahmanism, 
possession was recognized, even embraced by brahmans. This was before the folk parted way 
with the Sanskritic.” 
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primary sources, thereby recovering more of what is being said through an 
improved understanding of how it is being said. 
 It is in this connection that I forward two contentions, originally pressed 
forth by Frederick Smith with respect to spirit and deity possession.79 Firstly, the 
“force of ethnographic accounts” – to which I would add the force of religious 
anthropologies – should elicit a re-examination of middle Vedic texts for 
evidence of a direct and primary involvement between language and the person. 
This involves a careful scrutiny of cosmological dynamics, which are not only 
articulated by texts but encoded within their structures. After all, revelatory texts 
provide both descriptions of language and vital examples of language at play. 
Related to this, the second contention is that recent Indological accounts of 
Sanskrit do not encompass or address the full spectrum of the language as it is 
demonstrated in Vedic texts. Curiously, and for similar reasons, nor do the 
traditional systems of grammar, exegesis, and epistemology that have so often 
been taken as the authoritative representatives of the culture surrounding 
Sanskrit. In order to retrieve the human dimensions of saṃskṛta as an indigenous 
category, our understanding of Sanskrit must expand beyond the parameters that 
are currently being assigned to it. 
 
Sanskrit and the Question of Experience 
 
While other Sanskrit texts, such as those belonging to the traditions of Vyākaraṇa 
and Alaṅkāraśāstra, already discussed, make efforts to isolate and define 
subgroups of language based on the domains and restrictions on their usage, the 
middle Vedic Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas speak of vāc as a unified complex with 
mutating boundaries that encompass language in all of its manifestations, from 
the encoded structures of the Vedic hymns (chandas) to speech in the human 
body and the sounds of the natural environment. Conversely, the consistency of 
Vedic ritual recitations are able to “reveal or confirm the fundamental affinity of 
man with speech.”80 Just as vāc is not always Sanskrit, then, it is vāc and not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Ibid.: 4. 
80 Malamoud 2002: 19, 23. 
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Sanskrit that is coextensive with brahman or Prajāpati.81 It is the consanguinity of 
all aspects of language, transcendent of domain and restriction, that binds vāc to 
the unveiling of the cosmos in manifest form and to the ongoing sacrificial project 
of world-making. From an emic perspective, this consanguinity denies the 
possibility of any strict categorical distinction within Sanskrit as it is used in 
ritual and in the human life-world; and it sits in opposition to contemporary 
theories of the meaninglessness of the ritual sphere that emerged from the earlier 
Vedic sacrifice. Such porosity between language, person, and cosmos opens the 
study of Sanskrit to how the affective dimensions of language inform not only its 
conceptualization, but its appearance in the texts. 
To those who undergo the experience of bodily “entextualization,” 
divinization or attunement to the wider universe through the merging of external 
linguistic forms with the internal structures of subjectivity, language is a veridical 
reality, with a profound ability to instigate transformations in self-identity.82 In 
this admittedly internalist view, language is far more than the simple symbolic 
representation of something conceptualized, but is rather an exacting instance of 
the experience which it immediately embodies and is seen as a literal expression 
or distillation of. This understanding runs against the grain of much modern 
academic theorizing about the cultural and historical significance of Sanskrit, 
which, as we have already seen, negotiates the deep association between Sanskrit 
and ritual through reliance upon external standards more amenable to critical 
agenda. These standards introduce points of reference that comply with 
commonly agreed-upon rules of the theoretical game – rationality, neutrality, 
historical facticity, and so on – yet they also hint at an embedded characteristic of 
the modern hermeneutic approach to language: because of the desirability of 
empirically observable hard data in analysis, language itself, as ontological, is 
rarely the actual subject of studies of language.83 As described by Fynsk, this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81  Note that this corresponds to postulations forwarded by the Vedic exegetes; see 
Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.10 and 12 with Kumārila’s Tantravārttika commentary (Josi 1971-80). 
82 Flood 2009: 87; F. Smith 2006a: 376-378, 385; Samuel 2008: 351. 
83 Harpham 2002: ix: “Nothing meaningful…can be said about language as such, both because 
language “as such” is not available for direct observation and because the features, aspects, 
characteristics, and qualities that can be attributed to language approach the infinite. Language is 
inadequate as an object of knowledge both because there is too little information available, and 
because there is too much.” See also the statement that “Imagining a language would, in fact, 
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approach results in a markedly narrow accounting of the value of language’s 
metaphysical status in the development of personal identity. 
 
The linguistic turn in modern thought tends to sweep right by the most 
basic, but admittedly elusive, fact – the simple fact that there is language. 
Thus, the questioning that should proceed from this fact, the question, to 
start, of the “essence” of language, is left to the residual obscurities of a 
few guiding texts. The result is a general impoverishment of all the 
analyses that have been enabled by this linguistic turn and the notion of the 
linguistic construction of identity – analyses throughout the disciplines of 
the humanities and social sciences that have been of immeasurable 
importance for cultural and sociopolitical study. What has been lost?… 
Most immediately: everything of language that exceeds the order of 
signification, together with the human share in this “excess” that is the 
(non)ground of history and the material site of all relationality, beginning 
with that unthought that is widely termed “culture.”84 
 
The foregrounding of meaning, retrievable through the scientific means of 
linguistics and apprehended in independence of the existence of an human 
subject, broadly outlines the respect in which language has sat at the fore of 
twentieth century hermeneutics. It also interfaces with the place of textual 
analysis in the reconstruction of Sanskrit’s historical significance in South Asian 
religious culture. As one scholar of comparative religions and religious 
phenomenology, Gavin Flood, notes, “from an outsider perspective, or from a 
rational perspective which seeks to distinguish meaning from being, the history of 
religions which does not distinguish existence from language – particularly from 
mythological language – is a history of error.”85 This approach automatically 
places a limit on the extent to which a religious statement, let alone a religious 
language, is understood.86 A good example of this type of thinking about language 
comes from Harvey Alper’s introduction to the volume Understanding Mantras – 
mantras being perhaps the paradigmatic instance and model of religious language 
in India – in which he explains: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
become strictly impossible, because the attempt to do so would summon forth not clean linguistic 
facts (of the sort Wittgenstein thought he had discovered and described in the Tractatus), but the 
vast debris of the world” (ibid.: 3). 
84 Fynsk 1996: 1. 
85 Flood 1999: 103. 
86 Ibid.: 102. 
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Most of us who study mantras critically – historians, philosophers, 
Sanskritists – take the Enlightenment consensus for granted. We do not 
believe in magic. Generally, we do not pray. If we do pray, we try to do so 
in a universalistic idiom…. According to the standards of modern science, 
mantras are irrational. Mantraśāstra thus shares neither the prestige of 
modernity nor the lingering prestige of traditional Western religion. 
Perhaps for this reason it has fallen through the cracks of Indology.87 
 
The compartmentalization of language from religion to which Alper draws our 
attention facilitates the separation of meaning from being described by Flood.88 
The influence of contemporary political philosophy is also evident here, 
presenting the ethical ideal of a state that is “neutral with respect to religion and 
the differing value systems accepted by its citizens,” the replication of which 
amounts to an hermeneutic ideal.89 
Recent doubts cast on the appropriateness of the configuration of religion 
as a self-contained isolate within a broader arena of secular activity 
notwithstanding, the restricted domain of yajña has entailed precisely that 
assertions made with respect to the significance of Sanskrit have not been seen as 
particularly meaningful at all.90 What results is a reconceptualization of the 
descriptions contained within religious texts as narratives, from which the facts 
needed for critical analysis are sorted out and located within a temporal, context-
relative framework. With respect to the study of Brahmanical texts, the 
implication is that the religious statements they contain do not amount to factual 
expressions of human experience in the life-world. For Flood, this means that the 
activity of passively describing and attempting to map what appear to be traces of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Alper 1991: 5. 
88 See Burns Coleman and White on the “privatization” of religion (2010: 1-3); cf. Turner 1997: 
36-37: “(In contemporary multicultural society, pluralism in religion and culture) leads to a 
market situation in religion where within a global and cosmopolitan environment modern people 
can choose religious styles and beliefs rather like they choose commodities.” As Burns Coleman 
and White note, this situation typifies a distinct rupture with cosmological traditions: “Within the 
post-modern lifestyle we do not simply choose things; we know that we choose them” (2010: 3). 
89 Burns Coleman and White ibid.: 2; cf. Dallmayr 1996, especially 39-62. 
90 Hertel and Humes offer a succinct statement of the asymmetry between this relatively recent 
conceptualization of religion and the traditional world-view, which, although made with respect to 
contemporary Hinduism, is nonetheless applicable to the present discussion (1993: 7): “religion in 
a more limited sense of activities such a puja and fasting can be seen as distinct from other social 
institutions of education, politics, and so on. For most “Hindus” their religion is more inclusive. 
For many, Hinduism is a way of life. Thus, Hindu religion in the broader sense encompasses 
religion in the narrower meaning.” 
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consciousness in texts becomes instead an active construction of historical 
narrative, through which language is moved “completely away from any 
essentialist understanding of religion” and religious meanings are drained of any 
existential content.91 Put one way, the resultant envisioning of belief as dogma 
“over-intellectualizes religious activity,” while its construal as a matter of 
preference or sentiment “gives religion the characteristic of a personal (emotional 
or aesthetic) taste, rather than something that is an organizing force of one’s life 
that provides it with meaning.”92 Restated, Flood asserts that any interpretative 
position which proposes to take a neutral or agnostic stance on the link between 
meaning and being “is in the end an implicit denial of it and an implicit 
hermeneutics of suspicion” because it precludes the possibility of attributing 
actual positive value to religious perspectives.93 
These methodological quandaries – the separation of language from 
ontology and of religion from historical culture – were apparently not shared by 
the composers of the Vedic canon, but they do bring us into the precipitous 
terrain of the relevance of experience to our understanding of Sanskrit. The 
prevailing modern perspectives on this issue, and their repercussions for textual 
analysis, are discussed extensively in the next chapter. At this point, however, the 
fact bears noting that because the śāstric privileging of theory over experience 
does not account for the central role of embodiment in a diverse range of Tantric, 
yogic, devotional, Vedic, epic, medical and literary traditions, the ostensible 
absence of personal experience in Sanskrit texts has every reason to raise our 
suspicions. Just as the apropos extension of śāstric categories to Sanskrit texts 
(envisioned as a singular class) has redefined Sanskrit, the extension of these 
same normative concerns to Brahmans and Brahmanical culture overall has the 
effect of strongly reorienting the people and practices studied – or of 
perpetuating, in the words of Frederick Smith, conclusions which are “little more 
than weary stereotyping” and fail to address the fact that “many if not most 
brahmans demur in practice, at least part of the time, from the “ism” of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Flood 1999: 113-114. He writes: “Engaging with religious phenomena in this sense of locating 
‘data’ within narrative, does not give privileged position to religion and places it within the 
context of its wider cultural history.” 
92 Burns Coleman and White 2010: 4. 
93 Flood 1999: 102. 
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brahmanism, and probably always have.” 94  By understanding that the 
monocultural edifice referred to is comprised of official śāstric opinion, this latter 
perspective on Brahmans and religious culture sets contextual parameters around 
scholarly observations which, in the words of Richard Gombrich, suggest that 
“brahmanism inculcated control” in such a way as to deny value to – and even to 
screen out – the place of potentially uncontrolled (and uncontrollable) subjective 
experience in religion.95  
It is important for our purposes to note that the view represented by 
Gombrich exists within Indology in multidimensional fashion, and has had the 
impact of reinforcing a one-directional reading of the apparent affiliation between 
Sanskrit and orthodoxy.96 As magisterial as the enquiries of the last century have 
indeed been, it seems there is yet more to be recovered from Sanskrit texts. This 
is not to level opprobrium at Indologists specifically, but to draw attentive care to 
a significant catch involved in some of the assumptions about language that 
underpin current approaches to the study of this literature. In holding onto the 
definitively postmodern conclusion that it is language which structures society 
and not the other way around, scholars have re-engineered Sanskrit as an object 
of analysis and enforced a limitation on their own critical endeavour: as the 
parameters of what constitutes language are narrowed, texts can only be assessed 
on the basis of categorically commensurate data, which in this case means texts 
about knowledge about language.97 What is lost from sight are human and cultural 
phenomena that might be considered uncivilized, abnormal, and 
epistemologically aberrant by śāstric and modern standards alike, but which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 F. Smith 2006a: 8. 
95 Gombrich 1988: 37. As F. Smith (2006a: 8) states in response to this, “what [Gombrich is] 
doubtless referring to are the official brahmanical doctrines espoused by the literary elite for the 
past two or three millennia, as they appear in the normative dharmaśāstra texts and philosophical 
darśanas. In this sense, Gombrich is correct in noting the importance of “brahmanism” in 
delimiting the parameters of control, self-awareness, and the self as a single discrete independent 
entity.”  
96 For example, see Bhalla 1964: 39-40; Gombrich 1988: 37, 64, 145; Heesterman 1985, 1993; and 
Pollock 2006: 96-99. De Caroli (2004: 9-10) and Shulman (2001: 82) are both inclined to disagree 
with this interpretation of events. 
97 Habermas 1971: 314; cf. Kristeva 1989: 3: “the conception of language as the ‘key’ to man and 
to social history and as the means of access to the laws of societal functioning constitutes perhaps 
one of the most striking characteristics of our era, and as such is definitely a new phenomenon.” 
For a discussion of assimilative cross-cultural intellectual engagement generally, along with 
particular focus on South Asia, see Dallmayr 1996. 
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decades of ethnographic and anthropological research have established as 
cornerstones of South Asia’s religious culture. The relevance of these findings for 
India’s history has been confirmed in recent years by a number of religious and 
textual historians, who point out that the “unwritten rules” of śāstric texts 
“discourage discussion of personal experience except as a mythical, fictional, or 
paradigmatic figure might have a paradigmatic experience.”98 In other words, 
where the sociopolitical valence of Sanskrit has been amply studied with 
reference to the intellectual traditions and philosophical darśanas of the Common 
Era, the relative positioning of language and person in mid-Vedic cosmological 
visions, together with the behavioural and ritual environments perforce required, 
is a consideration that ties more strongly to the religious culture of seventh- to 
fifth-century BCE South Asia than it does to the metaphysical civilization of a 
small cadre of Sanskrit-using intellectuals.99  
By contrast, a perspective on Brahmans and religious culture that instead 
sees diversity within and engagement between darśana-based and popular 
cultures allows for the generation of potentially far broader definitions by 
factoring in a wide sample of evidence drawn from a range of disciplines and 
methods either represented within or closely affiliated with modern Indology. In 
sharp distinction to the mainstream picture of Sanskrit that has emerged based on 
the rarefied domain of Sanskrit’s literary culture combined with sociolinguistic 
theories, evidence uncovered through religious anthropologies and ethnographic 
accounts places linguistic practices involving Sanskrit into a much wider field of 
cultural phenomena. The principles underlying traditions and practices that have 
commonly been perceived as antithetical or opposed to Brahmanical orthodoxy 
can, as a result of viewing anthropological and ethnographic study alongside 
textual analysis, be seen as related to, if not actively embraced by, the Sanskrit-
based religious culture of the Vedic period. And it is this widening of the 
parameters currently ascribed to early Brahmanical culture, the development of a 
more inclusive context, that reveals the complexity and scope of Sanskrit as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 F. Smith 2006a: 5. 
99 Following the distinction made in White 2003: 3: “While it is the case that [the] elites – the 
brahmin intelligentsia, a certain Indian aristocracy, and the merchant classes – have been the 
historical bearers of much of Indian religious civilization, their texts and temples have had limited 
impact on the religious culture of the vast majority of South Asians.” Italics original. 
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meaningful reality known through human experience, that has purchase beyond 
the rule-based intellectual structures of grammar and exegesis, and whose deeper 
meanings may be retrieved from the non-semantic textures of self-transformative 
experience that are embedded throughout revelatory texts. It is to these patterns 
and their conflictive role in the modern characterization of the Āraṇyakas that we 
turn in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
From Language to the Āraṇyakas 
 
We can’t solve problems using the same kind of thinking 
we used when we created them. 
 
ALBERT EINSTEIN 
 
 
 
 
Despite the fact that over a century has passed since they were first taken up by 
modern scholars, the Āraṇyakas remain scarcely familiar even within the 
specialist circle of Vedic Studies. While this fact alone places them in stark 
contrast to the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, their family corpora of related texts 
and some of the earliest evidence for India’s ancient sociolinguistic past, it might 
be said without exaggeration that these circumstances are the result of the leading 
organizational approaches adopted in the classification of the Vedic canon and its 
internal divisions. More specifically, this chapter argues, the common perception 
of the Āraṇyakas as aberrantly eclectic texts or convenient repositories for 
otherwise undesignated materials has developed from a long-standing tendency to 
benignly ignore the grounds on which they are traditionally recognized to form a 
separate class: the indigenous claim that the appellation āraṇyaka, “wilderness 
(book),” indicates that the esoteric contents of these texts should be studied away 
from the boundaries of human settlement loses its substance in light of modern 
considerations of what defines genre, while its casual acceptance as a point of 
belief rather than epistemology has prevented its inclusion in methodological 
frameworks of analysis. 
To whatever extent modern perceptions of the Āraṇyakas are justified by 
the practice of working within the empirically observable features of textual style, 
structure, and content, the point remains that the divergence between traditional 
and current orientations should not automatically preclude consideration of 
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alternative approaches to definition, but instead might reopen the interlocking 
questions of what constitutes sufficient grounds for inclusion in these texts and 
how this reflects the cultural textures and dynamics of Vedic revelation. The 
present chapter attempts to account for the difference in these etic and emic views 
by means of an examination of the analytical procedures that contribute to the 
appearance of difficulties in interpretation and, moreover, frame these as 
inconsistencies inherent to the Āraṇyakas rather than as correctable symptoms of 
a need for revised approaches to definition. This necessarily involves the same 
point of departure as that taken in other studies, namely, asking the question of 
whether there is something that quantifiably distinguishes the Āraṇyakas from the 
closely-related texts that surround them, that would provide them with a clear 
pivot upon which a picture of genre could be constructed. However, unlike other 
studies, this chapter questions whether such a textual identifier (assuming for a 
moment that it does indeed exist) must necessarily be stylistically constant in 
order to be definitive, or whether it is possible for continuity to be located behind 
the discontinuities on the surface of these texts, in which case it would generate 
the conditions for variations in style and structure – and conversely render these 
inconsistencies a valuable source of information in an inductive approach to the 
study of the Āraṇyakas as instances of revelation. What is not attempted here, 
therefore, is to produce a definition of the Āraṇyakas based either on their 
positioning within the Veda or on a comparison between those texts belonging to 
the Ṛgvedic and Yajurvedic lineages respectively. Not only are comprehensive 
overviews of the Vedic corpus readily available, but to repeat procedures 
previously undertaken is unlikely to yield fresh insights with which to begin 
filling the lacuna these texts represent in our understanding of Vedic religious 
culture. Instead, we consider the possibilities of incorporating the soteriological 
dimensions of language into a modern typologization of the Āraṇyakas, and 
examine the reasons for which this has not already be done. 
 
 
	   54	  
Definitions, Typologies, and Linguistic Structures 
 
As stated above, the Āraṇyakas have largely eluded modern efforts at definition 
in their reflection of a broad array of interests, concerns, and linguistic 
developments that blur the lines demarcating them from the texts they directly 
follow and precede, namely, the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. From both 
philological and literary critical perspectives, these considerations render their 
indigenous acknowledgement as a singular division of the Veda unsatisfactory; 
thus, while the Āraṇyakas ostensibly comprise the smallest group of canonical 
texts, the modern enumeration of them is unclear at best and implicates 
contradictory criteria for inclusion. These spiralling attempts to reach a definitive 
identification of the Āraṇyakas shed light on the influence of cultural 
conceptualizations of language upon subsequent practices of textual analysis, and 
raise the question of whether our inherited modern understandings are 
appropriate to the task at hand. It is thus to a review of the leading interpretations 
of the Āraṇyakas that we now turn. 
 The working depiction of the Āraṇyakas currently favoured by Indologists 
presents a group of four texts related by appellation, antiquity, and eclecticism of 
content, namely, the Ṛgvedic Aitareya and Śāṅkhāyana (or Kauṣītaki) Āraṇyakas 
and the Taittirīya and Kaṭha Āraṇyakas of the Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda. While this 
particular enumeration has been standardized by the availability of published 
editions and translations of these texts,100 it belies the uncertainty that underscores 
modern literature on the subject. According to Rājendralālā Mitra’s 1872 edition 
of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, six texts belong to the class: in addition to the Kṛṣṇa 
Yajurvedic Taittirīya that provides the focus of his study and the two Ṛgvedic 
Āraṇyakas just mentioned, he includes the Śukla Yajurvedic Br̥hadāraṇyaka 
Upaniṣad and makes further reference to two texts belonging to the Sāmaveda, 
but leaves them unnamed.101 While Mitra does not offer any explanation of his 
reasoning behind these latter inclusions, it may be induced from an observation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 With the exception of Keith (1909, 1918), the majority of editions in European languages are 
partial and focus only on what is considered to be the oldest section of each text. See: Houben 
1991 (as Pravargya Brāhmaṇa); Malamoud 1977; Witzel 2004. 
101 Mitra 1872: n.p. 
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offered by Oldenburg, nearly half a century later, that such additions to the genre 
likely stem from the interpretation of the term āraṇyaka. In the words of 
Oldenburg, the early Upaniṣads were “attributed to the Āraṇyakas and not 
denoted Āraṇyakas. For there were also forest-parts of the liturgic [sic] texts 
(Saṃhitās) in the Āraṇyaka collections beside these forest-sections of the 
Brāhmaṇas.”102 To this might be added the extended enumeration of no less than 
nine texts advanced by Jan Gonda roughly a century after Mitra. Gonda identifies 
the following: the core group of four Āraṇyakas belonging to the Ṛgveda and 
Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda respectively; the Āraṇyakakāṇḍa (“Forest Chapter”) of the 
Mādhyaṃdina recension of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, belonging to the Śukla 
Yajurveda and containing within it the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad; and, for the 
Sāmaveda, the Āraṇyagāṇa and Āraṇyaka Saṃhitā of the Kauthuma recension, 
the Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa of the Talavakāra (Jaiminīya) recension, and 
the first section of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad of the Tāṇḍya recension.103 These 
instances are characterised, firstly, by the addition of all canonical texts that bear 
the term āraṇyaka in their appellation, and secondly by an implicit 
acknowledgement of this term as denoting a relationship to the wilderness. As 
seen in Gonda’s account, this allows for an inclusion by extension of texts whose 
internal features are suggestive of a similarly secretive context of composition 
and performance; furthermore, whether intentionally or unintentionally, it also 
allows for the attribution of at least one functional “Āraṇyaka” to each in a 
majority of Vedic lineages. 
 This pattern of alternatively negotiating the openness of the terms on 
which a picture of the genre is constructed is not peculiar to older scholarship. In 
1983, the well-known Vedic scholar, Frits Staal, included in an overview of the 
Vedas only those texts explicitly named as Āraṇyakas, thus seeming to reduce the 
class back to the core collection of four texts.104 However, he elsewhere positions 
the Āraṇyakas within a broader division of materials identified as 
araṇyageyagāna, “songs to be sung in the forest.” 105  Echoing a suggestion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Oldenburg [1915] 1991: 87. 
103 Gonda 1975: 424, 430-31. 
104 Staal 1983: 36. 
105 Staal 1996: 297. 
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implicit in the work of both Mitra and Oldenburg, this delineation between the 
categories of araṇyageyagāna and grāmageyagāna (“songs to be sung in the 
village”) is ostensibly based on the internal structure of the Sāmaveda Saṃhitā, 
from which Staal extrapolates a division within ritual application (prayoga) that 
he further asserts is culturally normative throughout Vedic tradition.106 
Evidence for this performance-based account of textual classifications 
would, one might assume, be reinforced by traditional descriptions of the 
Āraṇyakas as rahasya, or secret.107 To the extent, however, that it is commonly 
applied to a variety of otherwise distinct materials, it goes only a short way 
towards precisely elucidating what differentiates Āraṇyakas from either 
Brāhmaṇas or Upaniṣads. Where on one hand, then, scholars face the highly 
restrictive scenario of a small group of texts whose sole exclusively 
distinguishing feature is the name Āraṇyaka, on the other we encounter a 
description that is applicable to point of not defining any one genre at all. Writing 
in 1992, Jamison and Witzel attempt to provide āraṇyaka with a denominative 
centre by employing an inclusive combination of criteria spanning appellation 
and application, in conjunction with secrecy of ritual and characteristic 
strangeness of content. After recalling the fact that, unlike in the case of the 
Ṛgvedic and Kṛṣṇa Yajurvedic schools, the traditions of the Sāmaveda and 
Atharvaveda do not possess any texts that are explicitly named Āraṇyakas, 
Jamison and Witzel assert the following: 
 
the Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa may, in part, be regarded as the 
[Āraṇyaka] of [the Sāmaveda], and the Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa plays the same 
role for the AV [Atharvaveda]. In addition, the first part of Kāṇḍa 14 of 
the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa, which deals with the Pravargya ritual (ŚB 14.1-
3), may with good reason be called the Ār. of the Mādhyandina school of 
the White [Śukla] YV, for all three Ār. texts of the YV deal centrally with 
this ritual. Its performance and even its acquisition by learning is regarded 
as too dangerous to be carried out inside the village and has to be done 
“where the houses of the village cannot be seen any more.” This points to 
the correct meaning of the designation Ār., from araṇya “wilderness” 
which curiously still eludes most modern Sanskritists though it was 
established long ago by Oldenburg (1915-16). This oversight also clouds 
the understanding of the type of texts the Ār. constitute. They are not, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Ibid.: 315. 
107 See Jamison and Brereton 2014: 367 (vol. 1); also Jamison and Witzel 1992: 12. 
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medieval Hindu tradition asserts, the texts of the third stage in life, the 
Vānaprastha, but deal, quite in the fashion of other Brāhmaṇa type texts, 
with a particular ritual. In the case of the RV it is the Mahāvrata day of the 
year long Gavām Ayana and some other rituals.108 
 
While some of the finer details of this interpretation vary from those given by 
other scholars, Gonda and Olivelle among them, the more significant point is that 
what Jamison and Witzel do is establish the ritual that accounts for the leading 
preoccupation of each text, and also importantly constitutes one of the more 
secret teachings of its respective śākhā or lineage, as a necessary condition of 
inclusion in the category of Āraṇyaka.109 Considered together with the practical 
impetus suggested by āraṇyaka, the attention paid to ritual generates a strong but 
flexible combination of determinative characteristics that are able to account for 
both those texts explicitly named Āraṇyakas and those that lack this appellation 
yet appear to serve a similar function, whilst at the same time preserving the 
distinction between the two. Furthermore, although it is firmly grounded in the 
methods of philology – a tradition that has come into criticism in the last decade – 
Jamison and Witzel’s insistence upon the restrictive and mutual connection 
between the rituals described, these texts, and the performance environment 
results in a considerably more comprehensive description of the Āraṇyakas than 
most. This is because it provides the characteristic of rahasya with a substantial 
basis in the behaviours or practices that both surround the treatment of the texts 
and are described within them, while their apparent attribution of a culturally 
normative status to the dangers inherent in these rituals allows for a sophisticated 
mediation of emic and etic perspectives. 
  That said, it needs to be pointed out that Jamison and Witzel’s definition 
applies to those parts of the texts alone that directly address the rituals in 
question, and thus includes in its purview only the minority percentage of the 
texts’ contents – their oldest strata – and not the entire form in which they have 
been transmitted. To understand this as an hermeneutic equation of age with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Jamison and Witzel 1992: 11-12. 
109 Gonda identifies Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 14.4-9, rather than 1-3 (1975: 430-431). Olivelle parts 
ways with both Gonda and Jamison and Witzel in his classification of the Sāmavedic Chāndogya 
and Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa as Upaniṣads in entirety; this, however, is in keeping with the 
primary trend of scholarship on the Upaniṣads; see Olivelle 1998: 29. 
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authenticity would, I believe, be a mistake. Rather, Jamison and Witzel’s 
conclusions arguably demonstrate the operative terms of a lexical approach to 
definition, which in this instance combine with philological methods to produce a 
strict linguistic and chronological differentiation between the diverse materials 
from which the Āraṇyakas are comprised. In accordance with the exclusive terms 
on which such a definition is built, the separation, firstly, of those sections that 
are designated as Upaniṣads and, secondly, of the varied selection of materials 
that have been added at later dates is justified on the grounds of structure, style, 
and content, and is further supported both by the independent commentarial 
traditions that in some cases surround these materials and also by their wide 
representation or parallel appearance elsewhere. The removal of these from 
immediate consideration – or, more precisely, their subjection to independent 
processes of definition – thus allows for the conception of an original nucleus, 
whose qualities alone become definitive of the Āraṇyakas, surrounded by a 
variety of inconsistent materials that do not satisfy class requirements. In the 
words of Jamison and Witzel: 
 
The veda- (or mantra or saṃhitā-) text-type consists of collections of 
liturgical materials, the brāhmaṇa-text-type of ritual exegesis. The 
āraṇyaka-text-type often develops the cosmic side of brāhmaṇa 
explanations into esoteric speculation about some of the more cryptic and 
secret of the rituals and generally has served as a catch-all for the later 
texts of the particular school involved. The upaniṣad-text-type proceeds 
further on this speculative path.110 
 
Although such processes of identification on one hand reflect the internal 
divisions evidenced by these texts in their transmitted forms, it introduces strict 
chronological and stylistic considerations that come to circumscribe the 
Āraṇyakas exclusively on the basis of their Brāhmaṇa-like linguistic features and 
ritual concerns. Support for this is once again found in the form of philological 
evidence; Jamison and Witzel continue: 
 
First of all, as has been pointed out above, there is no inherent difference 
in content and style between Brāhmaṇa and Āraṇyaka texts: both deal with 
rituals, although the Āraṇyakas deal with the more secret rituals such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Jamison and Witzel 1992: 5; cf. comments in Witzel 2004: xxx. 
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the Mahāvrata (in the RV) and the Pravargya (in the YV Āraṇyakas). Both 
rituals indeed are explained in the usual Brāhmaṇa style…111 
 
Viewed from this perspective, the only feature to uniquely distinguish the 
Āraṇyakas from the Brāhmaṇas is the dangerousness attributed to the rituals they 
describe. Given that this quality is not typically considered to be empirically 
observable, and as such does not provide a sufficiently rigorous basis for testing, 
analytical priority is ascribed to linguistic characteristics over the affective impact 
suggested by rahasya, to the end that the variability of the Āraṇyakas’ contents is 
seen at once as being neither similar enough to establish a picture of internal 
coherence when considered in entirety, nor differentiated enough from the 
Brāhmaṇas to establish an independent class of texts when separated.112 Although 
the historical precision of such an assessment is without doubt, its contribution to 
the understanding of the Āraṇyakas is constrained by its belying of the cultural 
significance of these texts in their complete forms; furthermore, the strictness of 
their identification with the Brāhmaṇas obscures the fact that the substance of the 
Āraṇyakas’ traditional acknowledgement as a unique expression of the Vedic 
revelation is not here addressed. To anticipate an argument that will be examined 
in detail below, I contend that the price of establishing this coherence is a 
dramatic and unnecessary loss of detail, an elision of differences and 
inconsistencies that should contribute to a deeper sensitivity to what makes for an 
Āraṇyaka as such, in short, of the underlying patterns of coherence and integrity 
that may well account for why the various sections of these texts were put 
together and kept together in precisely this way as attested by a remarkably 
unbroken manuscript tradition.113 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Jamison and Witzel 1992: 73; cf. Jamison 1991: 9: “[The āraṇyaka-]text type develops the 
cosmic side of brāhmaṇa explanations into esoteric speculation about some of the more cryptic of 
the rituals. In certain ways, the āraṇyaka-text type seems like a lopsided brāhmaṇa with a mystic 
bent.” 
112 Michael Witzel has generously clarified this analysis (personal communication; 13 February 
2012). As to the suggestion that the Āraṇyakas be seen as a unique class of texts, Witzel responds 
that this “impression may be shaped by the many additional sections (even Upaniṣads) in these 
texts, especially the RV Āraṇyakas with their grammatical discussions. And of course [by] the 
traditional division of the Vedas into 4 levels, which leaves out the truly Vedic (early) Sūtras.” 
113 Gonda (1975: 424, 427) with reference to the AitĀ; it appears that he follows Keith in this 
matter. See comments in Keith (1909: 1): “Variant readings occur here and there, but none of 
sufficient importance to justify the idea that any different recensions of the text ever existed, and it 
is hardly ever possible to feel serious doubt as to the correct reading. What is especially important 
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Vedic Watersheds 
 
While the positioning of the Āraṇyakas in relation to the Brāhmaṇas and 
Upaniṣads can lead to their clouding by these far better-known divisions of the 
Veda, the same chronological factors also make the Āraṇyakas a readily 
appropriated point of reference in the study of developments undergone by 
Brahmanical religious culture during the mid- to late-Vedic period. The most 
productive starting-point for such approaches is to see the evidential basis 
provided by the texts themselves; we therefore commence with an overview of 
the five books that comprise the Aitareya Āraṇyaka [henceforth AitĀ] according 
to its manuscript tradition. 
   
1.1-5 Dated to circa 700 BCE.114 These sections describe the recitations 
and activities that accompany the performance of the Mahāvrata in 
the context of their hidden connections and esoteric meanings. 
Emphasis is placed on the two corresponding recitations that 
accompany the midday libation of soma, namely, the Mahāvrata 
Sāman and the Mahaduktha, the recitation of which is apportioned 
to correspond to the shape of a bird. The linguistic style of this 
book is characterised by its similarity to that of the Brāhmaṇas.115 
2.1-3 ca. 700-600 BCE. The first three sections of AitĀ 2 continue the 
discussion of the Mahaduktha, which is identified as prāṇa or 
puruṣa. Section 2.3.8 contains a set of five embedded verses that 
describe the bodily senses as yoked horses or steeds (yujo yukta) 
and suggestively links prāṇa and the subtle dimensions of speech, 
vāc, to the truth of identity. Keith suggests these verses are earlier 
than the surrounding prose and notes their similarity to those given 
in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.6.23 and Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.8.116 
These three sections, AitĀ 2.1-3, are formally considered an 
Upaniṣad by the native tradition, according to which the entirety of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is that MSS. from both the extreme north – as Bühler’s MS. from Kashmir – and the south agree 
in presenting the same text. Further, the commentary of Sāyaṇa presents the same text as the 
commentaries of Śaṅkara on Books II and III, and of Ānandatīrtha and Viśveśvara on the same 
books.” Keith consulted a total of 38 manuscripts, partial and complete, with a date range from 
1575 (ms. B, from Kashmir) to 1885 (ms. T, Andhra Pradesh), and written in Grantha, Śāradā, 
Telugu and Malayālam with the majority in Devanāgarī. 
114 I follow the dates given in Keith’s (1909) introduction to this text. 
115 Note Keith 1909: 51: “Āraṇyaka I contains, in comparison with the Upaniṣads, little of 
philosophic interest. It is important, however, to observe that in it brahman appears already as a 
principle of unity.” 
116 Ibid.: 223, n.1. 
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AitĀ 2 may be referred to as either the Mahaitareya or 
Bahvr̥cabrāhmaṇa Upaniṣad. 
2.4-6 ca. 700-600 BCE; the “Upaniṣad par excellence” according to 
Keith, who also refers to these sections as containing the Aitareya 
Upaniṣad “proper” in contrast to the native typology.117 AitĀ 2.4-6 
is formally counted among the early or classical Upaniṣads and as 
such possesses an independent commentarial tradition; as Olivelle 
notes, however, the distinction is “somewhat artificial, there being 
little difference in the topics covered” by 2.1-3 and 2.4-6 
respectively.118 That said, AitĀ 2.4-6 is characterised particularly 
by its narrative style and its focus on the true identity of the ātman, 
both of which resonate more obviously with the Upaniṣads of other 
śākhās than with AitĀ 1. 
3.1-2 6th century BCE. This book of the AitĀ identifies itself as the 
Saṃhitā Upaniṣad, an appellation which corresponds to its focus on 
the esoteric meanings of the phenomenon of saṃhitā, or euphonic 
combination, and its connection to the transformative qualities of 
the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā. The two adhyāyas of AitĀ 3 are divided into 
six sections apiece; in addition to metaphysical discussions of 
saṃhitā, the latter half also details the symptoms of impending 
death of one who has “no part in language” (na tasya vācy api 
bhāgo asti) and a corresponding ritual for the preservation of life. 
AitĀ 3.2.5 further identifies itself as an Upaniṣad conducing to the 
whole of language (sarvasyai vāca upaniṣat) and identifies the 
corporeal body with a divine lute or daivī vīṇā. 
4 ca. 500-450 BCE. AitĀ 4 consists of a single invocation known as 
the Mahānāmnī and comprising nine verses to Indra followed by a 
final tenth verse that names Indra alongside the gods Agni, Viṣṇu, 
and Pūṣan. The 13th century commentator, Sāyaṇa, explains the 
presence of these verses by stating that they must be studied in the 
forest (araṇyādhyayanārthā vai procyante ’tha caturthake).119 
Parallel occurrences of the Mahānāmnī are found in the Āraṇya 
Saṃhitā and Naigeya Śākhā of the Śukla Yajurveda Saṃhitā, and 
also as one of the khilas or compendiums associated with the 
Ṛgveda. According to Keith, they are also referred to in 
Br̥haddevatā 8.100, Śāṅkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra 10.6.10, R ̥gvidhāna 
4.25, and Śāṅkhāyana Gr̥hya Sūtra 4.5.9. Their dating is uncertain; 
the version preserved in the AitĀ attests rare Vedic forms but 
shows more recent modification to metre.120 
5.1-3 ca. 500-450 BCE. This final book of the AitĀ consists in major part 
of a sūtra-style description of the Mahaduktha recitation and ritual 
activities as per the account given in AitĀ 1. This leads Keith to 
state that AitĀ 5 forms “a sort of complement to Book [Āraṇyaka] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Ibid.: 17. 
118 Olivelle 1998: 314. 
119 Phaḍke 1898: 230. 
120 See discussion of the verses in Keith 1909: 258-61. 
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I, which is the Brāhmaṇa as contrasted with the Sūtra.”121 The final 
passage, AitĀ 5.3.3, sets forth exceptions regarding who is 
permitted to recite the Mahāvrata and contains an extensive outline 
of the rules of Vedic study (svādhyāyadharma). 
 
As discussed above, the integration of this assortment of materials into the single 
text of the AitĀ is suggestive of a gradual process of addition that reflects the 
changing interests of Brahmanical cultures through the steady development of 
compositional styles and, subsequently, of textual taxonomies. Although these 
details accurately document the positioning of the texts in relation to the 
development of the Vedic canon over a number of centuries, characterisations of 
the Āraṇyakas as interstitial must usually be understood as contributions to wider 
interpretations that focus on the socio-religious processes involved in the 
transition between the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. Gonda’s observations aptly 
summarise the basis upon which this picture of the Āraṇyakas’ relevance to the 
ambient environment is built. He states: 
 
The structure of the āraṇyakas is as little homogenous as their contents. 
Some portions have the character of a saṃhitā, others of a brāhmaṇa, 
others again of a sūtra, according to the material that, varying from Veda 
to Veda, and from school to school, was collected in an āraṇyaka corpus. 
Linguistically and stylistically also, these works form a transition between 
the brāhmaṇas proper and the speculative literature that follows them and 
develops part of the ideas and lines of thought which are characteristic of 
them.122 
 
The details cited by Gonda fix the Āraṇyakas within the parameters of an 
historical overview that interprets the significance of their contents’ heterogeneity 
in accordance with external sources of meaning. In so doing, their apparent lack 
of internal continuity is ascribed conceptual value as a legitimate expression of 
cultural transformation, as opposed to being reduced to an ad hoc by-product of 
the decision-making processes and conveniences involved in textual 
transmission.123 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Ibid.: 18. 
122 Gonda 1975: 424. 
123 Ibid.: 423: “There can…be no doubt that in course of time the tendency was for the explanation 
contained in the definite portions of the brāhmaṇas to develop into explanations of meta-ritualism, 
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 Although many earlier examples of such interpretation – including among 
them the now-classical histories of Indian philosophy given by Surendranath 
Dasgupta and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan – have now been effectively undermined 
by recent studies showing the āśrama system to be a neologism,124 the tendency to 
approach the Āraṇyakas in connection to inexplicitly related religious practices 
has retained currency especially in attempts to map developments occurring in the 
period between the compositions of the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. One of the 
better examples of this hermeneutic approach, which typically aims to elucidate 
points of evolving divergence between these largely oppositional texts of Vedic 
religious culture, is Mahoney’s depiction of the Āraṇyakas as reflecting the 
teachings and, inadvertently, the living circumstances of early renunciant 
communities. He states: 
 
As early as the ninth century BCE, small groups of people began to leave 
the life of the villages to meditate in the forest, where, unwilling or 
financially unable to perform the grand and expensive public rituals, they 
contemplated the nature of the various homologies and equivalences 
between divine and human as well as outer and inner worlds. Their 
teachings formed the basis of texts know as the Āraṇyakas (“forest-
books”). The generally mystical perspective driving the composition of the 
Āraṇyakas came to fuller expression beginning as early as the eighth 
century BCE, when the earliest collections of another genre of 
contemplative texts, the Upaniṣads (“secret teachings, mystic doctrines”), 
first passed through the generations.125 
 
While Mahoney’s deferral to a rather sweeping view of the divisions in mid-
Vedic society is not positioned to account for the intricacies internally 
characterising the Āraṇyakas, his description raises a number of considerations 
that bear centrally upon the way these texts are understood in relation to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and then to grow independent of the ritual until the stage was reached where the name āraṇyaka 
was no longer applicable, because the subject matter had passed into that of an upaniṣad.”  
124 Olivelle 1993: 8, 31-32; cf. Bodewitz 1973: 237: “The araṇya in opposition to the village or 
town denotes the secret, esoteric sphere rather than a permanent habitation and therefore has no 
relation with the āśrama system.” For examples of romantic perceptions of āśrama, see 
Macdonald 1901: 39-40, Dasgupta [1922] 1969: 14, and Radhakrishnan [1923] 1999: 65. 
Madeline Biardeau provides a more recent argument for a direct correlation between the 
Āraṇyakas and the vānaprastha or forest-dwelling stage in the life of a practitioner (Biardeau 
1989: 31); furthermore, her invocation of the prāṇāgnihotra as evidence is anachronistic (cf. 
Bodewitz 1973: 238-40, 318).  
125 Mahoney 1998: 10. 
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soteriological practice. Drawing upon Mahoney’s suggestion of a renunciant 
community of practitioners whose focus, while functionally grounded in 
techniques of meditation, was oriented around orthodox Brahmanical rituals, it 
might be surmised that the affiliation he forges between the araṇya as form of 
identity marker and the sociology of the texts makes reference not to the third, 
forest-dwelling (vānaprastha) stage in the formalized sequence of āśrama, but 
rather to the earlier demographic of Brahmanical renunciants or semi-renunciants 
known likewise as vānaprastha and distinguished from other ascetic communities 
by their maintenance of a ritual fire and stated goal of achieving heavenly 
rebirth.126 If this is accurate, Mahoney adheres to a revised historical model, 
established particularly through the works of Bronkhorst and Olivelle, that 
convincingly argues for the existence of multiple variations and traditions within 
Brahmanical culture that were obscured through the normativising effects of 
textual reinterpretation by later orthodox scholars. While the conclusion he 
reaches differs fundamentally from that offered by Mahoney, Jan Heesterman 
similarly posits a common denominator between the texts’ contents and religious 
practice outside of the settled community in his assertion that the intended 
reference of the term āraṇyaka is not “as has erroneously been thought, the life of 
the ascetic (vānaprastha), but of the nomadic warriors of old setting out with their 
fires and cattle into the wilderness.” 127  In this, Heesterman attends to 
particularities of the Mahāvrata that place both it and the Āraṇyakas on the social 
– and canonical – periphery through their ostensible association with the Vrātyas, 
groups of young men in Vedic society who, as described by Samuel, had “a 
specific ritual function” involving “the performance of extended midwinter 
sacrificial rituals out in the forest, away from the village community, on behalf of 
the community as a whole.”128 For example, and most obviously, the Mahāvrata 
occurs on the mid-winter solstice and concords with the wintertime culmination 
of the Vrātyas’ year-long ritual activity (AitĀ 1.1.1: etad vā ahar īpsantaḥ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Samuel 2008: 122-23; Olivelle 2003: 272; Bronkhorst 1998. 
127 Heesterman 1987: 1028  (Encyclopedia of Religion 2nd ed., s.v. “Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas”). 
128 Samuel 2008: 115. While research on the Vrātyas remains slim, what does appear to be well 
attested is that is Mahāvrata was their domain, at least up to some point in history (ibid.: 158). 
However, most such scholarship does not address the AitĀ and ŚāṅkhĀ, but focuses on the 
explicit references contained in other mid-Vedic texts. 
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saṃvatsaram āsate ta āgacchanti, “desiring this day they worship the year [and 
now] come close to it”). Further, it is classified as a sattra, a term whose general 
usage refers to a variety of soma offering but which in specific application refers 
to rites performed in the wilderness by Vrātyas;129 and to this might be added 
their shared association with the god Indra, and the sexually transgressive and 
polluting behaviours that have linked each to speculation about the early 
developments of yogic practices and Tantra.130 
As with the case of allusions to evidence of vānaprastha-type practice, 
however, these social associations are presently of little practical use for they do 
not so much expand the basis of textual interpretation as simply relocate the 
Āraṇyakas between competing cultural frames without addressing the matter of 
how their heterogeneity intersects meaningfully with or operates as a significant 
expression of – or, indeed, is permitted by – the principles underpinning their 
emic status. Although the absence of sustained research into the Āraṇyakas 
certainly contributes to this situation, I would here forward the observation that it 
is equally informed by limitations inherent in mainstream academic approaches to 
religious experience and its classification. 
 
Ritual, Realization, and Competing Contexts 
 
Before pursuing the matter of experience further, it is firstly necessary to discuss 
the major specifications outlining the Āraṇyakas as religious texts, which is to say 
as participating fully and not nominally in the revelation of the Veda. Because the 
underlying understanding of this, the emic or indigenous view, is that it is a 
matter of belief or – perhaps more sympathetically – non-ordinary perception that 
is not available to empirical examination by outsiders, the veridical status of 
revelation is rarely treated as a direct object of study, being instead positioned as 
epiphenomenal to the social and practical contexts that are commonly 
foregrounded in academic theorizing about mid-Vedic religion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Samuel 2008: 114-16; White 1991: 95-96; Keith 1908: 85. 
130 Samuel 2008: 158-59; White 2003: 30-31; Jamison 1996: 244; Deeg 1993: 130-36. 
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 Saṃhitās aside, the primary plot of evolutions in India’s ancient religious 
culture has generally been mapped in relation to two poles – the first being the 
ritualistic cosmology of the Brāhmaṇas, and the second the metaphysical enquiry 
of the early Upaniṣads – that mirror the post-Vedic exegetical division of the 
Veda along the soteriological axes of karma, ritual activity, and jñāna, liberating 
knowledge. While the vision of incommensurable opposition that once coloured 
the grounds of comparison between these groups of texts has undergone radical 
tempering since the mid-twentieth century, the classical tension between karma 
and jñāna remains influential particularly in its suggestion of an intrinsic internal 
separation of the Veda into sections (kāṇḍa) according to path (mārga) or mode 
of spiritual practice. Kaebler aptly summarizes the generally accepted view of 
this historical phenomenon: 
 
Knowledge, once a focus in tandem with ritual action, becomes the 
primary focus of an entire Vedic tradition. It is important to realize, 
however, that action, too, becomes the centre of its own tradition or trend. 
The two diverge, therefore, each becoming a focus around which two 
differing, though interrelated, constellations of thought and behaviour 
revolve. It is in this regard that we speak of a Vedic watershed. Two trends 
begin to diverge in Vedic thought, once centred in jñāna, the other in 
karma.131 
 
Salient to our purposes is a pertinent corollary of this differentiation, namely, its 
bearing upon the interpretation of each group of texts in association with a 
correspondingly distinguished mode of soteriological practice, and thence 
community identity, as implicated in the details of textual composition itself. 
Restated, what is perceived to be contained in the classifications of karma and 
jñāna is a mutuality of text-type and religious system, a definitive correlation 
between the variety of instruction (ritualistic or contemplative) articulated in the 
contents of the texts and the variety of behaviour assumed of the human subjects 
originally involved in the composition, transmission, and study of these 
materials.132 Correspondingly, these affiliations locate a meaningful performative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Kaebler 1981: 74; cf. Samuel 2008: 159-60. 
132  Holdrege 1996: 343: “cosmogonic and epistemological paradigms associated with Veda 
[sic]…are reflected in practices with respect to the methods of transmission, study, and 
appropriation…” 
	   67	  
centre for soteriological practice in the very linguistic features that characterize 
the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads in opposition to each other – for example, in the 
recitation of mantras and ritual directives by a group whose multiple participants 
are predetermined by socially encoded relations, as contrasted against the 
individual realization of esoteric connections through various meditative and 
ascetic practices. Such distinguishing features drive the scholarly impression of a 
definitive difference of substance and culture between fixed text and scripted 
performance, on one hand, and direct experience and individualised teaching, on 
the other. 
 Are these delineations appropriate to the cultural textures of Vedic 
revelation in an extended context, that is, as encompassing the spectrum of 
received materials that comprise the canon as a whole? In a discussion that recalls 
the attempt to define the Āraṇyakas on the basis of this appellation’s lexical 
derivation from araṇya, Jan Houben locates the ground of an identification 
between genre and spiritual technique in the form of a continuum extending from 
the particular vocabulary employed to describe the texts in question. In thus 
turning to a serious consideration of the existence claims held in the traditional 
Sanskrit designations for these textual collections, Houben draws upon the term 
brahman as an hermeneutic touchstone, a window onto the traditional cosmology 
in which the disclosure of the Veda is embedded. This brings his interpretation’s 
disciplinary basis in the etic methods of historical linguistic reconstruction into a 
complementary relationship with the internal view of the cosmological power of 
revelatory language and its involvement as a creative force in the activities of 
ritual. In Houben’s words: 
 
The Brāhmaṇas in the broadest sense comprise distinct sections at the end 
which are referred to as Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads. The Āraṇyakas, 
according to the tradition to be studied in the forest or wilderness 
(araṇya), typically discuss more esoteric ritual matters, while the 
Upaniṣads contain spiritual teachings which are not necessarily connected 
with the ritual (or even have an anti-ritualistic flavour). …In later times, 
the Brāhmaṇas came to be considered to be part of the Vedas, and to be as 
sacred as the hymns and formulas on which they commented. The name 
brāhmaṇa itself illustrates the great importance attributed to language and 
speech in these texts; it can be analysed as “belonging to the bráhman,” 
where the word bráhman has as its more original meaning “sacred and 
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powerful formulation” or “power to formulate” (cf. Renou 1955: 12: “le 
pouvoir formulateur”).133 
 
Houben’s preservation of the traditional Indo-Aryan presentation of these 
materials informs a closer inspection of the revelatory qualities claimed of each 
canonical stratum in alignment with the particular cultural textures and literary 
development of Indo-European inheritances in South Asia. Therefore, rather than 
drawing a line of strict opposition between the Upaniṣads and the ritualistic 
compositions preceding them, he demarcates between the Saṃhitās and the 
evolutions of a following tradition, allowing the Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, and 
Upaniṣads to be envisioned as related materials whose particularistic styles of 
inflection nonetheless demonstrate a common investment in the revelatory 
potential of language captured in these texts. 
Working along similar lines to suggest that these texts then differ from 
each other in degree and not kind, Jamison and Witzel assert that the Upaniṣads 
“do not represent a break with the intellectual tradition that precedes them,” 
 
but rather a heightened continuation of it, using as raw material the 
religious practices then current. What makes the Upaniṣads seem more 
different than they actually are from the Brāhmaṇas and even from the 
Āraṇyakas, which contain similar speculative and “mystical” material, is 
their style. The Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas are authoritative in their 
presentation; even the most advanced and esoteric speculation is positively 
stated, as an exegetical truism. The early Upaniṣads, with their dialogue 
form, the personal imprint of the teacher, the questioning and admissions 
of innocence – or claims of knowledge – from the students, seem to 
reintroduce some of the uncertainties of the late RV, give the sense that the 
ideas are indeed speculation, different attempts to frame solutions to real 
puzzles.134 
 
This change in perspective allows for a more nuanced interpretation of the 
relationship between karma and jñāna, particularly with respect to the practical 
employment of language they each entail. While the distinctions between the 
Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads is basically summarized in terms of the direction in 
which each collection’s focus seems primarily oriented by matters of style and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Houben 1997: 64. 
134 Jamison and Witzel 1992: 75-76; emphasis added. 
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content, this difference encompasses within it certain assumptions regarding 
performative practices of revelation.135 More precisely, to the extent that it bears 
upon the immediate interpretation framing the Āraṇyakas in historical view, this 
shift allows these canonical texts to be seen as active instances of the worldviews 
they communicate: there is understood to be a sympathetic relationship between 
their theoretical and pragmatic aspects, in which the objective structure of the 
texts takes on the added significance of the subjective meaning that arises in 
terms of the transformative practices enacted by their human subjects. Although 
such an introduction of practical considerations into the space of language 
certainly advances textual interpretation in promising directions, there exists a 
significant inheritance of scholarly assumptions about the validity of experience 
that can also result in serious reductions where the creativity and subjectivity of 
human participants involved in ritual performance – such as that foregrounded by 
the Brāhmaṇas – is concerned. This occurs particularly when the outward 
orientation and repetitious nature of ritual acts are taken to indicate a less-intense 
mode of personal encounter and even privileging of rote memorization over direct 
experiences of realization. This often-unchallenged binary posits discreet models 
of the human subject, one structured around an exacting preservation of tradition 
and a conceptualization of knowledge as rigid and impersonal, the other around 
individualized or spontaneous behaviour and careful discernment of scripted 
learning from true insight; moreover, it has led to a curious discontinuity of 
interpretation in which the repetitive character of ascetic or meditative practice is 
widely held to culminate in direct experience, but the repetitive character of 
Vedic recitation is not. 
 Although written with an eye for the Buddha’s critical conceptualization 
of Brahmanical culture, as portrayed in the Pali canon, Sue Hamilton’s 
description of Vedic ritual during the Upaniṣadic period is a useful entry point 
into the way that the particulars of textual performance can implicate a denial of 
personal affectivity. This raises the question of to what extent such impressions 
arise from the manner in which these ancient materials are received or interacted 
with by modern scholars, that is, as written documents, apparently determinate, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 See the description of the Upaniṣads and their pragmatic dimensions in Brereton 1990. 
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passive and inert objects that are available to be read regardless of time or place, 
rather than as sensory events whose reception involves heightened perceptual 
reciprocity, restricted circumstances, and extensive prerequisite training. 
Hamilton, like many other scholars, identifies the unnecessariness of 
practitioners’ insight into true meaning with the inherently powerful nature of 
Sanskrit itself, as a language of revelation that obviates Brahmanical ritual of any 
requirement of actual human understanding or subjective contribution. Viewed 
from this perspective – which, it must be noted, is suggestive of the rigorous 
epistemological standards demanded by Pūrvamīmāṃsā – the isolation of all 
human physiological and psycho-mental processes from the Veda equates to a 
positive assertion of the latter’s unlimited and independent reality. Hamilton 
states: 
 
The language of all the ritual instruction manuals, and the language of the 
verbal rituals themselves, Sanskrit, was…closely guarded by the brahmin 
priests. This was because it was, and still is, believed that the language of 
Sanskrit is intrinsically correlated to the structure of cosmic Order. Thus it 
was that the Sanskrit sounds uttered at the sacrifice had the consequence of 
maintaining, in the sense of continually re-crafting, that cosmos… The 
nature of the rituals was such that what their preservation required above 
all else was memorization: it was the action qua action that brought the 
consequence, so what mattered was that each movement or verbalized 
word or sound had to be accurate. Beyond believing that correctly 
performed rituals brought corresponding results, meaning was neither 
required nor sought.136 
 
Hamilton’s account is suggestive of a significant separation between the speaker 
and the spoken text of ritual in which a Brahmin priest’s possession of sacred 
knowledge amounts to a secondary ownership, via memorization, of a 
predetermined linguistic object, and thereby does not require any primary, active, 
or direct engagement with meaning as a prerequisite to the authenticity of verbal 
activity. While this may amount to a more or less accurate depiction of 
generalized Buddhist sentiments on the epistemological – and hence 
soteriological – matters of insight, knowledge, and true or honest speech, it falls 
short of providing a satisfactory interpretative basis on which to understand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Hamilton 2000: 46. 
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Brahmanical practices of recitation. This is not only because it fails to address the 
nuanced context of the criticism, namely, its equal application to others including 
those of the Buddhist fold who engage in discourse without the proper basis, thus 
redirecting it away from its intended target in individual conduct and instead 
toward Vedic ritual overall. It also ignores the equivalent Brahmanical insistence 
on the one “who knows thus” (ya evaṃ veda), as it likewise does the Buddhist 
acknowledgement of true Brahmins who are spiritually advanced practitioners 
whose teaching is consonant with the authenticating requirements of direct 
perception.137  
Additionally, Hamilton’s summary of the relationship between person and 
practice does not appear to take into consideration early Indic conceptualizations 
of personhood and embodiment, and therefore arguably fails to accord with 
indigenous views of the person (puruṣa) as changing and constituted under the 
influence of all environmental conditions and activities, which would 
categorically include practices of recitation as a mode of self-formation.138 It is 
therefore interesting to note that just as Hamilton’s assumption of a person that 
can exist in autonomous and unaffected isolation from their active undertakings 
stands in significant contrast to traditional Buddhist and Brahmanical views, it 
similarly diverges from the findings of modern biomedical research into 
embodiment and neurophysiological functions. This is because such a perspective 
on memorization drains the human subject of any attribution of what Damasio 
terms “the feeling of knowing” that arises whenever an organism is involved with 
the processing of an object,139 firstly, and secondly denies that object (here, the 
Sanskrit language) the ability to actively provoke and engage a sensory response 
from those participating in recitation – in Hamilton’s words: “So used were they 
to the exoteric and repetitive requirements of the sacrifice, which they were able 
to preserve and practice so meticulously, that the necessity for experiential insight 
seemed beyond many of them.”140 Alongside phenomenological discussions of the 
reciprocity between internal and external sensory milieux, modern scientific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 See discussion in Aklujkar 2003: 8. 
138 F. Smith 2006a: 18-23. 
139 Damasio 2000: 26. Cf. Abram 1996: 56. 
140 Hamilton 2000: 46.  
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insights again indicate that an opposing line between exoteric and esoteric may 
not be so easily drawn as Hamilton’s comments suggest, while the characteristic 
of repetition promotes deeply engrained perceptual adaptations involving 
heightened sensitivity, awareness, and response. The implications of such 
findings for a revised interpretation of recitative practices and their suggestion for 
the significance attributed to language in cosmological traditions is further 
examined below. 
 By isolating the activity of ritualized recitation from the awareness-states 
of insight and understanding, Hamilton signals a characterization of genre drawn 
along the axes of epistemology and intentionality, or the desire to protect the 
Saṃhitās through mechanically accurate techniques of preservation and extend 
control through the appropriation of mystical teachings, in opposition to an 
authentic interest in self-cultivation through direct experience. As a conceptual 
pairing, this renders human experience irrelevant to a definitive relationship 
between religious practice and revelatory text, and reduces the more esoteric 
inclusions contained in the Brāhmaṇas – the Āraṇyakas – to little more than an 
interested Brahmanical attempt at retaining religious dominance by the extension 
of “their remit from sacrificial teachings to include the teachings of yogic 
practices.”141 A similar example of scholarship in which the intertwined practices 
of memorization and recitation drive an hermeneutic separation of the 
meaningfulness of language from its basis in human being occurs in Barbara 
Holdrege’s comparative study of the “textuality of scripture” in Brahmanical and 
Rabbinical traditions of revelation. As in the analysis offered by Hamilton, albeit 
conducted from a different orientation, Holdrege presents a case of interpretation 
in which the very turn to epistemology, the place of knowledge and valid 
perception in Brahmanical ritual, is what voids the ground of a need for personal 
understanding or, rather, relocates the centre of that understanding from the ritual 
participants to their predecessors whose revelatory visions establish the substance 
of the hymns contained in the Saṃhitās. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Ibid. Hamilton rejects out of hand the possibility that Brahmanical religion had an underlying 
person-centered aspect: “by extending their remit they were able to retain religious control as their 
religion evolved. What this meant was that though the new yogic path was essentially about 
personal experience, within the Brahmanical religion it was taught by priests whether they had 
themselves experienced it or not.” 
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Beginning with the contention that form and content do not suffice to 
define scripture as a general category because, “in certain traditional 
representations of Veda and Torah, scripture is depicted not simply as a textual 
phenomenon but as a cosmological principle that is inherent in the very structure 
of reality,” Holdrege extrapolates an epistemological paradigm based on a model 
of relational coherence involving the ṛṣis’ cognition of the Veda and the motive 
force of Vāc, deified speech. 142  This paradigm is intended to explore the 
connection between the functional historical dimensions of scripture and its 
cosmological status: building upon the observation that in the Saṃhitās the ṛṣis’ 
awareness is directly penetrated by Vāc in a process unfolding as the Veda, 
Holdrege contends that the Brāhmaṇas are instead distinguished by their 
employments of series of connections (bandhu) that serve to establish the 
sacrificial officiants as present-day counterparts of the primordial seers. As such, 
they are not considered to undergo personal processes of insight and revelation, 
but rather as continuing this project by means of appropriation. What Holdrege 
refers to is viniyoga, a process that Jamison describes as a systematic recycling of 
Saṃhitā material in which mantras are extracted from the larger (and presumably 
original) context of entire hymns and applied to new ritual situations. In 
Jamison’s words: 
 
the very fact that [the mantras] were being used and re-used marks a 
crucial shift in the ritual culture, as we assume that Rigvedic hymns were 
composed for each new ritual occasion… In classical Śrauta ritual, by 
contrast, fixed liturgies were constructed from older verbal materials, 
rather than being newly and freely composed. Though these liturgies often 
employed complete Rigvedic sūktas (especially in the long recitations 
known as śāstras), quite frequently individual ṛcs were plucked from their 
original context and applied to a different purpose, chosen for reasons 
often unrelated to their subject matter, reasons that are sometimes merely 
mechanical… Thus, already within the Vedic period the text of the Rig 
Veda had become radically deconstructed, dissolved into thousands of 
independent units available to be mined and recombined for other 
purposes. So even in its own restricted tradition the integrity of the hymn, 
the sūkta, was not always respected.143 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Holdrege 1996: 5. 
143 Jamison 2007: 53; emphasis original. 
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While the central problematic addressed by Jamison relates to the preference 
shown for the treatment of ṛc-based textual units over complete sūktas by later 
texts appended to the Veda, Holdrege’s concern is with the way that the ongoing 
re-presentation of Vedic mantras acquires a functionally revelatory status by 
means of the relational intersection between the texts’ restricted performance and 
their cosmological significance. The contours of this engagement of primary 
evidence mined from Brahmanical and Rabbinical texts with the suggestively 
Judeo-Christian theological distinction between original and dependent 
revelations informs an underlying perception of a qualitative demarcation 
separating the Saṃhitās from the following three phases of Vedic revelation, 
which Holdrege defines collectively in terms of “scripture” – a “relational 
category, which refers not simply to a text but to a text in relationship to a 
religious community for whom it is sacred and authoritative.”144 The Brāhmaṇas, 
Āraṇyakas, and Upaniṣads are thus unlike the primordial mantras and sūktas, the 
visionary disclosure of which through the medium of the ṛṣis is without 
cosmological precedent, for they take the original revelation together with its 
reception as a fixed point of reference while their respective receptions of it 
evidence ongoing transformation and change.  
To the extent that this distinction emphasizes the reception of the Veda as 
a definitive expression of the relational dynamics that frame scripture, Holdrege’s 
analysis of the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads (she does not address the Āraṇyakas 
specifically) centres on religious behaviours and their implications for the 
subsequent characterisation of each spiritual community. This boosts the 
perception of the fundamental irreconcilability of karma and jñāna; as she states, 
unlike the priests of the karmakāṇḍa, who appropriate revelation through reciting 
and hearing, the “exponents of the jñānakāṇḍa seek direct realization of that 
transcendent reality which is the source and abode of the Veda”145 – a variety of 
reception reflected in their scriptural correlates, the Upaniṣads, which 
demonstrate “little concern with the earthly manifestation of the Vedic mantras as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144  Holdrege 1996: 4. For a discussion of the theological distinction between original and 
dependent revelations, see Tillich 1951: 126. 
145 Holdrege 1996: 343. 
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recited texts that form a part of the sacrificial order.”146 Elsewhere expanding 
upon this distinction, Holdrege continues to define the major preoccupation of the 
Brahmanical tradition as being with “sound over meaning, memorization over 
understanding, and recitation over interpretation.” 147  According to her 
explanation, this is because: 
 
Brahmanical paradigms for the theurgic efficacy of Vedic sacrifice and 
recitation provide a cosmic rationale for the priority given to recitation 
over interpretation as the proper method of transmission and study of the 
Vedic mantras. The creative power of the Vedic mantras resides in their 
sounds, not in their discursive meaning, and thus the principle focus of the 
brahmin reciters must be to reproduce accurately the primordial sounds 
that are held to have been originally cognized and recited by the 
archetypal ṛṣi, the creator [Prajāpati] himself, in his cosmos-creating 
activities.148 
 
Although the analysis offered by Holdrege falls within the parameters of a 
broadly cosmological model of religion, her treatment of memorization and 
recitation as mimetic appropriations of Prajāpati’s experience of illumination 
rather than as affective or enactive in their own right marks a significant break 
with this paradigm, which on the contrary argues that the precise relationship 
between the archetype of the human ṛṣis’ proper positioning in the cosmos and 
the practices of Brahmanical priests serves to establish memorization and 
recitation as a performance of the memory of tradition, and therefore as no less 
personal or interior or transformative than contemplative approaches to 
realization.149 Additionally, this selective adoption of a cosmological framework 
results in the prioritization of the ideological and conceptual attributes of 
Brahmanical ritual, masking its relationship to the fundamental emic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Ibid.: 65. 
147 Ibid.: 346; emphasis original. 
148 Ibid.: 351. 
149 See Flood 2004: 10-11: “Cosmological religion provides a map and a route from which 
individual life-ways can be constructed.” This involves methods of internalization or 
personalization by means of which the macrocosm and its processes are found, paralleled and 
reflected in the microcosm and its processes, and are thereby ritually enacted. This enactment, 
which Flood terms the “performance of the memory of tradition,” is considered internalizing and 
ritualized whether it involves outwardly physical gestures or internal contemplative states, as both 
are behaviours that ultimately locate the person in appropriate relationship to the cosmos 
regardless of the particular attitude to ritual. In Flood’s words (ibid.): “Subjectivity and interiority 
recapitulate cosmology.” 
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understandings of human existence that render it both effective and coherent as a 
mode of soteriological practice that creatively reveals self and world 
simultaneously. As a site of engagement between revelation and the recovery of 
true identity, it is embodiment that directs attention back to the central 
problematic of language and its role in defining the Āraṇyakas. 
 
 
Experience and Embodiment 
 
One of the leading difficulties that has encumbered efforts to reach a 
comprehensive definition of the Āraṇyakas is, as can be detected in the accounts 
examined above, the ambiguity surrounding the relationship of language to 
experience. This is largely the result of a perceived irreconcilability of the 
cognitive to the non-cognitive, or of the pre-given and therefore anonymous and 
delimiting character of communication to the immediacy and unbounded 
ineffability of raw personal feeling. It will be argued here that these are 
conceptual constructs established upon culturally relative assumptions about 
language as a referential system and the human subject as a psychophysical 
entity, and as such are neither inevitable nor universally applicable. Rather, they 
are properly open to adaptation in accordance with context and the ongoing 
revisions suggested by modern scientific research in the form of an open-ended 
dialogue between emic and etic views. This is significant because, in its 
challenging of the cultural and intellectual biases that underpin the prevailing 
uniform model of language, it creates the space needed for indigenous claims to 
be genuinely considered rather than inadvertently dismissed. 
 Returning in depth now to the question of experience raised in the 
previous chapter, it is pertinent that a number of scholars have in recent decades 
brought into question the very “notion” of experience as a viable approach to the 
interpretation of religion. 150  As described by Sharf, following Proudfoot, 
experience – and especially religious experience – is a concept that can be traced 
no further back than the late-nineteenth century work of the German theologian, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 F. Smith 2006a: 16. 
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Friedrich Schleiermacher.151 The validity of personal religious experience as such 
is seen to depend on highly specific cultural contexts, by extension of which its 
application in relation to Indian religious culture is envisaged as an issue of 
doctrinal concern that arose in the textuality of Asian religions as a form of 
response and resistance to the pressures of modernity. According to Sharf’s 
summary: 
 
The interest in religious experience among twentieth-century Asian 
intellectuals is not difficult to fathom. …Castigated as primitive, 
idolatrous, and intellectually benighted, Asian religion was held 
responsible for the continent’s social, political, and scientific failings. This 
is the context in which we must understand the Asian appropriation and 
manipulation of the rhetoric of experience. Men like Radhakrishnan and 
Suzuki would not only affirm the experiential foundation of their own 
religious traditions, but they would turn around and present those 
traditions as more intuitive, more mystical, more experiential, and thus 
“purer” than the discursive faiths of the West. …This strategy had the 
felicitous result of thwarting the Enlightenment critique of religion on the 
one hand and the threat of Western cultural hegemony on the other.152 
 
Experience, from this perspective, is conceived of as a Western notion utilised by 
Indian intellectuals to the end of asserting a nation-wide cultural identity rooted in 
the image of tradition. More precisely, the configuration of experience as a 
touchstone in this particularly crafted narrative of contemporary Hinduism’s 
esteemed and ancient pedigree appears to be only of twentieth-century vintage. 
Sharf deploys this as an illustration of a broader trend in religious hermeneutics, 
which he asserts is unfounded. He states: 
 
I have suggested that it is ill-conceived to construe the object of the study 
of religion to be the inner experience of religious practitioners. Scholars of 
religion are not presented with experiences that stand in need of 
interpretation but rather with texts, narratives, performances, and so forth. 
While these representations may at times assume the rhetorical stance of 
phenomenological description, we are not obliged to accept them as 
such.153 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Sharf 1998: 98; Proudfoot 1985: xiii; cf. Habermas 1999: 135. 
152 Sharf 1998: 102-103. See also his comments on p. 100: “In the end there is simply no evidence 
of an indigenous Indian counterpart to the rhetoric of experience prior to the colonial period.” 
153 Ibid.: 111. 
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Although the accuracy of Sharf’s pin-pointing of an appropriation of the Western 
rhetoric of religious experience by modern Hindu intellectuals is beyond a doubt, 
neither he nor Halbfass, whose essay “The Concept of Experience” he largely 
follows, are concerned to outline its particular context-relative validity as a 
development that is associated specifically with the Brahmo movement in late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century Bengal. 154  This is significant. Like 
Halbfass and Sharf, Brahmo intellectuals constructed a model of experience 
based on the major commentaries and epistemological concerns of the classical 
śāstric tradition while eschewing discussion – and, in the case of the Brahmos, the 
living practices – of personal experience, such as emphasised by the yogis and 
tantrics who were marginalised and intellectually discredited under British rule.155 
 A few historical details will suffice to indicate the anachronism involved 
here. As attested by the ethnographic surveys commissioned by Francis 
Buchanan, a British civil servant, in the early 1800s, there is a notable absence of 
evidence for the existence of the sanātana dharma or “old-time religion” prior to 
the nineteenth century, and it appears to have its base not in the Sanskritic 
tradition but in a Rāmaite form of Vaiṣṇavism that looks especially to Tulsidās’ 
Rāmcaritmānas as its core text.156 According to reports compiled by the Bengali 
pundits commissioned by Buchanan in a village of Bihar considered to be a 
typical representative of religious distribution in the region, one-fourth of the 
population’s religious affiliation consisted  of the worship of predominantly 
female village deities; these people and their practices were termed “unworthy of 
the note of any sage” and have been identified by David White as socially and 
culturally marginalized tantric practitioners.157 Of the remaining three-quarters of 
the population considered “worthy of note,” one-sixteenth were noted as 
Kabīrpanthīs; three-sixteenths followed the “sect of Nānak”; one-eighth were 
identifiably Vaiṣṇava; another eighth, Śaiva; and a full one-fourth were Śākta, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Halbfass 1988: 378-402. For a thorough overview of Neo-Vedāntic developments in the 
Brahmo Samaj, its interactions with Western spiritualism and transcendentalism, and peculiar 
influence on the intellectual representation of India’s religious culture, see De Michelis 2004. 
155 Singleton 2010: 35-53. 
156 Lutgendorf 1991: 363. 
157 White 2003: 5. 
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devotees of the Goddess in the form of Śakti.158 In addition to this, Buchanan 
records his own observation that a majority of pundits surveyed in the districts of 
Patna and Bihar were “Tantriks” who worshipped Śakti as their chosen divinity, 
while increasing numbers of Brahmans serving as Vaiṣṇava gurus were only 
recorded as he moved further northwest toward Ayodhya.159 These statistics lead 
White to make the following pointed conclusion: 
 
In other words, less than one hundred years prior to the “Rāma-fication” 
of this part of the “Hindu heartland,” less than 10 percent of the total 
population, and one-eighth of the middle- and upper-middle-class 
religiosity reflected in Buchanan’s survey, considered itself to be 
Vaiṣṇava, while over 40 percent were either Tantric or Śākta.160 
 
The historical inaccuracy of both the recent scholarly denials of experience and 
the Brahmos’ earlier formulation of it as being meditation-based are brought into 
sharp relief when it is recalled that dependence upon the sensory dimensions of 
permeable embodiment is not only a defining characteristic of tantric and yogic 
practice, but closely if not inseparably related to what David Shulman has 
referred to as the “mental economy” behind a spectrum of South Asian traditions, 
a driving force of self-transformation that has in numerous cases been defined in 
explicit opposition to the variety of sense-denying transcendence popularised 
through Vedānta.161 
 Despite their basic differences, it is therefore still observable that where 
Vivekananda, Radhakrishnan, and other prominent Neo-Vedāntins constructed a 
vision of religious culture that depends upon a particular foregrounding of śāstric 
knowledge and privileging of transcendent meditative experience over the 
practices of the religious majority, Sharf and Halbfass have in some degree 
continued this project through their adherence to a particular constellation of 
śāstras as the authoritative texts of tradition and disinclination to consider the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Pinch 1996: 82-92. 
159 Ibid.: 37. 
160 White 2003: 5. To this may be added the following observation by Sanjukta Gupta and Richard 
Gombrich (1986: 123): “[The Vedic] stratum of ritual has never become wholly obsolete, but 
throughout Hinduism it has long been overlaid with the ritual of the monotheistic sects, ritual 
which is accurately known as tāntrika.” Sir John Woodroffe gives a similar statement; see Avalon 
1960: 1. 
161 Shulman 2012; White 2009: 38-48. 
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dearth of ethnographic, textual, art historical, and other evidence that attests to the 
centrality of embodied religious experience in South Asian culture.162 This is 
particularly the case in the work of Halbfass, who, taking his lead from these 
Neo-Vedāntin philosophers, focuses almost exclusively on Śaṅkara’s 
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya as the final authority on the role of experience (anubhava, 
brahmānubhava) in the soteriology of the Veda. Halbfass does not consult either 
non-śāstric models for the interpretation of Vedic texts or question the extent of 
the applicability of the formal exegetical notion of apauruṣeyatva – the 
unauthored status of the Veda – outside of the bounded context of śāstric 
epistemology.163  This reliance on Śaṅkara and the influences inherited from 
Pūrvamīmāṃsā allow him to form an assessment of the Veda as utterly and 
transcendently isolated from the subjectivity of its human recipients. 
 
[Instead] of being a documentation  of subjective experience, the Veda is 
an objective structure which guides, controls, and gives room to legitimate 
experience, as well as legitimate argumentation… It is an objective, 
transpersonal epiphany, an authorless, yet didactically well-organized 
body of soteriological instruction.164 
 
To quote Frederick Smith, this leaves us with the question of whether it is 
“actually the case that the elites whose discourse controls the “isms” also control 
the experience?”165 According to the proliferation of texts and practices that attest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 See discussion in Singleton 2010: 41-49 and De Michelis 2004: 178-80. The justification of this 
particular grouping of Sanskrit texts drawn upon by the Brahmos (especially those assigned to the 
philosophical tradition of Yoga by Vivekananda) is historically peculiar, but it intersects 
relationally with the intellectual preference for so-called “canonical texts” established by early 
Indologists. Cf. F. Smith 2006: 5-6. 
163 Gachter’s observation – that there might be individuals or groups who were authorities within 
the Vedic tradition, but no authorities who stood over the Vedic tradition – applies well here 
(1983: 80). Laurie Patton, for example, points out that “despite Mīmāṃsā’s influence in many 
areas of Vedic interpretation, the question of authorship has not been erased…despite Mīmāṃsā’s 
strategies, the rishis are nonetheless discussed in a number of Vedic texts” (1994: 282). For a 
discussion of the pragmatic aspects of apauruṣeyatva, I direct the reader to Clooney 1987: 673-74 
and 1990: 168; see also Jamison 2007: 28. 
164 Halbfass 1988: 398. I note the critique of this approach offered by F. Smith, who states (2006: 
17-18): “In spite of Sharf’s and Halbfass’s observations that personal inner experience is a notion 
imported to interpretations of Asian religious phenomena by Western and Western-informed 
scholars and practitioners, I contend that the removal of the role of individual inner experience, or 
subordinating it to a normative context, is another kind of ill-conceived construction of the object 
of study.” 
165 F. Smith 2006a: 43: “To say that brahmanism or Christianity inculcate control is to say that the 
human desire and capacity for exotic empowering experience is kept within manageable, 
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to the power of revelatory language as an agent and witness of personal 
transformation, it seems clear that the answer is they do not.166 I would argue that 
while we are certainly not obliged to accept the phenomenological descriptions 
contained in Vedic texts, their rejection out of hand fails to constitute a secure 
methodological stance. 
 
Language and Control 
 
It is by now evident that Sanskrit is frequently interpreted as a tool of social 
control – a wide category of influences that observes the instilling of restrictions 
on behaviour, broadly understood, both within the narrow fold of the 
Brahmanical elite and across South Asian society at large, and extending from 
active or forceful inculcation to a more passive inheritance of cultural ideology. 
Surveyed from such a perspective, Sanskrit is an integral part of an historical 
trajectory of normativising influences, typically seen to flow from the top down, 
in which the erasure or devaluing of particularity, idiosyncrasy, and other 
expressions of personal (non-“Sanskritic”) identity establishes a common 
denominator linking language to control. 
 While the compelling nature of Sanskrit when seen in this light (as a 
discourse, as value-laden, as authoritative, as prescribed) may account for its 
pervasiveness in the textual culture of South Asia’s religious traditions, the 
equation between Sanskrit and the denial of individual expression is not able to 
explain the high personal stakes, the affective charge or emotional appeal, 
involved in its ongoing employment in self-transformative practices, past and 
present. Because this has a direct impact not only on the way that Vedic texts are 
defined, but also on the types of evidence they are thought to contain, and thus 
searched for, it is necessary at this point to ask whether this gap between 
Sanskrit’s authority and its affectivity is, in fact, a lacuna in our understanding of 
revelation – a scholarly oversight in need of redressal – or fully justified by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
recognizable limits. In fact, however, is it actually the case that the elites whose discourse controls 
the “isms” also control the experience?” 
166 Shrinivas Tilak (1994: 143) emphasizes the fact that the Mīmāṃsāka perspective on language 
“differs radically from the view of language favoured by the non-Mīmāṃsākas, who saw language 
as a tool for manipulating or transforming consciousness.” 
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view of the Veda as denaturalized and experience as ineffable or precognitive. 
Here again, Sharf provides an exemplary statement of the latter perspective: 
 
I have suggested that it is a mistake to approach literary, artistic, or ritual 
representations as if they referred back to something other than 
themselves, to some numinous inner realm. The fact that religious 
experience is often circumscribed in terms of its nondiscursive or 
nonconceptual character does not mitigate the problem: that nothing can 
be said of a particular experience – that is, its ineffability – cannot in and 
of itself constitute a delimiting characteristic, much less a phenomenal 
property. Thus, while experience – construed as that which is 
“immediately present” – may indeed be both irrefutable and indubitable, 
we must remember that whatever epistemological certainty experience 
may offer is gained only at the expense of any possible discursive meaning 
or signification. To put it another way, all attempts to signify “inner 
experience” are destined to remain “well-meaning squirms that get us 
nowhere.”167 
 
Sharf does not deny the reality of experience to one undergoing it, but rather the 
plausibility of its observation and analysis through the signifying properties of 
language. He describes an impasse between linguistic representation and 
experience itself, locating a problem in the very rhetorical logic undergirding 
appeals to directly perceived phenomenal events; as he states: “The word 
“experience,” insofar as it refers to that which is given to us in the immediacy of 
perception, signifies that which by definition is nonobjective, that which resists 
all signification. In other words, the term experience cannot make ostensible a 
something that exists in the world.”168 This widespread view of literary, artistic, 
and ritual forms as representations presupposes a divorce between reflection on 
experience and the immediacy of live experience, according to which the former 
is a priori framed as entirely theoretical and reduced to an abstract and 
disembodied, for cognitive, activity, while the latter is dismissed as irretrievable. 
It is important that this critique of language with its post-Hegelian separation of 
meaning and being is not conflated with the principle of ineffability, which has 
made its way into studies of the Upaniṣads in their identification by (primarily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Sharf 1998: 113-114. 
168 Ibid.: 113; italics original. 
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Western) scholars as mystical texts.169 This, which is more precisely known in 
terms of the twinned issues of aporia and apophasis, poses a distinct logical 
paradox involving, on one hand, the doctrine that “nothing in principle can be 
said” about the nature of an absolute reality that transcends all form, and, on the 
other, the contradiction between the unitive character of mystical experience as a 
mode of awareness and the duality, if not multiplicity, assumed of both the 
process of knowing with its mental screens and the fundamentally differentiating 
operations of language.170 As Kripal notes, a pronounced tendency of academic 
discussions of mysticism and language is to treat the mystical as a universal 
phenomenon that must, by very necessity of being what it is, be free of the 
trappings of cultural contextualization.171 In many cases, however, including that 
of Kripal’s maintenance of the “inherently dualistic categories of language,” the 
epistemological terms in which these discussions are couched are themselves 
culturally relative and therefore run contrary to the understandings of language 
and subjectivity, and the basic relationship between them, that are claimed by the 
texts.172 We return to these issues in Chapter 4; suffice to say here that such 
epistemological assumptions are unproductive to the extent that they obscure 
rather than clarify the connections between Sanskrit and embodiment that form 
the background to the Āraṇyakas. 
 One of the best-reasoned and also most methodologically sustained 
accounts of the positive relationship between existence, experience, language, and 
texts is perhaps that argued by the anthropologist Thomas Csordas in his study of 
linguistic expressions of religious healing. Csordas’ theoretical approach benefits 
from its development in light of and testing against a wide sample of linguistic 
situations including glossolalia, spontaneous outbursts, narrative accounts, and 
the use of scripted materials, as well as from its considerations of bilingual and 
speech-impaired subjects and the responses of spiritual communities to these 
varied expressions of religious experience. Stated succinctly, the result of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Habermas 1999: 138; see also 139: “Hegel destroys the myth of the given through an analysis 
of the material implications of words and sentences. A language articulates in advance the 
conceptual space of possible encounters with anything in the world.” 
170 Matilal 2002: 66; Kripal 1995: 20-21. I direct the reader to Sell’s (1994) description of 
apophatic language. 
171 Kripal 1995: 18. 
172 Ibid.: 31. 
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Csordas’ findings is the recognition that language occupies and occurs from 
within the same embodied space as is sensorily revealed in direct experience. 
Csordas thus describes his approach as being informed by “the notion of 
experience as a stance from which to understand the nature of human experience 
in culture”: 
 
It emerged from a moment in anthropology when “experience” was 
suspect on the grounds that it was either undefinable or inaccessible. 
Resisting this tendency, I have come to understand experience as the 
meaningfulness of meaning, immediate both in the sense of its 
concreteness, its subjunctive openness, its breakthrough to the sensory, 
emotional, intersubjective reality of the present moment; and in the sense 
in which it is the unmediated, unpremeditated, spontaneous or unrehearsed 
upwelling of raw existence. The anthropological challenge is, accordingly, 
not to capture experience, but to give access to experience as the 
meaningfulness of meaning.173 
 
Csordas’ anthropological perspective – which in various respects recalls the 
arguments forwarded by Paul Tillich over half a century ago in support of the 
phenomenological study of the Bible174 – has the potential to provide a thicker 
description of revelatory language than that offered in the accounts considered 
above because, in its re-grounding of meaning in the active state of existence that 
constitutes embodiment, it allows for a perception of simultaneity between self-
transformative experience and text. Through the dynamics of experience, in other 
words, language becomes “comprehensible as such a self-process” and itself also 
something that is subject to being felt. 175  Following this, texts are able to 
genuinely disclose or reveal because they, via language, are co-extensive not only 
with the existential awareness of the speaker or knower, but also and equally with 
the ground of being itself, regardless of whether this is conceived of in terms of 
divine ultimacy or the scientific, final inescapability of the body. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Csordas 2002: 2. 
174 Tillich 1955: 43: “It is…necessary to analyze from the subjective side of biblical religion and 
to confront it with the subjective side of the ontological task. This confrontation, however, will 
bring us to the point where the positive relation between biblical religion and ontology comes to 
light for the first time.” 
175 Csordas 2002: 4. These observations are redolent of A. L. Becker’s differentiation between 
language and the interior experience he coins “languaging” (2009: 9, 14, 349-350). Becker 
develops this model of languaging in reliance upon the concept of ensimismamiento 
(“inoneselfness”) that is discussed by Ortega Y Gasset (1957). 
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 To these observations must be added a further point: By ostensibly 
proceeding under the influences of the Western phenomenological tradition, 
especially as articulated in Merleau-Ponty’s work on the encounter, or entre-deux, 
of self and world, Csordas’ account of experience allows for the phenomenon of 
bodily “entextualization,” to quote Flood,176 that was mentioned in the previous 
chapter, a process which might be identified with that elsewhere known in the 
biological sciences as structural adaptation and which describes the inter-
subjective transformations that occur in identity when personal subjectivity 
adapts to a trans-personal structure, such as a traditional text like the Veda. This 
accounts for both the objective side of revelation, the fixed point of focus or 
vanishing point of tradition, and its subjective dimension in the form of its 
recipients whose soteriological transformation forms a continuity of revelation 
over time. Furthermore, it preserves the specific cultural contours of the language 
in question; indeed, Elizarenkova’s observation that the Vedic goddess Vāc 
“combines herself in both subject and object, being at once speech (Vedic text) 
and poet (creator of the text)” is noteworthy in this connection.177 Thus it is 
precisely within the subjective character of an experiential upsurge of cultural 
knowledge that the meanings we seek are located. More to the point, it is in the 
transaction between language and person that texts become defined. 
 The modern recognition among cognitive scientists that the body is as 
much a product of culture as of biology, or that, in other words, it is the 
“existential ground of culture and self rather than just their biological substrate,” 
opens the possibility for an understanding of the body’s reality as “religious, 
linguistic, historical, cognitive, emotional, and artistic” in addition to biological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Flood 2009: 87. 
177 Elizarenkova 1995: 20. Again, Tillich’s theological observations are suggestive of the wider 
applicability of this view of revelation. He argues (1951: 109): “Revelation of that which is 
essentially and necessarily mysterious means the manifestation of something within the context of 
ordinary experience which transcends the ordinary context of experience. Something more is 
known of the mystery after it has become manifest in revelation. First, its reality has become a 
matter of experience. Second, our relation to it has become a matter of experience… If nothing 
happens objectively, nothing is revealed. If no-one receives what happens subjectively, the event 
fails to reveal anything. The objective occurrence and the subjective reception belong to the whole 
event of revelation. Revelation is not real without the receiving side, and it is not real without the 
giving side.”  
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and anatomical.178 This boosts an observation that has long been made of India’s 
religious and philosophical cultures, namely, that being and knowing are indeed 
equivalent; as David Shulman observes: “Epistemology shades off into ontology, 
and vice versa: to know the truth is to become that truth, in a transformative and 
experiential manner.”179 What this means for our present purpose, the place of 
experience in the investigation of Sanskrit’s cultural significance, and therefore in 
the definition of Vedic texts, is that language does not exist merely as a by-
product of cognition, but is governed by physical embodiment and coloured by 
cultural perceptions of personhood, and has the ability to instantiate real changes 
in one’s awareness, identity, and perception of their surrounding sensory 
environment. Soteriological advancement, such as that claimed in the Āraṇyakas, 
can therefore be a result of enjoined bodily constructions in which language is 
intentionally employed to act upon the malleable structures of personhood – and 
it can equally be attested to through language, which is generated from within the 
shifting parameters of mind-body awareness that results from lived experience in 
the world and thence may literally embody transformations in personhood.180 
When Sanskrit is seen not only as an object but as a state, a specialized 
knowledge grounded in ordinary biological processes, however these are 
specified by culture – assuming for a moment that this perspective will hold up to, 
and also be fleshed-out by, the information retrieved from the Āraṇyakas – we are 
immediately presented with the question of how that knowing, vis à vis the 
subject undergoing the experience, should inform a remodelling of our own 
accounting of genre. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Csordas 1994, 2002: 3-4; see also Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 4-5; Maturana and Varela 1992: 
211-212; Patel 2008: 3; and Varga 2005: 210. An intriguing study of the body as a reality relative 
to culture, and of the distinct conceptual structures and practices that emerge around these 
understandings, can be found in Kuriyama 1999. 
179 Shulman 1993: 99. Potter reaches a similar conclusion with respect to karman as a metaphor in 
the Sanskrit philosophical tradition; see 1988: 29-30. 
180 See Flood 2009: 78-92, 2004: 8-12; cf. F. Smith’s account of nyāsa, which provides an 
exemplary instance of the intentional employment of language to institute psychophysiological 
changes in the practitioner (2006a: 376). 
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Āraṇyaka and Anukti: Reconsidering Genre 
 
The value of the idea of an encounter between person and world that is also 
definitive of language has been attested through its productive employment in the 
retrieval of emic perspectives across a broad array of religious traditions and 
phenomena, and by its use as a keystone in comparison-based studies linking 
philosophy, science, and traditional worldviews.181 However, if this call to the 
living reality of perception is to be fully realized in academic research, it requires 
that our methodology not only acknowledges but engages with, and thereby 
maintains, the place of language as an expressive intersection between person and 
world. A pertinent methodological implication of these suggestions is therefore 
that the psychophysiological effects generated by the demands of sustained 
recitation, listening, memorization, and so on cannot be merely epiphenomenal to 
the traditional methods of transmitting the Veda, just as the high level of 
structural repetitions characterizing the composition of these texts can be seen to 
serve more than a solely mnemonic function. Technicalities momentarily aside, 
this presently means the recognition that the Āraṇyakas are not inert loci of 
referential meaning so much as instances of revelation in all respects – subjective, 
objective, semantic, and trans-semantic – that move forward from the space of 
personal realization, and therefore both carry the traces of their recipients’ 
embodiment and function affectively in accordance with culturally inherited 
notions of personhood. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that it has come to provide the view of the 
Āraṇyakas that modern Indology treats as representative of the indigenous 
tradition, Sāyaṇa’s reading of the sense of āraṇyaka needs to be addressed. His 
equation of its appellation with an intended restriction surrounding its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 To cite a range of examples: for asceticism in Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism, see Flood 
(2004); for Biblical religion, see Ong (1967, 1982) and Tillich (1951, 1955); for Confucianism, 
Ames (1984), Hall and Ames (1987, 1998), Tu Wei-ming (1972, 1973, 1994); in modern Japanese 
philosophy, Yuasa Yasuo (1987); in tantric Śaivite practice, Flood (2009); in yogic āsana, Morley 
(2001), and on perception and possession in Yoga, White (2009); in kalarippayattu, Zarrilli 
(1998). See also Abram (1996) on phenomenology, ecology, and shamanism; A. L. Becker (2000) 
on linguistics, philology, and identity-formation; J. Becker (2001) on biological analysis in 
ethnomusicology and emotion; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) on cognitive science and 
Buddhist meditation; and Zarrilli (2004) on performance and in-depth engagement of bodily 
awareness. 
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performance and study occurs in verse 5 of his preface to AitĀ 1 and serves as a 
general introduction to the text: 
 
aitareyabrāhmaṇe ’sti kāṇḍam āraṇyakābhidham / 
araṇya eva paṭhyaṃ syād āraṇyakam itīryatām //182 
 
This is the section in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa known as [its] Āraṇyaka. It is 
maintained to be an Āraṇyaka [for] it should only be recited in the 
wilderness. 
 
Further context for his interpretation is suggested by the comment made in verse 
8, which, though addressed specifically to the content of AitĀ 1, indicates in the 
direction of a potentially significant point of divergence with mainstream 
approaches to the language of the text. Sāyaṇa states: 
 
sattraprakaraṇe ’nuktir araṇyādhyayanād iti /183 
 
On account of its studying in the wilderness, it is said of the sattra [that its 
speech is] not to be uttered (anukti). 
 
Given the difficulties presented by this passage, not least of which is absence of 
other recorded instances of anukti either in Sāyaṇa’s commentary or elsewhere, 
our analysis of this term and therefore of this indigenous perspective of the 
language of AitĀ 1 must remain frustratingly incomplete. It is, however, possible, 
to draw some tentative observations. Firstly, the morphology of anukti does not 
carry the same suggestion of negative assessment as can be seen, for example, in 
the Vedic durukta, which is understood to refer to difficult (dur-, “bad, hard”) 
speech that is grammatically improper or otherwise fails to meet the ritually 
authoritative profile of Sanskrit demanded in orthodox ritual.184 Short of other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Sanskrit text reproduced from Phaḍke 1898: 2. Phaḍke footnotes the editorial correction 
pāṭhyam iti samīr[?]cāntaram (ibid.). Keith (1909: 15) gives the variant readings pāṭhyatvād in 
place of paṭhyaṃ syād, and itīryate for itīryatām; cf. Gonda 1975: 423 n.1. 
183 Phaḍke 1898: 3; he notes the variant readings anuktakaraṇādhyayanād and –adhyayanāya hi 
(ibid.). Cf. Keith 1909: 15. 
184  Hans Henrich Hock, “aduruktavākyam (PB 17.9): “Vrātya Prakrit” or Ritual Concerns” 
(presentation, 16th World Sanskrit Conference, Bangkok, Thailand, July 1, 2015). It is interesting 
to note a common denominator underlying both anukti and durukta, namely, their employment in 
respect to ritual practices associated with the little-known and even lesser-understood Vrātyas. To 
my knowledge, the possibility of an intentional connection here has not been explored; this is 
possibly on account of the strict lexical parameters that currently dominate the classificatory 
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instances of its employment coming to light, there does not appear to be reason to 
assume that anukti bears the sense of such a degradation or unsanctioned 
deviation in the quality of the speech utilised in the sattra. What it does plausibly 
indicate, by contrast, is a discernibly different mode of language use, the activity 
or engagement of a distinct quality within language, such as its power to affect its 
participants in particular and potentially dangerous ways. While this quality may 
elude modern linguistic description, it nonetheless accords with the depictions of 
language’s motile force that are contained in the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas and upon 
which their various rituals and teachings arguably depend. The introduction to 
ŚāṅkhĀ 1.1 illustrates this conceptualization: 
 
prajāpatir vai saṃvatsaras tasyaiṣa ātmā yan mahāvrataṃ tasmād enat 
parasmai na śaṃsen net sarveṣāṃ bhūtānām ātmānaṃ parasmin dadhānīty 
atho indrasyaiṣa ātmā yan mahāvrataṃ tasmād enat parasmai na śaṃsen 
ned indrasyātmānaṃ prasmin dadhānīty atho yam evaitam ṛṅmayaṃ 
yajurmayaṃ sāmamayaṃ puruṣaṃ saṃskurvanti tasyaiṣa ātmā yan 
mahāvrataṃ tasmād enat parasmai na śaṃsen net sarveṣāṃ chandasām 
ātmānaṃ parasmin dadhānīti kāmaṃ tu sattriṇāṃ hotā śaṃset pitre 
vācāryāya vātmane haivāsya tac chastaṃ bhavati ātmānaiva tad yajñaṃ 
samardhayati /185 
 
Prajāpati is the year; the Mahāvrata is his body (ātman); therefore one 
should not recite it for another in case they place in the other the body of 
all beings. Now, the Mahāvrata is the body of Indra; therefore one should 
not recite it for another in case they place in the other the body of Indra. 
Now, the Mahāvrata is the body of this person (puruṣa) made of the ṛc, 
yajur, and sāman verses who they complete (saṃskurvanti); therefore one 
should not recite it for another in case they place in the other the body of 
all the metres. One may freely recite it, however, as the hotr̥ of the Sattrins 
or for one’s father or teacher – the recitation is really for oneself alone, 
and with oneself alone does one fulfil (sam-√ṛdh-) the sacrifice. 
 
It may in the second instance be observed that the repeated reference to araṇya in 
verses 5 and 8 of Sāyaṇa’s introduction allows the correspondence between 
araṇya and āraṇyaka to be further pursued. This is because anukti suggests a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
schemata used in Vrātya studies and which restrict textual investigation to mid-Vedic sources, 
thus side-lining both the descriptions of ritual and language given in the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas 
(which do not employ the lexical items and other references that occupy scholarly attention) and 
Sāyaṇa’s reference to anukti (which is chronologically removed). 
185 Sanskrit text reproduced from Pāṭhak 1922: 1. The implications of this passage are discussed at 
length in the examination of language presented in Chapter 4. 
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substantial connection between a quality of language and the placement of a 
spatial restriction around the recitation and performance of the Āraṇyaka. Unlike 
the explicit constraint araṇya eva (“only in the wilderness”), Sāyaṇa’s 
employment of anukti to describe the sattra does not automatically indicate that 
this quality applies exclusively to these liturgical proceedings, but is rather 
contextualised by the turning of his attention to the topic of AitĀ 1, in which case 
it serves to distinguish the transition from Brāhmaṇa to Āraṇyaka by elucidating 
the qualitative difference in their otherwise similar preoccupation with ritual.186 
When taken together as the major guidelines at play in Sāyaṇa’s description of the 
genre, this pair of considerations lead to the conclusion that the term āraṇyaka 
designates a text that can only be recited or studied in the wilderness because its 
language is such that it cannot be openly uttered – a definitive quality that 
identifies a common denominator underscoring the texts’ contents, but which 
otherwise leaves the grounds for inclusion open-ended. The precise variety of the 
Āraṇyakas’ contents, in other words, is undetermined and does not equate to a 
formal set. This, of course, is a tacitly polythetic description, an organizational 
approach to classification that in many respects goes against the reasoning 
employed in the majority of modern approaches to textual definition, which are 
largely monothetic in their outlook.187  To anukti and the narrow constraint 
surrounding their performance might thus be added the further characteristics of 
the Āraṇyakas’ lineage-based relationship to the Saṃhitās, their Vedic 
chronology, their concern with how properly to establish – and, moreover, 
preserve – the moving parts that contribute to the arising of the puruṣa, and their 
attention to both the creative and destructive potential of language alike. These 
aspects of the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas’ emic worldview are examined over the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 See also Sāyaṇa’s comment in his preface to the AitB: tata ūrdhvam atha mahāvratam ity 
ādikam ācāryā ācāryā ity antam āraṇyakavratarūpaṃ ca brāhmaṇam āvir abhūd iti / Āgāśe 1896: 
5. 
187 Jonathan Silk has employed a polythetic approach, which he adapts from anthropology and the 
biological sciences, to great advantage in his discussion of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Silk describes 
the approach thus (2002: 387): “In a Polythetic Class, to be considered a member of the class each 
object must possess a large (but unspecified) number of features or characteristics which are 
considered relevant for membership in that class. And each set of features must be possessed by a 
large number of members of the class. But – and this is key – there is no set of features which 
must be possessed by every member of the class. There is no one feature or set of features 
necessary and sufficient for inclusion in the class. When a class has no single feature or set of 
features common to all its members, it is called Fully Polythetic.” Emphasis original. 
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following chapters. Suffice to say that an immediate benefit of this polythetic 
approach is its ability to account for the Āraṇyakas’ eclecticism without 
destroying their inner coherence in the process. 
 A major issue that arises when anukti is permitted as a veridical or 
ontological reality is that of how it can be made available to study and analysis. 
And it is here that the perspectives provided by cognitive science and 
phenomenology allow the distance between traditional South Asian practices and 
modern theories of linguistic interpretation to be radically shortened. By virtue of 
the interconnections between language, revelation, and the ordinary grounding of 
human being-in-the-world, the Vedic texts with their patterns of recitation and 
ritual employment, and their interfacing with the transformative insights of the 
ṛṣis and ones “who know thus” (ya evaṃ veda), can be perceived as both a site 
and source of  experience. Ostensibly, this is not specific to the Veda, but 
characteristic of traditional attitudes to revelation in terms of a pan-Indic cultural 
complex. Geoffrey Samuel, for example, makes the observation that: 
 
Even if…understanding could be understood as a logical proposition 
outside from the inner transformation, and Indian traditions have been far 
from united over whether this is possible, it is ineffective without the 
transformation: the point is not to assert the logical proposition that one is 
Śiva, or that all is Buddha-nature, but to directly experience the truth to 
which those words refer. The liberating insight is thus not a logical 
proposition but something intrinsic to a patterning or attunement of the 
mind-body system as a whole to the wider universe of which it forms an 
indissoluble part.188 
 
If language is an instance of embodiment that surges forth from within the same 
space as the lived bodily experiences that ground meaningfulness, then linguistic 
meaning can be defined not simply in terms of rules, schema, symbols, tropes, 
customs, texts, and representation, but also and equally in terms of intuition, 
emotion, intersubjectivity, movement, evocation, and texture. 189  In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Samuel 2008: 351. 
189 Csordas 2002: 3-4. I note in particular his assertion that, “No matter how successful literary 
scholars might be in animating texts…textual(ist) interpretations remain reflections of experience, 
slightly to the side of immediacy. The missing ingredient is supplied by the notion of being-in-the-
world, from phenomenological philosophy, insofar as it speaks of immediacy, indeterminacy, 
sensibility – all that has to do with the vividness and urgency of experience…if studies of 
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interpretation of Shulman and Stroumsa, traces of experience are embodied in the 
language of materials that address self-transformation and are available for 
retrieval through “careful hearing, for transformation, like everything else in life, 
has express texture, where the deeper meaning usually lies. We need to note the 
markers of each text – the shifters, syntactical patterns, the words and meters – 
that compose a self, and the persistent metaphors of self-transformation…”190 In 
this view, the sensory and rhythmic qualities of language are understood to 
substantially illuminate not only a text’s proposed meaning and cultural 
significance, but also the personal expectations and experiences of bodily 
encounter that inform original composition, as well as ongoing employment. 
 
Preliminary Conclusions 
 
Although the argument can be made that such sonic and textural, non-semantic 
phenomena as those identified by Shulman and Stroumsa belong to a different 
domain than that of linguistic evidence, it is entirely possible for these 
considerations to influence – and, I suggest, advance – our modern practices of 
reading and translation.191 After all, a distinct vocabulary of orality features in the 
Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas that admits a nuanced soundscape into the way that processes 
of revelation are conceptualized and ritually enacted. It also illustrates the variety 
of forms in which orality occurs, including the recitation or repetition of 
invocations and hymns (√śaṃs); opinions, sayings and teachings that proliferate 
within a body of common lore (ity āha, “it is said…”); revelations spoken by 
archetypal Vedic ṛṣis (tad uktam ṛṣiṇā, “this is said by a ṛṣi”), which are lexically 
distinguished from the announcement (ud-ā-√hṛ) of brahmans or revelatory 
statements by named speakers who are not ṛṣis; the identification of speech and 
breath alike as phenomena that sound out loud (saṃ-√nad); and, together with a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
representation are carried out from the standpoint of textuality, then complementary studies of 
being-in-the-world can be carried out from the standpoint of embodiment” (ibid.). 
190 Shulman and Stroumsa 2002: 9. 
191 See F. Smith’s notes on the technical considerations involved in translating, for example, a 
recitation accompanying the practice of nyāsa (2006a: 383): “It is important to read this in full, to 
translate this simple passage replete with redundancies…The performer, a ritualist familiar with 
the cadences of Sanskrit, is not just reciting a text and connecting the dots between mantra and 
body parts – [he] is training and prompting his body to resonate with the cadences of the text.” 
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distinction between the cosmological associations of reciting silently (upāṃśu) or 
aloud (ucchaiḥ), a differentiation between talking (√bhāṣ), reciting from heart 
(adhīyāna-) and uttering (√jap). To this may be added the frequent reference 
made to teachers as expounders (vaktṛ) and relaters (pravaktṛ) of the knowledge 
contained in the Āraṇyaka (versus the limited use of the titular ācārya), and the 
characterization of teaching as verbal pronouncement (pra-√brū). These 
conservative Brahmanical processes are elaborated by the accompanying 
depictions of the power of language to injure or protect by warding against harm 
or transferring it to one’s enemy, depictions which have often been sidelined as a 
detritus of common superstition and irrational magic whose preservation in the 
canon of śruti is merely by account of their being caught, as if by accident, in the 
Āraṇyakas’ undiscerning net. As will be seen in the following chapters, the 
proposed dividing line between soteriological and magical employments of 
Sanskrit is not always easily traced. The mutability – or mutuality – of this 
boundary points toward a worldview that is religious or cosmological in part by 
including all manner of things within its reach, where orality draws Sanskrit into 
the space of the world, enlivening it with a physically manifest presence against 
which the self either adapts and develops a kind of soteriological coordination, or 
fails to, as in the disintegrative impact of imprecations. 
A close reading of the Āraṇyakas suggests therefore that the significance 
of orality extends beyond the technicalities and social infrastructures required to 
ensure ongoing transmission of the Veda and the rituals around which Vedic texts 
orbit. More importantly for the addressees of these texts, the activity of recitation 
generates the body of the speaker in ways that participate in and bring into focus 
the archetypal dynamics of the cosmos, such that the temporal narrative of human 
life is inevitably established as the immediate context of revelation and platform 
for spiritual attainment, which we examine in Chapter 3. For modern-day scholars 
of the Āraṇyakas, however, orality introduces a distinct set of issues that need to 
be addressed before further examination can take place, for they strongly affect 
our deliberations on text-internal notions of Sanskrit and embodiment, and this 
implicates the way these notions and processes are retrieved, particularly in the 
case of memorization. More than just a practical necessity of oral transmission 
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and its association with mnemonic structures, memorization is about the way a 
text is accessed – and, when considered in this light, the differences between 
being reliant upon reading a printed page and having a text by heart in its original 
language are not only stark but determinative of how information is gathered. 
Memorization entails, firstly, that the whole of a text is present in the memory of 
one who has learnt it. Because all of the parts that constitute its received form are 
simultaneously available to personal recollection, a memorized text is already a 
complete context prior to its being pushed through a framework of structured 
historical delineations: each textual unit is situated contemporaneously against all 
other such units, enhances and relativizes them, and prevents any from standing 
either first or alone.192 
The particularity of these contextual dynamics is something that neither 
chronological reconstruction nor our typical reading practices are suited to 
retrieve. The linear arrangement of textual strata, such as is encountered in a 
book, does not reflect the animated character of being able to bring to mind any 
part of a text, and do so in changeable or spontaneous orders. Such flexibility is 
well-known in Vedic traditions from the emphasis placed on the ṛc, as opposed to 
on the entire sūkta, as the primary textual unit used in ritual and also from the 
metonymic underpinnings of viniyoga, the art of applying these units to novel 
contexts.193 It is suggested again by the differing arrangements in the presentation 
of ritual material in the AitĀ and ŚāṅkhĀ: the cosmological explanations, 
references to ṛcs, and interpolation of mythemes and other grouped units of 
information featured in these texts show internal and external variability in spite 
of the fixed order of proceedings in the Mahāvrata.194 These variations can move 
backwards and forwards across historically differentiated textual strata, as in the 
ŚāṅkhĀ’s interspersion of passages from Books 1 and 5 of the AitĀ; reorder the 
grouping and relationships of thematically similar materials; and differ in their 
degree of focus and detail and placement of emphasis. Again, although the 
presence of interlinear commentarial material has the effect of fixing textual 
sequences, it is equally clear that in the absence of such scaffolding these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Clooney 1996: 22-25. 
193 See Patton 2005. 
194 Cf. the accounts of the Mahāvrata in AitĀ 1 and 5 in comparison with ŚāṅkhĀ 1-2. 
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sequences display a tendency towards rearrangement across historical strata and 
narrative orders.195 It is worth considering whether these variant readings may not 
be symptomatic of faults in transmission so much as indicative of a dynamic 
interaction with pools of memorized and hence simultaneously accessible 
materials, and reflective of the degree to which earlier texts fell under the 
controlling influence of the Brahmanical intellectual elite.196 
The oral transmission of texts situates them in the domains of speaking 
and hearing, and thus memorization, secondly, includes not only words but their 
sonic textures. Texts such as the Āraṇyakas were accessed through a developed 
capacity to physically recall and extract subtleties from lengthy tracts of spoken 
Sanskrit in which the cadence and rhythm of recitation not only heightens but 
may be inseparable from the way semantic meaning is received and understood. 
Total hermeneutic reliance upon reading alone and in silence comes at the risk of 
depleting a text of this richness because the cadences and patterns of sound that 
provide a layer of aural coherence simply go unheard. This silencing of language 
constrains the scope of textual analysis in its failure to engage with sonic features 
that play out in the space of memory as a non-semantic weft of thematic prompts 
that exert influence upon how connections are made and brought to mind.197 In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 A prime example of this is supplied by the formally recognized early Upaniṣads contained in 
the AitĀ and ŚāṅkhĀ. While Śaṅkara composed a separate commentary for the AitU, he did not 
give the KṣU individual treatment, although he does make reference to it several times in his 
commentary on the Brahmasūtra. This difference in circumstance is presumably to account for the 
numerous variant readings of the KṣU, making its transmission “much less faithful than that of 
any other ancient Upaniṣad” (Olivelle 1998: 324). This opinion is echoed in Cohen 2008: 139. 
The AitĀ inclusive of the AitU, on the other hand, has been the subject of a number of 
commentaries, and Keith observes (1909: 1): “Variant readings occur here and there, but none of 
sufficient importance to justify the idea that any different recensions of the text ever existed, and it 
is hardly ever possible to feel serious doubt as to the correct reading. What is especially important 
is that MSS. from both the extreme north – as Bühler’s MS. from Kashmir – and the south agree 
in presenting the same text. Further, the commentary of Sāyaṇa presents the same text as the 
commentaries of Śaṅkara on Books II and III [i.e., the Bahvṛca, Aitareya and Saṃhitā Upaniṣads 
of the AitĀ], and of Ānandatīrtha and Viśveśvara on the same books.” 
196 Cohen (2008: 139-140) suggests that Śaṅkara may not have composed a separate commentary 
on the KṣU by reason of its description of magical rites: “knowledge of magical rites was perhaps 
not the kind of knowledge that he cared to comment on.” This returns us to a point made earlier, 
namely, that it would be anachronistic to impose the epistemological requirements observed in 
formal argumentation upon texts such as the Āraṇyakas. 
197 This discussion is influenced by Clooney’s account of his research into the Śrī Vaiṣṇava poetic 
text, the Tiruvāymoḻi. He states (1996: 58): “By memorization the whole would become available 
all at once, operative in a kind of immediacy that includes, but passes beyond, every individual 
strategy for putting the text in manageable order in one way or another. The memorized text, 
present all at once, becomes the place where the thematic elements are able to play off against one 
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addition, the ignoring of sound can reshape the interpretation of structural 
features. This is particularly evident in the modern analysis of the high density of 
repetition that is a core stylistic trait of middle Vedic texts, where, rather than 
attending to the rhythmicity that arises from the interplay of similar and 
dissimilar Sanskrit sounds, attention is turned to what might be termed the 
fluency or literary sophistication with which information is delivered. Viewed in 
this light, repetitions are seen either pejoratively as merely “repetitive” (viz. 
uninspired) and thus redundant to the message of a text, or pragmatically as 
serving a mnemonic or pedagogic function.198 
An alternative is to see in the relationship between form and content the 
non-accidental communication of a particular worldview. In the case of the 
Āraṇyakas, as of other oral literatures, and especially of revelations of human 
being, form is necessarily extended to include the sounds of speech, which are not 
only non-arbitrary but dynamically brought to life and thus known through the 
intersecting processes of being received and recalled by a human subject. This is 
not to insist that these texts be memorized before they are studied, but rather to 
point out that if our reading practices are adapted to accommodate those aural 
qualities that dissolve into silence when texts are translated, this change in 
approach would offer the grounds for a promising rereading of old data by 
bringing it more fully to light.199 To this end, I reproduce and translate Sanskrit 
passages in full, retaining all redundancies and repetitions; it is to the reader to 
sound them out and find – or hear – their rhythm and role in the organization and 
gradual disclosure of meaning. 
When brought to bear on the primary sources investigated in the following 
chapters, these deliberations on orality inform an approach that seeks to retrieve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
another in an endless series of possible combinations, according to patterns of similarity and 
difference that are bound only by the literary features of the text and then by the reaches of one’s 
imaginative powers.” 
198 Keith provides a classic instance of this type of interpretation in the Introduction to his 
translation of the AitĀ (1909: 54): “But utterly lacking as is the style in precision, balance, and 
elegance, and although the Āraṇyaka is destitute of any attempt at ornament, it has nevertheless a 
certain fitness to its subject-matter. The naïve speculations, the vague guessings after truth, the 
confusion of thought, which make up the matter, are not inadequately mirrored in the harsh 
abruptness and elliptic brevity of the style, and a certain variety is introduced in the frequent 
quotations of verses intended to bear out the argument.” 
199 A. L. Becker 2000: 10-12; cf. Beck 1993: 1-7. 
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the cultural importance of Sanskrit not in its structures and their socio-political 
appropriations, but through the internal affective life that reflects its cosmological 
activity and articulates a textual teleology from which the personal employment 
of Sanskrit in religious practice gains coherency. Chapter 3 turns to the depictions 
of the body in the primary sources, questioning the ways in which the body is 
constructed and controlled, mutates, and undergoes ritualization in the variety of 
instances that fall within the texts’ cosmological breadth of view. These 
considerations take us from descriptions of ontological viability and the 
vulnerability arising from a transactional model of personhood to the multi-
levelled impact of saṃhitā as denoting both revelation and the linkages involved 
in the perfection or completion (sam-√dhā, sam-√ṛdh, sam-√kṛ) of the self. The 
open-ended and subjectivizing affect of this shared vocabulary brings us to the 
matter of the embodied integration of Sanskrit and the individual, which bears 
reflexively upon textual hermeneutics and will be examined in Chapter 4. These 
deliberations in conjunction with the positions forwarded thus far – that the 
parameters ascribed to the study of Sanskrit can fruitfully be expanded, that our 
understanding deepens when existence claims are taken seriously, that embodied 
experience is a keystone to contextualizing revelation – here take on a practical 
weight as they shape the parameters of the linguistic investigation of bandhus and 
questions of translation and interpretation that occupy our final chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Bodies of Revelation 
 
tad uktam ṛṣiṇā / svāṃ yat tanūṃ tanvām airayatety asyāṃ 
śārīryām imāṃ chandomayīm ity eva tad āha / atho tanūr eva 
tanvo astu bheṣajam ity asyai śārīryā iyaṃ chandomayīty eva 
tad āha / 
 
This was said by a ṛṣi: “Since it raised its own body in the 
body” – meaning this one made of meters in this, the mortal – 
“so let just this body be medicine for the body” – this body 
made of meters [is the medicine] of this, the mortal. 
 
AITAREYA ĀRAṆYAKA 1.3.4200 
 
 
 
 
Entering into the Texts 
 
Precisely on account of the fact that we all have one, the body has become one of 
the most discussed and debated categories in postmodern scholarship. This 
interest in the body and its array of potential forms and interpretations are now 
regarded by many, as summarized Csordas,201 to reflect the postmodern concern 
with fragmented meanings and the related attempt to locate a stable center that 
might provide a point of universal reference in historical and cross-cultural 
analysis. Put simply, a vast literature has been generated from the tension 
between the body as biologically common to all humans regardless of time or 
place and its particularity as a culturally constructed phenomenon, with these 
antipodal characterizations becoming increasingly vague as an outcome of 
developments in the apprehension of the body as undergoing continual, volitional 
or non-volitional, and even open-ended changes in chemical structure, anatomical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 For other occurrences of the first part of this passage, see notes in Kubisch 2012: 25. The text 
quoted is ṚV 10.100.10c, and I follow the translations of this line by Jamison and Brereton 2014: 
1559 (vol. 3). 
201 Csordas 1994: xi; cf. Doniger 1997: 167; Flood 1996: 20-23; Turner 1997. 
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appearance and so on, which may further intersect with cultural notions of self-
transformation and other values and priorities.202 
This literature and the dizzying array of considerations which comprise it 
are so large that even a minor foray therein would lead us far afield from the 
primary sources that form the bulk of the material to be examined in the present 
chapter. With this caveat in mind, however, there are two broad trends that bear 
identifying before our examination of body- and language-based practices in the 
Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas can commence. Both paradigms will be drawn upon and 
inform the questions with which the Sanskrit materials are approached; yet, 
remaining in accordance with the propositions outlined at the beginning of this 
study, they are employed in service of the Sanskrit, to extract and elucidate 
existence claims contained therein in ways that make sense and are valuable to a 
modern audience at the same time as maintaining what we understand of their 
traditional, emic, sensibility. As Clooney summarizes in his convincing 
arguments for doing theology among a community distant from our own, these 
efforts to understand will ultimately entail “reopening the old” such that a 
conversation is joined which takes place “across religious [or even just 
commonsensical] boundaries” and through which our questions will be re-asked 
and re-understood, perhaps many times over. In Clooney’s own words: “The goal 
is to participate in a wider conversation, to hear and see more, yet in a way that 
remains recognizable to one’s conversation partners, old and new, without merely 
doing something novel.”203 
The first interpretative trend to be identified follows the genealogical or 
critical approach, most famously developed by Foucault, in which the body is 
perceived as a site of contested power and as subject to being defined or inscribed 
upon by socio-political discourses. To the extent that the body is here seen as an 
effect of deeper structural arrangements – be they symbolic, historical, or 
discursive – any basic ontological coherence it may possess is challenged, 
resulting in a standpoint that “dissolve[s] the body in the discourse.”204 Because 
the body here is inertly subject to being controlled, its power is limited to that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 See the discussion of the body in Turner 1997: 19-20 and Varga 2005. 
203 Clooney 1996: 49-50. 
204 Varga 2005: 224. 
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invested in it by discourse.205 Postmodern scholarship of the critical variety 
reinvests this power by calling upon the body in the destabilization of discourse, 
yet in so doing may simply replace one epistemological program for another: the 
body remains an abstraction and, as such, is not treated as being significantly 
involved in the generation of meaning. As was seen in the previous chapters, this 
trend is particularly apparent in scholarly and political critiques of how elite 
brahmanical codes of dharma and orthodox epistemologies have brought 
cosmological force to bear upon the marginalization of non-Brahmins, their 
languages, beliefs, and practices; its influence is also seen in interpretations of 
brahmanical ritual and recitative practices as no more meaningful than a mere 
following of the rules in isolation from any expression of personal subjectivity. 
The affinity or similarity between this interpretative approach to the human body 
and the approaches to Sanskrit examined earlier is not coincidental; in this 
application the restrictions surrounding Sanskrit and Vedic texts particularly are 
seen to be commensurate with notions of purity and pollution that circumscribe 
the body and attempt to control its vulnerability to chaos.206 As this approach 
questions whether Sanskrit texts can be authentically communicative of truly 
individual thinking, so it draws into doubt whether the heavily ritualized body 
articulated in the texts can authentically be anybody’s. 
A similar concern with the character of the interrelationship between 
language and the body, viz. subjectivity, is taken up by the second of these 
interpretative approaches, but in significantly, substantially different ways. As a 
result of building upon the phenomenological developments of Merleau-Ponty, 
but also by drawing variously from cognitive science, anthropology and biology, 
this second approach sees the body both in and as the context of the lived 
experience of everyday life. The foundational premises of this approach – resting 
on the concept of embodiment and its inevitability within the structures of all 
human processes and productions – were examined in the preceding chapter.207 In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Schilling 1993, especially p. 81; Núñez 1997. 
206 Sanderson 1985 provides a sophisticated example of a critical approach to the interpretation of 
the body and the conceptualized role of text and language therein. 
207 Maturana and Varela’s (1992: 26-27) summary of this perspective in two key aphorisms is 
worth repeating here. Firstly: “all doing is knowing, and all knowing is doing.” Secondly: 
“Everything said is said by someone.” 
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this view, language and the body share inter-subjective space, where the 
subjectivity conceptualized relates to the first-person subject but is necessarily 
remote from Western notions of individuality208; and one emphatic upshot of this 
is that the proposition that all culture is grounded inescapably in the human body 
must be given serious consideration, not only because it is worth thinking about, 
but rather because the body is the final frontier of all we have to think with. As 
the ordinary moorings of the body – including awareness and mentation – are 
what make possible all experience, so all experience, no matter how extraordinary 
or revelatory, must take the shape of lived, embodied experience in the everyday 
life of the subject: the structures of human being, which structure perception and 
conception, entail that even the numinous can only be apprehended within 
biological parameters. Thus whatever is objective, abstract or independent – such 
as discourses, epistemes, and revelations – has “its full being in individual 
persons, in their minds and bodies, not in some abstract realm of Platonic 
ideas.” 209  This does not deny the structures referred to by the critical or 
genealogical approach, but introduces an alternative understanding of subjectivity 
as co-requisite to their effectiveness: “the former is expressed in the latter, and 
the latter is articulated in the former. The text is expressed as body and the body 
articulated in the text.”210 This approach is suited to an examination of the interior 
worldview of cosmological traditions, in which human being coincides with the 
workings of the cosmos and each fulfills the ideal direction of the other within the 
framework of soteriology. 
This chapter first examines embodiment as it appears in certain archetypal 
forms in the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas and indicate a construction of the person – or, 
indeed, a relationship to the self or innermost support of identity – that is 
inseparable from notions of multiplicity and mutability and can be traced through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 For example, see Flood 2006: 1987: “tradition-formed subjectivity must be distinguished from 
Western individuality…subjective transformations occur not through the assertion of individuality 
but through transforming self and body to master and tradition.” 
209 A. L. Becker 2000: 14. See also Núñez 1997: 153: “…the living body is the source of 
experiences, and the history of our experiences defines what the body does and literally shapes 
how the body is. Ignoring the experience of the living body in the study of conscious experience is 
not a simple matter of harmless simplifying assumptions. It is throwing away the subject matter, 
and that is flatly a mistaken move.” 
210 Flood 2006: 4. 
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both narrative and vocabulary. This conceptualization of personal identity as a 
composite structure or multiform opens the doorway to the occurrence of 
transactions between entities of differing substance, which penetrate the boundary 
between natural corporeality and divine incorporeality to endow one with the 
qualities required for the attainment of immortality after death.211 Again, it is 
through the vocabulary employed by the texts that the subtleties of embodiment 
are most strikingly highlighted in both their specificity and conceptual 
sophistication. Furthermore, because these deliberations assume the dynamic 
fluctuations that occur within the living person as a prerequisite to the attainment 
of soteriological goals, they introduce the intersecting matters of temporality and 
its valorization of the person as a knowing structure, the medium in which 
soteriological alterations adhere. Thus, a related matter that must be addressed in 
the same context of fluctuations in embodiment is the possibility of an approach 
to knowledge (prajñā, veda) that sees it encoded within the body, as a 
phenomenon that exerts physical force in its entailment of internal 
reconfigurations. 
We then turn to the strong and determinative influence of these cultural 
understandings on the framing of language and revelation, in particular as 
Sanskrit – pace knowledge – is brought into the body, with repercussions for the 
way that subjectivity is expressed as a textually-specified phenomenon, but as a 
phenomenon whose valence conforms differently before and after death. It is by 
no accident that these fluctuations between embodiment and disembodiment blur 
the lines that demarcate the personal, and properly soteriological, transformations 
endorsed by tradition from the apparently magical practices which lie outside the 
sphere of orthodox ritual. With respect to the multifaceted vision of personhood 
posited by the Āraṇyakas, vulnerability and control are related matters that go 
beyond such a boundary to the question of what these distinct technologies of 
transformation say about the relationship between Sanskrit and experiences of 
embodiment in light of a spiraling cosmos where language has the power to 
create and destroy, and revelation includes the disclosure of both. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Feher 1989: 13; Csordas 1994: 3. 
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Complex Identities and the Vocabulary of Creation 
 
The AitĀ and ŚāṅkhĀ between them contain no fewer than thirty accounts 
dealing with the way that human being is constituted, the bulk of which are found 
in those sections of the texts formally recognized as Upaniṣads. Like many other 
such accounts held in the Upaniṣads, these passages often address their concerns 
in the narrative form of creation stories utilizing sequences of linkages and 
hierarchies that integrate the diversity of worldly phenomena and re-establish it in 
a relationship of irreducible identity with brahman, the all-encompassing 
primordial power that manifests and animates “this all” (idaṃ sarvam). While it is 
undeniable that these appeals to cosmogony and their repeated themes have often 
served as literary tropes, much of value in their detail is lost when they are 
viewed exclusively in light of an Upaniṣadic quest for knowledge and their 
meaning studied in separation from the style in which it is communicated.212 The 
importance of these passages for a contextualized examination of embodiment, in 
other words, lies not only in the vision of an essential self that they finally 
impress upon their audience, but equally in the processes involved in primordial 
creation through which the person is animated. As shall be seen, it is this complex 
of dynamic movements and their repercussions for personal identity, rather than 
the notion of an unwavering eternal ātman, that shape the heart of practices of 
self-transformation and relocate our discussion of Sanskrit from being imposed to 
being emplaced. 
 One of the most complete accounts of embodiment in the Ṛgvedic 
Āraṇyakas occurs in AitĀ 2.4.1-3 (= AitU 1.1), a creation story and exemplary 
instance of a typically Upaniṣadic narrative structure that displays the following 
basic stages: (1) before either being or not-being there was nothing other than 
brahman, an absolute and unlimited power or principle213; (2) brahman decides to 
create (worlds, gods, creatures, etc.), and does so by pouring its desired subject 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Cf. Brereton’s (1990: 120) comments on this narrative.  
213 Not to be mistaken for the brahman of Vedānta, brahman as it appears in the Āraṇyakas and 
Upaniṣads is a broad term or designation for an absolute, eternal and unlimited power or principle 
whose specific conceptualization and associations are variable. 
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forth from itself, which; (3) by various means and phases that may include 
heating, division or emergence, copulation and chain-reactions, the teeming 
multiplicity of this world arises; and (4) this multiplicity is shown to be integrated 
within, permeated by or established upon the singular and fundamental 
comprehensiveness of brahman, to the effect that there are no loose ends or real 
distinctions but only the one true identity. It is the fourth of these stages, in which 
through processes of erasure, reversal and deference a vision of integrative 
totality emerges, considered in conjunction with a turn away from deliberations 
on ritual objects to the subtle internal connections between the macrocosm and 
human body, that is taken as a defining characteristic of the early or classical 
Upaniṣads. For instance, as Brereton states with reference to the passage from the 
AitĀ to which we shall shortly turn: 
 
The correspondence between the microcosm and the macrocosm illustrates 
how the Upanishads fashion a vision of totality through correlation. This 
correspondence unifies the world in the form of the person, and therefore 
makes the world comprehensible as a whole. Furthermore, it also implies 
that the world and the power that controls it are not outside, bearing down 
and threatening the individual. Rather, because the parts of the world are 
equivalent to the parts of a person, humans include everything within 
themselves.214 
 
As alluded above, a note of caution is in order here: while the numerous 
correspondences between the parts and faculties of the body and various 
macrocosmic forms and elements undeniably serve the communication of an 
integrative vision – and, indeed, also bolster the understanding of an evolution in 
soteriological practice emphasizing the direct realization of these esoteric 
connections (upaniṣad) – these connections, and the accounts of their entry and 
departure from the body, have much to say about a conception of personhood 
which is obscured by a singular focus on the transformative discovery of 
brahman through the human subject’s ātman. In other words, interpretative 
priority given to the indivisibility of one’s innermost identity may well remain in 
keeping with the final message of these narratives, but it falls short of accounting 
for the lived reality – better, the soteriological context – of a body whose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Brereton 1990: 122-23. 
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interiorization of primordial macrocosmic elements pends entirely upon its 
penetration by those elements, firstly, and secondly upon their remaining in place. 
Again, the identity or co-extension of a person’s ātman and the universal 
brahman is stable, yet with respect to each embodied person, the stability of this 
identity does not speak for the further layers of identification that are contributed 
by the presence of deities (devatā) in the body, nor for the temporality of their 
involvement with the person within whom they share a locus until either their 
inevitable departure at death or their volitional departure under other 
circumstances. In anticipation of a conclusion to be discussed later in this chapter, 
it may be postulated that this openness of the body, its vulnerability to chaos or 
disordered confusion, informs a further practical impetus in the mode of 
maintaining the cosmos of the body as per a control center; and that this bears 
strongly upon a forceful identity of Sanskrit that is inseparable from the 
permeability of personal embodiment. 
 We return now to AitĀ 2.4.1-3.215 This narrative introduces a number of 
archetypal concerns and paradigms, quite systematically, and its deliberations on 
origins and underlying patterns are worth examining at length. In this beginning, 
“this [world] was a self, one alone, and there was nothing else at all that blinked 
an eye” (ātmā vā idam eka evāgra āsīn nānyat kiñcana miṣat). The self resolves to 
pour forth the worlds (sa īkṣata / lokān nu sṛjā iti //), releasing a group of four 
impressionistic spheres evoking expansiveness and movement: the flood, the 
glittering specks, the mortal, and the waters (ambho marīcīr maram āpaḥ). At this 
point, the narrator’s voice re-enters to explain that what appears abstract is in fact 
a complex map of the cosmos comprising three vertically oriented worlds of 
which the highest and lowest share a symmetrical relationship to unlimited bodies 
of water: “Now the flood is beyond the sky, and its foundation is the sky (or 
heaven); the glittering specks are the space in-between; the mortal is the earth; 
and what is beneath are the waters” (ado ’mbhaḥ pareṇa divaṃ dyauḥ 
pratiṣṭhāntarikṣaṃ marīcayaḥ pṛthivī maro yā adhastāt tā āpaḥ). The self next 
resolves to pour forth keepers of the worlds (lokapāla), and, through a process of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 All translations in this chapter are my own; however, they are influenced by Olivelle’s (1998) 
translations of the early Upaniṣads. 
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heating, catalyzes a series of chain-reactions that systematically weave onto the 
scaffold of worlds just emitted to create a grid of distinct vertical hierarchies 
along with their horizontal counterparts: 
 
so ’dbhya eva puruṣaṃ samuddhṛtyāmūrcchayat / tam abhyatapat 
tasyābhitaptasya mukhaṃ nirabhidyata yathāṇḍaṃ mukhād vāg vaco ’gniḥ 
/ nāsike nirabhidyetāṃ nāsikābhyāṃ prāṇaḥ prāṇād vāyu / akṣiṇī 
nirabhidyetām akṣibhyāṃ cakṣuś cakṣuṣa ādityaḥ / karṇau nirabhidyetāṃ 
karṇābhyāṃ śrotraṃ śrotrād diśaḥ / tvaṅ nirabhidyata tvacā lomāni 
lomabhya oṣadhivanaspatayaḥ / hṛdayaṃ nirabhidyata hṛdayān mano 
manasaś candramāḥ / nābhir nirabhidyata nābhyā apāno ’pānān mṛtyuḥ / 
śiśnaṃ nirabhidyata śiśnād reto retasa āpaḥ // 
 
From the waters alone [the self] drew out man and gave him a solid shape. 
It incubated that man, and from that man so incubated a mouth was 
hatched like an egg; from the mouth hatched speech; from speech, fire. A 
pair of nostrils was hatched; from the nostrils hatched out-breath; from 
out-breath, the wind. A pair of eyes was hatched; from the eyes hatched 
sight; from sight, the sun. A pair of ears was hatched; from the ears 
hatched hearing; from hearing, the directions. A skin was hatched; from 
the skin hatched hair; from hair, plants and trees. A heart was hatched; 
from the heart hatched the mind; from the mind, the moon. A navel was 
hatched; from the navel hatched in-breath; from in-breath, death. A penis 
was hatched; from the penis hatched semen; from semen, the waters. 
 
To summarize, what has been created in this second layer of “pouring forth” 
comprises: the solid and inert form of man, drawn from the waters beneath up to 
the level of earth or the mortal; the orifices/openings, definitive external features 
(hair and skin, as compared with fur, etc.) and major centers (heart, navel) of the 
Vedic body, also inanimate and obtaining at the level of the mortal; a host of 
deities (devatā) that belong to the upper sphere of heaven/sky (div), and which, as 
will shortly be seen, are animate and willful; and various elemental, spatial, 
cosmological and temporal features of the macrocosm that abide in the space 
between (antarikṣa) earth and heaven. Nowhere does the AitĀ indicate that these 
manifestations are to be understood as illusory or that the relationship between 
them is simply one of equivalence or similarity. Each, once emitted, sits aside 
from the original ātman in a state of disembodiment – albeit within its own 
particular kinship-group – but retains the status of an emanation or hypostasis. 
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The body is an exception, for it is characterized by a vacancy made possible by its 
plural affiliations and corresponding lack of self-containment. 
Unlike the person or puruṣa, then, these deities and cosmological forms 
each possess a unique and primordial identity, but it is an identity that is 
incomplete, limited to their status as specific parts within the whole. Nor, it 
appears, is there space for the deities to re-group either vertically or horizontally 
– within or across hierarchical streams – and so together constitute a communal 
identity that would reflect the fullness and limitlessness of the original ātman216: 
the deities, as also the cosmological forms, are like reference-points on the grid of 
worlds; having hatched or broken away from the person, they are implicitly 
isolated by the absence of a suitable dwelling (āyatana) and foundation 
(pratiṣṭhā) on which to realize their ontological viability, or be sustained. This 
differentiation is not stated explicitly, but is inferred on the basis of similar 
patterns in this and other narratives in the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas; it also resonates 
with the Brāhmaṇas’ preoccupation with the lifeless condition of pṛthak.217 If 
accurate, this interpretation would be in keeping with the myths of Prajāpati that 
occur elsewhere in these texts, none among which address jāmi, a symmetrical 
but polar flaw in creation. 
This lack of cohesiveness informs the first of three complications that arise 
in this account, around which each subsequent paragraph is structured. The 
second paragraph in the narrative, AitĀ 2.4.2, thus continues: “these deities that 
had been poured forth fell down into this magnificent foaming sea; [and] it (the 
sea) afflicted that [self] with hunger and thirst” (tā etā devatāḥ sṛṣṭā asmin 
mahaty arṇave prāpataṃs tam aśanāpipāsābhyām anvavārjat). In response, the 
deities demand that the self find them an abode, a physical dwelling, in which 
they can “get established and eat food” (āyatanaṃ naḥ prajānīhi yasmin 
pratiṣṭhitā annam adāmeti). The self brings them a cow, and then a horse; but 
they reject first one and then the other, calling them inadequate (alam). Finally, 
the self brings them a man – the highest of paśu, creatures fit to be sacrificed – at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 The animation of the deities is implicit in the centrality of movement to their physiological 
functions, while the cosmological and other macrocosmic phenomena seem in some sense to 
depend on the deities in order to exist. 
217 See Verpooten 1977. 
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which the deities announce that man indeed is well-made (tā abruvan sukṛtaṃ 
vateti).  
The order of emergence is now exactly reversed, but what this reversal 
achieves is more than just a mirroring and correspondence between the parts of 
the world and the human body.218 This is indicated by the introduction of the verb 
pra-√viś (to enter into, take possession of), which by the time of the Upaniṣads, 
as F. Smith observes, “is used for entry in which the intentionality of entering, 
pervading, permeating, or possessing originates from without, from an external 
agent.”219 In this respect, again citing Smith, pra-√viś replaces the employment of 
ā-√viś in the Ṛgveda, where it is used 
 
not in the simple sense of entry, as a person through a door, but in the 
more abstract sense, beyond the normal physical contexts of entering a 
separate enclosed or semienclosed space. The root ā-√viś in its many 
derivative forms occurs almost entirely in the sense of entities of different 
densities or substantialities penetrating and pervading one another.220 
 
Such an employment of pra-√viś in the sense of an external entity entering and 
taking up possession of another entity, as opposed to indicating a basic return or 
re-entry, is apparent in AitĀ 2.4.2.221 This is because, firstly, the deities are 
external, disembodied, and of an altogether different substantiality to man, who 
they eventually perform their actions through the medium of; and secondly, the 
possession is guided externally, in this case under the instruction of the ātman, 
but later through the volition of the deities themselves. Thus: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Compare the examinations of AitĀ 2.4.1-4 by Brereton (1990: 120-122) and F. Smith (2006a: 
206). 
219 F. Smith 2006a: 211. 
220 Ibid.: 13-15, 110-172 (esp. 117). 
221 As previously mentioned, recent scholarship indicates that these narratives need to be read not 
just as rarified products of orthodox religiosity, but as part of the broader world of “folk” 
practices, including possession (āveśa) and Tantra, in which light the Brahmanical “inculcation of 
control” spoken of by Gombrich takes on far more nuanced aspects (Gombrich 1998, discussed in 
Chapter 1 above; cf. Sanderson 1985.) As for a convergence of the folk and the classical, F. Smith 
levels the convincing argument that: “What transformed folk into classical was not appropriation 
of folk material by a brahman literati, but the dynamics of preservation between the cognitive and 
narrative aspects of literary production” (2006a: 175). This might be compared, for example, with 
the “reconstruction” of Buddhism at the hands of scholars; see Almond 1998, Hallisey 1995, 
Lopez 1995. 
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tā abravīd yathāyatanaṃ praviśateti / agnir vāg bhūtvā mukhaṃ prāviśad 
vāyuḥ prāṇo bhūtvā nāsike prāviśad ādityaś cakṣur bhūtvākṣiṇī prāviśad 
diśaḥ śrotraṃ bhūtvā karṇau prāviśann oṣadhivanaspatayo lomāni bhūtvā 
tvacaṃ prāviśāṃs candramā mano bhūtvā hṛdayaṃ prāviśan mṛtyur apāno 
bhūtvā nābhiṃ prāviśad āpo reto bhūtvā śiśnaṃ prāviśan / tam 
aśanāpipāse abrūtām āvābhyām abhiprajānīhīti te abravīd etāsv eva vāṃ 
devatāsv ābhajāmy etāsu bhāginyau karomīti / tasmād yasyai kasyai ca 
devatāyai havir gṛhyate bhāginyāv evāsyām aśanāpipāse bhavataḥ // AitĀ 
2.4.2 
 
[The self] told them: “Each enter according to your respective abode.” Fire 
became speech and entered the mouth; wind became out-breath and 
entered the nostrils; the sun became sight and entered the eyes; the 
directions became hearing and entered the ears; the plants and trees 
became hair and entered the skin; the moon became the mind and entered 
the heart; death became in-breath and entered the navel; and the waters 
became semen and entered the penis. Hunger and thirst then said to him 
[the self]: “Find one for us.” It said to them: “I give you a share among 
these very deities, I make you sharers among them.” Therefore, to 
whatever deity an offering is made, hunger and thirst are sharers alongside 
that deity. 
 
 According to Brian Smith’s examination of this and similar passages in the 
Brāhmaṇas, the unintended arrival of hunger and thirst – together with the theme 
of food that tries to run away – should be interpreted as indicating a mid-Vedic 
conceptualization of creation as disordered and unsatisfactory.222 This reading 
supports his suspicion of such sequences as providing justification for the 
positioning of Brahmins at the apex of the human hierarchy as those whose rituals 
bring order to the world, and hence as those upon whom all others must properly 
depend. What he does not address is that these events fit with the 
complication/resolution structure of the narrative, wherein each successive 
complication is not only solved by the primordial ātman but provides further 
insight into the nature of the afflictions faced by humans together with a paradigm 
for their understanding, and perhaps even for their control, that again draws upon 
the deities’ activity within the body. Thus, having made hunger and thirst as 
compelling as the deities, and having done so in a manner that implicitly 
acknowledges them as another set of embodied phenomena that exerts uninvited 
force within the body, the self now decides to create food for the worlds and their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 B. Smith 1998: 60. 
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keepers. Food, another solid form (mūrti) is born out of the waters that the self 
has incubated, but it seeks to run away as soon as it is born (tad enat sṛṣṭam parāṅ 
atyajigāṃsat, AitĀ 2.4.3). The self tries, and fails, to capture the food with each 
of the deities in turn, until at last “it tried to take it over with the in-breath, and 
then managed to seize it. So the wind (vāyu) is the one that captures food, wind is 
the procurer (āyu) of food” (tad apānenājighṛkṣat tad āvayat / saiṣo ’nnasya 
graho yad vāyur annāyur vā eṣa yad vāyuḥ).223 
 The same paragraph continues with an account of how the self entered the 
body: 
 
sa īkṣata kathaṃ nv idam madṛte syād iti / sa īkṣata katareṇa prapadyā iti / 
sa īkṣata yadi vācābhivyāhṛtaṃ yadi prāṇenābhiprāṇitaṃ yadi cakṣuṣā 
dṛṣṭaṃ yadi śrotreṇa śrutaṃ yadi tvacā spṛṣṭaṃ yadi manasā dhyātaṃ yady 
apānenābhyapānitaṃ yadi śiśnena visṛṣṭam atha ko ’ham iti / sa etam eva 
sīmānaṃ vidāryaitayā dvārā prāpadyata / saiṣa vidṛtir nāma dvās tad etan 
nāndanam / tasya traya āvasathās trayaḥ svapnā ayam āvasatho ’yam 
āvasatho ’yam āvasatha iti / sa jāto bhūtāny abhivyaikṣat kim ihānyaṃ 
vāvadiṣad iti / sa etam eva puruṣaṃ brahma tatamam apaśyat / idam 
adarśam itīm3 / AitĀ 2.4.3 
 
It thought to itself: “How can this possibly exist without me?” And it 
thought: “Through which one of these should I enter?” It thought: “If it is 
uttered by speech, if it is exhaled by the out-breath, if it is seen by sight, if 
it is heard by hearing, if it is felt by the skin, if it is thought by the mind, if 
it is inhaled by the in-breath, if it is ejaculated by the penis – then who am 
I?” Splitting open just this parting in the hair, it entered by this door. This 
door is named ‘Split’ – it is a garden of pleasure. It has three dwellings, 
three levels of dream: this is a dwelling; this is a dwelling; and this is a 
dwelling. When it had been born (jāta), it surveyed the beings, reflecting: 
“Will it be declared there is another here?” It saw only this person, 
brahman, the utmost. “I have seen this (idam),” it said. 
 
 The information contained in these paragraphs allows some significant 
additions to be made to the Āraṇyakas’ depiction of archetypal embodiment. This 
goes beyond either a singular summary identification of brahman and ātman or a 
merely postulated literary or metaphorical equation between body and world, 
neither of which sufficiently accounts for the multiple dynamics at play in the 
narrative. This is because what emerges from a literal reading of the Sanskrit is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 The text does not explain the new association of apāna, in-breath, with vāyu. 
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picture of composite personhood, in which the person is a compound of diverse 
elements with different substantialities held within the encompassing structure of 
the body. It is also composite because, as an identity, it rests upon the 
interrelationship of multiple relationships.224  
These observations implicate certain breaks with some of the most 
influential divisions of scholarship in the study of the self and embodiment. First, 
the perspectives articulated in AitĀ 2.4.1-3 amount to a claim for the existence of 
external and disembodied substances that penetrate into the body and thereby 
constitute its physiological functioning, whilst at the same time contributing their 
own macrocosmic “substance codes” – as termed by Marriott225 – to the person’s 
ontology and, finally, to the realization and definition of identity. The unique 
configuration of these deities and their codes within a previously lifeless body 
differs radically from a primary view held by cognitive science in both its 
neurophysiological (or biological) and philosophical streams, which in one of its 
versions states “our explanatory proposal of conscious experience must be 
coherent with the knowledge we have about physics. Following this assumption 
we leave no room for spirits, ghosts, or other disembodied ‘beings.’”226 Here, 
embodiment is necessarily of an internally-originating biological milieu whose 
identity is specifically human, as opposed to of a complex of external and 
disembodied substances which each contribute a distillation of their own identity 
to the creation of a composite person. Another articulation of this premise, argued 
by Lakoff and Johnson, posits that “we all have a metaphor system that 
conceptualizes our minds as disembodied,” and that this informs the development 
of a metaphorical “Subject” that in turn has become articulated in worldwide 
religious terms as a “Soul or Spirit.” This is incommensurate with a biologically-
grounded conception of embodiment. In the words of Lakoff and Johnson: 
“Whether you call it mind or Soul, anything that both thinks and is free-floating is 
a myth. It cannot exist”: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 This might be compared with early Chinese deliberations on the body in the cosmos; see Lewis 
2006. 
225 Marriott 1976. 
226 Núñez 1997: 153. 
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Requiring the mind and Soul to be embodied is no small matter. It 
contradicts those parts of religious traditions around the world based on 
reincarnation and the transmigration of souls, as well as those in which it 
is believed that the Soul can leave the body in sleep or trance. It is not 
consistent with those traditions that teach that one can achieve, and should 
aspire to achieve, a state of pure consciousness separate from the body.227 
 
This widespread conceptualization of embodiment, which bears strongly on 
previously discussed notions of the person as a bounded individual, automatically 
falsifies the model of entry and possession suggested by pra-√viś and turns 
instead to a paradigm of spirituality based on ethically-oriented environmentalism 
arising from contact and conviviality with a world that is finally experienced as 
“more-than-human.” The understanding of what makes for truly human identity, 
in other words, is framed by the dynamics of an environment, both plant and 
animal, whose animation is entirely dependent upon the sensing body and is 
relative to a person’s degree of sensitivity. Because this etic perspective maintains 
the inescapability of our biological functioning, and thence is able to account for 
culturally distinct experiences of the body by invoking tradition as another 
environment to which these functions adapt or undergo ontogenic co-ordination, 
it has taken on a level of universalism in cross-cultural examination.228 
Although the more or less consistent denial of external self-volitional 
phenomena seems to suggest otherwise, these accounts illuminate an 
interrelationship between bodily structures and the derivation of meaning from 
the world, and in so doing have the potential to deepen our understanding of 
passages like AitĀ 2.4.1-3 by drawing attention to unarticulated points of 
reference embedded in texts. It is easy, for example, to see how precognitive 
experience of the automated internal functions and adjustments of the body 
inspires conscious reflection on the disembodied origin, motility and independent 
volition of the deities, and likewise to see how these are experienced as a 
functional relationship between the internal milieu and the cosmos; in addition, 
this highlights the non-random nature of the deities’ appearance as protagonists 
and indicates a level of textual coherence beyond rhetoric or narrative device that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 563-565. 
228 For an example this interpretation in cross-cultural context, see Abram 1996. 
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becomes evident once the interconnection between the body and cultural 
production is brought into consideration. Furthermore, these perspectives 
irrevocably implicate a physical experience of language in bodily adaptations and 
developments in personal awareness, which opens new dimensions in textual 
interpretation. Yet it is only through the admission of the deities’ viability as 
external substances that the Vedic or Upaniṣadic model of personhood comes into 
focus as a unique variety of fluctuating embodiment in which disembodiment is a 
prerequisite that binds human ontology to practices of self-transformation and 
enables Sanskrit, as vāc, included among the deities, to become literally 
established in the person, exert independent influence over them, and either invest 
or divest them of aspects of identity.229 
Another point of divergence occurs with respect to scholarly approaches to 
the matter of personhood or identity in the Upaniṣads. These approaches, in brief, 
draw upon a broadly Indic conceptual binary between person and self, or puruṣa 
and ātman, in which the person is delineated as a material collocation of 
substances, forms and attributes that is worldly and subject to cultural 
construction, undergoes change, can be possessed by external forces, and – in the 
case of sufficient epistemological or substantial alterations – may reflect the 
presence of the ātman or manifest extraordinary abilities (vibhūti; e.g. AitĀ 
2.1.7). This is properly distinguished from the ātman, which is an eternal and pre-
objective “metaphysical residue” produced within the puruṣa and ascribed 
freedom, autonomy and reflexivity.230 As has already been seen, such binaries 
tend to become aligned with other such constructions; with respect to the 
phenomenological distinction between person and self, two further comparisons 
are often appended: the traditional Indian preoccupation with the immortal 
principle in the person as opposed to an only passing interest in the human 
(typically “man,” manuṣya) as a species (homo sapiens), and the categorical 
difference from ātman implicated by the prevailing descriptions of the body as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 To anyone familiar with the prevailing claims of Pūrvamīmāṃsā regarding Vedic interpretation 
these statements may seem oppositional. It may however be said that the episteme of 
apauruṣeyatva is illustrative of a belief in language’s independent capacity to pervade and direct 
human cognition and behavior, and thus at the same time implicates the lived body and its 
processes as co-requisite to the realization of soteriological goals. 
230 F. Smith 2006a: 19-20; Fields 2001. 
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either śarīra, that which breaks down or decays, or as deha, the body as a 
container of the immaterial self.231 
These polarities in identification are central to the cosmology examined in 
this chapter and form a necessary backdrop to the relationship between language 
and person – they are, in other words, a crucial inclusion in the armamentarium 
with which the primary sources are interpreted. The distinction between ātman 
and puruṣa, already evident in the narrative sequence of AitĀ 2.4.1-3, is 
reinforced by the language of the passage, where the primordial ātman’s entrance 
into the body is cause for two significant additions to the preceding Sanskrit 
vocabulary. The first of these is the description of the person’s ātman as having 
been born or produced (jāta) rather than emitted (√sṛj), which suggests the 
possibility that whereas emission involves a disembodiment or separation from 
the matrix of brahman that results in elements or substances that are bounded, 
production insinuates an embodied reproduction that retains the identification 
with brahman. This implication of the verb √jan is not opposed to its common 
employment in the sense of birth, and includes the reduplication of the deities that 
possess the body. Whether reproduction is of the mortal or the immortal, what is 
produced remains fully identified with its parental species or primordial 
archetype. AitĀ 1.3.8, a relatively older passage, provides a supporting statement 
that connects these senses of √jan to indicate that birth is a complete reproduction 
of embodied identity. 
 
cakṣuḥ śrotraṃ mano vāk prāṇaḥ tā etāḥ pañca devatā imaṃ viṣṭāḥ 
puruṣaṃ pañco haivaitā devatā ayaṃ viṣṭaḥ puruṣaḥ / so ’trālomabhya 
ānakhebhyaḥ sarvaḥ sāṅga āpyate tasmāt sarvāṇi bhūtāny āpipīlikābhya 
āptāny eva jāyante / AitĀ 1.3.8 
 
These five deities – sight, hearing, mind, speech and prāṇa – have entered 
(viṣṭa) this person; this person has entered (viṣṭa) even these five deities. 
He is here obtained completely throughout his limbs from the hairs of his 
head to the tips of his nails; therefore all beings down to ants are born 
(jāyante) so obtained.232 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 See Halbfass 1991: 266-289; Fields 2001: 21-23. 
232 Keith (1909: 186) translates āpyate as “pervaded”, whereas Sāyaṇa’s comments on this passage 
indicate that this verb should be read in the sense of “obtained” (āpyate prāpto dṛśyate, Phaḍke 
1898: 54). The latter seems better in keeping with the semantic overlap of √viś and pra-√viś in 
later literature, with respect to which it would carry the sense of the deities’ entrance and 
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The contrast between the expansive completeness of ātman and the bounded 
identity of the deities in the body of the person remains consistent in the second 
lexical addition, which is the use of pra-√pad to describe this final episode of 
entry into the body. Unlike pra-√viś, which was used of the deities’ entry into 
and possession of the puruṣa, the prefixed verb pra-√pad carries nuances of 
permeation and penetration in addition to its simple senses of going forward or 
entering.233 Assuming that F. Smith is accurate in his observation that pra-√pad 
would thus remain closer to early uses of ā-√viś in the Ṛgveda, it is also 
distinguished from pra-√viś by its suggestion of benign permeation as opposed to 
the ambivalence of entry and possession that is guided externally and can occur 
without the consent or willingness of the human subject. Further, if the place of 
its occurrence in the progression of the narrative is given value, then a 
comparison in the extent of these entrances can be made: whereas pra-√viś 
confines entry to the possession of particular parts or abodes (āyatana) in the 
body, which are matched to the equally circumscribed function of each deity, pra-
√pad marks an act of entry that goes beyond its association with the crown of the 
head to suffuse the entire body to completion. 
Another example of the selective employment of pra-√viś and pra-√pad 
appears at AitĀ 2.1.4, where it again indicates a conceptualized distinction 
between brahman and the deities that is grounded in terms of the extent and 
quality of their entrance into the person. This rather long passage occurs in an 
early part of the larger complex known as the Mahaitareya Upaniṣad and 
employs Sanskrit etymologies that provide its ontological deliberations with 
forward impetus and result in a distinctively interwoven verbal texture.  
 
taṃ prapadābhyāṃ prāpadyata brahmemaṃ puruṣaṃ yat prapadābhyāṃ 
prāpadyata brahmemaṃ puruṣaṃ tasmāt prapade tasmāt prapade ity 
ācakṣate śaphaḥ khurā ity anyeṣāṃ paśūnām / tad ūrdhvam udasarpat tā 
ūrū abhavatām / uru gṛṇīhīty abravīt tad udaram abhavat / urv eva me kurv 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
possession or obtainment of the body (see F. Smith 200a6: 195). Note also the following 
occurrences in Sāyaṇa’s commentary: imaṃ puruṣaṃ manuṣyadehaṃ praviṣṭāḥ “they entered this 
person, the body of the man,” and saṃpūrṇā eva jāyante “they are born completely filled” 
(Phaḍke 1898: 54). 
233 F. Smith 2006a: 238 n.72. 
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ity abravīt tad uro ’bhavat / udaraṃ brahmeti śārkarākṣyā upāsate 
hṛdayaṃ brahmety āruṇayo brahmāhaiva tā3i / ūrdhvaṃ tv evodasarpat tac 
chiro ’śrayata yac chiro ’śrayata tac chiro ’bhavat tac chirasaḥ śirastvam / 
tā etāḥ śīrṣañ chriyaḥ śritāś cakṣuḥ śrotraṃ mano vāk prāṇaḥ / śrayante 
’smiñ chriyo ya evaṃ etac chirasaḥ śirastvaṃ veda / tā ahiṃsantāham 
uktham asmy aham uktham asmīti / tā abruvan hantāsmāc charīrād 
utkrāmāma tad yasmin na utkrānta idaṃ śarīraṃ patsyati tad ukthaṃ 
bhaviṣyatīti / vāg udakrāmad avadann aśnan pibann āstaiva / cakṣur 
udakrāmad apaśyann aśnan pibann āstaiva / śrotram udakrāmad aśṛṇvann 
aśnan pibann āstaiva / mana udakrāman mīlita ivāśnan pibann āstaiva / 
prāṇa udakrāmat tat prāṇa utkrānte ’padyata / tad aśīryatāśārītīṃ3 tac 
charīram abhavat tac charīrasya śarīratvam / śīryate ha vā asya dviṣan 
pāpmā bhrātṛvyo bhavati ya evaṃ veda / tā ahiṃsantaivāham uktham asmy 
aham uktham asmīti / tā abruvan hantedaṃ punaḥ śarīraṃ praviśāma tad 
yasmin naḥ prapanna idaṃ śarīram utthāsyati tad ukthaṃ bhaviṣyatīti / vāk 
prāviśad aśayad eva / cakṣur prāviśad aśayad eva / manaḥ prāviśad 
aśayad eva / prāṇaḥ prāviśat tat prāṇe prapanna udatiṣṭhat tad uktham 
abhavat / tad etad ukthāṃ3 prāṇa eva / prāṇa uktham eva vidyāt / taṃ devā 
abruvaṃs tvam uktham asi tvam idaṃ sarvaṃ asi tava vayaṃ smas tvam 
asmākam iti / tad apy etad ṛṣinoktam / tvam asmākam tava smas iti // AitĀ 
2.1.4 
 
Brahman entered (prāpadyata) that [man] through the tips of his feet 
(prapadābhyām); it is because brahman entered this person through the 
tips of the feet that they are the “tips of the feet” (prapade) and one calls 
them prapade, but those of other animals are called “hoofs” or “claws.” 
Then he snaked upward (ūrdhvam), and that became the thighs (ūrū). 
“Swallow widely (uru)” he said, and that became the stomach (udaram). 
“Make it spacious (uru) for me,” he said, and that became the chest (uras). 
The Śārkarākṣyas honor brahman as the stomach, the Āruṇis, brahman as 
the heart – the two are brahman, certainly. But he snaked even higher until 
he settled (aśrayata) at the head (śiras); when he settled at the head it 
became the head, and state of being śiras came to belong to the head. So 
these marks of royalty (śri) settled (śrita) at the top (śīrṣam) – sight, 
hearing, the mind, speech and prāṇa – and these marks of royalty settle in 
the one who thus knows why head has the state of being śiras. They struck 
at each other, saying “I am the hymn! I am the hymn!” They said: “Look! 
We have to depart from this body, and then the one at whose departure this 
body collapses will be the hymn.” Speech departed, but it just went on 
eating and drinking silently. Sight departed, but it just went on eating and 
drinking blindly. Hearing departed, but it just went on eating and drinking 
deafly. Mind departed, but it just went on eating and drinking, comatose.  
Prāṇa departed; and when prāṇa departed, it fell down. It decayed 
(aśīryata); and as they were saying “it has decayed (aśarī),” it became the 
body (śarīra) and the state of being śarīra came to belong to the body. The 
hateful, evil adversary of one who knows this indeed decays (or) becomes 
the hateful, evil adversary of another. Those (marks of royalty) struck at 
each other again, saying “I am the hymn! I am the hymn!” And they said: 
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“Look! We must enter (praviśāma) this body again, and then the one at 
whose entrance (prapanna) this body rises will be the hymn.” Speech 
entered (prāviśat), but it just lay there. Sight entered, but it just lay there. 
Hearing entered, but it just lay there. Mind entered, but it just lay there. 
Prāṇa entered (prāviśat); and when prāṇa entered (prapanna) it stood up, 
so that became the hymn. So prāṇa alone is the hymn. One should know 
just this – that prāṇa is the hymn. Those gods said to it: “You are the 
hymn, you are all of this (idaṃ sarvam), we are yours, you are ours!” This 
too was said by a ṛṣi: “You are ours, we are yours.”234 
 
The consistency with which the lexical stems pra-√viś and pra-√pad are 
employed and differentiated attests not only to the polarity of the bounded and 
unbounded identities of the deities and brahman respectively, but also clarifies 
the grounds on which prāṇa is conceptually distinguished within the hierarchy of 
deities. As will be seen, this allows prāṇa to be mapped alongside brahman, the 
cosmos (idaṃ sarvam) and language, whilst at the same time preserving its 
individual identity and function. However, while the unstable and temporary 
collocation of elements and substances that comprise the puruṣa are emanations 
of brahman and, when properly understood as such, are correlated with the goal 
of directly realizing the true nature of the ātman, their distinct identities are rarely 
treated in studies of these texts as possessing much of final soteriological value. 
This is because their appearance as independent and appetite for the world give 
rise to the very epistemological fallacies that the Upaniṣads aim to overcome: the 
apparent multiplicity of identities is ultimately seen through and loses validity 
upon its subsuming within brahman; and in this respect is not dissimilar to the 
later problematizing of prakṛti in the metaphysical explanations of Sāṃkhya. 
Yet the weight of the above passages suggests that more is at play. When 
the body, possessed by the deities and their substance-codes, is permeated by the 
self, the process of creation presented by AitĀ 2.4.1-3 is not only reversed but 
brought to a state of completion. A similar process appears in ŚāṅkhĀ 11.1-2, a 
slightly later passage that presents Prajāpati as the creator and includes the 
identification between brahman and ātman within an extended and somewhat 
modified list of the deities and abodes that constitute the person. As in AitĀ 
2.4.1-2, the disembodiment of these deities appears in conjunction with their self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 The reference is to ṚV 8.92.32. 
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volition to introduce the vexing issue of what constitutes a sustainable ontology; 
this bears strongly upon our consideration of how the particularities of this model 
of embodiment provide the driving force behind Vedic practices of self-
transformation. 
 
oṃ prajāpatir vā imaṃ puruṣam udañcata tasminn etā devatā āveśayad 
vācy agniṃ prāṇe vāyum apāne vaidyutam udāne parjanyaṃ cakṣuṣy 
ādityaṃ manasi candramasaṃ śrotre diśaḥ śarīre pṛthivīṃ retasy apo bala 
indraṃ manyāv īśānaṃ mūrdhany ākāśam ātmani brahma sa yathā mahān 
amṛtakumbhaḥ pinvamānas tiṣṭhed evaṃ haiva samuttasthāv atha hemā 
devatā īkṣāṃ cakrire kim ayam asmābhiḥ puruṣaḥ kariṣyati kiṃ vā vayam 
anena hantāsmāc charīrād utkramāmeti tā hoccakramur hedaṃ śarīraṃ 
riktam iva parisuṣiraṃ sa hekṣāṃ cakre prajāpatir randhrāya na kṣamam 
hantāham imā aśanāyāpipāsābhyām upasṛjā3 iti tā hopasṛje tā hopasṛṣṭāḥ 
sukham alabhamānā imam eva puruṣam punaḥ pratyāviviṣuḥ // ŚāṅkhĀ 
11.1 
 
Om. Prajāpati raised up this person and made these deities enter 
(āveśayad) him: in speech, fire; in the out-breath (prāṇa), wind; in the in-
breath, lightning; in the rising-breath, rain; in sight, the sun; in the mind, 
the moon; in hearing, the directions; in the decomposing body, the earth; 
in semen, the waters; in strength, Indra; in temper, Īśāna; in the skull, 
space; and in the self, brahman. Just as a magnificent jar of ambrosia 
would stand, swelling, so he rose up altogether. Now these deities 
considered: “What will this person (puruṣa) do with us, or we with him? 
Look, we must depart from this body (śarīra).” And they departed. Now 
this body was quite empty and pierced all around. Prajāpati reflected: “It is 
not able to endure this opening – come, I will let loose upon them with 
hunger and thirst.” So he let loose upon them; and they, having been let 
loose upon and finding no contentment, re-entered (pratyāviviṣuḥ) this 
person. 
 
The deities described here are not those that enter the person in the AitĀ’s 
account, which were bodily functions, but instead consist of an array of 
elemental, spatial and cosmological features and personalities that are associated 
with the macrocosm. Although this account of entry and exit thus occurs at a 
different level within the hierarchical cosmos of the texts, the person is 
nonetheless reduced to an empty and perforated encasing – the physiological 
functions of the body together with the ātman are themselves dependent upon a 
transaction of identity through possession, and on this issue the subsequent 
paragraph of the narrative is clear: when those macrocosmic deities enter the 
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functions and the ātman, then “as a magnificent green tree stands with its roots 
moistened, so [that person] rose up altogether” (sa yathā mahān vṛkṣa ārdra 
upasiktamūlas tiṣṭhed evaṃ haiva samuttasthau, ŚāṅkhĀ 11.2). 
 Read in conjunction, these passages from the AitĀ and ŚāṅkhĀ indicate 
that the relationship between puruṣa and ātman is not a binary opposed on 
grounds of difference in substantiality, but rather entails a co-dependent mutuality 
that arises from the nested transactions through which both the activity and reality 
of brahman is revealed.235 It is this multiplicity of relationships contained within 
the complex structures of personhood, not the self hidden behind the curtain of 
senses, that comprises the fullness of identity with brahman that is expressed in 
each form or manifestation. Here, integration into brahman does not lessen the 
reality of the person. Rather, embodiment integrates and relates brahman to its 
creation. This defines a model of self-realization that is at once immanent and 
transcendent, and is actualized equally through the interaction of these multiple 
identities in life and their stepping out (ut-√kram) of the body at death. 
Furthermore, the claims made by these texts require that the macrocosmic 
evolutes are literally present in the person: the person as microcosm is not a 
replica of the cosmos with bodily functions that correspond on miniature scale to 
their macrocosmic equivalents, but through repeated acts of entry is substantially 
possessed by those evolutes in the same way as they are by the deities comprising 
bodily functions. Although the texts we are concerned with are chronologically 
much earlier, this would remain cognizant with accounts of personhood contained 
in the Sanskrit epics and Tantras; it may also be suggested by the selective use of 
the adjective mahan – which is cognate with the English “magnificent” and 
overlaps semantically with brahman in its sense of “expansive” – in its analogous 
application to the puruṣa that rises up altogether.236 Having been possessed by “all 
of this,” idaṃ sarvam, in the very beginning, the person is an integrity of various 
relationships and identities in action, which through the countervailing 
movements of the deities and brahman inside and outside of the body disclose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 Marriot 1976: 113: “In the cosmic brahman there inheres both power or energy as an 
embracing code (puruṣa) for transactions among the differentiated genera of beings whose 
substances, codes, and powers emanate from the brahman.” 
236 White 2009: 172-77. 
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personhood as a potential state of living revelation. The substance-code of each 
embodied deity directly contributes to personal identity; and this co-extension 
between person and world magnifies the self in the body, making it functionally 
as expansive as brahman. Thus, in AitĀ 2.1.2: 
 
uktham uktham iti vai prajā vadanti tad idam evoktham iyam eva pṛthivīto 
hīdaṃ sarvam uttiṣṭhati yad idam kiñca / tasyāgnir arko ’nnam aśītayo 
’nnena hīdaṃ sarvam aśnute / antarikṣam evoktham antarikṣaṃ vā anu 
patanty antarikṣam anu dhāvayanti tasya vāyur arko ’nnam aśītayo ’nnena 
hīdaṃ sarvam aśnute / asāv eva dyaru uktham amutaḥ pradānād dhīdaṃ 
sarvam uttiṣṭhati yad idaṃ kiñca tasyāsāv ādityo ’rko ’nnam aśītayo 
’nnena hīdaṃ sarvam aśnute / ity adhidaivatam / athādhyātmam / puruṣa 
evoktham ayam eva mahān prajāpatir aham uktham asmīti vidyāt / tasya 
mukham evokthaṃ yathā pṛthivī tathā / tasya vāg arko ’nnam aśītayo 
’nnena hīdaṃ sarvam aśnute / nāsike evokthaṃ yathāntarikṣe tathā / tasya 
prāṇo ’rko ’nnam aśītayo ’nnena hīdaṃ sarvam aśnute / tad etad 
bradhnasya viṣṭapaṃ yad etan nāsikāyai vinatam iva / lalāṭam evoktham 
yathā dyaus tathā / tasya cakṣur arko ’nnam aśītayo ’nnena hīdaṃ sarvam 
aśnute / samānam aśītayo ’dhyātmaṃ cādhidaivataṃ cānnam evānnena 
hīmāni sarvāṇi bhūtāni samanantīṃ3 annenemaṃ lokaṃ jayaty annenāmuṃ 
tasmāt samānam aśītayo ’dhyātmaṃ cādhidaivataṃ cānnam eva / tad idam 
annam annādam iyam eva pṛthivīto hīdaṃ sarvam uttiṣṭhati yad idaṃ kiñca 
/ yad dha kiñcedaṃ prertā3i tad asau sarvam atti yad u kiñcātaḥ praitīṃ3 
tad iyaṃ sarvam atti seyam ity ādyāttrī / attā ha vā ādyo bhavati / na 
tasyeśe yan nādyād yad vainaṃ nādyuḥ // AitĀ 2.1.2 
 
“Hymn! Hymn!” the offspring say – this is the hymn, for from this earth it 
all this rises, whatever there is. Its praise is fire, the eighty verses its food, 
for through food one arrives at all this. The space in-between is the hymn, 
[for] across that space they fly, and along that space they drive; its praise 
is the wind, the eighty verses its food, for through food one arrives at all 
this. That heaven is the hymn, for from its gift all this rises, whatever there 
is. Its praise is that sun, the eighty verses its food, for through food one 
arrives at all this. So it is with respect to the divine. Now, with respect to 
oneself. The person is the hymn, [for] this (person) indeed is magnificent 
(mahān) [and] is Prajāpati; one should know that they are the hymn. Its 
mouth is the hymn such as is the earth. Its praise is speech, the eighty 
verses its food, for through food one arrives at all this. Its nostrils are the 
hymn such as is the space in-between. Its praise is prāṇa, the eighty verses 
its food, for through food one arrives at all this. The part of the nose that 
curves in is the zenith of the sun.237 The brow is the hymn such as is 
heaven. Its praise is the eye, the eighty verses its food, for through food 
one arrives at all this. The eighty verses are alone the food with respect 
equally (samānam) to the divine and to oneself, for through food all these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 I take the Sanskrit to refer to the radix of the nose: the part that “‘curves’ as it were (iva).” 
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beings breath (samananti), through food one conquers this world and that, 
and therefore the eighty verses are alone the food with respect equally to 
the divine and to oneself. This food and feeder are this earth, for from it all 
this rises, whatever there is. Whatever goes this way, that [heaven] eats it 
all; whatever goes that way, this [earth] eats it all – this, the earth, is food 
and feeder. The person becomes both the feeder and the food. He will not 
be master of that which he does not eat or which does not eat him. 
 
Once more according to the account presented in AitĀ 2.4.3, when the ātman 
surveys the beings (bhūta) that occupy the body’s internal landscape, what it sees 
there is identified as the whole world (idam).238  This powerful coterminous 
extension (vibhūti) between the embodied and disembodied aspects of creation is 
an underlying theme of passages addressing the true identity of the person, where 
it correlates with descriptions of how a person’s “knowing self” (prajñātman) 
steps out of the body at death in the same manner as do the deities and bears upon 
the conceptualization of possession as a framework and foundation of self-
identity understood and enacted. Far from foremost being rhetorical devices 
aimed at communicating the singular reality lying behind all worldly appearances 
and indicating the exclusive role of the ātman in personal identity as it is both 
pre-given and then subsequently realized, these creation stories explicate a 
conceptual terrain in Vedic soteriological practice according to which the 
identification of the self as brahman does not and cannot stand alone: it is the 
interaction between the puruṣa’s possession by animating forces and its pervasion 
by the unlimited self-reflexivity of the ātman that allows for a multileveled 
realization in which the integrative vision of brahman is directly revealed through 
the living structures of human being. According to the passages surveyed here 
and below, the truth of a person’s self “cannot be expressed except by its 
multiplicity”239 – expressed, that is, through a fluctuating antinomian embodiment 
that is liable to expand or contract in ways that may be expected or unexpected, 
integrative or disintegrative, magical or soteriological, but are consistently 
compelling, deeply ritualized, and entirely enabled by the particularities of how 
this all began. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 See Olivelle (1998: 579 n.1) on the reading of idam in AitU 1.3.13 (= AitĀ 2.4.3). 
239 F. Smith 2006a: 203. 
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Temporary Persons 
 
If it can viably be argued that the Āraṇyakas’ ruminations on primordial creation 
implicitly contain a paradigm for self-realization that integrates puruṣa and ātman 
in the shared space of personal identity, and I believe that it can, then what needs 
to be addressed is the matter of how the shifting structures of embodiment are 
related to soteriological practices, and in what capacity. Can the epistemological 
shifts – the insightful and all-encompassing intelligence, prajñā – that so typically 
characterize attainment across Indic religious traditions be located and explained 
in bodily terms? And given the fundamental divergence between traditional and 
modern understandings of what embodiment actually entails, how might the 
perspectives on disembodiment presented in these Āraṇyakas clarify the 
dynamics involved in Vedic revelation? These questions lead us directly into the 
landscape of how Sanskrit vis à vis revelatory language was conceived of and, 
more importantly, engaged with prior to its Sanskritization through the lens of 
brahmanical orthodoxy – prior, that is, to the insertion of a retrospectively 
conceptualized division of laukika and vaidika into alternative worlds. 
 
Leaving the Body Altogether: Prāṇa and the Deities 
 
We turn now to a selection of passages that illuminate some of the textual routes 
by which embodiment intersected directly with epistemology, thereby influencing 
the framework surrounding the Āraṇyakas’ deliberations on knowledge, 
immortality, and the acquisition of extraordinary powers. An initial suggestion of 
transformative knowledge as having been conceived of as a bodily phenomenon 
appeared in AitĀ 2.1.4, translated above. To briefly recap: according to this 
narrative, the deities that occupy and thereby animate the body are all limited in 
contrast to brahman; and all enter (pra-√viś) from without as individuated 
disembodied essences. Amongst themselves, however, they are not only 
distinguished by their respective contribution to the arising of a person – 
speaking, hearing, thinking, and so on – but also by the reach or extent of their 
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respective identities. In keeping with a recurring theme in the soteriology of the 
Āraṇyakas, the deities engage in a struggle to know which among them is the 
“hymn” – an ontological status recalling both the transcendent nature of the Veda 
and the super-motility of the mantras, pace Vāc, as they course between worlds – 
and proceed to successively step out (ut-√kram) of the body to see at whose 
departure it will fall. At each instance of departure it is only the respective 
contribution of the departed deity that is lost; this continues until prāṇa exits and 
the body collapses. The sequence is then reversed, although with the difference 
that as they re-enter (pra-√viś), the body does not resume the activity associated 
with each deity now present but continues to lie there – until the entry of prāṇa, 
that is, which is then declared to be the hymn. 
 The simple translation of prāṇa as breath logically accounts for the 
revitalization of the body; what it fails to do, however, is capture the full 
conceptualization of prāṇa indicated by the language of employed in AitĀ 2.1.4, 
quoted above. This passage conclusively states: 
 
Prāṇa entered (prāviśat); and when prāṇa entered (prapanna) it stood up 
(udatiṣṭhat), so that became the hymn (uktham). So prāṇa alone is the 
hymn. Those gods (the other deities) said to it: “You are the hymn, you are 
all of this (idaṃ sarvam), we are yours, you are ours!” This too was said 
by a ṛṣi: “You are ours, we are yours.” 
 
The appearance of prapanna, a nominal derivative of pra-√pad, shifts the focus 
of prāṇa’s identification from the physiological function of breath to the 
pervasive nature of its entry. As seen previously with respect to brahman, this use 
of pra-√pad indicates not only that prāṇa is extensive in its macrocosmic 
identity, but that this quality of extensiveness is retained when prāṇa enters the 
body; this sets prāṇa aside from the other deities, whose identities become 
constrained within the limits of their respective bodily abodes. Prāṇa is thus 
established as a physical entity that actively reveals the puruṣa’s interweaving 
with the universe and courses freely, as wind (vāyu), throughout the layers of the 
cosmos. In both these respects, prāṇa is akin to the Vedic revelation that moves 
between the ṛṣi and the conjunction of god (devatā) and meter (chandas) to 
complete the circuit of pervasion “between entities of different essentiality and 
	   124	  
density of substance”240 and defines the hymn as an verbal embodiment of ṛta, the 
truth that “essentially defines what a being or object is and what it does, 
and…structures the relationships of being and objects with other beings and 
objects.”241 
 Another passage, AitĀ 2.1.5, utilizes a series of etymological substitutions 
that define prāṇa from the perspective of its ability to extend. To regard this 
exchange of phonological similarities as a mere literary embellishment would be 
to seriously underestimate the revelatory nature of this statement about the way 
things really are and the essential role of language in embodying the hidden 
connections that pervade the Vedic universe.242 The overlapping between pra-√nī 
(to lead or guide forward), pra-√tan (Pass., to be extended or stretched), prātar 
(daybreak, dawn) and prāṇa is therefore not coincidental, but fundamentally 
truthful with respect equally to language and the phenomena described. 
According to this passage, then, it is extension both as a movement and as an 
ontological quality that describes prāṇa in the physical space of the world, of 
which the body is the smallest unit; it also accounts for the further coherence of 
prāṇa in the temporal association between days and breaths. 
 
taṃ devāḥ prāṇayanta sa praṇītaḥ prāyāta prātāyītīṃ3 tat prātar abhavat 
samāgād itīṃ3 tat sāyam abhavat ahar eva prāṇo ratrir apānaḥ / AitĀ 
2.1.5 
 
The gods led that [entity] forward (prāṇayanta), and once it had been led 
forward (praṇītaḥ), it was extended (prāyāta). Exclaiming, “it has 
extended! (prātāyi),” that became the break of day (prātar); exclaiming “it 
went away! (samāgād),” that became the close of the day (sāyam). The 
breath that reaches forward (prāṇa) is the day; the breath that travels 
downward (apāna), the night. 
 
This characteristic comprehensiveness of prāṇa is highlighted particularly by its 
depiction as an entity that is simultaneously identifiable as the wind, as the entire 
collection of subtle winds, airs or breaths that permeate the body, and as one 
particular within that collection, namely, the breath (ana) that reaches forward 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 F. Smith 2006a: 176-79, also 232 n. 4. 
241 Jamison and Brereton 2014: 22 (vol. 1). 
242 Ibid.: 24 (vol. 1). 
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(pra-) or extends. Unlike the deities, which undergo a marked transition in 
identity – their boundaries renegotiated by location and function – when they 
cross the threshold into the body, prāṇa includes within itself a whole and 
integrated personality.243 The consistency of identity thus demonstrated by prāṇa 
relates it to brahman and Vāc (language in its principle or deified form), which 
are mutually implicated in revelation as a process with subjective and objective 
dimensions. It is clear in AitĀ 2.3.3 that prāṇa’s multivalence is established upon 
its motility: firstly, as one of the five elemental substances comprising the person, 
it is the macrocosmic wind outside the body; this macrocosmic wind is then 
identified as consisting of the various internal breaths that move within the body; 
finally, the deities enter (ni-√viś) – but do not possess – the primary functions of 
exhalation and inhalation, which, the text states, pour out (or enter the other 
worlds, api-√i) when prāṇa withdraws. 
 
sa eṣa puruṣaḥ pañcavidhas tasya yad uṣṇaṃ taj jyotir yāni khāni sa ākāśo 
’tha yal lohitaṃ śleṣmā retas tā āpo yac charīraṃ sā pṛthivī yaḥ prāṇaḥ sa 
vāyur / sa eṣa vāyuḥ pañcavidhaḥ prāṇo ’pāno vyāna udānaḥ samānaḥ / tā 
etā devatāḥ prāṇāpānayor eva niviṣṭāś cakṣuḥ śrotraṃ mano vāg iti 
prāṇasya hy anvapāyam etā apiyanti / AitĀ 2.3.3 
 
This person is fivefold: what of him is hot is light, what are apertures are 
space; now, blood, mucus and semen are the waters, the decomposing 
body is the earth and prāṇa is the wind. This wind is fivefold: the forward-
reaching breath (prāṇa), the downward-moving breath (apāna), the 
circulating breath (vyāna), the upward-moving breath (udāna) and the 
equalizing breath (samāna). These deities – sight, hearing, mind, speech – 
have entered into (niviṣṭāś) the forward-reaching breath and the 
downward-moving breath, for these pour out [of the body] with prāṇa’s 
withdrawal. 
 
This image of the deities entering prāṇa and being transported or guided 
by it out of the body is not an isolated incidence; and nor does it describe a 
phenomenon that is limited to the involvement of the deities in the body alone. 
ŚāṅkhĀ 4.12-13 speaks of a related phenomenon called parimara, the “dying 
round” of the cosmological and embodied deities, which describes brahman’s 
luminous appearance in the deities and its transition from one location to another 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 F. Smith (2006a: 212) on “transfer of essence.”  
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in accordance with the manifestation of their respective and definitively encoded 
functions or characteristics. Put simply, the vision of cyclicality codified in 
parimara explains imperishability from within the perspective of mortality. As 
the nature of the transfers described here are quite tellingly distinct from the 
primary processes of embodiment involved in the event of creation, and because 
the repetitions in the text themselves make certain claims, it is worth taking this 
fairly long account in its entirety. 
 
athāto daivaḥ parimaraḥ etad vai brahma dīpyate yad agnir jvalaty 
athaitan mriyate yan na jvalati tasyādityam eva tejo gacchati vāyuṃ prāṇa 
etad vai brahma dīpyate yad ādityo dṛśyate ’thaitan mriyate yan na dṛśyate 
tasya candramasam eva tejo gacchati vāyuṃ prāṇa etad vai brahma 
dīpyate yac candramā dṛśyate ’thaitan mriyate yan na dṛśyate tasya 
vidyutam eva tejo gacchati vāyuṃ prāṇa etad vai brahma dīpyate yad 
vidyud vidyotate ’thaitan mriyate yan na vidyotate tasyā diśa eva tejo 
gacchati vāyuṃ prāṇas tā vā etāḥ sarvā devatā vāyum eva praviśya vāyau 
mr̥tvā na mr̥cchante tasmād eva punar udīrata ity adhidaivatam 
athādhyātmam // 12 // etad vai brahma dīpyate yad vācā vadaty athaitan 
mriyate yan na vadati tasya cakṣur eva tejo gacchati prāṇaṃ prāṇa etad 
vai brahma dīpyate yac cakṣuṣā paśyaty athaitan mriyate yan na paśyati 
tasya śrotram eva tejo gacchati prāṇaṃ prāṇa etad vai brahma dīpyate yan 
manasā dhyāyaty athaitan mriyate yan na dhyāyati tasya prāṇam eva tejo 
gacchati prāṇaṃ prāṇas tā vā etāḥ sarvā devatāḥ prāṇam eva praviśya  
prāṇe mṛtvā na mṛcchante tasmād eva punar udīrate tad yad iha vā evaṃ 
vidvāṃsam ubhau parvatāv abhipravarteyātāṃ dakṣiṇaś cottaraś ca 
tustūrṣamāṇau na hainaṃ stṛṇvīyātām atha ya enaṃ dviṣaṇti yāṃś ca 
svayaṃ dveṣṭi ta evainaṃ parimriyante // ŚāṅkhĀ 4.12-13 
 
Next, the divine dying round. This brahman shines when fire blazes and 
dies when it blazes not; its tejas goes to the sun, its prāṇa to the wind. This 
brahman shines when the sun is visible and dies when it is not visible; its 
tejas goes to the moon, its prāṇa to the wind. This brahman shines when 
the moon is visible and dies when it is not visible; its tejas goes to 
lightning, its prāṇa to the wind. This brahman shines when lightning 
flashes and dies when it flashes not; its tejas goes to the directions, its 
prāṇa to the wind. All of these deities, entering just the wind and dying in 
the wind, do not perish – thus, they rise again. So it is with respect to the 
deities; now, with respect to oneself. This brahman shines when one 
speaks with speech and dies when one does not speak. Its tejas goes to the 
eye, its prāṇa to prāṇa. This brahman shines when one sees with the eye 
and dies when one does not see; its tejas goes to the ear, its prāṇa to 
prāṇa. This brahman shines when one hears with the ear and dies when 
one does not hear; its tejas goes to the mind, its prāṇa to prāṇa. This 
brahman shines when one thinks with the mind and dies when one does 
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not think; its tejas goes to prāṇa, its prāṇa goes to prāṇa. All of these 
deities, entering just prāṇa and dying in prāṇa, do not perish – thus, they 
rise again. Even if both mountain-ranges in this world, the southern and 
northern, were to advance upon one who is a knower of this, seeking to lay 
him low, they would not overthrow him; so, those who hate him and who 
he himself hates die round him. 
 
In comparison to the accounts of creation examined above, which were concerned 
with archetypes in the background of a remote beginning, parimara explains an 
ongoing natural occurrence and thus captures subtle distinctions in the 
conceptualization of the various entities and substances which are at work in the 
body and the cosmos in the present time and together make up the spatial, 
conceptual and dynamic context of real-world soteriological practices. These 
distinctions pertain specifically to tejas and prāṇa in contrast to the deities, and 
two general differences may be noted. First, with the exception of multivalent 
prāṇa, the movement of the deities is limited to entering and exiting their 
associated abodes – with respect to both levels of their manifestation,  
adhidaivatam and adhyātmam, the identity of the deities constrains them within 
their vertically encoded streams, following which no aspect of their substantiality 
is able to move or transfer sideways, for example, from sun to moon or from 
speech to sight. This constraint gives rise to the vexing problem of how the 
incorporation that is achieved within the encompassing structure of the body and 
which discloses brahman is to be sustained either in spite of the cessation of a 
deity’s activity or beyond death. In contrast to the deities, tejas and prāṇa display 
the following interrelated characteristics: (1) they are not identified with any one 
locus and do not manifest in cosmos-specific forms, and therefore are not bound 
either vertically or horizontally; (2) they do not contribute to the identity of the 
puruṣa, but are in effect within the puruṣa’s activity; (3) their presence is 
conditional upon the shining of brahman, which can cease in a given location but 
weaves throughout the universe and is imperishable; (4) this transition across 
locations is reflected by the employment of the verbal root √gam, to go, and does 
not carry the suggestion of entry and possession that is reserved for entities or 
substances of limited identity; (5) they exhibit similarity to the abstract 
phenomena (the flood, the glittering specks, etc.) emitted by brahman in the 
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initial stages of creation, which preceded the formation of the three worlds and 
were suggestive of subtle movements of light, time and fluid; and (6) their 
movement is also regulated by subtle similarities in movement, namely, radiation 
or projection in the case of tejas and ethereal flowing in the case of prāṇa. 
 A second distinction may be noted in the comparison between tejas and 
prāṇa. Tejas is an active and creative luminosity, whose extension in rays is 
influential both in later contact-based (prāpyakāri) theories of perception and 
Epic accounts of yogis and supernatural power.244 According to the passage 
above, tejas moves along a chain of locations whose activity likewise is 
characteristically radiating or projective and which tejas itself then radiates 
through. In this regard, tejas manifests through bodies; and the unviability of its 
potential for disembodied activity is highlighted by the fact that it is depicted as 
finally making its way to vāyu or prāṇa. Prāṇa, however, repeatedly goes either 
to vāyu or to itself, with both entities displaying such a high degree of intrinsic 
motility that they pervade the microcosm and macrocosm alike, being equally 
active in their embodied and disembodied states. The almost indistinguishable 
phenomenology of vāyu/prāṇa, which is grounded in the terms of their innate 
ability to flow between worlds and across bodily thresholds whilst preserving the 
individuation and different substantiality of the deities, encodes this vision of an 
ontological apotheosis – immortality through ascension to the heavenly world – 
as a natural event. This encoding of prāṇa’s dynamic activity both inside and 
outside of the body naturalizes the conception of prāṇa as the instrumental 
agency by which apotheosis occurs; to the extent that this agency is naturalized, it 
can be predicted; and to the extent that it is predictable, it is able to be codified 
within practices of self-realization.245  
 
Prāṇa and Prajñātman 
 
Although the focus on prāṇa undoubtedly reflects historical developments in the 
conceptualization of the body, and in particular the increasing turn towards 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 See F. Smith 2006a: 215; White 2009: 125, 138, 146, 287 n. 190, also 2012: 61-76. 
245 This discussion is influenced by F. Smith 2006a: 215. 
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identifying ritual technologies with internal physiological functions, it is 
consistent with the general tenor of both Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas, in all their parts, 
including the more explicitly ritualistic early books of the Aitareya. For example, 
these implications of prāṇa are drawn out through an interlinear interpretation of 
verse 38 of R̥V 1.164, which appears in AitĀ 2.18 and pertains to the 
performance of this hymn as part of the Mahāvrata proceedings. Stating firstly 
that it is “death and immortality” (sa eṣa mṛtyuś caivāmṛtaṃ ca), the speaker of 
this passage goes on to describe prāṇa as the embodied aspect of the immortal 
that travels to the distant heavenly world, yet remains identified with the level of 
the mortal puruṣa and, in accordance with the will of brahman, is prevented from 
going forth for so long as the person is living and breathing both in and out. The 
text is clear: it is necessary to comprehend prāṇa in the context of a binary 
interrelationship – an unobserved connection – between the mortal and the 
immortal, the person and the self, the body and the deity. To “know thus” is more 
than a matter of perception – it implicates a structural, physiological adaptation to 
epistemological shifts. 
 
tad uktam ṛṣiṇā / apāṅ prāṅ eti svadhayā gṛbhīta ity apānena hy ayaṃ 
yataḥ prāṇo na parāṅ bhavati / amatyo martyena sayonir ity etena hīdaṃ 
sarvaṃ sayoni martyāni hīmāni śarīrāṇīṃ3 amṛtaiṣā devatā / tā śaśvantā 
viṣūcīnā viyantā ny anyaṃ cikyur na ni cikyur anyam iti nicinvanti 
haivemāni śarīrāṇīṃ3 amṛtaivaiṣa devatā / amṛto ha vā amuṣmiṃl loke 
saṃbhavaty amṛtaḥ sarvebhyo bhūtebhyo dadṛśe ya evaṃ veda ya evaṃ 
veda // AitĀ 2.1.8 
 
This was said by a ṛṣi: “Inward and outward he goes, controlled by his 
own will” – for prāṇa, constrained by the downward-moving breath, does 
not go forth. “The immortal one, of the same womb as the mortal” – for 
through [the immortal brahman] all this is of the same womb: these bodies 
are mortal, this deity immortal. “Those two are ever going apart in 
different directions: they observe the one; they do not observe the other” – 
they observe these bodies, [but] this deity is immortal. He becomes 
immortal in that world and is seen as immortal by all beings, the one who 
knows thus, who knows thus. 
 
In this respect, prāṇa displays remarkable adaptability, for these texts – like all 
stages in the transmission of the Vedic revelation – do not present a single 
cosmological vision, but rather a multifaceted spectrum of perspectives which 
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negotiate in various ways certain core impulses and intuitions that arise again and 
again across Indic religious traditions. Moreover, prāṇa is not just a topic, a 
theme addressed through the content of these texts, but is directly implicated in 
the affective life of revelation as a world-making activity, the activity of sensing 
the unseen dynamic connections that are true and real, and the activity of 
articulating them such that they are realized through changes within the space of 
the body. As an instrumental agency that is established within the body’s 
physiology, providing both a foundation and the means to expand, adapt, and 
change, prāṇa facilitates a circuit of pervasion whereby the complex systems of 
personhood co-ordinate adaptively to veda, as knowledge and as revelation. The 
Vedic body – the body as Veda – is literally phenomenal. 
Before taking up the question of how the physiological changes facilitated 
by prāṇa interpenetrate with language to bring Sanskrit into the body, emplacing 
revelation within the structures of personhood, it is necessary to briefly address 
prāṇa as it appears in contrast to the ātman, not only because they appear to 
display overlapping characteristics, but because the centrality of focus given to 
prāṇa raises the questions of what exactly here is the intended object of 
transformative knowledge, and how does this knowledge work? This bears 
strongly upon the interpretive framework through which we approach Sanskrit, 
for to the extent that the revelatory status of these texts lies upon the basis of 
veda, knowledge, and that this is inseparable from the language in which truth is 
fundamentally embodied or manifested, the identity of Sanskrit is bound not to 
what it represents but rather to what it does. Following the basic divisions 
invoked in our discussion so far, a point of comparison between prāṇa, as it 
appears in the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas, and the ātman, as it is typologically invoked in 
Indological scholarship (or generalized for the sake of undergraduate-level 
university students), is the matter of ontological positioning. As we have seen, 
prāṇa is usually either included among the deities or characterized in relation to 
them, which, in spite of their immortality, fall into the category of the person on 
account of the temporary and changeable nature of their configuration within the 
body that decomposes. Because the identity of the person is therefore limited 
temporally and, moreover, is permeable and fluid, prāṇa would appear to sit in 
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clear contradistinction to the ātman, the ultimate stability of which is born of its 
direct identification with brahman. Thus, although prāṇa is described as an 
immortal instrumental agency behind soteriological attainment, it nonetheless 
does not possess a complete and self-contained identity, which would require 
conservative identification with brahman. In this sense, prāṇa is the agency 
through which knowledge is enacted and assumes form, and the ontological basis 
for this soteriological function lies in its characteristic dynamics. An 
identification between prāṇa and ātman (the postulation that prāṇa here is the self 
or defines its substantiality) is not necessary as a prerequisite to this function, and 
nor does such an identification automatically follow from it. 
  While the substantiality of prāṇa and its function in regard to the puruṣa is 
then not entirely opaque, the matter of what precisely is intended by ātman 
remains to be addressed. In this respect, the comparison between the two can be 
furthered by turning attention to semantic developments in the meaning of ātman 
through the entire Vedic period. Although the equation of ātman/brahman as the 
ultimate identity or essence of the self has served as a cornerstone of 
metaphysical developments in the history of India’s religious culture, it is a 
broadly attested fact that the term ātman does not carry this specification in the 
majority of Vedic literature, and nor is it consistently the case that when ātman is 
used to denote an ultimate “self” that the essence of this identity is constituted as 
brahman. Nor again does ātman function as a “gnomon” of brahman implanted 
within all beings. This is strikingly highlighted by AitĀ 2.6, in which ātman is 
identified with prajñā before being extended to brahman and the world via a 
panoptic list that expands from core consciousness, the centers of the body (heart, 
mind) and various psycho-mental functions, states and qualities to macrocosmic 
forms (gods, elements), and from there to the commingling of microcosm and 
macrocosm within all forms of life. While this enumeration leaves one with the 
impression of a universal identity behind all worldly appearances, the 
inseparability of ātman from the greater matrix of relationships finalizes the 
validity of those appearances.  
 
ko ’yam ātmeti vayum upāsmahe kataraḥ sa ātmā / yena vā paśyati yena vā 
śṛṇoti yena vā gandhān ājighrati yena vā vācaṃ vyākaroti yena vā svādu 
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cāsvādu ca vijānāti / yad etad dhṛdayaṃ manaś caitat saṃjñānam ājñānaṃ 
vijñānaṃ prajñānaṃ medhā dṛṣṭir dhṛtir matir manīṣā jūtiḥ smṛtiḥ 
saṃkalpaḥ kratur asuḥ kāmo vaśa iti / sarvāṇy evaitāni prajñānasya 
nāmadheyāni bhavanti / eṣa brahmaiṣa indra eṣa prajāpatir ete sarve devā 
imāni ca pañca mahābhūtāni pṛthivī vāyur ākāśa āpo jyotīṃṣīty etānīmāni 
ca kṣudramiśrāṇīva bījānītarāṇi cetarāṇi cāṇḍajāni ca jārujāni ca 
svedajāni codbhijjāni cāśvā gāvaḥ puruṣā hastino yat kiñcedaṃ prāṇi 
jaṅgamaṃ ca patatri ca yac ca sthāvaraṃ sarvaṃ tat prajñānetraṃ 
prajñāne pratiṣṭhaṃ prajñānetro lokaḥ prajñā pratiṣṭhā prajñānaṃ 
brahma // AitĀ 2.6 
 
Who is the one we honor as the ātman, which of these is the ātman? Is it 
that by which one sees, by which one hears, by which one smells scents, 
by which one forms speech, by which one tells between sweet and sour? 
This heart and mind, this perception, injunction, discernment, intelligence, 
wisdom, vision, firmness, thought, conception, inclination, memory, 
resolve, determination, spirit, desire, wish? All these are just names of 
intelligence (prajñā). It is brahman, it is Indra, it is Prajāpati, it is all the 
gods and the five great elements – earth, wind, space, water, light – and it 
is [all of] these blended in the tiny, the seeds: every single variety of thing, 
whether born from eggs, from the womb, from sweat or by sprouting – 
horses, cows, people, elephants – whatever breathes, whether it walks or 
flies, and what is immobile. All of that is guided by prajñā, established on 
prajñā. The world is guided by prajñā; the foundation is prajñā; brahman 
is intelligence (prajñāna). 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the metaphysical centrality of ātman should 
resound in such spatial and physical terms. As has been pointed out by a number 
of modern scholars of Vedic texts, ātman is the term “most frequently used with 
reference to a living breathing body” and is “liable to misunderstanding and 
mistranslating because it can also mean the spiritual self or the innermost core of 
a human being, besides functioning as a mere reflexive pronoun.”246 Malamoud 
elaborates this point with respect specifically to the employment of the term 
ātman in the Brāhmaṇas: 
 
ātman, which is sometimes, not incorrectly, translated as “soul,” is not 
here the noncorporeal element of the person as contrasted with the 
material body (tanū, śarīra, or deha). Ātman is that in the body which is 
contrasted with the limbs (and the head), as the centre to the periphery, or 
else it is the whole as distinguished from the parts it encompasses. In this 
sense, ātman is the “person himself” (not my leg, nor even my heart, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 Olivelle 1998: 22. 
	   133	  
“me”), and thus the body, to the extent that it supports reflexivity (ātman, 
like its synonym tanū, is used as a reflexive pronoun for all persons).247 
 
Malamoud’s observations may well serve as a description of the employment of 
this term as it appears in the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas, where its frequent occurrences 
attest to a variety of intended points of reference, none of which are clearly 
explicated; furthermore, given the wide-ranging contents of these texts, ātman’s 
referential abstruseness is thrown into high relief. However, although this 
apparent lack of exactitude may suggest otherwise, a prominent feature of its use 
(overlapping again with prāṇa) is the consistency with which it directs attention 
to what is personal, obtaining at the level of the puruṣa, or has the potential to be 
personalized, encoded in the structures of a fluid personhood, as opposed to 
directing focus to something eternal and existing in isolation from what is 
changeable. Therefore, while knowledge and its embodied states (veda, prajñā) 
illumine what ultimately is real, its coincidence with prāṇa’s instrumentality and 
the polyvalence of the term ātman directly engages the congruent malleability of 
personal identity.  
When viewed from this perspective, ātman’s spiraling multiplicity (self, 
essence, “me,” heart, body, core, nature, etc.) appears with pragmatic, 
metaphysical precision as it makes its claim for the reality of an identity whose 
truth hangs on the personal, temporal narrative through which immortality 
unfolds.248 In ŚāṅkhĀ 4.14, the passage that directly follows the discussion of 
parimara examined above, the motif of the deities entering and exiting the body 
acquires a pregnant sense of anticipation as it describes the one who possesses 
true knowledge (vidvān) of prāṇa as merging into prāṇa and blowing up into 
heaven together with the deities and their functions. In this convergence of bodily 
technologies and states – prāṇa, prajñā, ātman and veda – knowledge impacts on 
the person from within, with the full force of revelation emerging through a 
deeply patterned reconstruction of identity that sublimates individuality into the 
supra-individual structures of tradition, yet preserves the individual and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 Malamoud 1989: 97. 
248 Patton (1990: 184) speaks of paradox, ambiguity and multivalency as “Vedic intentions.” These 
linguistic qualities point to extra-semantic characteristics or powers of vāc. 
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collocation of entities from which identity arises by means of their achievement 
of immortality.249 
 
athāto niḥśreyasādānam etā ha devatā ahaṃśreyase vivadamānā asmāc 
charīrād uccakramus tad dha papāta śuṣkaṃ dārubhūtaṃ śiśye ’thainad 
vāk praviveśa tad vācāvadac śiśya evāthainac cakṣuḥ praviveśa tad 
vācāvadac cakṣuṣāpaśac śiśya evāthainac chrotraṃ praviveśa tad 
vācāvadac cakṣuṣāpaśyac chrotreṇa sṛṇvac chiśya evāthaitan manaḥ 
praviveśa tad vācāvadac cakṣuṣāpaśyac chrotreṇa śṛṇvan manasādhyāyac 
chiśya evāthainat prāṇaḥ praviveśa tat tata eva samuttasthau tā vā etāḥ 
sarvā devatāḥ prāṇe niḥśreyasaṃ viditvā prāṇaṃ eva prajñātmānam 
abhisaṃbhūya sahaivataiḥ sarvair asmāc charīrād uccakramus 
vāyupratiṣṭhā ākāśātmānaḥ svar īyus tatho evainaṃ vidvān prāṇe 
niḥśreyasaṃ viditvā prāṇaṃ eva prajñātmānam abhisaṃbhūya 
sahaivaitaiḥ sarvair asmāc charīrād utkrāmati sa vāyupratiṣṭha ākāśātmā 
svar eti sa tad gacchati yatraite devās tat prāpya yad amṛtā devās tad 
amṛto bhavati ya evaṃ veda // ŚāṅkhĀ 4.14 
 
Next, the claiming of pre-eminence. The deities, disputing among 
themselves who was superior, departed from this body. It fell and lay 
there, as dry as a log. Now speech entered it, and it spoke with speech but 
just lay there. Now sight entered it, and it spoke with speech and saw with 
sight, but just lay there. Now hearing entered it, and it spoke with speech, 
saw with sight and heard with hearing but just lay there. Now the mind 
entered it, and it spoke with speech, saw with sight, heard with hearing and 
thought with the mind, but just lay there. Then prāṇa entered it, and 
because of that alone it rose up altogether. All of the deities, recognizing 
the pre-eminence of prāṇa and merging into prāṇa, the intelligent self 
(prajñātmānam), departed from this body together with all of these 
[faculties] and, established in the wind and identified with space, blew up 
into heaven. Exactly so does the knower of this, recognizing the pre-
eminence of prāṇa and merging into prāṇa, the intelligent self, depart 
from this body together with all these [faculties] and, established in the 
wind and identified with space, blow up into heaven. He goes where the 
gods go, and gaining this becomes immortal as the gods are immortal, the 
one who knows thus. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 Olivelle translates sahaivaitaiḥ sarvair asmāc charīrād utkrāmati as “departs from the body 
accompanied by all these” (1998: 345). The suggestion seems to be that the knower departs from 
the corporeal body and goes to heaven with the senses and their functions intact, i.e., still retaining 
the configuration of entities that animates the person in life; cf. ŚāṅkhĀ 3, 5 (= KṣU 1, 3). This is 
implicated in particular by the announcement in ŚāṅkhĀ 5.8 that just as in a chariot the rim is 
fastened to the spokes and the spokes to the hub, so the particles of being are fastened to the 
particles of intelligence, which are in turn fastened to prāṇa (tad yathā rathasyāreṣu nemir arpitā 
nābhāvarā arpitā evam evaitā bhūtamātrāḥ prajñāmātrāsv arpitāḥ prajñāmātrāḥ prāṇe ’rpitāḥ). If 
the pre-eminence of prāṇa and its immortality arise from the other deities’ adherence within it, 
and if the person gains immortality through an enactive knowledge of prāṇa, then this 
soteriological state would be inclusive of all deities together and in proper, functioning 
relationship. 
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The fact that this knowledge is conceived of as enactive is of great 
importance, because it illuminates embodiment as both an epistemological 
process and state attained within the temporal narrative of a person’s life; in the 
words of Deutsch, reflecting on the role of traditional Sanskrit texts: 
“Knowledge…is something made; it is a genuine action (karman) in this 
existentialist sense: it is not so much that which is contained in a (justified, true) 
belief or statement, as that which becomes wholly real in one’s life.”250 However, 
as Flood notes of ascetic traditions worldwide, there is a “deep ambiguity” in 
soteriological practices of self-realization that focus on the interiorization of 
cosmological structures, for the achievement of interiority goes beyond 
subjectivity, yet simultaneously always entails subjectivity because it requires a 
real, living, historical subject who acts, speaks and knows, and in these ways 
expresses their own will or intent.251 In this way, tradition is not opposed to 
individuality. Rather, it is suggested that in traditional cultures individuality is 
understood in dramatically different ways, and to this it may be added that the 
envisioning of the person as open, fluid, and subject to changes in psycho-
physiological constitution that are imposed from without does not support the 
notion of self-contained individuality and independence that predominate in the 
de-traditionalized culture of modernity. It is, rather, the seamless co-ordination 
between the individual and supra-individual tradition that marks the fullest 
flourishing of personhood; and thus the puruṣa, as also the ātman, is “an index of 
tradition-specific subjectivity,” albeit established at the antipodal nodes of change 
and continuity.252 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 Deutsch 1988: 166; Potter 1988: 29-30. 
251 Flood 2004; also Brereton 1990: 135: “…the Upanishads are a result of the very individuality 
they seem to compromise.” 
252 Flood 2006: 12. These patterns are also familiar in Chinese culture; see Hall and Ames 1981; 
also 1998:32: “the lived body is the concrete and particular medium through which the substance 
of the tradition is expressed.” 
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Subjectivities Specified by Language 
 
The purpose behind this panoramic and meandering examination of prāṇa can 
now be stated. The impact of Sanskrit on the person is explained not by its 
ideational value as an authoritative relic of timeless tradition, and nor by sacred 
association with ritual, but by the dynamic operations of prāṇa between body and 
cosmos. The texts are clear on this matter. Firstly, the forward movement of 
speech, as one of the bodily deities, in its tangibly sonic, grammaticalized and 
cadent sensuality, is contingent upon prāṇa. Prāṇa reaches through speech; and 
speech enters into and is transported by prāṇa. Secondly, speech, as an aspect of 
language, gives prāṇa manifest form in shapes that are inextricably bound with 
the potential for revelation. 
 
tasya vāk tantir nāmāni dāmāni tad asyedaṃ vācā tantyā nāmabhir 
dāmabhiḥ sarvaṃ sitaṃ sarvaṃ hīdaṃ nāmanīṃ3 sarvaṃ vācābhivadati / 
vahanti ha vā enaṃ tantisaṃbaddhā ya evaṃ veda / tasyoṣṇig lomāni tvag 
gāyatrī triṣṭum māṃsam anuṣṭup snāvāny asthi jagatī paṅktir majjā prāṇo 
bṛhatī sa chandobhiś channo yac chandobhiś channas tasmāc chandāṃsīty 
ācakṣate / chādayanti ha vā enaṃ chandāṃsi pāpāt karmaṇo yasyāṃ 
kasyāñ cid diśi kāmayate ya evaṃ etac chandasāṃ chandastvaṃ veda / tad 
uktam ṛṣiṇā / apaśyaṃ gopāṃ ity eṣa vai gopā eṣa hīdaṃ sarvaṃ gopāyati 
/ anipadyamānam iti na hy eṣa kadācana saṃviśati / ā ca parā ca pathibhiś 
carantam ity ā ca hy eṣa parā ca pathibhiś carati / sa sadhrīcīḥ sa viṣūcīr 
vasāna iti sadhrīcīś ca hy eṣa viṣūcīś ca vasta imā eva diśaḥ / ā varīvartti 
bhuvaneṣv antar ity eṣa hy antar bhuvaneṣv āvarīvartti / atho āvṛtāso 
’vatāso na kartṛbhir iti / sarvaṃ hīdaṃ prāṇenāvr ̥tam / so ’yam ākāśaḥ 
prāṇena bṛhatyā viṣṭabdhas tad yathāyam ākāśaḥ prāṇena bṛhatyā 
viṣṭabdha evaṃ sarvāṇi bhūtāny āpipīlikābhyaḥ prāṇena bṛhatyā 
viṣṭabdhānīty evaṃ vidyāt // AitĀ 2.6 
 
Speech is its line, names the tethers253; so through speech, the line, and 
names, the tethers, all this is joined – for all this truly is names, through 
speech it [= prāṇa] names it all. Those that are bound together with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 The key to grasping this statement lies in the image conveyed by the nouns tanti and dāman, 
which Keith (1909) simplistically translates as “rope” and “knots.” It is possible that this was an 
attempt to distinguish the terms, which overlap semantically: both tanti and dāman carry the 
simple sense of a string, cord, rope or line. However, their subtleties are drawn out through 
reference back to the verbal roots from which they are derived, namely, √tan “to stretch or 
extend” and √dā (4) “to bind”, from which we get tanti as a cord that is extended, and dāman as a 
string that binds. Taken together, these terms indicate that speech is conceived of as the pitching-
line to which names are tethered, as animals. See MW 436:1 tanti sv.: “a cord, line, string (esp. a 
long line to which a series of calves are fastened by smaller cords).” 
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rope (of speech) carry the one who knows thus. His hairs are the uṣṇih, the 
gāyatrī his skin, his flesh the triṣṭubh, his veins the anuṣṭubh, the jagatī his 
bones, his marrow the paṅkti, and the bṛhatī is prāṇa. He is covered 
(channa) by the meters (chandas-), and it is since he is covered by the 
meters that they are called chandas, “meters.” The meters cover him from 
evil action in whatever quarter he desires, the one who knows thus why 
the state of being chandas belongs to the meters. This was said by a ṛṣi254: 
“I saw the herdsman” – for it truly is the herdsman, it guards all this. 
“Who never settles down” – for it never rests. “Roaming here and afar 
along his paths” – for it roams here and afar along its paths. “Clothing 
himself in those that converge and diverge” – for he wears just these 
quarters that converge and diverge. “He moves back and forth among 
living beings” – for this moves back and forth among living beings. Then 
[there is the verse]255: “Like wells covered over by their makers.” For all 
this is covered with prāṇa. This ether is supported by prāṇa, the bṛhatī, 
and just as this ether is supported by prāṇa, the bṛhatī, so all beings down 
to ants are supported by prāṇa, the bṛhatī – one should know this to be so. 
 
Because of the subtle complexity of the primary sources – recalling that these 
texts not only furnish us with descriptive accounts of revelation, but are 
revelation in all aspects – it is worth pausing momentarily to outline some of the 
key features of prāṇa and vāc that play a decisive role throughout the rest of the 
analysis in this and the final chapter. For a start, vāc and prāṇa are conjoined in a 
relationship of countervailing potential manifested through bodily expression, 
whereby breath is latent within speech and speech within breath.256 Unlike the 
other deities that are most frequently referred to – sight, hearing and mind – 
speech and breath are not hidden forms whose activities cannot be “seen” in the 
body of another or felt within oneself, but are both expressed by the body or 
pressed out of it in forms that can be encountered in the space that is somewhere 
between within and without. Further to this, the external or disembodied 
existences of vāc and prāṇa are positioned aside from the vertical stream of 
macrocosmic to microcosmic evolutes that populate the body; they exist as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 The verse cited is ṚV 1.164.31, not 1.164.13 as Keith indicates (1909: 208). The translation 
follows Jamison and Brereton 2014: 357 (vol. 1). 
255 ṚV 1.55.8; Jamison and Brereton 2014: 171 (vol 1). The connection between the two verses is 
provided by the phonological similarity between āvarīvartti (intens. ā-√vṛt), āvṛta- (past part. ā-
√vṛ) and avatas. It is noteworthy that the interplay occurs between both verbalized and non-
verbalized aspects of the language employed, assuming the audience’s capacity to automatically 
link the lexical base of āvarīvartti to the nominal āvṛta, and “hear” the euphonic suggestiveness 
between -vṛ- and -va-. 
256 AitĀ 3.2.6, ŚāṅkhĀ 4.5. These passages are discussed fully in Chapter 4. 
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powers or principles in ways that the others do not, and this is evident in the 
stability of their identities and their ability to match brahman in its expansiveness 
(e.g., AitĀ 1.3.8: “wherever there is brahman, there is vāc; wherever vāc, 
brahman”, yatra ha kva ca brahma tad vāg yatra vā vāk tad vā brahma). With 
respect to these relationships between deities and levels of the cosmos, then, both 
vāc and prāṇa themselves embody deeper truths about reality, truths that are only 
superficially accessible through other forms, entities and substances whose 
limited identity prevents them from capturing the dynamic spectrum of polarities 
that build tension and urgency into this worldview. 
 In addition, some further points about vāc bear mentioning. As can be seen 
in the passage directly above, speech is multi-aspectual and displays semantic and 
trans-semantic, verbalized and non-verbalized qualities. These include: (1) the 
patterned cadences of meter, chandas, which are amenable to numerical analysis 
and reconfiguration; (2) sound, as abstracted from semantic content and 
grammatical structuring alike; and (3) grammatical forms and meta-structures, 
which may be verbalized or non-verbalized but assumed as present behind spoken 
forms. All of these aspects of embodied speech are simultaneously aspects of 
disembodied language; in this way again, personal psycho-physiological 
boundaries between inside and outside are demonstrated as open, porous, 
renegotiable, and vulnerable to being penetrated from without by meters, words, 
phonemes, and so on. As part of the process of knowledge and the mechanics of 
its generation, the invisible arrangements within language are a blueprint of 
manifestation, and its externalization through speech is an implicit revelation of 
those patterned relationships.257 In all these respects, Sanskrit interpenetrates with 
the body and unveils the circuits of pervasion that underscore human ontology, 
the cosmos and knowledge alike. And while prāṇa is the physiological instrument 
that re-arranges the person in accordance with epistemological shifts that can only 
be articulated in Sanskrit, these shifts restructure personhood in ways that 
recapitulate Sanskrit’s own internal forms.  
By establishing embodiment as the central context of revelation, the 
Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas bring our interpretation of Sanskrit and the person to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 See Larson 1974: 47; Padoux 1990: 4. 
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confluence between subjectivity and language. To the extent that immortality, 
although realized after death, is presented as an outcome that preserves 
epistemological shifts that occur during the temporal narrative of a person’s life, 
it is ostensible that these significant transformations would have dynamic 
repercussions before death, investing the person with power that makes use of 
their adaptations to knowledge. We are then brought immediately to the question 
of the living person’s relationship to revelation – of how it is expressed, of the 
ends to which it is employed, and of what this says about empowerment. 
This implicates two potentially conflicting modes of subjectivity, both 
inseparable from the ontological, revelatory power of Sanskrit – pace knowledge 
– to assertively disclose, and simultaneously to create what it discloses258: one in 
which the ultimacy of a person’s identity is realized after death and with respect 
to a purely transcendent absolute in the videhamukti or “disembodied” mode of 
liberation that later became formalized in bhakti traditions and was contiguous 
with a distancing from extraordinary attainments achieved during life; and 
another in which the ultimacy of a person’s identity becomes manifest during life 
and is legitimately expressed through extraordinary attainments (eventually 
encoded in jīvanmukti traditions that postulated “living liberation” and is closely 
related to yogic and tantric praxis) and the pursuit of immortality in life. The fact 
that the two appear side-by-side in the mid-Vedic texts leads White to observe of 
brahman in the Upaniṣads that “this absolute ground is simultaneously the 
universal container of all that exists and that which is contained in all that has 
life….These representations of the absolute give rise to two different and 
incompatible soteriologies, the one immanentist and the other gradualist.”259 
While the contrastive practices that drive this conflict have traceable Vedic roots, 
and differing opinions about whether extraordinary powers should rightfully be 
engaged in appear as early as the Upaniṣads, the Buddhist Pali texts and the 
canonical scriptures of the Jains,260 the formalization of this conflict through an 
argument about “the meaning of religion” that reflects “profound disagreement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Deutsch 1985: 117, 124-25. 
259 White 2009: 84. 
260 Cabezon 2008, Clough 2012, and Silk 2003 provide a representative sample of scholarship on 
extraordinary powers in different aspects of Buddhism. Wiley 2012 and Dundas 1998 are 
informative sources on such powers in Jainism. 
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about the very nature of God…and whether men could legitimately aspire to be 
gods” 261  significantly postdates the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas. And while this 
observation might seem so basic as to serve no purpose here, I point out that the 
same cultural influences that had a role in informing the medieval bhaktas’ 
invocation of a categorical division between magic and miracle are remarkably 
similar to, if not in fact of common heritage with, the underlying influence of 
biblical religion that was once active within the scholarly distaste for the 
“magical” practices of other cultures and has carried over into a scientifically 
reasonable approach to literary criticism.262 It was discussed at length in the 
previous chapter how the perception of categorical oppositions have played out in 
the study and definition of the Āraṇyakas, and even prevented scholars from 
seeing the patterns of continuity that a polythetic approach can bring to the 
surface. Unlike this long and vociferous list of Indic and academic pundits, the 
Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas show no such qualms about including discussion of rites, 
amulets, visions, mantras and other typically magical phenomena alongside the 
exposition of solemn rituals and deliberations on the true identity of the person or 
self. Subjectivity in the Āraṇyakas extends from the living expression of one’s 
spiritual attainment through extraordinary powers, to the fully transformative 
realization of knowledge in immortality after death.263 
Next, to the extent that the temporal framing of accounts such as ŚāṅkhĀ 
4.14 draws the Veda, as an open-ended matrix of knowledge production, into the 
physical space of the life-world, the patterns of tradition gain present relevance at 
the intersection between past events and future goals. Thus, the knowledge 
encoded within the Veda, which is interiorized through a structural co-ordination 
between person and text that redefines subjectivity, guides self-expression (or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Pinch 2006: 195. 
262 For an extensive examination of the category “magic” with respect to the study of mantra 
through “flawed terms and categories” see Burchett 2008. For the influence of monotheistic 
worldviews on the development of traditions of bhakti, as introduced via the Sufis, see Burchett 
2012. 
263 Compare Olivelle’s notes on the early Upaniṣads (1998: 27): “Many scholars ignore these and 
similar passages in their search for the “philosophy” or “the fundamental conception” of the 
Upaniṣads. But are we justified in doing so? If the compilers of the Upaniṣads thought them 
significant enough to be included in these collections, who are we to reject them? These passages, 
I believe, are as important to uncovering the religious history of the period as the passages 
proclaiming the oneness of Ātman and Brahman.” 
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assertion) into a loop which discloses the person as a “receptive replicator of the 
cosmos.”264  Yet this knowledge is never only geared toward self-realization. In 
the Āraṇyakas as in the Saṃhitās, knowledge expressed through Sanskrit is 
deployed to artfully manipulate the universe and the gods, via the richly 
condensed medium of ritual, in ways that rebound through the worlds and have a 
reverberating effect on humans and their quality of life. This pragmatic and 
performative process, which is widely accepted as a cornerstone of the sacrificial 
ritual performed by the r̥ṣis, appears in the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas but has tended to 
be read in terms of a commentarial-style explanation designed to establish the 
relevance between the verses used in ritual and the purpose to which a ritual is 
performed, or as evidence of the increasing irrelevance of yajña in mid-Vedic 
culture.265  
While it is of course possible that the claims made in the Āraṇyakas do 
serve this explanatory function, the person’s propensity towards flexible 
adaptation and the active role of structural change in defining soteriological 
attainment suggest that there is more at stake: as existence claims, these 
explanations are suggestive of the mechanics involved in revelation – knowledge 
as a process, as Smith aptly points out266 – and attest to an interdimensional 
adherence or conjoining between one who knows and what is revealed through 
Sanskrit in both its semantic and trans-semantic aspects. This is illuminated in the 
opening paragraphs of AitĀ (1.1.1-2), where the matter of which recitation should 
accompany the commencement of the Mahāvrata is addressed. The text proceeds 
by moving from one possible recitation to the next, citing five different Ṛgvedic 
verses to Agni (in order of appearance: ṚV 3.13, 8.74, 5.1, 2.5, and 7.1), all of 
which summon the god in his special identification with the hotṛ priest and invoke 
his powers as seer and poet, and by drawing correspondences between the 
thematic content of the hymns and the various outcomes that may be desired from 
the Mahāvrata: prosperity (rāddhikāmaḥ), increase (puṣṭikāmaḥ), glory 
(kīrtikāmaḥ), children and cattle (prajāpaśukāmaḥ), and good food or the securing 
of it (annādyakāmaḥ). Further correspondences are made between the metres in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 F. Smith 2006a: 374. 
265 For example, see Lubin (2010: 4-5) on the Brāhmaṇas as a mode of commentary. 
266 F. Smith 2006a: 178. 
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which the verses are composed, such as in the identification of the anuṣṭubh and 
gāyatrī of ṚV 8.74 with brahman and vāc respectively; the truth-claims contained 
within the lexicon of the hymns and their effect within the Mahāvrata, for 
example, in the play on the verbal form janayanti, “they bring to birth,” in ṚV 
7.1.1b (AitĀ 1.1.2: jātavad etasmād vā ahno yajamāno jāyate tasmāj jātavat, “it 
contains the word “birth” and the sacrificer is born from this day, thus it contains 
the word “birth””); and even the number of lines to a verse, verses in a hymn, and 
repetitions within the recitation. The rest of the paragraphs in AitĀ 1.1 continue 
in much the same way, with the addition of the often-repeated assertion that “[X 
is attained by] one who knows thus or by one for whom a hotṛ who possesses this 
knowledge recites” (ya evaṃ veda yeṣāṃ caivaṃ vidvān etad dhotā śaṃsati). 
If a case were to be made for a continuity between pure or orthodox 
instances of revelation and the utilization of this knowledge – as selfish magic – 
in the service of worldly ends that increase individual power and status, it lies in 
the efficacy of vāc to work changes in the person that bring them into a deeper 
state of integrated connection with the world around them, the cosmos at large, 
idaṃ sarvam. The Āraṇyakas’ claims bear a relevance and energetic urgency that 
center directly on the power of the verses to work through and for the person, 
harnessing the subtle but true relationships that weave through the cosmos and 
bringing them into contiguous manifestation in the life-world, in tangible forms 
that promote life and assert the transformations undergone in the subjectivity of 
the ritual actor. There is no reason to presume that the qualities of language 
involved in the revelation and manifestation of truth and true identity are 
categorically discreet from those that serve ends oriented toward the well-being 
of the individual, such as fame, illustriousness and repute; moreover, language in 
both instances is equally bound to prāṇa and the true (satya), while the valued or 
desirable attributes it can instigate within personhood are legitimated by their 
functional testimony to high levels of spiritual attainment. Just as revelatory 
knowledge takes hold within the person, restructuring them in ways that are 
suited to the transcendent and ultimately soteriological goal of immortality, the 
semantic and trans-semantic structures embodying this knowledge exist in 
relationship to everything that can be objectified in the life-world, allowing it to 
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be restructured in ways that are equally specified by the Vedic texts and which 
preserve the person and their attainments up to the time of death. And while it 
cannot be said that the latter practices are formally soteriological, in the sense of 
directly constituting the transformations required for self-transcendence, their 
power must nonetheless be explained through reference to the same fluidity of 
embodiment and disembodiment on which the attainment of immortality itself 
hangs. 
Let us turn now to a final example, AitĀ 2.3.6, where it appears that 
language serves a dual-end – one pertaining to the changes required for post-
mortem immortality and the perfected completion of realization, the other to the 
preservation and authoritative expression of those changes during live 
embodiment – rather than two divergent and contradictory goals. As we have 
seen repeatedly with respect to the reconfiguration of the deities in the body, 
transformations to the person occur in text-specific ways; and this is no less true 
in cases where it is the subjectivity of the person, the yard-stick of the very 
individuality that is supposedly attenuated through absorption into a universal 
identity, that “becomes greater” (bhūyān bhavati). This is not explicated by the 
texts; however, it is apparent that there are certain trigger-points within language 
– which Shulman refers to as “sites of ultimacy, where truth resides”267 – that are 
sunk deep within the shifting, recombinant and nested aspects of vāc. This 
division between what is true (satyam) and untrue (anṛtam), going against the 
grain of ṛta, encapsulates the fundamental efficacy of language, but with a caveat 
that this passage strikingly highlights: these triggers not only elude easy 
classification, but contain within themselves a threat of inversion, such that the 
same true speech that makes a man a lord can drain him, the same untrue speech 
that dries a man out fills the self but destroys him.  
 
sa vā eṣa vācaḥ paramo vikāro yad etan mahadukthaṃ tad etat 
pañcavidhaṃ mitam amitaṃ svaraḥ satyānṛte iti / ṛg gāthā kumbyā tan 
mitaṃ yajur nigado vṛthāvāk tad amitaṃ sāmātho yaḥ kaś ca geṣṇaḥ saḥ 
svara oṃ3 iti satyaṃ nety anṛtam / tad etat puṣpaṃ phalaṃ vāco yat satyaṃ 
sa heśvaro yaśasvī kalyāṇakīrtir bhavitoḥ puṣpaṃ hi phalaṃ vācaḥ satyaṃ 
vadati / athaitan mūlaṃ vāco yad anṛtaṃ tad yathā vṛkṣa āvirmūlaḥ suṣyati 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Shulman 2012: 128. 
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sa udvartata evam evānṛtaṃ vadann āvirmūlam ātmanaṃ karoti sa suṣyati 
sa udvartate / tasmād anṛtaṃ na vaded dayeta tv enena / parāg vā etad 
riktaṃ akṣaraṃ yad etad om3 iti tad yat kiñcom ity āhātraivāsmai tad 
ricyate sa yat sarvam oṃ kuryād riñcyād ātmānaṃ sa kāmebhyo nālaṃ 
syāt / athaitat pūrṇam abhyātmaṃ yan neti / sa yat sarvaṃ neti brūyāt 
pāpikāsya kīrtir jāyeta sainaṃ tatraiva hanyāt / tasmāt kāla eva dadyāt 
kale na dadyāt tat satyānṛte mithunīkaroti tayor mithunāt prajāyate bhūyān 
bhavati / yo vai tāṃ vācaṃ veda yasyā eṣa vikāraḥ sa saṃprativit / ākāro 
vai sarvā vāk saiṣā sparśoṣmabhir vyajyamānā bahvī nānā rūpā bhavati / 
tasyai yad upaṃśu sa prāṇo ’tha yad uccais tac charīraṃ tasmāt tat tira 
iva tira iva hy aśarīram aśarīro hi prāṇo ’tha yad uccais tac charīraṃ 
tasmāt tad āvir āvir hi śarīram // AitĀ 2.3.6 
 
The Mahaduktha is the highest transformation of vāc. It is fivefold: 
measured, unmeasured, sound, true, and untrue. The ṛc, the verse used in 
legends (gāthā), and precepts recorded in verse (kumbyā) are measured; 
the yajus, the audible invocation (nigada), and casual talk (vṛthāvāc) are 
unmeasured; the sāman or one of its songs is sound; om is true; and “no” is 
untrue. What is true is the flower and fruit of vāc. One can become a lord, 
famous and with excellent reputation, for they speak the true, the flower 
and fruit of vāc. Untruth is the lowest part of vāc. Just as a tree with its 
roots exposed dries up and perishes, so a man, speaking untruth, exposes 
his roots: he dries up, he perishes. Therefore, let a man not speak untruth 
but distance himself from it. Om is an empty syllable and goes forward, so 
when a man says om it is emptied out of him; if he were to [say] om to all 
things, he would empty himself – there would not be enough (left of him) 
for pleasures. Now, “no” is full for one’s self. If a man were to say “no” to 
everything, his fame would be born evil, and he would destroy himself. On 
account of this, one should give at the proper time and not give at the 
proper time – thus does one unite the true and untrue; and from their union 
he is brought forth, he becomes greater. The one who knows vāc, of which 
the [Mahaduktha] is a transformation, is wise. [The phoneme] a is all of 
vāc – being manifested through the mutes and sibilants, [vāc] becomes 
abundant and manifold. When, for [vāc], one whispers, that is prāṇa; when 
spoken aloud, that is the body. Therefore it moves beyond secretly, for the 
incorporeal moves beyond and prāṇa is incorporeal. Yet, aloud it is the 
body; and therefore it is apparent, for the body is apparent. 
 
 
Set against the backdrop of the soteriological impetus to preserve the 
epistemological shifts that have taken root within one’s body as a prerequisite to 
the person’s actualization of immortality in the afterlife, the dangers encoded 
within even this “highest transformation” or modification of vāc acquire a 
profound sense of existential urgency. 
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As in the creation narratives with which this examination of embodiment 
commenced, it is evident that the force of language gains its fullest coherence in 
light of a vision of personhood particularized by its openness, multiplicity, and 
extension to disembodied yet animate and affective forms whose relevance 
depends on their contingent juxtaposition against the temporal limitations 
imposed by a body that decays. What these passages reveal is that personal 
agency is codified and legitimated as enactive knowledge within the texts’ vision 
of soteriological practice. Spiritual attainment (being “wise,” saṃprativit) applies 
in the context of an unfolding awareness that sees reality through the lens of vāc 
and meets it with countervailing personal force by internally integrating these 
trigger-points within one’s conduct. And in this way, once again, the circuit of 
pervasion between various entities and beings of different substantiality is made 
complete: the control of language is the control of oneself, and what this intends 
is the perfect crafting into wholeness (sam-√kṛ) of one’s embodiment after the 
intricately balanced interior structures of Saṃhitā. Sanskrit is not transcendently 
aloof from the lived experiences that carve out the person – it is the knife that 
does the carving.	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CHAPTER FOUR 
Parsing Śruti 
 
vāṅ me manasi pratiṣṭhitā mano me vāci pratiṣṭhitam āvir āvīr 
ma edhi vedasya ma āṇī sthaḥ śrutaṃ me mā prahāsīr 
anenādhītenāhorātrān saṃdadhāmy r ̥taṃ vadiṣyāmi satyaṃ 
vadiṣyāmi tan mām avatu tad vaktāram avatv avatu mām avatu 
vaktāram avatu vaktāram // 
 
My speech is established in mind, my mind established in 
speech – 
may you be visible, visible to me. 
For me you are the two axle-pins of the Veda. 
May the sacred knowledge not desert me – 
with this attained, I join night and day. 
I will speak the real; I will speak the true – 
may it protect me, may it protect the teacher, 
may it protect me, may it protect the teacher,  
may it protect the teacher. 
 
AITAREYA ĀRAṆYAKA 2.7 
 
 
 
 
Grammatical Realities and the Generation of Truth 
 
It is ironic, although not altogether surprising, that one of the largest difficulties 
faced by modern scholars of Vedic texts and religion comes in the smallest of 
linguistic packages. This is the bandhu (“bond”), described by Frederick Smith as 
a “linkage of one phenomenon, entity, being, notion, or concept with another, 
based on phonological similarities, numerological equivalences, or other formal 
principles”268 that is typically generated at a syntactic level through the utilization 
of simple nominal apposition with or without the emphatic particle vai (“X vai 
Y”). Take, for example, the opening sequence of AitĀ 1.3.8: 
 
tā nadena viharati / prāṇo vai nadas tasmāt prāṇo nadan sarvaḥ saṃnadati 
/ nadaṃ va odatīnām itīṃ3 uṣṇig akṣarair bhavaty anuṣṭup pādair āyur vā 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 F. Smith 2006a: 211. 
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uṣṇig vāg anuṣṭup / tad asminn āyuś ca vācaṃ ca dadhāti / tās triḥ 
prathamayā pañcaviṃśatir bhavanti pañcaviṃśa ātmā pañcaviṃśaḥ 
prajāpatir daśa hastyā aṅgulayo daśa pādyā dvā ūrū dvau bāhū ātmaiva 
pañcaviṃśas tam imam ātmānaṃ pañcaviṃśaṃ saṃskurute / atho 
pañcaviṃśaṃ vā etad ahaḥ pañcaviṃśa etasyāhnū stomas tat samena 
samaṃ pratipadyate tasmād dve269 eva pañcaviṃśatir bhavanti / 
 
[He] intersperses [the verses of the recitation] with the “roaring bull” 
(nada; = ṚV 8.69.2). Now, prāṇa is the roarer, which is why every breath, 
roaring (nadan), sounds out aloud (sam-√nad). The verse “[you take aim] 
at the roaring bull among your moist females”270 is an uṣṇih by its syllables 
and an anuṣṭub by its feet – the uṣṇih is life, the anuṣṭub speech (vāc). 
Thus he places life and speech in this [offering]. With the first repeated 
three times, the verses come up to twenty-five; the body (ātman) consists 
of twenty-five and Prajāpati consists of twenty-five: the ten digits of the 
hands, the ten of the feet, two legs, two arms, and the core (ātman) are 
twenty-five. He completes (sam-√kṛ) that, this body consisting of twenty-
five. Further, this day is twenty-five (pañcaviṃśa) and the stoma of this 
day is the Pañcaviṃśa – identity is recovered through identity; thus they 
both become twenty-five. 
 
This condensed image of relationships spreading back and forth between 
revelation and embodied identity displays the expansive potential of bandhus to 
make multiple and simultaneous reference to a diverse array of phenomena and 
objects. Moreover, this linguistic operation activates the claim that “identity is 
recovered through identity” (samena samaṃ pratipadyate). 
Bandhus constitute the predominant compositional feature of the Ṛgvedic 
Āraṇyakas with the bulk of the ritual exegesis of the Mahāvrata and its recitations 
conforming to the “X vai Y” structure seen above and sharing an epistemological 
affinity with the statements of true identity (“one should know that they are the 
hymn”) that guide the cosmological narratives examined in the previous 
chapter.271 The fact that bandhus thus locate these materials within the broader 
setting of a pan-Indic practical concern with homologization and the discerning of 
invisible connections – a concern with a pedigree extending some three and a half 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 For this peculiarity of Vedic sandhi, see Macdonell 1910: 66. 
270 Translation by Jamison and Brereton 2014: 1161 (vol. 2); according to their reading, the 
subject of ṚV 8.69.2 is the hymn itself. 
271 B. Smith 1998: 30-31. The affinity of the bandhus or saṃpads in the Brāhmaṇas with the 
mahāvākyas of the Upaniṣads has not done much to raise the status of the former collection of 
texts; this may in part be to do with Śaṅkara’s assertion that saṃpads are not true so much as 
imaginary connections. See Shulman 2012: 128. 
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thousand years, from the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā to modern tantric practices of nyāsa,272 
and resonating with epistemological strategies and referential frameworks 
employed from Buddhism to Āyurveda to the Tamil poetic tradition – has done 
little to elucidate their contribution to the Āraṇyakas as revelation. This needs to 
be noted because, while the extreme syntactic brevity of bandhus does not belie 
their metaphysical depth, their lack of expository detail has left scholars in 
conflicting opinion over how these linkages should be understood and agreement 
reached through recourse to their language, with recent scholarship falling into 
two modes of approach, roughly speaking: firstly, those that align the hierarchies 
insinuated by bandhus with priest-led ritual and a sociolinguistic vision of 
Sanskrit, and who argue, with Brian K. Smith,273 for an intellectual coherence 
grounded in the varṇa system; and secondly, those that look beyond Sanskrit 
specifically to language generally and its intersection with a “mental economy” of 
religious practice and perception, as in Laurie Patton’s analysis of bandhu 
through the dual lens of metonymic association and performance. Thus, while one 
approach tells us a lot about critical interpretations of Sanskrit but little about 
language as such, the other tells us a lot about language and ritual but little about 
the Sanskrit language in particular. 
In addition to these, a third approach to bandhus may be noted, which 
comprises of a handful of side-notes and suggestions made by scholars working 
with Vedic antecedents of Tantra and related practices; this approach thus 
remains somewhat in potential. This matter aside, it would include such 
observations as Sylvain Lévi’s that the ritual practices depicted in the Brāhmaṇas 
paved the way to the “pious obscenities” of Tantra; Frederick Smith’s 
identification of bandhu as closely related to possession and transfers of essence; 
David White’s perception of the linkages contained in bandhu as one conceptual 
forerunner to the transacting of fluids so central to early yoginī cults; and, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 Lipner 1994: 34-35. 
273 Note the following statement by B. Smith (1994: 323): “Classifications, such as those made 
possible by the varṇa system, reflect the interests of those who are classifying. And those who do 
the classifying for a particular culture and time do so because they can, because they have 
seized…the ability to imperiously decree what is what.” This might be compared with Patton’s 
(2005: 81) statement that there is far more to bandhu “than the reenactment and the speech act. 
There is metonymic connection between word and action – the mantra’s power to refer, to 
identify, to create a world – and that too is part of bandhu.”  
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similarly, André Padoux’s identification of Vāc with Shakti and subsequent 
suggestion that the dynamics of dīkṣā and shaktipat echo vāc’s ability to not only 
move between realms but bind them.274 Again, however, this latter approach does 
not attend specifically to either bandhus or to Sanskrit. 
 Assuming for a moment that it is viable to suggest that bandhus reflect or 
are even constrained by Sanskrit in its linguistic and soteriological particularities, 
and that this would intersect determinatively with the human subject and their 
identity (both as self-apprehended and textually prescribed) then it is of interest to 
note that each of the approaches just mentioned marks a response to the 
nineteenth-century flowering of Vedic Studies and its beleaguering by the high 
reactivity of early translators to what they perceived as “magic,” as defined by an 
irrational belief in the power of words to serve manipulative selfish ends rather 
than the supplicative ones of prayer – or, as Whitney would state, what we have 
here is “one of the aberrations of the human mind.”275 Evidently, the repudiation 
of the magic allegation – the argument that these ritual materials are not irrational 
and bandhus not the work of delusional ritualists, the attempt to locate logically 
consistent explanations for obscure references and directions, and the effort to 
produce unabridged (and uncensored) editions of Vedic texts276 – has not, in the 
majority of cases, meant a corresponding return to a positive evaluation of the 
power of words, for, as Burchett states in a study of mantra: “The problem is that 
“magic” and “magical” are loaded terms; as soon as they are used to label any 
given phenomenon, a value judgment is made.”277 And again: “That which we call 
magical, by any other name would be just as irrational. In a sense, to think 
otherwise would be to grant language the very magical power that modern 
rationality has long refused it.”278 It seems suffice to say that while there is a 
space within the contemporary discipline of Indology for bandhus and their 
relationship to the deeply internal dynamics of vāc, it is obscured beneath a cross-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Lévi 1966 [1898]; F. Smith 2006a; White 2003; Padoux 1990, cf. Larson 1974: 47. See also 
Burchett’s (2008:822) critique of White’s identification of mantra with the transaction of bodily 
fluids, stating: “To understand the context of Tantric mantra it is essential to understand the 
concept of vāc.” 
275 Whitney 1882: 392-93; also Tull 1991. 
276 For example, see Doniger O’Flaherty 1985: 6-9; Jamison 1991: 36-39, 1996: 253. 
277 Burchett 2008: 834. 
278 Ibid.: 835. 
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hatching of our more culturally immediate, ingrained concerns about what 
constitutes acceptable scholarly practice. 
 Yet following this, it is even more interesting to observe that magic might 
be the very description that provides a promising point of departure for the 
present study. According the employment of the term in La Porta and Shulman’s 
volume The Poetics of Grammar, it appears feasible that “magic” can be used 
neutrally to describe the causal power of language to effect reality not through a 
word’s coercion of its referent, but from within the generative ability of grammar 
to create and manifest. The distinction made here, between grammar on one hand 
and the relation between a word and its referent on the other, marks a crucial shift 
in the underlying terms of how we understand the power of language, its magic. 
This is because, firstly, in an intellectual climate that holds a mainstream view of 
language as inert and even as arbitrary in respect to the construction of meaning, 
attention paid to words forces the discussion of magic into an analysis of 
representation. The scholarly disavowal of their power “configures a sharp and 
impermeable boundary between nature and culture, a natural world subject to 
nonhuman causality and the artificial, transitory world of human language.”279 
Secondly, this treatment of words, those seemingly bounded objects floating on 
the surface of language, constrains discussion to verbal structures and, indeed, to 
what is effable. By contrast, grammar suggests a multiplicity of dynamic 
processes; these implicate the veridical nature of interrelationship or linkage as 
they unfold inclusively from silence to sound to metrics, phonemes, derivations, 
words, sentences and entire lengths of composition. “Grammar,” report La Porta 
and Shulman, “though selective, presents a methodology much more textured and 
elastic than other conceptual models. It is, for one thing, capable of containing 
both the semantic and trans-semantic pieces of reality. It retains the contours of 
cultural expressivity, and allows for structured transitions between disparate 
domains.”280 Thus, what is magical about grammar is its intense creativity and 
inclusiveness, its promise that a matrix of numerable rules is in fact an infinitude 
of potential expression, and not the fixed structures that have preoccupied 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 Styers 2004: 221; cf. Foucault 1970: 43; Skorupski 1976: 159; Harpham 2002: 235-36. 
280 La Porta and Shulman 2007: 6. 
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linguists and modern philosophers.281 This brings La Porta and Shulman to the 
conclusion that: 
 
It is thus no accident that in culture after culture, grammar turns out to be 
dependably linked with creation and restoration. Knowledge of grammar 
allows access to the workings of reality, which the skilled grammarian is 
capable of using effectively – to bless or to curse, to kill or to heal, to 
make present or to transform. In this sense, grammar transcends the 
merely descriptive or referential analysis of linguistic systems. Such 
systems are perceived as subsets of a far more comprehensive poetics. The 
world itself is grammar-ed, though not necessarily in transparent ways.282 
 
The strength of the postulations forwarded by La Porta and Shulman lies in their 
amenability to being adapted to whatever moment in the history of a given 
language or culture is under investigation such that the emic or internal gravitas 
of grammar’s creativity is preserved; three of them are of particular consequence 
for the examination conducted in this chapter and merit further contextualization 
with reference to the Sanskrit of the Āraṇyakas. These are: (1) that grammar 
retains the contours of cultural expressivity; (2) the world itself is grammar-ed, 
though not necessarily in transparent ways; and (3) grammar allows for structured 
transitions between disparate domains. 
 With respect to the first postulation, what we know of the historical 
framing of the Āraṇyakas indicates that while the six Vedic auxiliary disciplines 
(vedāṅga) developed recognizable shape during the middle Vedic period, and that 
four of these have a sharply linguistic orientation (i.e., phonology, śikṣā; 
morphology, vyākaraṇa; etymology, nirukta; and metrics, chandas), the period 
dealt with here is prior to the formation of grammar as “a fully autonomous 
discipline of linguistic study and analytical speculation,” that is, of Vyākaraṇa, a 
system sufficiently distinct from poetics, Alaṅkāraśāstra, for their later 
proponents to debate the matter of which was the superior authority on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 I point the reader to Shulman’s study of the intersection between grammar and poetry in 
southern Indian visions of the creation of the Tamil and Telugu languages (2001b), and make note 
of his observation that “Grammar, in this case, is the condition of self-transcendence, the presence 
of a generative set of formative limits that allow, or even positively require, the informed poet to 
break through his own former constraints” (ibid.: 370). 
282 La Porta and Shulman 2007: 6. 
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language.283 Thus, the metaphysical grammar that is internally conceived by the 
Āraṇyakas (which, might be noted, display no explicit concern for the vedāṅgas) 
cleaves strongly, though silently, to the Veda and its recitation, even while 
demonstrating the numerous linguistic differences to be expected of middle Vedic 
language. Further, the embedding of r̥cs within the surrounding text extends the 
cultural expressivity of the Āraṇyakas from bandhus and related forms of linkage, 
including upaniṣad, to the entwining of poetic and grammatical knowledge that is 
implicit in hymn-composition and is a requisite both of Vedic revelation and, as 
we shall see, of the Āraṇyakas’ expression of self-transformation.  
To this may be added the observation that grammar is generated as a 
subtle evolute of vāc, as opposed to vāc being the outcome of grammatical 
processes. The stirring promise of an immanent emergence of sound precedes 
grammar, which in turn precedes spoken language in a familiar movement 
through identity from utter expansiveness to delimited form. This vision of 
grammar not only resonates across its cultural expression in the Āraṇyakas, but 
pertains equally to the second postulation, that the world is grammar-ed: vāc, the 
Āraṇyakas insist, is co-extensive with brahman, and brahman co-extensive with 
vāc (AitĀ 1.3.8284). It would be a mistake to assume that this necessarily implies 
either a strict identification of the two – that brahman is vāc – or their duality as 
cosmic absolutes; 285  indeed, the evidence of the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas rather 
suggests that vāc extends as far as does brahman because of its capacity to yield a 
full spectrum of manifest forms that are as unarguably differentiated as they are 
fundamentally linked by unseen, or unheard, connections. Since all of this is 
axiomatically identified with brahman, grammar principally describes 
manifestation and the entrenched dynamics of realizing the truth of self-
identification: “Brahman is [expressed as] a, and the “I” (aham) contained 
therein” (a iti brahma tatrāgatam aham iti; AitĀ 2.3.8). As this passage 
continues, the assonance of the vowel-sound a provides the basis of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Shulman 2001b: 371. 
284 The AitĀ here cites ṚV 10.114.8, and then gives the paraphrase: yatra ha kva ca brahma tad 
vāg yatra vā vāk tad vā brahmety etad uktaṃ bhavati / Jamison and Brereton observe that “we can 
see in this contrast the inherent message of the hymn, that insight and its verbal product, poetry, 
have the power to give shape and multiplicity to the perceptible world” (2014: 1158 [vol. 3]). 
285 See Padoux’ (1990: 8) description of the evolution of the relationship between vāc and 
brahman. 
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multilayered grammatical mapping that exposes florid linkages between the ritual 
domain with its focus on the syllabic dimensions (akṣara) of recitation, human 
life-expectancy (āyur) and its encoding in light of days (ahar) in the world, the 
acquisition (āpnoti) of transformative knowledge, the five senses as vital 
expressions of life and their establishment of the immediate context for 
soteriological realization (anakāmamāro ’tha devaratha), and the culmination of 
all hidden connections – their enactment – in the archetypal revelation (ā...) of the 
Ṛgveda: 
 
a iti brahma tatrāgatam aham iti / 1 / tad vā idaṃ bṛhatīsahasraṃ 
saṃpannaṃ tasya vā etasya bṛhatīsahasrasya saṃpannasya ṣaṭtriṃśatam 
akṣarāṇāṃ sahasrāṇi bhavanti tāvanti puruṣāyuṣo ’hnāṃ sahasrāṇi 
bhavanti / 2 / jīvākṣareṇaiva jīvāhar āpnoti jīvāhnā jīvākṣaram iti / 3 / 
anakāmamāro ’tha devarathas tasya vāg uddhiḥ śrotre pakṣasī cakṣuṣī 
yukte manaḥ saṃgrahītā tad ayaṃ prāṇo ’dhitiṣṭhati / 4 / tad uktam ṛṣiṇā / 
ā tena yātaṃ manaso javīyasā nimiṣaś cij javīyaseti javīyaseti // 5 // AitĀ 
2.3.8286 
 
Brahman is [expressed as] a and the “I” contained therein. This is brought 
forth as a thousand bṛhatīs; and of these thousand bṛhatīs brought forth 
there are thirty-six thousand syllables – so many are the thousands of days 
of a person’s life. By a single syllable of life one attains a day of life; by a 
day of life, a syllable of life. There is a chariot of gods that destroys the 
undesired; its seat is speech, sides the ears, yoked horses the eyes, driver 
the mind – this prāṇa stands upon it. This was said by a ṛṣi: “Approach 
with that, swifter than the mind, swifter, swifter even than the blinking of 
an eye.” 287 
 
It does not take an exhaustive analysis of the above passage for it to be evident 
that the recurrence of the phoneme a facilitates the grammatical and poetic 
movement across this interlocking set of ideas. What needs to be noted in 
addition, however, is the fact that this grounding in the phoneme a generates a 
stylistic deep structure that literally – viz. truthfully – figures or constitutes the 
revelatory claim in ways that are lost through translation. It is likely, I suggest, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 Numbers added. I take this passage to consist of five and not six lines; the formulaic tad uktam 
ṛṣiṇā is properly read with the RV̥ references that follow rather than as a particular contribution to 
the structure of the text. 
287 The first half of the citation (up to “mind”) is from ṚV 10.39.12; the second half from ṚV 
8.73.2. I translate these lines in accordance with their appearance in the AitĀ and not as they 
appear in the grammatical and thematic context of the original sūktas of the ṚV. 
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that this is a result of the inability of English grammar to capture the non-verbal 
claims that are made in the Sanskrit grammar; and it is the loss of this 
grammatical coherence, more than anything intrinsic to the emic perspective of 
the Āraṇyakas, that creates the impression of a loose sequence of phenomena 
being forced into relationships that cannot withstand modern scientific analysis.288 
 For this reason, it is worthwhile pausing to take a closer look at the 
phonetic and grammatical figures that constitute the stylistic claims of the above 
passage. We have already seen that the first and final lines are simplistically 
linked by the non-semantic repetition a iti… ā tena… in which the pairing of 
vowel quantities (a : ā) forms an icon of the connection between statements. 
Furthermore, however, this iconic function suggests that the passage should be 
read not as a linear progression from assertion to justification to authority claim, 
but as a strikingly comprehensive instance of poetic composition in which the 
first and final lines are conceived of as equivalent, and the central line 
(jīvākṣareṇa…) is thematically related to both, as indicated by the reappearance 
of the marker iti. This points to a recursively embedded, even spiraling network 
of relationships that commences in the very first line in the form of the 
anagrammatic identity of brahma and aham, 
 
a iti brAHMA tatrāgatam AHAM iti 
 
which appears in combination with a transition from a to ā that is indexed by the 
possible double reading of “entered/come there” (tatra:āgatam) and “in this 
respect gone to ā” (tatra:ā-gatam). As a grammatical figure, iti and gatam 
disclose themselves in relationship (they are otherwise unrelated forms) by 
performing a comparable bracketing function; and, building upon this, they 
highlight the further equivalences (1) in metaphysical identity between brahma 
and aham, and (2) in revelatory disclosure through a and ā, and by extension 
through Āraṇyaka and Saṃhitā alike. 
 
a iti brahma…āgatam aham a iti brahma…āgatam aham 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 For an example of a contrasting perspective on bandhu, see Witzel 1996:3. 
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From the perspective of the phonetic figure, the switching iti…gatam…iti 
generates a sonic icon that firstly frames the entire existence claim through the 
mirroring a iti … aham iti, and secondly utilizes the sharp effect of the interjected 
repetition -tam…-ham to sonically isolate the first person pronoun aham. This 
places unique emphasis on the relationship between personal identity and self-
realization; moreover, the neuter declension in –am provides the inversion of –ma 
that is required for the anagrammatic transition from AHMA to AHAM. 
 
a iti brAHMA tatrāgatAM AHAM iti 
 
The overall effect is of an unfolding of identity that can be found in the always-
present, but not immediately apparent, subtleties of language. 
 A set of related figures occurs in the final line of the passage, which 
consists of a pair of short extracts from two Ṛgvedic sūktas, ṚV 10.39.12 and ṚV 
8.73.2, which Jamison and Brereton translate respectively as “drive here with 
your chariot swifter than thought” and “drive here with your chariot quicker even 
than a wink.”289 I have already stated that the overall compositional structure of 
this passage, AitĀ 2.3.8, suggests that the first and final lines are positioned as 
equivalents and poetically indexed by the common bracketing of both lines by the 
initial position a/ā and occurrence of iti, where iti serves to direct emphasis 
within the line and also to highlight the line as a whole within the surrounding 
text. In addition may be cited the phonetic equivalence of āgatam and ā-yātam, 
which binds lines 1 and 5 together in the structure of a ring composition where 
the recurrence of ā establishes the ring and the contrastive shift between the 
grammatically unrelated items modified (-gatam is a past participle, and –yātam a 
second person dual verb in the imperative mood) exposes the concern of the 
speaker and soteriological import of the passage, namely, the inception of a 
transformation in identity that enacts the archetypal relationship of brahman and 
the person (viz. aham). Again, this is implicitly reinforced by the occurrence of 
āpnoti in the middle position of the central line, which provides the only other 
instance of a verb or verbal derivative modified by ā and elucidates the necessity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 Jamison and Brereton 2014: 1438-1441 (vol.3) and 1168-1169 (vol.1). 
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of attaining (√āp) the state described in the first line by means, presumably, of 
such transformative awareness as is culturally expressed (and doubly codified) in 
the relationship between ṛṣi (seer) and revelation embodied in line 5.  
The same transition between states is heightened thematically by the 
dedication of the Ṛgvedic verses cited in line 5 to the Aśvin twins (a pair of Vedic 
deities), the hymns to whom are typically characterized by the poetic attention 
paid to their signficance as “dual divinities that can extend between opposites” 
and “who facilitate movement between spheres: between childlessness and birth, 
death and life, old age and youth, non-marriage and marriage, and so forth.”290 In 
this connection, the famed speed and mobility of the Aśvins’ chariot – essential to 
their characterization as gods who “rescue people from various dangers and 
difficulties in various places and circumstances”291 – and its central role in their 
facilitation of the transition between ontological and soteriological states, is 
mapped over the emic religious gravitas of chariots, firstly, as a mode of 
transportation to the world of the gods and identified with the yajña itself in the 
early Vedic period, and secondly as an image of the relationship between the 
body and the senses that is well-established by the time of the Āraṇyakas and 
Upaniṣads and is described in the fourth line of the passage.292 More significantly 
for our current purpose, however, is the fact that these thematic connections are 
not only articulated in the deep structure of line 5, but that it is precisely through 
the stylistic and structural aspects of this articulation that a much fuller disclosure 
of meaning is able to take place. Indeed, it is by means of the non-verbal features 
of this final line that our analysis can progress from the detection of a single ring 
to the retrieval of multiply embedded concentric rings: a compositional technique 
known as an omphalos (“navel”). And this retrieval, in turn, supports a movement 
away from reading the text of line 5 in accordance with its appearances in the 
Ṛgveda, to reading it in light of its function within this particular passage, in 
which the original reference to the Aśvins and their chariot acquires new 
dimensions of meaning. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 Jamison and Brereton 2014: 49 (vol.1). 
291 Ibid. 
292 See the overview in White 2009: 59-67.  
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The postulation examined in the following paragraphs is that the five lines 
of this passage, AitĀ 2.3.8, are organized in the form of an outer and inner ring 
with the single line 3 intended as the center of the concentric composition. 
Viewed from this perspective, lines 1 and 5 establish an outermost circle dealing 
with ontological truth and the intersection of personal identity and revelation; 
lines 2 and 4 establish an inner ring addressing self-transformative knowledge in 
active practice; and line 3 is the innermost point, where the semantic and trans-
semantic facets of the composition come together in a crescendo of precisely 
balanced meaning that extends at once outwards, disclosing the relatedness of the 
inner and outer rings, and inwards, providing the key that reveals their action 
upon the person in the life-world. Moving from the outermost of these rings to the 
linguistically embedded central line of the composition, the echoic 
correspondence between āgatAM ahAM and ā-yātAM establishes an external 
frame around the gradual shift in subject from idAM in line 2 to ayAM in line 4. 
Here, while the sequence of –am endings in line 2 corresponds both phonetically 
and grammatically to the two subjects of line 1, the phonetically resonant 
interplay between ayAM in line 4 and ā-yātAM in line 5 utilizes the grammatical 
discontinuity of these lexical items – which is both hidden and hinted at by the 
added suggestiveness of AYAM…Ā…YātAM – to draw attention to the fact that 
the key focus of line 5 is not, indeed, what it appears to be.  
Again, this is indicated grammatically through the respective relationships 
of line 2 to line 1 and line 4 to line 5. Firstly, while line 2 utilizes a series of 
predicates that depict the ritual “chariot” – the expedient thousand bṛhati verses 
that generate thirty-six thousand syllables identified with the number of days in a 
life fully lived – the anaphoric referent of the pronoun idam is neither the ritual 
nor a connoted chariot, but the identification of brahman and aham that is 
iconically presented in the first line. A similar situation occurs in line 4, which is 
established as the counterpart to line 2 through its reference to the bodily chariot 
of the gods, and likewise depicts a change of grammatical subject, from chariot to 
prāṇa, in the final clause (in line 2, the shift is from idam to the numerical 
identity of syllables and days). Yet neither “chariot” nor prāṇa satisfies the 
grammatical or thematic subject of line 5: if the internal grammar of the passage 
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is adhered to, and noting that neither citation from the Ṛgveda explicates either 
“chariot” as the instrumental referent of tena or carries over the addressal of the 
Aśvins, it appears that this is a case of viniyoga in which the instrumental now 
refers to prāṇa as that which is quicker than either the mind or sight – 
respectively, the horses and driver of the chariot that prāṇa stands upon, 
according to line 4.  
Following this, the dual reference of the imperative verb ā-yātam may 
refer to the days and syllables named in line 3; after all, not only is this mutual 
pair conceptually inclusive of the diversity of phenomena addressed in lines 1, 2, 
and 4, but it seems sensible that this urgent summoning would correspond to the 
only two objects that the passage presents as concretely attainable. Thus, while 
these transitions occur within the concatenated, external phonetic frame 
āgatam/ā-yātam, it is the anagrammatic and repeated reference to the word jīva in 
line 3 that should direct our attention: 
 
line 3:  JĪVĀkṣareṇaiva JĪVĀhar āpnoti JĪVĀhnā JĪVĀkṣaram iti 
 
line 5:  ā tena yātaṃ manaso JAVĪyasā nimiṣaś cij JAVĪyaseti JAVĪyaseti 
 
And just as in line 1 the lexical item āgatam appears as part of an extended 
phonetic sequence that supplies the phonemes and inversions required to reach 
aham, thus emphasising its contextualizing function, so the opening sequence of 
line 5 provides the phonetics required to complete the adjective javīyasā. At the 
same time, it echoes and re-inverts the phonetic progression of line 1 in a 
variation on the transition brahma tatrāgatam: 
 
ā tena YĀtaṃ manaS(Aḥ) javīYASĀ nimiṣaś cij javīYASĀ:iti javīYASĀ:iti 
 
This repetition of javīyasā in line 5 suggests that it is a phonetic icon, a sonic 
picture of the swift motility of prāṇa, that retains the atmospheric associations of 
the verb root √jū from which it is derived. In addition, the utilization in line 4 of 
the verb adhitiṣṭhati to describe the relationship of prāṇa to the other senses both 
complements and advances the posited relationship between superlative speed 
and the instrumental agency of prāṇa: derivatives of adhi-√sthā (in the sense “to 
	   159	  
inhabit”) are attested in accounts of possession,293  and its employment here 
correlates with the more frequent occurrence of pra-√viś to describe prāṇa’s 
ability to pervade the body with its deities and to transport them between spheres 
by becoming established in the wind (vāyupratiṣṭha; see Chapter 3). Put simply, 
these considerations make line 5 into a call for the days and the syllables of life to 
arrive at the speaker by means of the prāṇa that is quicker than the mind or the 
blinking of an eye, and which already pervades their body in a demonstration of 
the identity between brahman and aham. In this instance, however, it is grammar 
rather than narrative that describes and enacts the revelation. 
Now, with respect to position and figure, the embedded central line of the 
passage is the navel in the omphalos, the fulcrum on which the rest turn. To 
recap: the initially striking feature of line 3 is the ending in iti that it shares with 
lines 1 and 5, and which emphasizes the importance of the preceding assertion: 
“By a single syllable of life one attains a day of life; by a day of life, a syllable of 
life. Iti.” This marker aside, the revelatory weight of the line is indexed by the 
four repetitions of the noun jīva compounded alternatively with akṣara (syllable; 
“undecaying”) and ahar (day). As in the first and final lines of this passage, the 
poetic density that is generated by grammatical and phonetic repetitions chips 
away the semantic surface to shed light on a truth that is manifestly embodied in 
the internal relationships existing deep within vāc. 
 
jīva:akṣareṇaiva jīva:ahar āpnoti jīva:ahnā jīva:akṣaram iti 
 
The droning repetition of initial-position jīva and short a-initial akṣara/ahar, 
together with the alternation between latter members of the compound, 
thematically integrates the union of syllables and days of a person’s life (line 2: 
puruṣāyuṣo ’hnāṃ) with the illustration of living vitality that occurs in line 4 (i.e., 
the senses as a chariot of gods). At the same time, the identical euphonic synthesis 
(a + a > ā) occurring at the internal boundary of each of the compounds 
(jīvĀkṣareṇaiva jīvĀhar…jīvĀhnā jīvĀkṣaram) illustrates the transition from a to 
ā and the equivalence of the first and final lines of the passage. It is, moreover, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293 F. Smith 2006a: 14. 
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clear that these repetitions do not only extend outwards to connect the 
surrounding material. They also draw inwards, framing the verb-form āpnoti 
through a combination of semantic reversal and case variation: 
 
-akṣareṇa –ahar ĀPNOTI –ahnā -akṣaram 
inst. acc.     VERB inst. acc. 
 
Secondly, and even more subtly, āpnoti is framed through a metrical patterning 
that isolates it at the exact center of two sets of nine syllables apiece. Here, the 
combination of the semantic reversal of akṣara and ahar, the switching between 
instrumental and accusative case functions, and the repetition of the fixed 
structure jīvākṣara + enclitic particle generates a frame that is not only measured 
but mirrored, taking the form 
 
jīvākṣareṇ(aiva) jīvāhar ĀPNOTI jīvāhnā jīvākṣaram 
(iti) 
1 2 3 4 (5 6) 7 8 9  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 (2 1) 
 
in which the three syllables of āpnoti are a metrical icon – the square root – of the 
surrounding text that itself iconically pictures the equation of a day to a syllable 
and presents three semantic items on either side of the verb.294 The full set of 
these overlapping grammatical, phonetic and metrical figures might be 
represented thus: 
 
jīvākṣareṇaiva jīvāhar ĀPNOTI jīvāhnā jīvākṣaram iti 
1 2 3 4 (5 6) 7 8 9  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 (2 1) 
life:by a 
syllable eva 
life:a day VERB life:by a day life:a syllable 
iti 
 
The precision of these levels of framing strongly suggests that it is neither 
insignificant nor accidental that the verb āpnoti (“one acquires/attains”) makes 
this passage’s first, and only, reference to a third person subject or actor. Thus, 
while the phonetic familiarity of the initial-position ā of this verb continues the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 The symmetry and positioning of āpnoti is also emphasized by the form of abbreviation that 
occurs here, with the second āpnoti being omitted. 
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progression of the alliterative movement toward the final line, its sudden 
grammatical foreignness and embedding at the center of the passage as a whole 
strongly emphasizes its practical impetus: from the play on brahman and personal 
identity in line 1 to the implicit linguistic embodiment of self-realization in the 
revelation of line 5, āpnoti is the axis that draws this entire passage irrevocably 
into the self-transformative undertakings of the speaker even as, if not precisely 
because, it draws the speaker physically into its own frame of reference. This 
transformation – better, disclosure – of the speaker as the spoken-to is an act of 
magic that is Sanskrit by any other name.295 
Returning now to the examination of La Porta and Shulman’s 
characterization of grammar as magic, it is clear that, with regard to the 
Āraṇyakas, not only is the world “grammar-ed” in ways that are not always 
transparent, but the cultural significance of this opacity extends far beyond the 
simple attestation to grammar’s internal dynamics. Enigma – or, as Watkins aptly 
puts it, the “conscious tradition of obscurantism” in Indo-European poetics296 – is 
a hallmark of the underlying belief in the power of language to harness truth (ṛta, 
satya) to a diversity of attested ends. And it is a belief that rises to the surface of 
Vedic oral composition in traceable forms that bind the magic of grammar to the 
driving forces of self-realization297: poetic techniques such as bandhu, in both 
their semantic and trans-semantic dimensions, share significant conceptual terrain 
with the human subject, while the grammatical texture of soteriological practices 
– what makes them a desirable or appropriate or urgent response to a given 
circumstance, the measures they consist of, and the encoding or conceptualization 
of their outcomes – is suggestive of their mutuality with the “magical” rites which 
they are presented alongside of by these texts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Cf. McCarthy 2007 on the Psalms as a “place of encounter” between revelation and 
congregation. 
296 Watkins 1995: 181. 
297 Brereton 1999; Jamison 2007; Patton 2003; G. Thompson 1995, 1997a, 1997b, 1998; Watkins 
1995: 85-93, 109-116, 179-193. A selective example of these compositional techniques would 
include self-attestation or the assertion of authority (ahaṃkāra, ātmastuti), truth formulations 
(brahman) and “truth-acts” (satyakriyā), cosmological debates (brahmodya), and the intuitive 
linking of mantra to yajña (viniyoga). In addition are the various levels of sound and levels of 
meaning, which inform a typology of “poetics as grammar” (Watkins 1995: 28). 
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The ontological basis for this assertion lies in the third proposition that 
was outlined above, namely, that grammar allows for structured transitions 
between disparate domains. Although the suggested orderliness of these 
structured transitions might seem to indicate an extrapolation of grammatical 
rules, including sonic linguistic features, for the purposes of establishing a formal 
framework for intellectual discourse and argumentation (such as in the classical 
instance of Sanskrit’s deployment as a universal notation system), this appeal to 
the transcendent or infallible status of Sanskrit dislocates grammar from its 
identification as a substantial quality of vāc. When the pertinence of embodiment 
and disembodiment is brought into consideration, however, these transitions 
between disparate domains appear in light of the transactual model or circuit of 
pervasion discussed in the previous chapter. Grammar, in these terms, is the 
substance-code identified with vāc – the trace vāc deposits as it moves on its 
circuitous path through the nested layers of reality, and the substantial 
contribution vāc makes to the multiplex identities of the different “bodies” that it 
enters. Moreover, the magic at play is nothing more – and nothing less – than the 
knowing engagement with the non-imaginary, pre-existing internal structures of a 
language whose self-disclosure reveals the ties that bind person and cosmos, 
within and without. 
Thus the structured transitions grammar facilitates are not, in the cultural 
expression of the Āraṇyakas, a result of any representative function it might serve 
as an external, meta-structural paradigm. The structure of grammar is the 
substance of transitions, firstly, with respect to re-arrangements in identity that 
equate to soteriological transformations of personhood, which require awareness 
of oneself as embodying numerous multivalent identities. Secondly, these 
transitions or transactions are circumscribed by the dynamic but hidden linkages 
that grammar articulates through its generation of multiple linguistic forms. Not 
only do these linkages disclose the truth of one’s identity in combination with the 
cosmos, but they come together in an enactive paradigm that works on the interior 
structures of subjectivity and personhood. For one who knows, grammar can be 
ritually consigned or invited into oneself, or invoked, called up from the deeply 
hidden layers to the surface of embodiment, where it directs the course of the 
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transactions and interrelationships that define a person, a hymn, or an altar. To 
return to an earlier point, this magic is revealed not through a study of 
grammatical rules, but through the type of deep personal engagement with poetry 
that comes from extensive exposure and the cultivation implicit in the mastery of 
oral composition, expressed as a merger with vāc’s grammatical coding that leads 
to the recovery of one’s seamless cosmological identity.  
 
 
Integrating Magic and Revelation 
 
The third book of the AitĀ, corresponding to Books 7 and 8 of the ŚāṅkhĀ, is an 
especially rich source of material on the intersection between language and 
transformations of personal identity. Although introducing itself explicitly as the 
Saṃhitā Upaniṣad (AitĀ 3.1.1: athātaḥ saṃhitāyā upaniṣat, repeated at ŚāṅkhĀ 
7.2) and considered by the native tradition to be one of the three Upanishads of 
the Aitareya school, this text has not been treated as such by modern scholars in 
what Olivelle has termed a “somewhat artificial” distinction between “the 
Upaniṣad proper [viz. AitĀ 2.4-6] and the rest of the Āraṇyaka.”298 What is of 
salient interest about this exclusion is its influencing by early, and largely 
unchallenged, academic interpretations of the term saṃhitā – a derivation of sam-
√dhā, to place, join or fasten together; to unite – as it appears in the introduction 
of AitĀ 3 as specifically intending the Saṃhitā, the fixed (“put together”) form of 
the Veda as canon.299 With support for the accuracy of this interpretation found in 
the further association of the proper noun “Saṃhitā” with sandhi (conjunction, 
union), the system of euphonic combinations through which the verbal surface of 
the Veda acquires its characeristic sonic texture, two short excerpts of AitĀ 3 
came to occupy a central role in early Indological attempts to cross-reference the 
formation of the canon against the development of the saṃhitāpāṭha method of 
textual transmission. While it was this particular set of linkages around the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 Olivelle 1998: 314; Keith 1909: 39-52. 
299 See the essays in Patton 1994. While recent examinations of “canonicity” in the Vedic context 
are moving increasingly from the study of form to analyses of function and other possible vantage 
points, the association between saṃhitā and a fixed corpus remains largely unchanged. 
	   164	  
conceptual nexus of sam-√dhā that first drew Müller’s attention to AitĀ 3.1.3 and 
3.1.5 in his 1869 study of the Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya, it was the intellectual grafting 
of this interpretation back into Book 3 by A. B. Keith that led to his narrow 
definition of this text as an exposition of “the mystical meaning of the various 
forms of the text of the Saṃhitā, the nirbhuja, pratṛṇṇa and ubhayamantareṇa, 
and of the vowels, semivowels and consonants.”300 Thus the following two 
excerpts – which together represent less than a twelfth of AitĀ 3 – would inform 
an understanding of saṃhitā that obscured the vast bulk of this text, including 
descriptions of rituals and recitations used to realize saṃhitā as a soteriological 
goal and the repeated emphasis on its occurrence within the boundaries of 
physical embodiment: “In the third Upaniṣad, III, 1-2”, states Keith, “there is 
little of philosophical interest.”301 
 
athāto nirbhujapravādāḥ / pr̥thivyāyatanaṃ nirbhujaṃ divyāyatanaṃ 
pratṛṇṇam antarikṣāyatanam ubhayamantareṇa / atha yady enaṃ 
nirbhujaṃ bruvantam upavaded acyoṣṭāvarābhyāṃ sthānābhyām ity enaṃ 
brūyāt / atha yady enaṃ pratṛṇṇaṃ bruvantam upavaded acyoṣṭā 
uttarābhyāṃ sthānābhyām ity enaṃ brūyāt / yas tv evobhayamantareṇāha 
tasya nāsty upavādaḥ / yad dhi saṃdhiṃ vivartayati tan nirbhujasya rūpam 
atha yac chuddhe akṣare abhivyāharati tat pratṛṇṇasyāgra u  
evobhayamantareṇobhayaṃ vyāptaṃ bhavati / AitĀ 3.1.3 
 
Next come the sayings about the nirbhuja [= saṃhitāpāṭha]. The nirbhuja 
has the earth as its abode; the pratṛṇṇa [= padapāṭha] has heaven as its 
abode; the ubhayamantareṇa [= kramapāṭha] has the ether between as its 
abode. Now, if (someone) curses one who is pronouncing the nirbhuja, he 
should respond by saying, “you have fallen from the two lower 
conditions.” If (someone) curses one who his pronouncing the pratṛṇṇa, he 
should respond by saying, “you have fallen from the two higher 
conditions.” But there is no cursing the one who says the 
ubhayamantareṇa. For when one produces the conjunction (saṃdhi), that 
is the nirbhuja-form; and when one utters the two syllables pure, that is the 
pratṛṇṇa-form; (but) foremost indeed is the ubhayamantareṇa – it extends 
to both. 
 
This identification of linguistic and textual profiles – of sandhi and Saṃhitā – is 
seen again in the second passage, AitĀ 3.1.5, where it appears as part of a more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 Müller 1869: iii-vii; Keith 1909: 17. In addition, Keith cites Oldenburg (1888: 380, 1892: 146) 
and Macdonell (1900: 49-52) as authorities on this defining interpretation of AitĀ 3. 
301 Keith 1909: 44. 
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clearly explicated development between the mode of verbalization (viz. the 
saṃhitāpāṭha) and its enactive impact within the living identity of a human 
subject who knows: 
 
atha khalv āhur nirbhujavaktrāḥ / pūrvam akṣaraṃ pūrvarūpam uttaram 
uttararūpaṃ yo ’vakāśaḥ pūrvarūpottararūpe antareṇa sā saṃhiteti / sa ya 
evam etāṃ saṃhitāṃ veda saṃdhīyate prajayā paśubhir yaśasā 
brahmavarcasena svargeṇa lokena sarvam āyur iti / AitĀ 3.15. 
 
Then the teachers of the nirbhuja say: “The preceding syllable is the 
preceding form; the following, the following form; the interval between 
the preceding form and the following form is the union (saṃhitā).” One 
who knows thus this union (saṃhitā) is united (saṃdhīyate) with offspring, 
livestock, glory, the splendour of brahman, and the world of heaven for all 
their life. 
 
Contrary to the earlier summarization of Book 3 by Keith, which arrives at a 
comprehensive interpretation only by prescriptively ignoring those passages that 
cannot fit with the reading of “Saṃhitā-text,” we might contend these sequences 
strongly suggest that self-transformation requires language, and language requires 
an embodied subject, producing the real terms of revelation. Further, what they 
also suggest is that the focus of AitĀ 3 (likewise, ŚāṅkhĀ 7-8) is not the 
collection of hymns that constitute the Veda as a corpus, but rather saṃhitā as a 
phenomenon, a living condition of integration that is both ontologically veridical 
and personally achieved.302 Rather than isolating saṃhitā and sandhi in their 
literary aspect, this approach allows the entirety of the Saṃhitā Upaniṣad’s 
contents to be seen as an elaboration on the dynamics of sam-√dhā, which by the 
middle Vedic period is attested as carrying the further and frequently self-
reflexive nuances of mending, restoration, and redress: “He put himself back 
together” (sa…ātmānaṃ samadadhād, AitĀ 3.2.6).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 Shulman 2012: 131: “It is critical to understand that none of these activities transpiring within 
awareness, with its external correlates, is “symbolic” in any sense of the word familiar to us. I 
would be prepared to argue that symbolism as such is relatively rare in South Asia, and I 
recommend avoiding the word altogether for contexts such as those described here [viz. saṃpads, 
mahāvākyas, and the transformative force of Vedic speech].” 
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Considered alongside instances from the corresponding portions of 
ŚāṅkhĀ,303 this brings a panoply of interrelated aspects of sam-√dhā into view: 
firstly, the connection between Saṃhitā and grammatical/poetic features, just 
discussed; secondly, the unions, conjunctions, and compacts (saṃhata, a phonetic 
relative) that exist between a diverse array of divine, ritualized, and personalised 
phenomena, and include also the act of unification (saṃdhāna) and its agency 
(saṃdhātṛ), often articulated in bandhus; thirdly, the state either resulting from or 
instigating the action of sam-√dhā (thus saṃdhīyate, “he is united”), and 
frequently involving some aspect of the Saṃhitā as a trigger or an instrument; and 
fourthly, the truth of a person’s identity and a cultivated soteriological state with 
repercussions before and after death. AitĀ 3.1.6 provides a representative 
example of these nuances in action: 
 
vāk prāṇena saṃhiteti kauṇṭharavyaḥ prāṇaḥ pavamānena pavamāno 
viśvair devair viśve devāḥ svargeṇa lokena svargo loko brahmaṇā 
saiṣāvaraparā saṃhitā / sa yo haitām avaraparāṃ samhitāṃ vedaivaṃ 
haiva sa prajayā paśubhir yaśasā brahmavarcasena svargeṇa lokena 
saṃdhīyate yathaiṣā saṃhitā / sa yadi pareṇa vopasṛtaḥ svena 
vārthenābhivyāhared abhivyāhārṣann eva vidyād divaṃ saṃhitāgamad 
viduṣāṃ devānām evaṃ bhaviṣyatīti / śaśvat tathā syat / sa ya evam etāṃ 
saṃhitāṃ veda saṃdhīyate prajayā paśubhir yaśasā brahmavarcasena 
svargeṇa lokena sarvam āyur iti / AitĀ 3.1.6304 
 
“Vāc is united with prāṇa,” says Kauṇṭharavya, “prāṇa with the flowing 
air, the flowing air with the All Gods, the All Gods with the world of 
heaven, the world of heaven with brahman – this is the union in inverted 
order (avaraparā saṃhitā). One who knows exactly thus the union 
inverted is united (saṃdhīyate) with offspring, livestock, glory, the 
splendour of brahman, and the world of heaven in such a way as is this 
union. If one is about to utter [it] for either their own or another’s sake, let 
them know as they utter that the union has gone up to heaven, and so as it 
is for the gods’ it will be for the wise.” It will always be thus: One who 
knows thus this union (saṃhitā) is united (saṃdhīyate) with offspring, 
livestock, glory, the splendour of brahman, and the world of heaven for all 
their life. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 While ŚāṅkhĀ 7.2 explicitly names itself the Saṃhitā Upaniṣad and the majority of passages 
corresponding to AitĀ 3 occur in ŚāṅkhĀ 7-8, ŚāṅkhĀ 11.3-12.8 also consists of parallel 
instances and other rites of high similarity. This is not altogether surprising given the high degree 
of variability demonstrated across manuscripts of the ŚāṅkhĀ. 
304 Cf. ŚāṅkhĀ 7.14. 
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The hidden connections entwining in saṃhitā provide this passage with its 
forward momentum. As it continues, moving from one disclosure of sam-√dhā to 
the next, these connections facilitate a poetically complex integration of the 
Ṛgveda Saṃhitā with middle Vedic cosmology by unfolding, in unison, the 
various semantic interpretations available for both “Prajāpati” (prajā:pati: lord of 
creatures; husband and offspring; the cosmic progenitor) and “Aditi” (a-diti: not 
tied, unbroken; the goddess of unending abundance) within the frame provided by 
human procreation. Again, this occurs across multiple grammatical levels, which 
point back to the third and central line as providing the key to this play on 
saṃhitā: “For all this is continuous, whatever there is….” 
 
athātaḥ prajāpatisaṃhitā / jāyā pūrvarūpaṃ patir uttararūpaṃ putraḥ 
saṃdhiḥ prajananaṃ saṃdhānaṃ saiṣāditiḥ saṃhitā / aditir hīdaṃ sarvaṃ 
yad idaṃ kiñca pitā ca mātā ca putraś ca prajananaṃ ca / tad apy etad 
ṛṣiṇoktam / aditir mātā sa pitā sa putra iti // sa ya evam etāṃ saṃhitāṃ 
veda saṃdhīyate prajayā paśubhir yaśasā brahmavarcasena svargeṇa 
lokena sarvam āyur iti // AitĀ 3.1.6305 
 
Next comes the Prajāpati union. The wife is the preceding form; the 
husband the following form; the son the connection (saṃdhi); procreation 
the putting-together (saṃdhāna) – this is the continuous union (aditiḥ 
saṃhitā). For all this is continuous (aditi), whatever there is, the father and 
the mother and the son and the procreation. This has also been said by a 
ṛṣi: “Aditi is the mother; she is the father, she the son.”306 One who knows 
thus this union (saṃhitā) is united (saṃdhīyate) with offspring, livestock, 
glory, the splendour of brahman, and the world of heaven for all their life. 
 
The resulting impression is of multiple view-points onto a single reality; and to 
these must be added a fifth aspect of sam-√dhā that can be retrieved from AitĀ 3 
and ŚāṅkhĀ 7-8: namely, the array of rites to protect or induce one’s cultivated 
state of integration with the cosmos, and which include imprecations 
(anuvyāhāra) used to divert curses, offerings and recitations to ensure heavenly 
apotheosis, and a ṛc verse to endow oneself with the essence of speech 
(vāgrasaḥ). What the inclusion of these practices reveal is that saṃhitā is a 
personally desirable state of integration that spans both the orthodox 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 See ŚāṅkhĀ 7.15 for a variant on this passage. 
306 ṚV 1.89.10; translation by Jamison and Brereton 2014: 222 (vol.1). Note that the reading aditir 
mātā sa pitā sa putra is consistent with that of the ṚV given in Van Nooten and Holland 1994. 
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circumscription of Sanskrit as bound to sacral knowledge and its appearance in 
worldly applications that challenge conservative notions of what constitutes 
vaidika ritual activity. This indicates a need to review the accuracy of the notion 
that, in the mid- to late-Vedic period, Sanskrit had a “mutually self-limiting 
relationship with textualized discourse on liturgy and liturgical knowledges: this 
discourse was composed exclusively in Sanskrit, and Sanskrit culture consisted 
entirely of this discourse.”307 Either we must expand what is meant by liturgical 
knowledge, such that it includes the entire and diverse array of practices 
involving this language, or we must rethink the boundary separating the ritual 
arena from the world, and bring their radical delimitation into question. 
 
 
Saṃhitā and Saṃskṛta 
 
That fact that it is saṃhitā as a principle, a goal, and an active transformation 
based in the linkage of two or more objects, their instruments and media, that 
provides the common orientation behind all five of these aspects (which, though 
simplified, do account for the multifarious contents of the Aitareyan and 
Śāṅkhāyanan texts) brings us immediately to two conclusions that will strongly 
influence the remaining discussion. First, the often difficult relationship between 
the texts’ self-identification as Saṃhitā Upaniṣads and the diversity of their 
content-matter should be taken to indicate positively that saṃhitā is a multivalent 
concept. Its openness of reference, together with its definitive demand for the 
linkage or integration of diverse entities and identities, is precisely the point and 
the means by which these texts progress: in the worldview of the Ṛgvedic 
Āraṇyakas, the separation of revelation and its unions (or hidden connections, 
upaniṣad), on one hand, from magic with its bandhus, on the other, is a logically 
meaningless exercise because both are equally entrenched in the dynamics of 
personal adaptation to vāc. This co-ordination is described as an infusion, a 
permeation between bodies in which changes to a person’s lived circumstances in 
the world are a reflection of changes introduced within their internal embodied 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307 Pollock 2006: 49-50. 
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milieu and realized through the shifting structures of identity. Such a dynamic 
interpretation may challenge the foregoing association between saṃhitā and 
canon, yet what it does achieve is an understanding of revelation and language 
that operates in tandem with primary depictions of embodiment. 
Secondly, the weight of these considerations, the observation that the 
minimum requirement for revelation is a transformative and subjective co-
ordination of the person to the structures of a trans-individual reality, and, in 
particular, the centrality of vāc in its encompassment of the transactions required 
by saṃhitā suggest that rather than looking for a language named Sanskrit it 
would be more productive to ask what it means to become saṃskṛta. This is in 
marked contrast to the engagement between language and individuality prevalent 
in Western-influenced Indological scholarship, which has pushed Sanskrit into 
the narrow space of a type-cast by valuing the individual in terms of their 
uniqueness and inviolability – both of which may be considered fundamental 
human rights in our current intellectual era, but neither of which are considered 
characteristic of any “definitive human unit” in Vedic ways of perceiving the 
person, their body, and the cosmos.308 It also asks that we view Sanskrit not as an 
hegemonic constraint upon individual expression, but in light of vāc’s substantial 
contributions to the construction or attainment of personal identity. While the 
verbal root sam-√kṛ and its derivatives (saṃskṛta, saṃskṛti) appear only a handful 
of times in the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas, it is clear from these occurrences that it is not 
employed simply in the sense of making, doing, or producing something 
completely (i.e., “well-made”). Nor is it employed in the sense of adornment, a 
non-integral and ornamental addition to an already-complete form (e.g., AitĀ 
1.3.4: ātmānaṃ pañcaviṃśaṃ saṃskurute; in Keith’s translation, “he adorns the 
self, the twenty-fifth [with the recitation]”). Rather, in all instances, sam-√kṛ and 
its derivatives occur wholly in the far more specific sense of a state of completion 
that is intentionally effected through the introduction of revelatory language into 
the subject. 
 
tad etad aiṣṭikaṃ karma yaṃ ātmānam adhvaryuḥ saṃskaroti tasmin 
yajurmayaṃ pravayati yajurmaya ṛṅmayaṃ hota ṛṅmaye sāmamayam 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 F. Smith 2006a: 586-589; cf. Eck 1993: 59-60. 
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udgātā sa eṣa trayyai vidyāyā ātmaiṣa u evaitad indrasyātmā bhavati ya 
evaṃ veda / ŚāṅkhĀ 4.6 
 
The adhvaryu completes (saṃskaroti) the body, this activity belonging to 
the sacrifice – on it he weaves the measure of the yajus; on the yajus, the 
hotṛ weaves the measure of the ṛc; on the ṛc, the udgātṛ weaves the 
measure of the sāman. One who knows thus becomes the body of this 
Threefold Knowledge, they alone become the body of Indra. 
 
aṣṭādaśāṣṭādaśākṣarāṇi bhavanti yāni daśa nava prāṇā ātmaiva daśamaḥ 
sātmanaḥ saṃskṛtir aṣṭāv aṣṭā udyante / aśnute yad yat kāmayate ya evaṃ 
veda // AitĀ 1.3.7 
 
[The recitations] become eighteen syllables apiece; of the ten syllables, 
nine are breaths (prāṇa) and the tenth is oneself – this is the completion 
[of the recitation] together with the self (sātmanaḥ saṃskṛtir); the 
remaining sets of eight syllables rise up. One who knows thus attains 
whatever they desire. 
 
The activity of the root sam-√kṛ also takes hold of the other “bodies” – offerings, 
altar, and human participants – that provide the basic media of the circuitous 
transactions that characterize early Brahmanical ritual. In this connection, it is 
worthwhile revisiting AitĀ 1.3.8, the passage that provided an example of 
bandhus at the very beginning of the present chapter: 
 
… āyur vā uṣṇig vāg anuṣṭup / tad asminn āyuś ca vācaṃ ca dadhāti / tās 
triḥ prathamayā pañcaviṃśatir bhavanti pañcaviṃśa ātmā pañcaviṃśaḥ 
prajāpatir daśa hastyā aṅgulayo daśa pādyā dvā ūrū dvau bāhū ātmaiva 
pañcaviṃśas tam imam ātmānaṃ pañcaviṃśaṃ saṃskurute / atho 
pañcaviṃśaṃ vā etad ahaḥ pañcaviṃśa etasyāhnū stomas tat samena 
samaṃ pratipadyate tasmād dve eva pañcaviṃśatir bhavanti / 
 
… the uṣṇih is life, the anuṣṭubh speech (vāc). Thus he places life and 
speech in this [offering/altar/body]. With the first repeated three times, the 
verses come up to twenty-five; the body (ātman) consists of twenty-five 
and Prajāpati consists of twenty-five: the ten digits of the hands, the ten of 
the feet, two legs, two arms, and the core (ātman) are twenty-five. He 
completes (saṃskurute) that, this body consisting of twenty-five. Further, 
this day is twenty-five (pañcaviṃśa) and the stoma of this day is the 
Pañcaviṃśa – identity is recovered through identity; thus they both 
become twenty-five. 
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It is the physical act of recitation that weaves the markedly diverse entities named 
in this passage into a space of shared subjectivity (a complex and dividual, though 
now interconnected, body) that is identifiable with revelation itself – its 
substance, its meaning and its means – and allows the completion indicated by 
sam-√kṛ to occur across multiple locations at once. If this is correct, then it might 
viably be argued that in bringing hidden connections to the surface, and thus into 
a degree of manifestation at which they can be placed (√dhā) or woven (pra-√ve) 
in bodies by one who knows thus, bandhus are an enactment of sam-√kṛ. Put 
otherwise, bandhus describe the processes – experiential and perceptual, and 
therefore phenomenological309 – of being saṃskṛta, of personally realizing a state 
of completion that is coterminous with the language of its truthful expression 
(sātmanaḥ saṃskṛtiḥ, AitĀ 1.3.7). 310  Conversely, such an understanding of 
saṃskṛta reflects both the physiological accounts of the consolidation of personal 
identity seen in the previous chapter and also the grammatical disclosure of 
relationships examined above, and further intersects with the soteriological 
requirement of integration that is articulated by the activity of sam-√dhā and its 
derivative forms. 
To the extent that these transformations demand a seamless adaptation of a 
person’s lived reality, an open-ended matrix of knowing, becoming and enacting, 
to the circulating flow of cosmic dynamics that characterise this all (idaṃ 
sarvam), vāc is uniquely and determinatively positioned by its provision of the 
means and model alike for the reconfiguration of identity in accordance with the 
truth of manifestation. Whilst avoiding the quicksand of entering into modern 
discussions of mystical awareness and language, it is worthwhile taking note of 
Frederick Streng’s conclusion that the “soteriological significance of 
language…is related to the function of language in communicating the nature of 
reality that is assumed in the mystical awareness.”311 Unlike a number of recent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 Sheets-Johnstone 2012: 193. 
310 Streng 1978: 149: “The knowledge of God (Brahman, Thusness) in the mystical insight is not 
simply subjective or objective since to know in the ultimate context is to ‘become’ or ‘be’ in an 
extraordinary way.” This presents scholars of such texts with the unique challenge of developing 
interpretative approaches that do not run contrary to the claims of the texts. This point raised by 
Streng (1978: 166) forms the basis of an extended discussion presented in Kripal 1995: 17-22.  
311 Streng 1978: 165.  
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scholars – among them Matilal, Kripal, Ganeri, and Katz312 – who frame their 
analyses of mystical language in terms originating from Classical Indian and 
Western traditions of logic and exegesis, Streng’s conclusion proceeds from his 
observations of language-use in Buddhist and Brahmanical revelatory, rather than 
intellectual, materials. The closeness thus kept to primary texts of mystical 
awareness, texts which do not attempt to forge universal explanations (indeed, if 
any at all) of the relation between the knower and the known, informs his 
development of an incisive argument that there is a basic misconception in 
treating non-dual mysticism as a monothetic phenomenon in which concerns with 
the referential qualities of language, inherited from the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
are universally applicable (“mystics interpret the function of language 
differently”).313 This is important because, in avoiding inadvertent recourse to 
questions of ineffability – which, in any case, rotate around a logical dilemma of 
duality that clearly presents no obstacle whatsoever to the composers of the 
Āraṇyakas – Streng is able to locate an alternative to the problem of linguistic 
referentiality by seeing language as non-separate to the reality of which the late 
Vedic texts speak.314 
Returning now to the point raised above – that is more productive to ask 
what it means to become saṃskṛta than to look for Sanskrit as a language with a 
merely circumstantial association with revelation – it is unsurprising to find that 
the passages that utilize the root sam-√kṛ and its derivatives employ poetic 
techniques to index the change in state suggested by the verb in a direct 
expression of the relationship between vāc’s soteriological signifcance and 
communicative function. This occurs particularly as an operation of what might 
be termed an intentional ambiguity: as the texts proceed from recitation to result, 
their intended points of reference become increasingly elusive at the same time as 
the initial diversity of objects identified (priest, patrons, verses recited, offerings, 
altar, and so on) are compressed into a single field or focus in an exact match of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 See for example Matilal 2002; Kripal 1995; Ganeri 1999, 2007; Katz 2013. 
313 Streng 1978: 141. 
314 Unlike Streng, Kripal’s analysis is shaped by recourse to the aporia of transcendence, i.e., that 
it must be beyond names. This leads him to speak of the mystical as something hidden from the 
referential structures of language after the sense of apophasis as a negative theology or “un-
saying” (Kripal 1995: 20-21; cf. Sells 1994:2). 
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poetic and ritual progressions. Take for example the following excerpt from AitĀ 
1.1.4, in which grammatical and phonetic associations facilitate a transition from 
niṣkṛta to saṃskṛta while the removal of niṣkṛta from its original embedding in 
the Ṛgvedic sūkta allows for an expansion of reference to the end that it is no 
longer clear whether the second occurrence of saṃskṛta describes the soma-
pressings prepared by one who knows or refers to a quality belonging to the one 
who knows. This ambiguity is heightened by the appearance of the genitive asya 
where an instrumental would typically be anticipated, a genitive whose properly 
possessive function is suggested by a second genitive, yeṣām, but which may 
serve the equally formal if somewhat less common function of indicating agency: 
 
indravāyū ime sutā ā yātum upa niṣkṛtam iti yad vai niṣkṛtaṃ tat 
saṃskṛtam / ā hāsyendravāyū saṃskṛtaṃ gacchato ya evaṃ veda yeṣāṃ 
caivaṃ vidvād etad dhotā śaṃsati / AitĀ 1.1.4 
 
[In the verse315] “O Indra and Vāyu, here are the soma-pressings; come 
near to the prepared,” what is prepared (niṣkṛta) is what is completed 
(saṃskṛta). Indra and Vāyu surely come to what has been completed by 
(/what is complete of) the one who knows thus or for whom a hotr̥ 
knowing thus recites. 
 
In light of the sense of completeness suggested by sam-√kṛ, characterized by a 
revelatory disclosure of identity across an interconnected space of shared 
subjectivity, it may be argued that this ambiguity of reference is itself pregnant 
with meaning. 
A further example of this phenomenon may be drawn from AitĀ 1.5.1, in 
which the ambiguity pertains, firstly, to whether it is the body of the reciter, the 
altar, or the cosmic progenitor that contains the breaths; secondly, to whether it is 
the breaths or the recitation that has been completed; and, thirdly, to the exact 
location in space or time that is intended by “here” (atra). This is not to say, 
however, that the text displays an high degree of indeterminancy concering its 
subject-matter. The form or style and content of the passage are consistent, 
marked by a mutual illumination and a particular approach to explanation. The 
poetic result is one of expressive precision, a precision relevant to its subject, in 	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which the text exemplifies its message by demonstrating the affective activity of 
the verb.316 
 
tām atrotsṛjati dvādaśakṛtvaḥ śastvā dvādaśavidhā vā ime prāṇāḥ sapta 
śīrṣaṇyā dvau stanyau trayo ’vāñco ’tra vai prāṇā āpyante ’tra 
saṃskriyante tasmād enām atrotsṛjati / AitĀ 1.5.1 
 
He ceases here after reciting [the verse] twelve times. These breaths 
(prāṇa) are twelve-fold – there are seven in the head, two in the chest, and 
three below – in here are the breaths contained, and here are they 
completed (saṃskriyante), thus he ceases [the recitation] here. 
 
Sanskrit is able to express the truth of reality experienced by the one who knows 
thus because it is phenomenally intrinsic to the manifestation of that reality, 
including the knower and the structures of personhood, and hence also the 
personal transformation entailed by becoming saṃskṛta. Pertinently, this means 
viewing sam-√kṛ in the fullness of its instrumentality, wherein the state of 
awareness indicated by knowing thus (evam) is a “genuine action (karman)”317 
with both ontological and soteriological repercussions. Following this, if the 
claims contained in bandhus are retained, then it is apparent that such 
repercussions extend beyond the immediacy of the knower and into the wider 
space of their environment in ways that are veridical and affective. In this 
connection, Shulman makes the observation that, 
 
The general principle involved is two fold, ubiquitous in ritual domains as 
well as in Indian models of the mind: the subtle and invisible always 
generates (devolves into) the crude and visible, and what is initially 
externalized or objectified in imperfect form can, indeed must, be reworked 
through mental, mantric, and/or ritual processes to become whole 
(saṃskṛta).318 
 
This continuity between cosmological evolution and personal achievement, and 
also its processual recovery as a state of completion (viz. wholeness), derive their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 This analysis is influenced by Martha Nussbaum’s work on the intersection between style and 
content (1990: 3-53). 
317 Deutsche 1988: 172; also Potter (1988: 29) on the axiomatic understanding that “acting is a 
making, awareness (mental activity) is acting, and so awareness is making.” In this connection, I 
draw attention to the Indic religious concern with saṃskāras, both in the sense of initiatory rites 
that mold personhood in specific ways and also as mental acts (karman) in the form of traces. 
318 Shulman 2012: 133. 
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particular texture from vāc’s defining characteristics. These may be broadly 
summarized as follows: (1) its integral disclosure of reality or fundamental 
affinity with manifestation, exemplified as an infinitude of multiplicity arising 
from a singular, infinitesmally subtle relationship; (2) its extreme pervasiveness 
and transactability, through which the characteristics in the preceding point are 
enacted; and (3) a marked shift in linguistic expression or “distancing of the 
poetic message from ordinary human language” 319  that corresponds to a 
“transformation of the use of both form and the formless.” 320  The active 
harnessing of the silent invisibilities contained within vāc, alongside its 
simultaneous presence inside and outside of the human body (as speech and as 
language), completes the process of manifestation that Shulman identifies as the 
achievement of saṃskṛta. 
Before turning to an examination of sam-√kṛ and sam-√dhā in light of the 
concern with collapse that can be traced out in numerous rites depicted by the 
Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas, one final observation regarding the literary context of 
saṃskṛta is in place. With respect to a posited continuity of involvement between 
sam-√kṛ as a specific kind of making grounded in a quality of awareness (veda) 
and the Sanskrit language as implicated in the archetypal revelation of the Veda, 
it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that all employments of this lexeme 
occur in relation to the recitative performance of the Mahāvrata, including the 
construction of the altar, and, in the majority of cases, occur in relation 
specifically to the performance’s impact on the ātman. The context provided by 
this literary consideration significantly reinforces the reading of sam-√kṛ outlined 
so far. Indeed, based on evidence drawn from Malamoud’s work on yajña and 
ritual transformations of identity, it may be confidently asserted that the 
interrelationship of sam-√kṛ, recitation (√śaṃs, or silent repetition, √jap), and 
the ātman as a core or central totality is a widely attested characteristic of middle 
Vedic perceptions of an affective identification between language, personal 
embodiment, and cosmic processes. 321  Recalling also the depths and 
expansiveness disclosed by bandhus and their valorization in the underlying mode 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 Watkins 1995: 183. 
320 Streng 1978: 164. 
321 For example, Malamoud 1989, 1996, 2002, 2004. 
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of grammar, we might further contend that the success of sam-√kṛ demands a 
knowing engagement of the human with their external environment in a self-
reflexive actualization of primordial connections. In Malamoud’s words: 
 
The Brahmanic doctrine is that the sacrificer, in constructing the sacrifice, is 
also constructing himself, and providing himself with a body in which the 
constituent elements of the sacrifice take the place of the organic materials 
of his profane body. …by virtue of the sacrifice he reaches heaven with a 
“body” [ātman] made of verses, formulas, melodies and offerings. He has 
incorporated the sacrifice, and therefore consists of chandas, metric 
schemes and poetry of the Veda; he has become chandomaya. The body of 
Man is the model for, and the origin of, the sacrifice and is therefore both its 
departure point and its effect. But the sacrifice for its part, in the guise of 
Speech – which is its final form – is what gives the body its ultimate 
substance.322 
 
The transformative role of language positively affirms that it would be a mistake 
to interpret these occurrences of sam-√kṛ as either a set formula or a mere 
representation of what is properly ineffable. To echo Streng, the recurring 
features of this contextualization should rightly be mined for what they say of 
language’s role in expressing reality according to the Āraṇyakas’ worldview: it is 
clear that the intricate weaving of bandhus, with their internally varying degrees 
of subtle abstraction and mututal embedding with physiological functions and 
macrocosmic processes, corresponds to a transformed use of “form and the 
formless” that closes any perceived distance between cosmological evolution and 
personal achievement by finding in both the manifestation of reality and its 
truth.323 And again, it is clear that such processual continuity between internal and 
external milieux bears strongly upon these traditional accounts of self-realization, 
namely, through the dual implication that the reality uncovered in states of 
awareness accounts for the very substance and possibility of awareness and its 
expression through the person as a shifting collocation of disembodied influences 
and entities. This indicates that the relationship of Sanskrit to revelation is one of 
a substantial fusion of identities extending through language, the person, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Malamoud 1989: 97. 
323 Such identifications are not limited to Indic religious traditions, but have also been observed in 
the conceptual backdrop to Confucianism, among other traditions of practice. See for example 
Ames 1984: 118; Tu Wei-ming 1972. 
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cosmos as so many focal-points within the already-interrelated field of “this all”; 
and it encodes the potential of crafting a state that is whole or complete, saṃskṛta, 
on the basis of its co-ordinated complexity and resolution of the oscillating 
dynamics of manifestation. 
 What these passages reveal, then, is that language which is saṃskṛta 
cannot be symbolic of or derive its own significance from something outside of 
itself, such as the poetic legacy of the ṛṣis or associations with transcendent 
authority.324 Its meaning, to significantly adapt Staal’s “meaninglessness” thesis, 
lies in the fact of its being and the affect of its presence, neither of which require 
a derivative or referential dimension 325  – a point easily overlooked in the 
scholarly adamance that language, as akin the popular twentieth century examples 
of ritual and birdsong, must be “a system of signs with a function outside this 
system,”326 or else if it eludes this communicative function, which is often the 
case with mantras, must be “prelinguistic.” The conflictual nature of these 
positions is relevant because it arises from the way each conceives of the 
relationship between language and the human subject in accordance with 
prevailing cultural assumptions about what is “natural.” Germane to this is the 
dedication of modern linguistics to explaining language through the lens of its 
neural and biological foundations, which are attributed universal legitimacy not 
only because language was “the first distinct cognitive module to be supported by 
scientific evidence,”327 but because of the natural fact that all language-users have 
brains. This has resulted in the tendency for traditional explanations to become 
displaced – or, apparently, improved upon: “Brāhmaṇa interpretations are more 
fanciful than anything contemporary scholars have yet come up with.” 328 
Following this assertion, it comes as no surprise that Staal returns to a cognition-
based analysis of mantras and their function despite his initially promising steps 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 This is not deny the undeniable role of such associations in social arenas that are not 
specifically soteriological in their interests. 
325 A similar interpretation of Staal’s thesis appears in F. Smith’s conclusions regarding the 
significance of the body possessed (2006a: 583). 
326 Jamison and Witzel 1992: 42; G. Thompson 1997c. 
327 Fromkin 1999: 32. 
328 Staal 1991: 59. 
	   178	  
towards a clarification of Vedic ritual from within a sympathetic point of view.329 
He writes: 
 
The mystical state is a prelinguistic state of mind that can be reached when 
language is renounced, through silence, mantras, or rites. Absence of 
language accounts for most or all of its allegedly blissful nature… 
Accordingly, mantras do not transform a person or lead to a new existence; 
on the contrary, they give access to a state or condition that at all times was 
already there. This simply means, on our interpretation, that the 
prelinguistic condition continues to exist beneath a state of awareness now 
steeped in language…330 
 
Concerns with distance between the immediacy of experience and words as 
pragmatic carriers of information, value placed on propositional content that can 
be traced in the world, and the desirability of neurolinguistic evidence as a 
footing of truth all correspond to implicitly cultural notions about our own 
biological functioning and can be located within a spectrum of self-understanding 
that determines the bedrock of empiricism. For modern scholars who prize the 
contributions of science to the advancement of the humanities, conceiving a sharp 
and qualitative distinction between the two, the above notions are often difficult 
to see as such; and they are even harder to shake.331 
Yet, the fact is that if the Āraṇyakas’ understandings about what 
constitutes a natural bodily relationship between humans and language are given 
precedence, then what we find is that saṃskṛta points to the functional – and 
significantly open-ended – possibilities of an intersection between vāc and the 
porosity of embodiment. Not only does this make good sense in view of the 
dynamics of disembodiment and transaction that underscore the Āraṇyakas’ 
accounts of personhood and creation, but, to paraphrase Frederick Smith, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 See the critique of Staal’s thesis by Jamison and Witzel (1992: 41-42). 
330 Staal 1991: 80; emphasis added. The intellectual preference Staal grants to the Mīmāṃsaka 
traditions limits his criteria for “mantra”; cf. the alternative interpretations of meaning elucidated 
in Coward’s turn to Bhartṛhari’s philosophy of language (1991). G. Thompson’s (1997c: 590) 
critique of Staal comes closer to what I am arguing here; he writes: “In my view…mantras 
presuppose an idea about language. Any theory of mantras which ignores this fact cannot be an 
adequate one.” 
331 Diana Eck (1993: 59-60) observes of this point that the “monotheism of the West is not simply 
the intellectual concern of theologians or the doctrinal concern of the faithful… (It) has not only to 
do with our way of thinking about God, but with our way of thinking about persons as 
“individuals,” our way of thinking about authority in the structures of family, church, and state, 
and our way of thinking about questions of truth.” 
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makes good “Sanskrit” sense: just as ṛc verses are taken from their setting within 
Vedic hymns and applied (viniyoga), like medicine, to the body of the sacrifice, 
and in this way bring a new state into being, so the activity of sam-√kṛ 
demonstrates an intentional enhancement of identity wrought on the introduction 
of language’s meaning-as-itself into the influenceable structures of another 
manifest form.332 It is to this extended context of human creativity that we now 
turn. 
 
 
After Emitting the Creatures, God Fell Apart 
 
To see these aspects of vāc in effect, they need to be viewed against the 
background of a cosmos in which the potential for collapse and urgency to 
integrate are encoded at the level of creation. The naturalization of these paired 
tensions within the interlocking time-cycles of life (āyur) and the year 
(saṃvatsara), their expression in the diminuition and balance of physiological 
elements and functions, and their disclosure of a common sensibility behind the 
diversity of rites detailed by the composers of the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas all point to 
a cultural apprehension of inherently soteriological facets to manifestation that 
extend far beyond the intensified formal sphere of yajña. The hovering and 
sometimes unavoidable realities of falling apart or becoming internally and 
externally unfastened (vi-√śraṃs), of one’s essential identity flying open and 
asunder (vi-√hā) from the puruṣa, and of a lunar cycle whose waxing and waning 
preys on peoples’ prāṇa, offspring, and livestock do not only cohere with the 
Vedic vision of deities entering and exiting the body. These concerns draw 
Sanskrit into the physical space and practices of the world with all the fears, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 Shulman’s (2012: 21) incisive observations about bhāvanā are worth citing at length: “If we 
insist that bhāvanā, the active, integrative business of creation, resides inside the verb, either in 
the root or in the final morpheme, are we then describing a linguistic representation of creative 
process or, in some definable sense, the process itself? Although ostensibly the former should be 
the case, there are good reasons to believe that the latter is more correct… Driven by its own 
internal mechanisms, which are strongly correlated to conceptual processes unfolding within our 
awareness – not always a conscious awareness, by the way – language habitually generates 
realities of varying intensities and existential urgency; bhāvanā is intrinsic to any such evolution 
into form”. 
	   180	  
hopes, interactions, and commitments that make up the richness of lived 
religiousity. 
  As already noted, two of the most prominent features of sam-√kṛ are the 
transaction of the reality being linguistically manifested in vāc into the mutable 
collocation of substances and entities that constitute the core or ātman of the 
subject, and the restriction of its occurrences to those portions of the Āraṇyakas 
which explicitly address the Mahāvrata. Regardless of this latter feature, it 
appears that the phenomenon designated by sam-√kṛ is assumed in other passages 
of these texts, where sam-√dhā, and likewise the verbs sam-√pad (to become full 
or complete; to unite with) and sam-√ṛdh (to flourish, increase greatly; to share in 
abundantly), establish the sense of an integrated completion of identity following 
upon a transfer of one or more qualities contained in vāc. This is supported by the 
final instance of sam-√kṛ to be addressed here, which occurs in the opening 
paragraph of ŚāṅkhĀ and attests to the potential for revelatory language to be 
transferred via the mechanism of recitation to other bodies – outside the 
immediate calendrical context of the Mahāvrata, and outside the circle of its 
initiated knowers – to equally potent effect. 
 
prajāpatir vai saṃvatsaras tasyaiṣa ātmā yan mahāvrataṃ tasmād enat 
parasmai na śaṃsen net sarveṣāṃ bhūtānām ātmānaṃ parasmin dadhānīty 
atho indrasyaiṣa ātmā yan mahāvrataṃ tasmād enat parasmai na śaṃsen 
ned indrasyātmānaṃ parasmin dadhānīty atho yam evaitam ṛṅmayaṃ 
yajurmayaṃ sāmamayaṃ puruṣaṃ saṃskurvanti tasyaiṣa ātmā yan 
mahāvrataṃ tasmād enat parasmai na śaṃsen net sarveṣāṃ chandasām 
ātmānaṃ parasmin dadhānīti kāmaṃ tu sattriṇāṃ hotā śaṃset pitre 
vācāryāya vātmane haivāsya tac chastaṃ bhavati ātmānaiva tad yajñaṃ 
samardhayati / ŚāṅkhĀ 1.1 
 
Prajāpati is the year; the Mahāvrata is his body (ātman); therefore one 
should not recite it for another in case they place in the other the body of 
all beings. Now, the Mahāvrata is the body of Indra; therefore one should 
not recite it for another in case they place in the other the body of Indra. 
Now, the Mahāvrata is the body of this person (puruṣa) made of the ṛc, 
yajur, and sāman verses who they complete (saṃskurvanti); therefore one 
should not recite it for another in case they place in the other the body of 
all the metres. One may freely recite it, however, as the hotṛ of the Sattrins 
or for one’s father or teacher – the recitation is really for oneself alone, 
and with oneself alone does one fulfil (sam-√ṛdh) the sacrifice. 
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AitĀ 5.3.3 specifies the restriction, stating that “one who is uninitiated should not 
recite the Mahāvrata, not when there is no fire [/altar], not for another, not when 
it has not been a year” (nādīkṣito mahāvrataṃ śaṃsen nānagnau na parasmai 
nāsaṃvatsara ity), thus instituting a circumference of programmatic control 
around the practice of transformation by ritualized self-immersion in positively 
valued forces. 
 How might these rules limit the sphere of recitation, and how might their 
metaphysical significance be interpreted? Such restrictions on recitation seem to 
relate in content and objective to the lists of spatial, temporal, and physical 
regulations on Vedic study, svādhyāya, that began to emerge around the time of 
the earliest Āraṇyakas333; and, although not identifying itself explicitly in terms of 
anadhyāya, the remainder of the Aitareyan passage comprises a detailed 
exposition of exactly such regulations, which it introduces as the “dharma of 
Vedic study” (AitĀ 5.3.3: athātaḥ svādhyāyadharmaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ). Yet the 
absence of in-depth research into the metaphysical underpinnings of these 
restrictions and the earliness of this AitĀ passage relative to the Dharmaśāstra 
codes in which most examples of anadhyāya occur make it difficult to comment 
on the restrictions pertaining to the Mahāvrata with any surety. There are certain 
observations, however, that are of considerable relevance. It is my sentiment that 
the interpretation of these rules, in Olivelle’s words (following Mary Douglas), as 
expressing a “concern for purity” that “translates into a concern for maintaining 
the integrity of boundaries, both physical and spatial, which in turn relates to a 
concern for maintaining social boundaries”334 fails to comprehensively account 
for the perceived involvement between the permeability of bodily boundaries and 
the potency of language that is evidenced elsewhere outside of the śāstric 
tradition. There is good reason to accept that the regulations outlined in the AitĀ 
correspond to the ŚāṅkhĀ’s description of the Mahāvrata’s linguistic encodings, 
its bandhus, being placed (√dhā) in the body of one exposed to it, as opposed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 Olivelle (2006: 306 n.4) records that the earliest reference to anadhyāya that he has been able 
to trace is TĀ 2.15: tasya vā etasya yajñasya dvāv anadhyāyau yad ātmāśucir yad deśaḥ / 
334 Olivelle ibid.: 319. 
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being motivated by the socialized norms that are characteristic of the 
Dharmaśāstras which Olivelle bases his study upon.335  
A second point may be raised with respect to the often-discussed matter of 
the extent to which Brahmanical culture sought to ritually and discursively 
control the uncontrollable forces at play in the cosmos. As Alexis Sanderson 
argues in his study “Purity and Power Among the Brahmins of Kashmir,” the 
veridical threat of forced or non-volitional possession influenced the centrality of 
behavioral norms followed by orthodox Brahmans, because “(any) relaxation of 
the inhibition and self-control that this conformity required was seen as opening 
up a chink in the armour [sic] of the integral self through which these ever alert 
and terrible powers of the excluded could enter and possess…”336 It is clear that 
the dynamics of possession relate to the phenomenon of powerful language, a 
disembodied entity, crossing bodily boundaries in ways that are not always 
desirable or intended, as is suggested in ŚāṅkhĀ 1.1 above. Sanderson’s study 
thus significantly connects patterns of closely managed personal behavior to the 
religious and cultural environment in which the “orthodox anthropologies” he 
draws upon were composed, demonstrating an acknowledgement of possession 
implicit in the exegetical defenses against it.337  
What Sanderson’s study does not address, however, are the ways in which 
the dynamics of possession were controlled without being erased from either the 
formal rituals of yajña or the worldly practices in which Brahmans participated, 
and continue to participate. This point is decisively established in the literary 
research and ethnographic and anthropological field-work conducted by Mary 
Hancock, Frederick Smith, and Glenn Yocum among others338; and it is not 
nullified by the observation that over time, by means of “exercising programmatic 
control, which occurred as a result of the elimination of its unstructured, 
noninstitutionalized, unpredictable, and (thus) frightening aspects, possession was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335  Olivelle cites śaṅkhā, which he translates “concern or scrupulousity”, as a socialized 
psychological impetus for maintaining ritual boundaries (ibid.: 321). 
336 Sanderson 1985: 200. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Hancock 1999, F. Smith 2006a, Yocum 1973; cf. Flood 1996: 161, 220-21. 
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drained of its spontaneity.”339  What is salient about this distinction for our 
purposes is that, albeit moderated through textualization, the basic sensibility 
behind the array of practices presented in the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas – from the 
Mahāvrata to the production of amulets – is consistently that of transactions 
between disembodiment and embodiment. Such rites with their open utilization of 
the central mechanisms of possession and identity-construction are a window 
onto mid- to late Vedic religious culture that precedes the intellectual rewriting of 
powerful language through the śāstric encoding of anadhyāya within 
normativizing socio-political frames of dharma, the Mīmāṃsakas’ delimiting 
vision of vidhi, and the Vedāntins’ benign unacknowledgement of powers and 
experiential realities aside from brahman. 
In light of the requirements of sam-√kṛ and the lexicon examined in Chapter 
3, these observations indicate that the restrictions around recitation presented by 
the AitĀ and ŚāṅkhĀ are aimed at preventing unintended transactions of vāc 
from taking place, thus protecting the subject by directing vāc’s movements in 
ways that are predictable, for revealed in the formulations of the Ṛgveda. While 
these Āraṇyakas are not unique in the attention paid to vāc, whose willful 
spontaneity is the crux of a number of Vedic myths340, this quality of their focus 
derives its particular contours from a specific association between the recitative 
(and therefore enactive) dimensions of language, Prajāpati’s cosmic emission, and 
a definition of saṃhitā that is explicated in the corresponding Saṃhitopaniṣad 
portions of each text. This short account sits within a subset of Prajāpati myths 
occurring in the Brāhmaṇas that are united by their shared concern with his 
initially failed attempts at emitting the cosmos, resulting in a creation that is 
either excessively undifferentiated or deficiently so, incestuous and cannibalistic 
or fragmented and incohesive.341 These myths – which Brian K. Smith argues are 
not cosmogonies, for what is produced from Prajāpati’s body is not cosmos but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339  F. Smith 2006a: 385. Again, as much can be seen in Śaṅkara’s selective approach to 
commentating on the Upaniṣads, particularly his non-inclusion of the rites that make up the 
greater portion of the KṣU; see Cohen 2008: 139-141. 
340 See the discussions of vāc and the exploits and self-descriptions of the goddess Vāc in 
Carpenter 1994 and Patton 1990. 
341 See B. Smith 1998: 54-69 and 1985: 73-75. 
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chaos 342  – establish both the pull toward dissolution and the potential for 
devourment as inborn conditions and identify ritual as the sole requisite means of 
effecting integration (saṃhitā), the foundation of the ātman’s ontological 
viability. In the words of the Aitareyan telling of this narrative: 
 
atha hāsmā etat kṛṣṇahārito vāgbrāhmaṇam ivopodāharati / prajāpatiḥ 
prajāḥ sṛṣṭvā vyasraṃsata saṃvatsaraḥ / sa chandobhir ātmānaṃ 
samadadhād yac chandobhir ātmānaṃ samadadhāt tasmāt saṃhitā / tasyai 
vā etasyai saṃhitāyai ṇakāro balaṃ ṣakāraḥ prāṇa ātmā / sa yo haitau 
ṇakāraṣakārāv anusaṃhitam ṛco veda sabalāṃ saprāṇāṃ saṃhitāṃ 
vedāyuṣyam iti vidyāt / AitĀ 3.2.6 
 
Now Kṛṣṇahārita sets forth this sacred utterance on vāc: When he had 
emitted the creatures, Prajāpati, the year, fell apart. He put himself 
together by means of the metres; since he put himself together by means of 
the metres, it is the Saṃhitā (“put together,” “union”). For the purpose of 
attaining this, that state of union (saṃhitā), the sound ṇa is strength, the 
sound ṣa is prāṇa, the self. One who knows these, the sounds ṇa and ṣa, 
the ṛcs as they are put together (anusaṃhitam), knows the Saṃhitā with its 
strength and with its prāṇa – one should know it to be for the sake of life. 
  
It is ultimately of note that this sacred and therefore revelatory utterance 
(brāhmaṇa) is specified as addressing not Prajāpati, but vāc. Just as Prajāpati, 
who takes the form of a person, falls apart as though limb from limb (vi-√śraṃs) 
into constituent pieces only to use the sonic and grammatical integration of 
chandas to put the pieces of himself together (sam-√dhā) in a realization of 
wholeness, so his myths and mantras are employed in rites of life (saṃskāras) 
that are undergone by human subjects to instantiate and maintain transformations 
of personhood “for the sake of life” (āyuṣya). Broadly speaking, these rites 
amount to the achievement of enhanced degrees of personal completeness as 
appropriate to varṇa, passage (initiation, marriage, and so on), and calendrical 
cycles (harvest, etc.) and in accordance with textual authorization; furthermore, 
they again implicate the phenomenon referred to by Flood as “entextualization,” 
in which “the body itself functions as a representation of tradition, text and 
cosmos.” 343  Tantamount to the latter point are the numerous documented 
instances of the employment of sam-√kṛ  to indicate the process of Prajāpati’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 B. Smith 1985: 73. 
343 Flood 2006: 5. 
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completion and its product, an intersection which once more extends to human 
embodied experience in the form of saṃskāras.344 Unlike Brian Smith, however, 
who sees in these myths a legitimation of the “audacious assumption of enormous 
power on the part of certain human beings”345 (an hermeneutic touchstone which 
more or less begins and ends his analysis of Sanskrit’s worldly significance), Jan 
Gonda’s meticulous investigation of the popular employments of Prajāpati 
materials in the domestic rituals detailed by the Gṛhyasūtras and Pariśiṣṭhas and 
in the magical rites outlined in lesser-known Vedic texts such as the 
Kauṣikasūtra346 leads him to argue for a significant connection between the 
processes and transformations identified in these myths, the nuances of creation 
and preservation contained in the literal rendering of Prajāpati’s name as “Lord of 
Creatures,” and people’s real-world concerns. 347  Gonda’s assertion of the 
practical validity of these connections is bolstered by more recent scholarship on 
the continuities between the Agnicayana, classed as a classical śrauta ritual, and 
the Brahmanical and Tantric practices of bodily divinization such as nyāsa and 
bhūtaśuddhi that fall within the category of obligatory daily rites (nitya).348 It is 
noteworthy that Gonda’s sympathetic defense, although grounded in the minutiae 
of literary analysis and conducted without reference to ethnographic data, stands 
up to comparison with the findings of a wide range of cross-disciplinary research 
on Brahmanic and Hindu culture – a point which draws attention to the value of a 
literal reading of the term saṃhita as it is employed in these passages. 
 A parallel version of Prajāpati’s cosmic emission and subsequent collapse 
occurs at ŚāṅkhĀ 8.10-11 together with a more detailed account of its 
repercussions for human soteriology. The initial stages in the sequence are almost 
identical to that presented in the AitĀ: according to a sacred utterance 
(brāhmaṇa) set forth by a teacher named Kṛtsnaṃ Hārīta, Prajāpati emitted the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 For a thorough survey of these instances, refer to B. Smith 1998: 91-104 (esp. 101) and 1985: 
76, 79-81. 
345 B. Smith 1998: 69. 
346 Cf. Jamison and Witzel 1992: 50. 
347 Gonda 1982: 137-140, 147-148. 
348 See Malamoud 2002: 26 and Flood 2000; also F. Smith’s statement that (2006: 378): “nyāsa 
may be viewed as a simplified and dramatic reduction of the agnicayana… This reassembled 
organic whole is considered as nothing less than the creator god Prajāpati himself, who contains 
within him the entire cosmos.” 
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creatures, became distressed (vi-√taṃs, a verb reminiscent of being dispersed or 
cast about as a net), and put himself together by means of chandas (chandobhir 
ātmānaṃ samadadhat), all leading to the identification of saṃhitā. For the 
purpose of attaining this saṃhitā, continues Kṛtsnaṃ Hārīta, “the sound ṇa is 
strength, the sound ṣa is prāṇa, and the self is the union” (ṇakāro balaṃ ṣakāraḥ 
prāṇa ātmā saṃhitā); and moreover, this entry into the changed state or condition 
in which the minute (or subtle, viz. sounds, self, strength, breath, etc.) are blended 
is manifestly indicated by the parts of the gross physical body, from hair to nails, 
and presumably including everything in between (athaiṣā kṣudramiśrāvikr̥tis tāni 
nakhāni romāṇi vyañjanānīti).349 And thus it is that the Saṃhitā, known with the 
sounds ṇa and ṣa, and its ṛcs learned in accordance with their phonetic 
integration, is for the sake of life (āyuṣya). 
 However, this integrative and therefore life-giving quality of saṃhita is 
not exclusive to the Saṃhitā-as-canon, but rather appears as a potential latent in 
speech: “vāc is history and lore and whatever else is made of sacred 
[speech/power]; so should one study it and know it also to be thus [for the sake of 
life]” (vāg itihāsapurāṇaṃ yac cānyat kiṃcid brahmīkṛty evādhīyīta tad apy evam 
eva vidyāt).350 In this case, the suggestion that saṃhitā – a total integration 
resulting in a viable self (ātman) – can be achieved in a variety of ways that 
always involve vāc but do not always require the Saṃhitā is evidenced by the 
continuation of the passage itself. After relaying Kṛtsnaṃ Hārīta’s brāhmaṇa, 
ŚāṅkhĀ 8.11 consecutively presents the teachings of Hrasva Māṇḍūkeya and 
Sthavira Śākalya, each of whom asserts that the sounds ṇa and ṣa (and, by 
extension, their affect) can be obtained (upa-√āp) through the study of the ṛcs 
and also by pronouncing the teachings or by learning the recitations belonging to 
their respective lineages. Following this, the passage adduces a fourth teaching on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 Note the similar reference to hair and nails in ŚāṅkhĀ 6.20, where the intelligent self (i.e., 
prāṇa) is said to pervade the bodily self “up to the hair, up to the nails” even as a razor is placed in 
a razor-case or fire in a fire-receptacle: tad yathā kṣuraḥ kṣuradhāne vopahito viśvaṃbharo vā 
viśvaṃbharakulāya evam evaiṣa prajñātmedaṃ śarīram ātmānam anupraviṣṭha ā lomabhya ā 
nakhebhyas… // 
350 To assume that the reference to itihāsapurāṇa marks a later insertion into the text of the 
ŚāṅkhĀ may be overly simplistic; see Patton’s discussion of the same in the Bṛhaddevatā (1996: 
203-206). Keith (1908: 56 n.2) does not attempt translation of this phrase, rather directing the 
reader to Geldner (1889: 290 [vol.1]) and Oertel (1899: 446-447). 
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saṃhitā, which is attributed to the Kāvaṣeyas and appears superficially to contend 
with the preceding assertions: 
 
etad dha sma vai tad vidvāṃsa āhuḥ kāvaṣeyāḥ kim arthā vayaṃ 
yakṣyāmahe kim arthā vayam adhyedhyāmahe vāci hi prāṇaṃ juhumaḥ 
prāṇe vācaṃ yo hy eva prabhavaḥ sa evāpyaya iti // ŚāṅkhĀ 8.11 
 
Yet while knowing exactly this [preceding teaching on saṃhitā], the 
Kāvaṣeyas say: “For what reasons should we sacrifice? For what reasons 
should we learn (the ṛcs) off by heart? We pour as an offering prāṇa in 
speech, speech in prāṇa – the source is the absorbing. 
 
Although it would be easy to interpret this final teaching as indicative of the 
typically Upaniṣadic interiorization of sacrificial performance, and therefore as a 
later addition to the surrounding text and challenge to its somewhat more 
conservative focus on Vedic study, the movement inwards is not inconsistent with 
the picture of saṃhitā that arises from a reading of the passage a whole in 
accordance with the form in which it has been preserved and transmitted 
according to oral tradition. Beyond this, the emphasis on vāc as existing in 
mutuality with prāṇa and as a substance of sacrificial oblation, and as therefore 
not contained within the parameters of a narrowly conceived canon of scripture, 
is wholly anticipated by the identification of vāc with all brahman-revealing 
teachings and its inclusion among the minute elements from whose blending a 
physically and phenomenally integrated ātman is achieved. In turn, ŚāṅkhĀ 8.11 
states, all of these teachings are saṃhitās, and subject to the restrictions on 
recitation fitting of Vedic learning.351 
 A wealth of examples accrues rapidly once this extended context of 
saṃhitā is established as a double-vision in which language and the person 
intersect in accordance with overarching cultural intuitions about embodiment 
and its permeability, within a cosmos that not only permits but insists that, 
through knowing, one must become a living expression of reality. Thus: “Earth is 
the preceding form, heaven the latter form, wind the union (saṃhitā)…speech is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 The final line of the passage reads: tā etāḥ saṃhitā nānantevāsine brūyan nāsaṃvatsaravāsine 
nābrahmacāriṇe nāvedavide nāpravaktra ity ācāryā ity ācāryāḥ // 
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the preceding, mind the latter, prāṇa the union” (ŚāṅkhĀ 7.2, AitĀ 3.1.1352); “The 
union (saṃhitā) is put together (saṃdhīyate) with the form of the Bṛhat and 
Rathantara [Samans]…speech, indeed, is the form of the Rathantara, prāṇa of the 
Bṛhat; by both, by speech and by prāṇa, the union is put together” (AitĀ 3.1.6353); 
“This union joins together the [divisions of] time; time joins together movement, 
stopping, and rest; by movement, stopping, and rest all this (idaṃ sarvam) is 
joined…the past is the preceding, the future is the latter, the present is the union 
(ŚāṅkhĀ 7.20354); “Intelligence is the preceding, faith the latter, action the union, 
truth the uniter” (ŚāṅkhĀ 7.18355); “Speech is the union…by speech are the Vedas 
united, by speech the meters; by speech one unites friends, by speech all beings; 
therefore all this is speech” (AitĀ 3.1.6356). It is saṃhitā as a personally realized 
phenomenon and transaction between identities, and thence between states, that 
draws forth the underlying coherence of these passages and their grouping within 
the Aitareyan and Śāṅkhāyanan Saṃhitopaniṣads; and no less significant is the 
fact that when viewed through this lens, such statements reiterate the functional 
role of bandhus in the achievement of sam-√kṛ. 
Yet it is in a remarkably different passage of the Saṃhitopaniṣad, AitĀ 
3.2.4, that the gripping impetus for integration is most fully brought to light.357 
Whilst characterized by a marked shift in style and content, this passage makes an 
important contribution to our understanding of saṃhitā by describing in detail 
change occurring at the antipode of self-transformation: “We have said that this 
incorporeal intelligent self and that sun are one (ekam). When they are lost…one 
should know his self (ātman) is gone and he will not live for long.” The verb 
employed here is vi-√hā (to relinquish, quit, abandon) which frequently appears 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 Pāṭhak 1922: 26: pṛthivī pūrvarūpaṃ dyaur uttararūpaṃ vāyuḥ saṃhitā…vāk pūrvarūpaṃ 
mana uttararūpaṃ prāṇaḥ saṃhitā; the identical text occurs in AitĀ 3.1.1 (Phaḍke 1898: 184, 
187). 
353 Phaḍke 1898: 199: bṛhadrathaṃtarayo rūpeṇa saṃhitā saṃdhīyata…vāg vai rathaṃtarasya 
rūpaṃ prāṇo bṛhata ubhabhyām u khalu saṃhitā saṃdhīyate vācā ca prāṇena ca / 
354 saiṣā saṃhitaitān kālān saṃdadhāti kālo gatinivr ̥ttisthitīḥ saṃdadhāti gatinivr ̥ttisthitibhir idaṃ 
sarvaṃ saṃdhīyat[e]…bhūtaṃ pūrvarūpaṃ bhaviṣyad uttararūpaṃ bhavat saṃhiteti…// The 
numbering between editions of the ŚāṅkhĀ varies slightly. Pāṭhak 1922: 31 gives this passage as 
7.20; Keith 1908 as 7.21. This difference between editions is consistent across ŚāṅkhĀ 7. 
355 Pāṭhak 1922: 30: prajñā pūrvarūpaṃ śraddhottararūpaṃ karma saṃhitā satyam saṃdhānam / 
356 Phaḍke 1898: 202: vācā vai vedaḥ saṃdhīyante vācā chandāṃsi vācā mitrāṇi saṃdadhati vācā 
sarvāṇi bhūtāny atho vāg evedaṃ sarvam / 
357 Corresponding to ŚāṅkhĀ 8.6-7, 11.3-4. 
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in Sanskrit literature together with references to living embodiment, such as 
śarīra (the decaying body) and prāṇa (the vital breaths), in the sense of 
abandoning the body or life, and thus “to die.” A sense of physical abandonment 
can be traced in this passage; however, rather than indicating the departure of 
one’s identity from their mortal body in a heaven-bound merger, vi-√hā in this 
case carries the inverse sense of the individual ātman and celestial sun – and 
therefore the stabilizing effect of this identification – becoming lost. This 
phenomenon is not framed as a natural progression or stage in life. On the 
contrary, the loss of self and sun is conceptually related to a directly preceding 
description of one – intertextually, a priest – for whom the Vedas are not 
productive but “milked-dry” (dugdhadoha) and who has no share (bhāga) in the 
knowledge he has received via the oral tradition (anūkta) for “he does not know 
the path of the rightly performed [ritual].”358 The reference is to ṚV 10.71.6, an 
hymn addressing “the mastery of sacred speech (vāc),” and a verse presenting a 
scenario in which “the uncooperative priest betrays the speech he perceives 
because only the priests together can perform the [soma] rite.”359 In this context, 
then, vi-√hā carries the sense of a strongly physical loss of the truth of identity, 
conceived as a decisive and disintegrative reaction to wrongful engagement with 
vāc that, firstly, unhinges one from the cosmological relationship between the 
embodied ātman and celestial sun, and, secondly, mortally disrupts the 
collocation of deities, body, and ātman that lies behind the functioning of the 
puruṣa.360  
The unsustainable physiological malfunction that here follows upon vi-√hā 
equates to a devastating rupture of self-containment (or the functional state that 
arises when the deities and ātman have become established, pratiṣṭha, in their 
associated corporeal abodes, āyatana) that is evidenced both by the odors and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 The opening line of AitĀ 3.2.4: dugdhadohā asya vedā bhavanti na tasyānūkte bhāgo ’sti na 
veda sukr ̥tasya pathānam iti / 
359 The text goes on to quote ṚV 10.71.6: yas tityāja sacividaṃ sukhāyaṃ na tasya vācy api bhāgo 
asti [sic] / yadīṃ śṛṇotv alakaṃ śṛṇoti na hi pra veda sukṛtasya panthām iti // See Jamison and 
Brereton 2014: 1496-1498 (vol. 3). 
360 Cf. variations at ŚāṅkhĀ 8.6: “His learning possesses no share of speech – so it is said. 
Therefore he should not recite this day for another, nor lay the fire, nor celebrate with the 
Mahāvrata in case he becomes detached from his self” (nāsyānūkte vāco bhāgo astīty eva tad āha 
tan na parasmā etad ahaḥ śaṃsen nāgniṃ cinyān na mahāvratena stuyān ned ātmano ’pihīyā). 
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winds that begin to break through the subject’s bodily boundaries, moving from 
the inside out, and also by the misperception of external phenomena whose 
stimuli travel in the opposite direction, from the outside in. In response to these 
transformations, the subject is instructed to silently recite (√jap) a prescribed 
selection of verses from the Ṛgveda, which I provide in their recent translation by 
Jamison and Brereton. While not returning the subject to a state of living 
integration and abundance in the world, these recitations aim to counteract the 
soteriological repercussions of vi-√hā by means of ensuring entry into 
immortality after death. In order to achieve this goal, the subject must induce four 
consecutive movements or transactions between themselves, the divine realms, 
and revelatory language: (1) purification of their person through the coded 
characteristics of a variety of gods; (2) a re-establishment of one’s poetic 
productions as substances fit for offering, achieved through the suggested 
identification between the origins of poetic inspiration and the primordial birth of 
the divine; (3) the harnessing of this re-invigorated speech to provide Soma, and 
hence the fluid of immortality (amṛtā), with the power to transport the speaker 
from the ritual sphere to heaven; and (4) the reconnection of the subject with the 
sun, “the highest light” and truth of their identity. In the words of AitĀ 3.2.4: 
 
sa yaś cāyam aśarīraḥ prajñātmā yaś cāsāv āditya ekam etad ity avocāma / 
tau yatra vihīyete candramā ivādityo dṛśyate na raśmayaḥ prādur bhavanti 
lohinī dyaur bhavati yathā mañjiṣṭhā vyastaḥ pāyuḥ kākakulāyagandhikam 
asya śiro vāyati saṃpareto ’syātmā na ciram iva jīviṣyatīti vidyāt / sa yat 
karaṇīyaṃ manyate tat kurvīta yad anti yac ca dūraka iti sapta japed 
āditpratnasya retasa ity ekā yatra brahmā pavamāneti ṣaḷ ud vayaṃ 
tamasas parīty ekā /  
 
We have said that this incorporeal intelligent self and that sun are one 
(ekam). When they are lost, the sun looks like the moon (and its) rays do 
not manifest, the sky turns red as madder, the rectum is prolapsed [/the 
wind is not retained?], his head emits the smell of a raven’s nest, and he 
should know his self (ātman) is gone and he will not live for long. He 
should do what he considers needs doing; [following that] he should 
silently recite the seven verses – 
 
What peril nearby and what at a little distance finds me here – 
 o self-purifying one, smash that away. 
The one who purifies himself through our filter today, the limitless 
one 
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 who is the purifier, let him purify us. 
The filter that is stretched out here within your flame, o Agni, 
 and the sacred formulation – with that purify us. 
Your filter of flames, Agni – with that purify us; 
 with the impulsions of the sacred formulations purify us. 
With both, god Savitar, with the filter and with your impulsion 
 purify me all about. 
With the three purify us – you, god Savitar, with your greatest 
 (impulsions), you, Soma, through your greatest domains, 
  and you, Agni, with your skills. 
Let the godly folk purify me; let the Vasus purify me with insight. 
 O All Gods, purify me; o Jātavedas, purify me.361 
 
the single verse – 
 
Just after that they see the dawning light of the age-old semen, 
 when it is kindled far beyond heaven.362 
 
the six verses – 
 
Where, o self-purifying one, the formulator, making metrical speech 
along with the pressing stone, makes himself great on soma, 
generating joy with soma – 
  - O drop, flow around for Indra. 
Where the inexhaustible light is, in which world the sun is placed, 
in that one place me, o self-purifying one, in the immoral, 
imperishable world. 
  - O drop, flow around for Indra. 
Where the son of Vivasvant is king, where there is a ladder down 
from heaven, 
 where those youthfully exuberant waters are, there make me 
immortal. 
  - O drop, flow around for Indra. 
Where one can move following one’s desire in the three-vaulted, 
three-heavened  
(place) of heaven, 
 where there are worlds filled with light, there make me 
immortal. 
  - O drop, flow around for Indra. 
Where there are desires and yearnings, where the upper surface of 
the coppery one  
[=Sun and soma?] is, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 ṚV 9.67.21-27; translation by Jamison and Brereton 2014: 1297 (vol. 3). I present their 
translation in italics for the sake of clarity. Whereas the AitĀ gives only the opening line or 
pratīka of the first verse of each set of recitations in accordance with common practice, I give the 
translation of the entire set of verses indicated by the text for the convenience of modern readers. 
362 ṚV 8.6.30; Jamison and Brereton 2014: 1040 (vol. 2, see their notes on p. 1037). 
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 where there is independence and satisfaction, there make me 
immortal. 
  - O drop, flow around for Indra. 
Where joys and delights, elations and exaltations dwell, 
 where the desires of desire are obtained, there make me 
immortal. 
  - O drop, flow around for Indra.363 
 
[and] the single verse – 
 
Looking up from the darkness to the higher light, we 
 have come up to the Sun, god among the gods, the highest 
light.364 
 
Interestingly, all of the verses prescribed for silent recitation are characterized by 
the particularity of their respective embedding within entire hymns of the Ṛgveda, 
being either self-contained units, enigmatic transitions or intermediate points 
between more clearly defined groups of material, or climactic omphalos verses. 
This contrast is even further reiterated by the designations of the hymns 
themselves, of which the first and third are dedicated to Soma Pavamāna, the 
second to Indra, and the third to Sūrya (the sun), thus resonating predictably with 
the themes of the Mahāvrata to which these Ṛgvedic texts often return; how the 
seemingly patterned contrast of the verses, and the obvious and thematic 
associations of the hymns, are to be interpreted with respect to the 
Saṃhitopaniṣad is not, however, clear. The passage then turns to an enumeration 
of sensory hallucinations (pratyakṣadarśana) and dreams (svapna), both classical 
portents of affliction, that are suggestive of a frightening ordeal in which the 
previously described rupturing of one’s personal boundaries causes 
corresponding and severe alterations in their experienced environment. 
 
athāpi yatra chidra ivādityo dṛśyate rathanābhir ivābhikhyāyeta chidrāṃ 
vā chāyāṃ paśyet tad apy evam eva vidyāt / athāpy ādarśe vodake vā 
jihmaśirasaṃ vāśirasaṃ vātmānaṃ paśyed viparyaste vā kanyāke jihmena 
vā dṛśyeyātāṃ tad apy evam eva vidyāt / athāpy apidhāyākṣiṇī upekṣeta tad 
yathā baṭarakāṇi saṃpatantīva dṛśyante tāni yadā na paśyet tad apy evam 
eva vidyāt / athāpy apidhāya karṇā upaśṛṇyāt sa eṣo agner iva prajvalato 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 ṚV 9.113.6-11; Jamison and Brereton 2014: 1365, esp. notes on 1364 (vol. 3). They identify 
vv.6-7 as the omphalos verses that provide “a dramatic transition from the poet’s description of 
the preparation of the soma in the first half of the hymn to a vision of heaven” (ibid.). 
364 ṚV 1.50.10; Jamison and Brereton 2014: 163 (vol. 1). 
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rathasyevopabdis taṃ yadā na śṛṇyāt tad apy evam eva vidyāt / athāpi 
yathā nīlam ivāgnir dṛśyate yathā mayūragrīvāmeghe vā vidyutaṃ paśyen 
meghe vā vidyutaṃ na paśyen mahāmeghe vā marīcīr iva paśyeta tad apy 
evam eva vidyāt / athāpi yatra bhūmiṃ jvalantīm iva paśyeta tad apy evam 
eva vidyāt / iti pratyakṣadarśanāni / athā svapnāḥ / puruṣaṃ kṛṣṇaṃ 
kṛṣṇadantaṃ paśyati sa enaṃ hanti varāha enaṃ hanti markaṭa enam 
āskandayaty āśu vāyur enaṃ pravahati suvarṇaṃ khāditvāpagirati madhv 
aśnāti bisāni bhakṣayaty ekapuṇḍarīkaṃ dhārayati kharair varāhair 
yuktair yāti kṛṣṇāṃ dhenuṃ kṛṣṇavatsāṃ naladamālī dakṣināmukho 
vrājayati / sa yady eteṣāṃ kiñcit paśyed upoṣya pāyasaṃ sthālīpākaṃ 
śrapayitvā rātrīsūktena pratyṛcaṃ hutvānyenānnena brāhmaṇān bhojayitvā 
caruṃ svayaṃ prāśnīyāt / sa yo ’to ’śruto ’gato ’mato ’nato ’dṛṣṭo ’vijñāto 
’nādiṣṭaḥ śrotā mantā draṣṭādeṣṭā ghoṣṭā vijñātā prajñātā sarveṣāṃ 
bhūtānām antarapuruṣaḥ sa ma ātmeti vidyāt // AitĀ 3.2.4 
 
Next, if the sun looks split (and) appears like the nave of a chariot-wheel, 
or he sees his shadow is split, he should know that it indeed is the case 
[that his self is gone and he will not live for long]. Next, if he sees himself 
in a mirror or in water with a crooked head or with no head, or if his 
pupils appear inverted or crooked, he should know that it indeed is so. 
Next, he should cover his eyes and look: circular lines of light that seem to 
fall together are visible; when he does not see them, he should know that it 
indeed is so. Next, he should cover his ears and listen: there is a sound 
such as of a blazing fire or of a chariot; when he does not hear it, he should 
know that it indeed is so. Next, when fire appears blue as a peacock’s 
neck, or if he sees lightning in a cloudless sky or does not see lightning in 
a cloudy sky, or sees what looks like glittering specks in a great cloud, he 
should know that it indeed is so. Next, when he sees the earth as if 
burning, he should know that it indeed is so. These are the [signs] 
perceived with the senses. Now, the dreams. He sees a black man with 
black teeth, he kills him; a boar kills him; a monkey leaps at him; a fast 
wind blows him along; he chews on gold and spits it out; he eats honey; he 
devours stalks; he carries a single lotus; he travels with a team of asses and 
boars; wearing a garland of red hibiscuses, he drives a black cow with a 
black calf toward the south. If he should see any of these, then, having 
kept a fast, he should heat the milk for the offering of cooked milk and 
grain (i.e., the sthālīpāka) and offer it with the Rātrī hymn – an offering to 
a verse – and feed the Brahmans with other food and eat the oblation 
himself. He should know that the person within all beings who is not 
heard, not reached, not thought, not seen, not discerned, not determined, 
(but is) the hearer, the thinker, the seer, the determiner, the sounder, the 
discerner (and) the knower is his self (ātman). 
 
Although the utilization of sūktas or parts thereof for the purpose of warding off 
nightmares and neutralizing their negative influences was established practice by 
the time of the Gṛhyasūtras, this passage appears to be unique in its deployment 
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of the Rātrī hymn (to the goddess Night, ṚV 10.127) together with the production 
of a sthālīpāka, “the most characteristic of domestic offerings.”365 Contrary to the 
approach taken by Gonda, whose comments on this passage are restricted to the 
thematic link between nightmares and Night, I contend that the prescribed 
dedication of a sthālīpāka to Rātrī here is not so simplistic.366 It needs to be 
mentioned, as Gonda fails to, that this sole hymn to Rātrī in the Ṛgveda is 
concerned neither with a formless and frightening dark nor asks protection from 
ill-dreams and omens, but describes an immortal goddess smeared over with stars 
at whose journey all creatures settle down and who repels the dark by sending 
forth her sister, Dawn.367 As such, while this hymn evokes the night as a space of 
comfort and rest, its poetic function anticipates the arrival of the dawn, and 
therefore the return of the sun, indicating that the goal towards which its 
recitation is directed is the restoration of one’s true identity in death for the sake 
of a heavenly afterlife. This is in contrast to the activity of counteracting 
nightmares, which would return the subject to a state of lived well-being but may 
not have any direct effect on the attainment of post-mortem immortality. 
To this may be added that the considerable intertextual documentation of 
sthālīpākas consistently points to the understanding that the combined 
involvement of the deity to whom the offering is dedicated and the family- or 
community-members who would typically share consumption of the oblation 
creates an extended relationship between the one who makes the offering and the 
event precipitating it. The sthālīpāka thus functions as a transactional strategy in 
which the simultaneous pouring-forth of hymn and oblation generates a 
substantial identification with the objectives brought into manifest form through 
language; this substance is then incorporated into the bodily identities of those 
who consume the food.368 Here again, given the context of the event and the focus 
of the hymn, it is unsurprising that the consumption of the caru (oblation) is 
reserved for the subject and not shared with the Brahmans present, which would 
instead make the transaction constitutive of their affective and relational identity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365 Gonda 1980: 180. 
366 Ibid.: 272-273. 
367 Jamison and Brereton 2014: 1605 (vol. 3). 
368 Marriott 1976: 114. See also his notes on “transactional strategies” (ibid.: 136). 
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in the world. Finally, it is noteworthy that while text from the Saṃhitā can 
evidently be used to adapt such a rite to the personalized end of regaining – or 
perhaps substituting for – the identity (ekam) of the ātman and the sun, and do so 
even in spite of the person’s previously improper engagement with vāc, this 
passage remains suggestively silent on the matter of their union (saṃhitā) with 
offspring, livestock, and all other measures of a fruitful integration with life. 
Whether or not the loss of this embodied union is intended and irreversible, or 
considered to have been substantially accounted for by the transformations 
encoded in the recitations and other ritual undertakings, it bespeaks a crucial 
addition to the approach to revelation taken here: it is the affective identification 
of living vitality and language, rather than any canonical proscription of magical 
practices, that provides the sufficient basis of saṃhitā in the cultural system of 
these Āraṇyakas. 
As has already been mentioned, this chapter concludes by briefly 
considering two examples of magical practice, both drawn from the ŚāṅkhĀ. I 
have selected these particular instances because they lucidly demonstrate the 
working characteristics of a multiply constituted identity and its moulding into a 
state of integrated personhood, yet what they also demonstrate herein are the 
characteristics that have led to their deploring, simple neglect, or epistemological 
invalidation by Classical Sanskrit paṇḍitas and modern Indologists alike. It may 
be argued that this is because they resist interpretation in light of a pure and 
dispassionate self, uninformed by the body and the puruṣa’s involvement with the 
world, and iterating an eclipse of persona by submersion in an ultimate and 
idealized form. However, it is for these reasons of resistance and challenge that 
magical rites provide a valuable terrain in which to test the interpretations we 
have been exploring, in particular, the postulation that language is substantially 
involved in the life-long processes of shaping a soteriologically viable and 
advanced state of being, and that these changes at the level of embodiment, with 
its interiorization and expressivity, are proximate to and even complement the 
transformative dimensions of Vedic revelation. 
In their tendency to expose cultural intuitions about the body’s place in 
identity formation (upon which they in no small part depend), these rites show 
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that knowing is invariably physical and creative, not only perceptual and 
psychological, and that even the realization of an immutable and unadulterated 
self (ātman, prāṇa) does not alter the fact of the puruṣa’s continued identification 
with the macrocosm and thence its vulnerability to external influences. Rather, in 
keeping with the tenor of these texts, it follows that such knowledge informs and 
enhances a spiritual practitioner’s capacity for self-preservation until the time of a 
natural or desired death, and ability to identify effective means of achieving 
precisely this aim. 369  These considerations rightly bring us to question the 
coherence of attempting to retain a boundary between religion and magic as the 
distinguishing features of the latter blur in relation to their ameliorative provision 
for the textually authorized, and traditionally acknowledged, former ends. 
Let us turn then to these examples of magical practice, ŚāṅkhĀ 11.5-8 and 
4.7-8 (in order of discussion). Both sequences are characterized by their portrayal 
of the puruṣa as a multivocal and shifting collocation of deities that abide within 
the internal spaces of the corporeal body and each of which has a coded identity 
that quite literally extends from a substantially subtle physiological function to a 
macrocosmic phenomenon, thus agreeing with the creation narratives that 
punctuate this Āraṇyaka. Whilst remaining within the boundaries of coherence set 
by the same cosmological archetypes, the forward-momentum of these sequences 
revolves around their description of how to incorporate additional substance-
codes into oneself, thus volitionally instigating changes in physical identity that 
preserve and extend life. These changes provide for ongoing soteriological 
practices of self-transformation by means of controlling the entry and exit of 
substance-codes from the person. 
The first example, ŚāṅkhĀ 11.5-8, corresponds broadly to the latter part of 
the account of bodily malfunction and ritual directives found just above in AitĀ 
3.2.4, but with the significant variation that this description of sensory 
hallucinations and dreams directly follows an account of the puruṣa’s creation by 
Prajāpati (11.1-2, translated in Chapter Three) and is introduced as the “visions of 
the year” that will be seen by that archetypal puruṣa when they are approaching 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 Shulman and Stroumsa 2002: 15. 
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death.370 While the text still continues to prescribe the offering of a sthālīpāka, 
this shift in context informs a corresponding change in the recitation, which now 
consists of four pre-patterned stages of increasing complexity. The subject, and 
the text here seems to make simultaneous reference to both “this” person and the 
archetypal puruṣa, must first recite a short and repeated sequence as they pour 
libations of ghee onto the offering of cooked grain. This first stage of the 
recitation exactly mirrors the process of primordial creation in its detailing of the 
establishment of each macrocosmic phenomenon in its respective physiological, 
temperamental, or anatomical locus, including brahman in the ātman (ŚāṅkhĀ 
11.5371). The second recitation follows the same sequence, but in an extended 
form that locates each deity in the heart and the heart in the self. Thus: 
 
vāci me ’gniḥ pratiṣṭhito vāg hṛdaye hṛdayam ātmani tat satyaṃ devānāṃ 
māham akāmo mariṣyāmy annavān annādo bhūyāsaṃ svāhā / ŚāṅkhĀ 11.6 
 
Fire is established in my speech, my speech in my heart, my heart in my 
self; this is the truth of the deities. I will not die against my will; I will be 
rich in food, an eater of food – svāhā! 
 
The formula is repeated for each deity; while undertaking this and the following 
recitations the subject is instructed to consume portions (śeṣa) of the sthālīpāka. It 
might be effectively argued that as a strategy of transfer, this initial pair of 
recitations confines each deity to increasingly deep, subtle, and multiply 
embedded loci within the person as a means of preventing their departure in a 
reversal of the phenomenology of death. This procedure both preserves the 
distinct integrity of each deity, and integrates them within the concentric yet 
singular spaces of body, heart, and ātman. 
 Having in this way stabilized the puruṣa by ensuring the ongoing 
contribution of each deity, the circuitous liquid offering of language into the 
sthālīpāka, and sthālīpāka into the body, now turns to the incorporation of other 
substance-codes into the person’s developing ontological state. While the third 
and fourth stages in the recitation find no parallels in the AitĀ, the methodology 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 ŚāṅkhĀ 11.3: athāyaṃ puruṣaḥ preṣyan purā saṃvatsarāt saṃvatsarasya drṣ̥ṭīḥ paśyati… / The 
sensory hallucinations and dreams described vary only very slightly in detail from those presented 
by the AitĀ. 
371 The formula is: X(loc.) me Y(nom.) pratiṣṭhita- svāhā, “Y is established in my X, svāhā!” 
	   198	  
is familiar and draws upon the comprehensive interrelationships that weave 
throughout reality. The third recitation (ŚāṅkhĀ 11.7) utilizes bandhus to 
establish linkages between two hierarchies of increasing subtlety and 
comprehesiveness of identity: on one hand, an enumeration of natural phenomena 
that follow a vertical movement from the coarse and inanimate (stone, iron, 
copper, lead, silver, gold), through the person and their animated involvement in 
the life-world (food, satiation [tṛpti]), to the etheral formations of midspace (the 
firmament [nāka], Bṛhaspati, brahman, Prajāpati), and finally to the Vedas. 
Providing the other half of this X = Y bandhu formation is, on the other hand, a 
hierarchy of chandas that moves from the ubiquitous ritual metres of jagatī and 
triṣṭubh to the utterly comprehensive, and utterly condensed, Savitṛ or Gāyatrī 
mantra – the “metre of all the Vedas.” The fourth recitation presents an extended 
form of these identifications, in which they are specifically bound to the 
overarching aim of self-preservation by means of the quality of firmness (sthira) 
that at once is intrinsic to their own substance-coding and works to the 
enhancement and promotion of the deities’ establishment (pratiṣṭha) in the 
person: 
 
aśmeva sthiro vasāni jāgatena cchandasā puruṣo maṇiḥ prāṇaḥ sūtram 
annam granthis tad granthim udgrathnāmy annakāmo mṛtyave brāhmaṇam 
api sarvam āyur aśīyāyuṣmān māham akāmo mariṣyāmy annavān annādo 
bhūyāsaṃ svāhā / ŚāṅkhĀ 11.8 
 
I remain as firm as stone with the jāgatī metre! Man is the jewel, breath the 
thread, food the knot – the knot that I, the desirer of food, tie as a brāhmaṇa 
[against] death. Full of life, I attain a whole life. I will not die against my 
will; I will be rich in food, an eater of food – svāhā! 
 
Approached from the perspective of transaction, the repetition that generates the 
body of the recitations prescribed in ŚāṅkhĀ 11.5-8 demonstrates the transferral 
of each substance and its telescoping relationships via the harnessing of 
language’s richly communicative capacities for manifestation and fundamental 
affinity with oblation.372 Despite their introduction of new material – that is, 
material of non-Vedic origin that differs in focus and style from the Ṛgvedic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 See Sandess 2010. 
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sūktas we have elsewhere seen employed in ritual transformations – these 
recitations are arguably Vedic in their cogent application of teachings about the 
truth of identity. 
 The passages comprising our second example of magical practice, ŚāṅkhĀ 
4.7-8, better known as Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad [KṣU] 2.7-8, cast these tensions and 
continuities into still higher relief. This is in large part a matter of 
contextualization rather than content: the formal inclusion of these passages in the 
Kauṣītaki is, like innumerable similar instances within this corpus of texts, at odds 
with what many scholars have come to expect of the true metaphysical purpose of 
the Upaniṣads and the subtle communicative function of their language. Generally 
speaking, the focus on ritualized activities (categorically, karman) and worldly 
well-being do not sit comfortably within the purview of an argument for the 
primacy of knowledge and its acquisition through an ascetic disengagement with 
one’s conventionally experienced identity. Nonetheless, the first of the passages 
translated here describes three acts of veneration (upāsana), which are attributed 
to Sarvajit (“All-Conquering”) Kauṣītaki, the teacher from whom this branch of 
the Ṛgveda takes its name, and which again possess an aura of domestic ritual in 
their deployment of liquid and linguistic offerings to establish an intersection 
between the person and a natural course of events:  
 
athātaḥ sarvajitaḥ kauṣītakes trīṇy upāsanāni bhavanti sarvajid dha sma 
kauṣītakir udyantam ādityam upatiṣṭhate yajñopavītaṃ dhṛtvodakam ānīya 
triḥ prasicyodakapātraṃ vargo ’si pāpmānaṃ me vṛṅdhīty etayaivāvṛtā 
madhye santam udvargo ’si pāpmānaṃ ma udvṛṅdhīty etayaivāvṛtāstaṃ 
yantaṃ saṃvargo ’si pāpmānaṃ me saṃvṛṅdhīti tad yad ahorātrābhyāṃ 
pāpaṃ karoti saṃ tad vṛṅkte tatho evaivaṃ vidvān etayaivāvṛtādityam 
upatiṣṭhate yad ahorātrābhyāṃ pāpaṃ karoti saṃ tad vṛṅkte // ŚāṅkhĀ 
4.7373 
 
Next, there are the three acts of veneration belonging to Sarvajit Kauṣītaki. 
Now, this is how Sarvajit Kauṣītaki would venerate the rising sun: wearing 
the sacred garment in the sacrificial manner and having fetched water, he 
would pour it into a water-pot three times, saying, “You are the one that 
removes! Remove my sin!” He would venerate the midday sun in exactly 
this way, saying, “You are the one who tears out! Tear out my sin!” He 
would venerate the setting sun in exactly this way, saying, “You are the one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373 Sanskrit text from Pāṭhak 1922. Dev’s 1980 edition shows minor variations in the reading of 
the text, as does the corresponding text of the KṣU presented by Olivelle 1988. 
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who devours! Devour my sin!” And the sun did devour any sin he had 
committed by day or night. Likewise, when a man knows this and venerates 
the sun in exactly this way, it devours the sin he commits by day or night. 
 
Although these rites of veneration do not lay out a discursively esoteric teaching 
on the truth of identity, they at the very least enact one by pressing the inherited 
cause-and-effect model of karman into the soteriological framework of a 
transformative knowledge that consists of hidden relationships and, on these same 
terms, locates authority in individuals. The metaphysical diversity of the 
Upaniṣads aside, the efficacy with which Kauṣītaki’s speech is depicted 
presupposes a determinative state of realization. Such a presupposition of 
knowledge can again be seen in the directly following paragraph, an instance in 
which the actions described compare favorably with early Upaniṣadic teachings, 
particularly those relating rebirth and identity to the moon, its function as a door 
through the heavenly vault, and the critical role of linguistically formulated 
knowledge in a person’s attainment of the worlds beyond the cycles of time and 
space. 374  These teachings confer a logical center to the circumstances and 
procedures described in ŚāṅkhĀ 4.8, cohering in spite of (or better, perhaps, in 
relation to) this passage’s emphatic vocalization of the desire for offspring, 
livestock, and the prolonging of life – all living proofs of knowledge that were to 
become archetypal of the ritualists’ interests, but which undeniably share 
conceptual ground with the understanding that retas, semen, and thence all life 
stems from the seasons of the lunar calendar. 
 
atha māsi māsy amāvāsyāyāṃ vṛttāyāṃ paścāc candramasaṃ dṛśyamānam 
upatiṣṭhetaitayaivāvṛtā haritatṛṇe vā pratyasya yan me susamid dhṛdayaṃ 
divi candramasi śritaṃ manye ’haṃ māṃ tad vidvāṃsaṃ māhaṃ putryam 
aghaṃ rudam iti na hy asmāt pūrvāḥ prajāḥ praitīti 
jātuputrasyāthājātuputrasyāpyāyasva sametu te saṃ te payāṃsi samuyantu 
vājā yamādityā aṃśum āpyāyayantīty etās tisra ṛco japitvā māsmākaṃ 
prāṇena prajayā paśubhir āpyāyayiṣṭhā yo ’smān dveṣṭi yaṃ ca vayaṃ 
dviṣmas tasya prāṇena prajayā paśubhir āpyāyayasvety aindrīm āvṛtam 
āvarta ādityasyāvṛtam anvāvarta iti dakṣiṇaṃ bāhum anvāvartate // ŚāṅkhĀ 
4.8 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 Cf. Citra Gāṅgyāni’s famous teaching to Āruṇi on rebirth and the afterlife (ŚāṅkhĀ 3.2 = KṣU 
1.2). The same teaching occurs at BĀU 6.2.1-15 and CU 10.1-3 with the significant addition that 
two paths are described, of the gods and of the ancestors. For a literary comparison of these 
redactions, see Olivelle 1999. 
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Now, every month on the night of the turning of the new moon, one should 
worship the moon as it becomes visible in the west using exactly the same 
procedure, or one should throw two blades of green grass at it, saying, 
 
My heart, a fine kindling stick,  
is placed in heaven in the moon –  
this, I do believe, I know. 
May I not have to weep 
for my children’s suffering! 
 
His children, surely, will not die before him. This is for a man who has a 
son. Now as for a man who does not have a son [there are the verses]: 
 
Swell up, O Soma! 
May virility 
 gather in you from all sides! 
be there 
 at the gathering of power! 
May juices and powers, 
May virile energies, 
 gather in you, who crush the enemies; 
As you swell, O Soma, to immortality, 
 you capture in the sky the highest glory.375 
That tiny drop, 
 the Ādityas make to swell; 
That imperishable drop, 
 the imperishable ones drink; 
With that drop, 
 may king Varuṇa and Br̥haspati, 
 the guardian gods of the world, 
 make us swell!376 
 
Having silently recited these three ṛcs, he then says, “Do not swell yourself 
up by means of our prāṇa, offspring, and livestock! Swell yourself up with 
the prāṇa, offspring, and livestock of one who hates us and whom we hate!” 
He then turns a full circle toward his right, saying, “I turn the way of Indra! 
I turn the way of the sun!” 
 
The magical dimensions of this passage are standard: alongside other occasions 
when this heavenly body is of unusual colour or irregular appearance, the 
amāvāsya night when the new moon is “dwelling at home” is a preferred time for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 The verses are ṚV 1.91.16 and 18. The translation of these verses is Olivelle’s (1998: 339, also 
588 n.8). 
376 TS 2.3.5.3. 
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the performance of magic; the rites exhibit personal power and self-invested 
interests that benefit only the speaker, and which, to a greater or lesser degree, 
implicate the conscious harming of others; and, unlike yajña in which the 
seamless flow of vāc and sacrificial materials draws in the presence of gods and 
other divine elements in the poetic creation of the event, but also unlike the 
domestic gṛhya rites in which the same affinities are utilized in response to 
naturally occurring events and their auspicious potential, the offerings prescribed 
here and in the preceding examples are characterized by their intention to 
constrain worldly phenomena and thereby control their personal impact.377 
With reference to other qualitative measures of magic, the dimensions just 
listed cannot sufficiently answer the question of whether these practices represent 
unorthodox transgressions of moral and religious boundaries, for they do not in 
any sense mark a supernatural departure from the organismic reality of the 
Āraṇyakas’ revelation, the reality within which all possible expressions of being, 
and therefore all transformations of identity, must naturally occur. This too holds 
for their powerful employments of language. As a practical matter, then, the 
inherent violability of an unbound self that is both feeder and food (attā ha vā 
ādyo bhavati; AitĀ 2.1.2) and fundamentally subject to the “dictates and 
mutations of the local environment”378 points to the usefulness – indeed, the 
necessity – of ritual mechanisms that safeguard the person and, most importantly, 
ensure their continued transformation. Additionally, a fact that still does not result 
in any definite moral fibre: these mechanisms, no less than the formally 
celebrated discernment of hidden connections that underscores the Saṃhitās and 
Upaniṣads, entails a perceptual shift in the reality understood and experienced by 
the human subject. This shift, compelled by vāc, whose capacity for expression 
extends as far as brahman, is nothing other than a rupturing of the boundaries that 
limit self-awareness, to the ends of unleashing the truth of an identity whose very 
boundlessness manifests through the composite interplays of personhood and the 
subtle category-fusions beheld in the attainment of integration and completeness, 
where embodiment must become the revelation of revelation itself. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 Gonda 1980: 244-245, 249-251. 
378 F. Smith 2006a: 262. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusions 
Sanskrit and the Textuality of the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas 
 
 
 
 
Given the amount of space already dedicated to discussions of a theoretical 
timbre, this study does not conclude by offering a summation of either the 
dynamics that characterize language and embodiment in the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas 
or the methods used to retrieve these, except to say that it should by now be clear 
that there exist viable alternatives to the currently prevailing approaches to these 
texts. The fact that these alternatives build upon established methodologies by 
marking a shift in orientation that openly challenges the establishment of our 
common assumptions whilst intentionally avoiding a disruptive impact on emic 
perspectives is, I contend, a strength of this embodied approach to language and a 
necessary step in the direction of better understanding the existence claims and 
soteriological transformations that at once comprise these materials and are 
anticipated as their result by indigenous participants. This, simply, is a matter of 
open-ended dialogue between emic and etic standpoints, such that advances in the 
scientific understanding of human biology and neurophysiological adaptation 
provoke an engaged response from those working in the humanities, thus together 
providing an informed basis on which to adapt literary interpretation and analysis 
to the underlying idea of language seen at work in the particularities of  
traditional expression and text formation. To the extent that this idea of language 
is not previously specified, but conceived to be grounded in perceptions of 
personhood and to reflect fundamental understandings about reality, it applies 
equally to both sides of the emic–etic divide and significantly allows the unique 
cultural inflections of texts to be preserved at the same time as satisfying modern 
analytical desiderata. Further, in the context of the present study, it takes into 
positive account the pressures increasingly incumbent upon scholars of Vedic 
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texts to respond to evidence, amassed in recent decades, that not only indicates a 
convergence of the folk and Sanskritic in early Brahmanical culture, but which, in 
suggesting that interpretations based on the notion of a seizure of enunciative 
control through Sanskrit are more appropriately applied to later orthodox thinkers 
than to an indiscriminate demographic of “ritualists,” has also highlighted the 
reifying involvement of modern academic theory in the way mid-Vedic responses 
to the Veda have been popularly represented. These considerations and revisions, 
their hermeneutic foundations and analytical procedures, have been sufficiently 
addressed. 
 Instead, let us turn to the wider implications of the embodied model of 
language suggested by saṃskṛta. If the variety of nuanced expressions and 
ritualized employments of language demonstrated in the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas 
attests commonly to a creative intersection between permeable embodiment and 
vāc, it is then apposite to re-raise the issue of a Brahmanical inculcation of control 
executed over the centuries by means of a practical and ideological deployment of 
Sanskrit invoking an orthodox imaginaire of authoritative textuality. This is not to 
ask about a forced marginalization of Prakritic, regional, and vernacular 
practices, a topic that is not dealt with explicitly or otherwise in these primary 
sources, but rather to ask whether the restrictions articulated in the AitĀ and 
ŚāṅkhĀ can be seen to prefigure the concerns with exclusivity and authority that 
later come to demarcate intellectual or formally codified Brahmanism in its 
literary and ritual or performative aspects. What these texts reveal is a concern 
with control which, unlike that conceptualized by Pollock and others, arises 
entirely from the model of the body as “a locus for external forces.”379 As seen, 
these deities, their externalizing emission from the cosmic progenitor, and 
subsequent disembodiment, extended codification, and disruptive volatility, 
altogether provide the substantial basis for both self-integration and its 
devastating collapse – the expressive extremes of identity and personal 
malleability at which the metaphysical equivalence of knowing, being, and doing 
is most fully disclosed. These movements are in all cases guided, circumscribed, 
and personally realized through vāc; and I propose that, if a case were to be made 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 F. Smith 2006a: 581. 
	   205	  
for a Brahmanical concern with control as expressed in these texts, the potential 
for a disfiguring disruption at the intersection between person and cosmos – the 
puruṣa that falls apart, dries out, is abandoned by the identity of self and sun – 
should provide the immediate terms and context for ensuing analysis. 
This, of course, entails a subjectivity that sits emphatically at odds with the 
major discourses that color the śāstric expression of Sanskritic culture: the 
Pūrvamīmāṃsākas’ erasure of all human involvement or influence from the 
revelation of the Veda, which, circuitously, drives an argument against the 
possibility of any soteriological potential inherent in other languages; the 
Vedāntins’ depiction of an inviolate transcendent ātman and corresponding denial 
of relationality, whether in terms of ritual technology, ontological veridicality, or 
transformations in awareness (e.g., brahmānubhava); and the widespread 
appropriation of Sāṃkhyan cosmogony as an explanatory paradigm in service of 
theological visions of an absolute God. If anything, however, the popular 
acceptance of these metaphysical and epistemological paradigms as 
representative of Brahmanical practice in practice renders the acknowledgement 
of their limitations, exceptions, and variable negotiation a matter of pressing 
significance. It is thus germane to recall Frederick Smith’s observation that 
possession – a phenomenon which in its relationality is at the very least proximate 
to (but at most is arguably identifiable with) the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas’ depiction of 
personhood and its formation – can be found existing in close juxtaposition with 
other domains of ritual and ritualized concerns. 380  This is evidenced 
ethnographically, through the participation of Brahmins in non-Brahmanical 
festivals and rites involving the induction of possession states, noted by Knipe 
among others, and likewise through the adherence to modes of linguistic conduct 
intended to prevent against drawing the attention of the “evil eye,” to quote 
Appadurai, who further attributes both “Vedic” or “Indo-Aryan” and “Dravidian” 
clusters of meaning to these verbal behaviors.381 Of significance to the present 
discussion is the fact that such ethnographic data receives textual support from 
distinctly orthodox Brahmanical sources. According to Sanderson’s study of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Ibid.: 592. See also Hancock 1999; Ram 2013. 
381 Knipe 2005; Appadurai 1990. 
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Mīmāṃsāka, Vedāntic, and Vaiṣṇava materials with respect to the opposed 
phenomena of purity and pollution as the primary considerations informing 
behavioral conformity among Kashmiri Brahmins, the retreat to the normativity 
of pure consciousness, and hence the idealized depersonalization of self-identity, 
equates to a strategic – and textually enjoined – maintenance of one’s socially 
privileged position in the form of a direct response to the “dark chaos of 
possibilities” that arise from a turbid world with its potent external forces.382 
While, in Sanderson’s analysis, it is the formlessness of pure 
consciousness that ensures its veridicality, such safeguarding against the 
dramatically polluting impact of personal invasion by these disembodied 
substances affirms rather than denies their affective reality despite their 
contradiction of “the metaphysics of autonomy and responsibility.” 383  Such 
instances of Brahmanical interaction with the vulnerabilities and potential of a 
self without fixed boundaries, whether through its implicit acknowledgement as a 
threat requiring an enjoined response or through its active ritual embrace as an 
instrument of volitionally induced shifts in awareness and the experiencing of 
one’s self, cannot be fully explained by the dialogic processes involved in 
Sanskritization. Although it is undeniable that these too have had a role to play, 
the evidence points further towards the ongoing historical significance of 
permeable embodiment and its extended cosmological dynamics, both among 
localized practices on the ground and at the rarified heights of Sanskritic 
discourse. Here again, it is probable that inherited assumptions about the 
singularity of the orthodox Brahmanical concern with the ultimacy of an 
unchanging and transcendent ātman and denial of different models of personhood 
have considerably limited the scholarly engagement with śāstras and other 
officially recognized texts by placing pre-established dictates around the varieties 
of evidence searched for in these materials. 
Returning now to the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas, it is not difficult to see the 
active mutuality between permeable embodiment and the interrelationship of vāc 
and prāṇa, which together establish the experience of the puruṣa’s porosity, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 Sanderson 1985: 193. 
383 Ibid.: 200. 
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entry (pra-√viś) and exit (ud-√kram) of its constitutive deities, in paradigmatic 
and fundamentally accessible physiological terms. Although the exact order of 
precedence in the relationship between vāc, prāṇa, and manas, the mind, is not 
something that the accounts held in these texts allow us to establish with 
certainty, this does not undermine the fact that vāc is the key to a 
phenomenological understanding of the Āraṇyakas – indeed, this unresolvable 
dilemma with its remarkably subtle shading between epistemology and ontology 
figures as a major point of disagreement among the teachings on integration that 
are presented in both versions of the Saṃhitopaniṣad.384 The linkages of identity 
that grammar veridically manifests intersect with the openness of embodiment to 
introduce changes in personal constitution that, firstly, challenge the gap between 
discourse and practice by vitalizing these Āraṇyakas, in their full affectivity, as 
active instances of self-transformation, and secondly demonstrate the 
expansiveness of vāc as a matrix that encompasses form and formlessness, 
corporeality and non-corporeality, subjectivity and objectivity, and thence 
continuity between person and cosmos. This is clearly to be distinguished from 
the negative treatments of nāma-rūpa, name and form, as an epistemological 
problematic by South Asian analytical traditions, in which the exactitude 
suggested by words and worldly appearances presents a perceptual obstacle to the 
discernment of truth through their implied identification of substantial qualities 
and actual phenomena. In accordance with the ontological demands of a self, an 
ātman or jīva, whose absolute transcendence defies language in both its 
referentiality and substantiality, the objects, states, and conditions communicated 
by words are merely conventional, with their supposed reality being contingent 
upon the ignorant and uninformed perceptions that beleaguer the spiritually 
uncultivated subject. Much the same is also concluded following the demands of 
the absence of any self (anātman) that could be assigned to the individually 
unique and mutating collocation of skandhas, personality constituents, that 
informs the experience of selfhood, but which ultimately shows the referential 
constancy of language to be void of reality. By contrast, the state of having 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 This is not limited to the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas; see Shulman’s (2012: 11-12) discussion of mind 
and speech – and their existence prior to their appearance – in the cosmogony of Śatapatha 
Brāhmaṇa 7.4.11. 
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become nāmāyatta, bound to or dependent upon names, is esteemed by the AitĀ 
as the condition in which the archetypal poets kept free from the conventional 
strictures and confusions that limit the ordinary engagement with language, and 
instead were satiated in the revealed.385 
It would thus be a mistake to assume that the textuality of the Ṛgvedic 
Āraṇyakas either reinforces a controlling need for infinitesimal categorization or 
presents only the discursive component of a teaching to the opposite effect, that 
is, in isolation from the practical transformations of awareness and experience 
that are its necessary source and counterpart. When seen in light of the 
expansiveness of the person as an open locus for external forces, the grammatical 
and poetic complexity of these texts fractures such categorization – including the 
separation of discursive knowledge from its practical affect – in a verbal and 
therefore enactive dismantling of the limitations that inhere in the vision of 
oneself as autonomously isolated from the world and which restrict the ability of 
the self to transform as a result.386 The acts of categorical distinction typically 
predicated as the modus operandi of language, that impose sharp boundaries 
between the subject and the multiplicity of objects perceived in the world as an 
unavoidable dimension of linguistic referentiality, do not survive the impact of 
vāc on the delicate fabric of personal identity. To cite Shulman and Stroumsa, this 
is one way in which the performance of these Āraṇyakas indicates a mode of self-
transformation that is “largely a form of healing that removes a block” by 
revealing, through the structures of the self as a whole, the linkages of identity 
that embed the experience of knowing one’s personal multivocality.387 It is this 
multivocality, the evidence of the texts suggests, that allows one to continually 
adapt or transform in accordance with the changes in their environment – the 
movements of sun and moon, the death of a father, the arrival of a new year, the 
malignant action of enemies, and so on – as demanded by the larger soteriological 
endeavor of preserving the living state of integration that is prerequisite to the 
attainment of post-mortem immortality. Rather than pointing beyond itself to an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 See the verses in AitĀ 2.3.8, especially 3: yad vāca om iti yac ca neti / yac cāsyāḥ krūraṃ yad u 
colbaṇiṣṇu / tad viyūyā kavayo anvavindan / nāmāyattā samatṛpyañ chrute ’dhi // 
386 Shulman and Stroumsa 2002: 13-15. 
387 Ibid.: 15. 
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ineffable reality that transcends the divisions introduced by its referential 
function, the spiritually adept engagement of language reaches deeply into itself, 
exploding such perceptual limitations through its embodiment of the silent 
dynamics that describe manifestation as a constantly mutating and potentially 
unlimited edifice of relational linkages in identity. 
The multivalency of vāc thus reveals the truth of compound personhood 
precisely by acting upon its structures, as from without, while simultaneously 
arising from within them as a component of identity that is at once familiar and 
foreign. In this way, however, the extensiveness of its expression – its rupture of 
the boundaries that limit self-transformation, and replacement of them with the 
experience of liberating openness – encodes the threat of disintegration. The 
urgency of this dimension of vāc and its grounding in the deep structures of Vedic 
revelation itself have gone largely unrecognized by those working in the 
academic study of the Āraṇyakas, despite its notable degree of overlap with other, 
considerably well-documented concerns belonging to the Brahmanical ritual 
sphere.388 This may in part be due to the latters’ conceptual relegation to the 
rather shadowy category of mythology; nonetheless, the tension of a revelation 
that threatens to cast the very identity it reveals into dysfunctional chaos helps to 
co-ordinate the effort to define the Āraṇyakas as a textual genre. 
Thus, some general observations are in order. As the opening sequence of 
the ŚāṅkhĀ explicitly cautions its reciters, the transformations induced by the 
recitations that variously comprise these texts may take place volitionally or non-
volitionally, for they lie within vāc and not with the intention of the speaker 
alone. This understanding of the dangers of disregarding the power of revelatory 
language – which is inclusive of, but not restricted to, the hymns of the Veda – 
reveals a significant point of continuity that is not only shared by the AitĀ and 
ŚāṅkhĀ, but can be traced beneath the multifariousness of their contents, from 
their careful attentiveness to the requirements of viniyoga and bandhu that 
regulate the transformative effect of the recitation of the Mahāvrata, to their 
detailed descriptions of collapse and physiological malfunctioning, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388 In particular, I note the tendency of the altar, the sacrifice, and other ritual elements and 
essences to run away and Vāc’s predilection towards uncontrollability. For example, see 
Carpenter 1994; Jamison 1991, 1996: 40, 149; Malamoud 1989: 86-90. 
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prescription of rites that actively harness the power of vāc to restore self-
integration, transfer ritual essences between bodies, and deflect the potentially 
devastating impact of imprecations.389 This concern, or rather nexus of concerns 
bearing upon the tense and potentially volatile intersection between revelation 
and embodied integration is not restricted to practices that have been 
determinatively codified by their formal inclusion in Brahmanical ritual texts, but 
extends to practices and teachings that have been conceived of by scholars as the 
earmarks of a strictly distinct Upaniṣadic culture in which such complexity and its 
repercussions for the valuation of the senses were reconstructed negatively in 
accordance with emerging systems of thought about saṃsāra and liberation 
therefrom. It was argued in Chapter 3 that the absolute terms in which such 
characterizations are frequently cast can be traced back to an intersection of 
influence between the Vedāntins’ inheritance of epistemological principles from 
Pūrvamīmāṃsā, namely, the denial of subjectivity as a valid means of knowledge 
(pramāṇa), and the commensurate undervaluing of the puruṣa by modern and 
medieval scholars, as in the case of Sāyaṇa whose reading of these materials is 
heavily influenced by the leading Vedāntic commentaries.390 However, the notion 
of an encounter between language and the puruṣa’s compound identity is not 
entirely absent from these materials; its soteriological significance and 
relationship to the antipodes of integration and disintegration are apparent in the 
determinative influence of upaniṣads, ahaṃkāras, mahāvākyas, and other 
verbalized modes of self-revelation upon whether the speaker gains entry to 
heaven and subsequent immortality or, breaking again into their constitutive 
elements, are reabsorbed into the cycle of saṃsāra.391 As in their chronological 
antecedents, it is clear that the attainments predicated upon knowledge require 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 The discussion of the ineffectuality of rebukes and imprecations against one who integrated by 
virtue of their recitation of the Saṃhitā is particularly telling in this respect; see for example AitĀ 
3.1.3-4. 
390 Galewicz 2009: 175-185. 
391 This is most clearly articulated in Citra Gāṅgyāyani’s teaching on the repeated tests of 
knowledge encountered by the deceased (ŚāṅkhĀ 3). However, the determinative influence of 
such dialogues is also apparent in the accounts of Viśvāmitra’s entry to the world of Indra (AitĀ 
2.2.3, ŚāṅkhĀ 1.6) and the debate between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru (ŚāṅkhĀ 6). The AitĀ’s (2.1.7) 
correlation of the qualities of Varuṇa’s undecaying world with the soteriological attainments of 
the knower are also of note in this connection. 
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subtle insight into vāc as the reservoir of revelations about the truth of identity, 
manifested in the ability to harness its internal dynamics. 
Additionally, it must be added that these scenarios suggest the 
transformations induced by vāc, whether positive or negative, are not restricted to 
an internal domain of pre-objective experience, but are publicly observable and 
communally affective occurrences with external expressions that can be identified 
by others in either their aberrant symptomology or authoritative command of 
attention and respect. This raises the apposite issue of how these transformations’ 
personal and social reverberations bring substance to the spatial restrictions that 
are repeatedly invoked in definition of the Āraṇyakas’ textuality. In most if not all 
cases, this emerging phenomenology of vāc requires that the accounts contained 
in these materials need to be read rather more literally than the poetic figures of 
English would typically have us assume, while their structured sonic textures 
require more analytical attention than can be captured by either translation alone 
or the modern methods of philology and linguistics in their present state of 
ideological separation from a positivistic and culture-specific engagement with 
religious language. 
This is to suggest the possibility that the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas’ concern with 
the transfiguring impact of revelatory language – its dismantling of the subject 
into the chaos of innumerable fragmentary linkages – and their resultant depiction 
of integration as the fundamental prerequisite to the attainment of a personal 
identity, point to the existence of linguistic affects that may indeed be retrievable 
if a detailed analysis of their verbal surfaces were to be undertaken. While the 
demands of such a project extend far beyond the capacity of the present study, the 
understanding of vāc and embodiment that has emerged from the examinations 
conducted here contains ample space for adaptation and fine-tuning in accordance 
with future findings. Unfortunately, however, it is not advisable to extrapolate a 
definition of the Āraṇyakas as a formal corpus from the observations offered 
throughout these chapters. As indicated early in this study, and as most 
Indologists would be well aware, the lack of availability of editions, absence of 
reliable or complete translations, and lack of comprehensive information about 
textual parallels in the wider Vedic corpus present an outstanding difficulty that 
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would need to be addressed before the details needed for further research could 
begin to be amassed. The significance of such work cannot be overestimated, for 
this absence of sheer raw data is matched by an equivalent lacuna in our 
understanding of the Veda as revelation and the early religious culture of the 
Brahmins. 
In light of the observations offered throughout this study, the central 
insight revealed through examination of the Ṛgvedic Āraṇyakas is that if our 
assumptions about Sanskrit as a language are not reconsidered in relation to vāc, 
the difficulties that occlude the understanding of these materials are not liable to 
go away. As the transformations of personhood entailed by becoming saṃskṛta 
draw embodiment ever closer to living revelation, Sanskrit comes to bear strongly 
upon Vedic textuality, not through association, but as an affect whose desirability 
can only be made sense of in the context of the body’s porosity and the internal 
horizons of sensory awareness. The fact that this challenges familiar 
preconceptions about language and the stability of its arbitrary relationship to 
reality is, I contend, a necessary development, for it highlights the inherited 
orthodoxies that enter the fray when methods of cross-cultural literary 
interpretation are constructed without due consideration for the contingencies and 
limitations of the tools we take for granted. As has been demonstrated, the 
convergence entailed by an admission of Vedic models of relationality into 
modern ways of working with texts is not only possible, but relatively simple, if 
first we are willing to accept as reality the fact of embodied identity and the open-
endedness of its construction in response to the appearance of stimuli, both 
predictable and unexpected, in our internal and external environments. The 
challenge, then, is not simply to maintain the beliefs of a religious culture, but to 
push deeply into the question of how we bring our own values into scholarly 
work and allow them to colour the way we understand texts, as Clooney reminds 
us.392 Yet here too, perhaps, the issue remains the desire to reach out to the Vedic 
revelation from the untouched space of an autonomous self. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 Clooney 1996: xviii. 
	   213	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Abram, David. 1996. The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a 
More-than-Human World. New York: Vintage Books. 
Āgāśe, Kāśīnāthaśāstrī. 1896. Aitareyabrāhmaṇam. 
Śrīmatsāyaṇācāryaviracitabhāṣyasametam. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 32. Part 
1. Puṇe: Ānandāśrama. 
Aklujkar, Ashok. 2003. “A Different Sociolinguistics for Brahmins, Buddhists and 
Jains.” In Contemporary Views on Indian Civilization. Edited by Bhu Dev 
Sharma, 54-69. USA: World Association for Vedic Studies. 
———. 2004. “Can the Grammarians’ Dharma be a Dharma for All?” Journal of 
Indian Philosophy 32: 687-732. 
Alper, Harvey P., ed. 1991. Understanding Mantras. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
———, ed. 1998. Mantra. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Alter, Joseph S. 2004. Yoga in Modern India: The Body between Science and 
Philosophy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Almond, Philip. 1998. The British Discovery of Buddhism. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ames, Roger T. 1984. “Coextending Arising, Te, and Will to Power: Two Doctrines 
of Self-Transformation.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 11: 113-138. 
Appadurai, Arjun. 1990. “Topographies of the Self: Praise and Emotion in Hindu 
India.” In Language and the Politics of Emotion. Edited by Catherine Lutz and 
Lila Abu-Lughod, 92-112. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Arnold, Daniel. 2001. “Of Intrinsic Validity: A Study on the Relevance of Pūrva 
Mīmāṃsā.” Philosophy East and West 51: 26-53. 
———. 2011. “For Whom is the “Naturalness” of Language a Problem? Thoughts 
on Reframing a Buddhist – Mīmāṃsaka Debate.” In South Asian Texts in History: 
Critical Engagements with Sheldon Pollock. Edited by Yigal Bronner, Whitney 
Cox, and Lawrence McCrea, 245-66. Asia Past and Present. New Research from 
AAS, No. 7. Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies. 
Avalon, Arthur (Sir John Woodroffe), ed. 1960. Principles of Tantra: The 
Tantratattva of Śrīyukta Śiva Candra Vidyārṇava Bhattacārya Mahodaya. 3rd ed. 
With Introductions by Arthur Avalon and B. K. Majumdar. Madras: Ganesha. 
Bailey, Greg. 1995. “The Fundamental Problems of Contemporary Indology.” In 
International Conference in Sanskrit and Related Studies. Vol. 1. Proceedings. 
September 23 – 26, 1993. Edited by Przemysław Pierkawski, 15-26. Cracow: The 
Enigma Press. 
Beck, Guy L. 1995. Sonic Theology: Hinduism and Sacred Sound. Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass. 
Becker, A. L. 2000. Beyond Translation: Essays toward a Modern Philology. Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
	   214	  
Becker, A. L. with Judith Becker. 2000. “A Musical Icon: Power and Meaning in 
Javanese Gamelan Music.” In Becker, A. L. Beyond Translation: Essays toward a 
Modern Philology, 349-364. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
Becker, Judith. 2001. “Anthropological Perspectives on Music and Emotion.” In 
Music and Emotion: Theory and Research. Edited by Patrik N. Juslin and John A. 
Sloboda, 135-60. Series in Affective Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bell, Catherine. 1997. Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Belvakar, S. K. and Rangacharya B. Raddi, eds. 1920. Daṇḍin’s Kāvyādarśa. 
Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series No. 75. Bombay: Bombay Government 
Central Press. 
Bhalla, Madan Mohan. 1964. “In Search of Indian Theatre.” Diogenes 12: 37-48. 
Bhandarkar, Ramkrishna Gopal. 1914. Wilson Philological Lectures on Sanskrit and 
the Derived Languages. Bombay: Radhabhai Atmanam Sagoon. 
Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban, ed. 1991. The Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. Translated by 
Surendratnath Dasgupta. New Delhi: Council of Indian Philosophical Research. 
Biardeau, Madeleine. 1989. Hinduism: The Anthropology of a Civilization. 
Translated by Richard Nice. French Studies in South Asian Culture and Society 
III. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Bloomfield, Maurice. 1906. A Vedic Concordance. Harvard Oriental Series Vol.10. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. 
Bodewitz, H. W., tr. 1973. Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa I, 1-65: Translation and 
Commentary with a study Agnihotra and Prāṇāgnihotra. Orientalia Rheno-
Traectina, vol. 17. Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
Brereton, Joel P. 1990. “The Upanishads.” In Eastern Canons: Approaches to the 
Asian Classics. Edited by William Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, 115-135. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
———. 1991. “Cosmographic Images in the Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.” Indo-
Iranian Journal 34: 1-17. 
———. 1998. “Unsounded Speech: Problems in the Interpretation of BU(M) 1.5.10 
= BU(K) 1.5.3.” Indo-Iranian Journal 31: 1-10. 
———. 1999. “Edifying Puzzlement: R̥gveda 10.129 and the Uses of Enigma.” 
Journal of the American Oriental Society 119(2): 248-260. 
———. 2006. “The Composition of the Maitreyī Dialogue in the “Br̥hadāraṇyaka 
Upaniṣad.” Journal of the American Oriental Society 126(3): 323-345. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1998. The Two Sources of Indian Asceticism. 2nd ed. Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass. 
———. 2007. Greater Magadha: Studies in the Culture of Early India. Handbook of 
Oriental Studies, Vol. 19. Leiden, Boston: Brill. 
Bronner, Yigal, Whitney Cox, and Lawrence McCrea, eds. 2011. South Asian Texts 
in History: Critical Engagements with Sheldon Pollock. Asia Past and Present. 
New Research from AAS, No. 7. Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies. 
	   215	  
Bronner, Yigal, and Gary A. Tubb. 2008. “Blaming the Messenger: A Controversy 
in Late Sanskrit Poetics and its Implications.” Bulletin of SOAS 71: 75-91. 
Brough, John. 1996. “Sakāya Niruttiyā: Cauld kale het.” In Collected Papers. Edited 
by Minoru Hara and J. C. Wright, 35-42. London: School of Oriental and African 
Studies. 
Burchett, Patton E. 2008. “The ‘Magical’ Language of Mantra.” Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 76: 807-43. 
———. 2012. “My Miracle Trumps Your Magic: Encounters with Yogīs in Sufi and 
Bhakti Hagiographical Literature.” In Yoga Powers: Extraordinary Capacities 
Attained Through Meditation and Concentration. Edited by Knut A. Jacobsen, 
345-380. Leiden: Brill. 
Burns Coleman, Elizabeth, and Kevin White, eds. 2010. Medicine, Religion, and the 
Body. International Studies in Religion and Society, Vol. 11. Leiden: Brill. 
Burrow, T. 1955. The Sanskrit Language. The Great Languages. London: Faber and 
Faber. 
Cabezón, José Ignacio. 2008. “Buddhist Narratives of the Great Debates.” 
Argumentation 22: 71-92. 
Campanile, Enrico. 1977. Richerche di cultura poetica indoeuropea. Pisa: Giardini. 
Cardona, George. 1988. Pāṇini: His Work and Its Traditions. Vol. 1. Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass. 
———. 1990. “On Attitudes towards Language in Ancient India.” Sino-Platonic 
Papers 15: 1-19. 
Carpenter, David. 1994. “The Mastery of Speech: Canonicity and Control in the 
Vedas.” In Authority, Anxiety, and Canon: Essays in Vedic Interpretation. Edited 
by Laurie L. Patton, 19-34. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Cassirer, Ernst. 1955. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Vol. 1: Mystical Thought. 
Translated by Ralph Manheim. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Chari, V.K. 1990. Sanskrit Criticism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
Charsley, Simon. 1998. “Sanskritization: The Career of an Anthropological 
Theory.” Contributions to Indian Sociology 32 (2): 527-549. 
Clooney, Francis X. 1987. “Why the Veda has No Author: Language as Ritual in 
Early Mīmāṃsā and Post-Modern Theology.” Journal of the American Academy 
of Religion 55: 659-84. 
———. 1990. Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini. 
Publications of the De Nobili Research Library. Vienna: Sammlung De Nobili. 
———. 1996. Seeing through Texts: Doing Theology among the Śrīvaiṣṇavas of 
South India. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Clough, Bradley S. 2012. “The Cultivation of Yogic Powers in the Pāli Path 
Manuals of Theravāda Buddhism.” In Yoga Powers: Extraordinary Capacities 
Attained Through Meditation and Concentration. Edited by Knut A. Jacobsen, 77-
95. Leiden: Brill. 
	   216	  
Coakley, Sarah, ed. 1997. Religion and the Body. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Cohen, Signe. 2008. Text and Authority in the Older Upaniṣads. Brill’s Indological 
Library. Vol. 30. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill. 
Collins, Steven. 1982. Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravāda 
Buddhism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1998. Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
———. 2003. “What is Literature in Pali?” In Literary Cultures in History: 
Reconstructions from South Asia. Edited by Sheldon Pollock, 649-688. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Coomaraswamy, Ananda Kentish. 1980. Yakṣas. New Delhi: Munshiram 
Manoharlal. 
Cousins, L. S. 1983. “Pali Oral Literature.” In Buddhist Studies Ancient and Modern. 
Edited by Philip Denwood and Alexander Piatigorsky, 1-11. London and Dublin: 
Curzon Press Ltd. 
Coward, Harold. 1991. “The Meaning and Power of Mantras in Bhartr̥hari’s 
Vākyapadīya.” In Understanding Mantras. Edited by Harvey Alper, 165-176. 
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
Csordas, Thomas J., ed. 1994. Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Ground 
of Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2002. Body/Meaning/Healing. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Dallmayr, Fred. 1996. Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Damasio, Antonio. 2000. The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the 
Making of Consciousness. London: Vintage Books. 
Daniélou, Alain. 1995. Music and the Power of Sound: The Influence of Tuning and 
Interval on Consciousness. Rochester: Inner Traditions. 
Dasgupta, Surendranath. 1992. A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. 1. Great Britain: 
Cambridge University Press. 
DeCaroli, Robert. 2004. Haunting the Buddha: Indian Popular Religions and the 
Formation of Buddhism. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Deeg, Max. 1993. “Shamanism in the Veda: The Keśin-Hymn (10.136), the Journey 
to the Heaven of Vasiṣṭha (ṚV 7.88) and the Mahāvrata Ritual.” Nagoya Studies 
in Indian Culture and Buddhism. Saṃbhāṣā 14: 95-144. 
De Michelis, Elizabeth. 2004. A History of Modern Yoga: Patañjali and Western 
Esotericism. London: Continuum. 
Deshpande, Madhav. 1979. Sociolinguistic Attitudes in India: An Historical 
Reconstruction. Ann Arbor: Karoma Publishers. 
———. 1993. Sanskrit and Prakrit: Sociolinguistic Issues. MLBD Series in 
Linguistics Vol. 6. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
	   217	  
Deussen, Paul. 1899. Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie. Vol. 1, part 2, Die 
Philosophie der Upanishad’s. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. 
———. 1966. The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads. Translated by A. S. Geden. New 
York: Dover Publications. 
Deutsch, Eliot. 1985. “The Ontological Power of Speech.” Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy 12: 117-29. 
———. 1988. “Knowledge and the Tradition Text.” In Interpreting Across 
Boundaries. Edited by Gerald James Larson and Eliot Deutsch, 165-73. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
———. 1992. Creative Being: The Crafting of Person and World. Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press. 
Dev, Bhim, ed. 1980. Śāṅkhāyanāraṇyakam. Hoshiarpur: Vishveshvaranand Vedic 
Research Institute. 
Dirks, Nicholas. 2011. Foreword to South Asian Texts in History: Critical 
Engagements with Sheldon Pollock. Edited by Yigal Bronner, Whitney Cox, and 
Lawrence McCrea, xiii-xix. Asia Past and Present. New Research from AAS, No. 
7. Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies. 
Doniger, Wendy. 1997. “Medical and Mythical Constructions of the Body in Hindu 
Texts.” In Religion and the Body. Edited by Sarah Coakley, 167-184. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2009. The Hindus: An Alternative History. New York: The Penguin Press. 
Doniger O’Flaherty, Wendy, tr. 1981. The Rig Veda: An Anthology. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
———. 1984. Dreams, Illusions, and Other Realities. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
———. 1985. Tales of Sex and Violence: Folklore, Sacrifice, and Danger in the 
Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa.” 
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Dundas, Paul. 1998. “Becoming Gautama: Mantra and History in Śvetāmbara 
Jainism.” In Open Boundaries: Jain Communities and Cultures in Indian History. 
Edited by John E. Court. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Eck, Diana. 1993. Encountering God: A Spiritual Journey from Bozeman to Banaras. 
Boston: Beacon Press. 
Eggeling, Julius, tr. 1963. The Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa According to the Text of the 
Mādhyandina School. Part 2. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
Eliade, Mircea. 1958. Yoga: Immortality and Freedom. Translated by Willard R. 
Trask. New York: Pantheon Books. 
———. 1964. Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy. Translated by Willard R. 
Trask. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Elizarenkova, Tatyana J. 1995. Language and Style of the Vedic R ̥ṣis. Edited by 
Wendy Doniger. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
	   218	  
Farquhar, J. N. 1920. An Outline of the Religious Literature of India. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Fausbøll, Viggo, ed. 1896. Jātakatthavaṇṇanā. The Jātaka together with its 
Commentary Being Tales of the Anterior Births of Gotama Buddha. 6 vols. 
London: Kegan Paul Trench Trübner & Co. 
Feher, Michel, ed. 1989. Fragments for a History of the Human Body. Part One. New 
York: Zone. 
Fields, Gregory P. 2001. Religious Therapeutics: Body and Health in Yoga, 
Āyurveda, and Tantra. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Fiordalis, David V. 2012. “The Wondrous Display of Superhuman Power in the 
Vimalakīrtinirdeśa.” In Yoga Powers: Extraordinary Powers Attained through 
Meditation and Concentration. Edited by Knut A. Jacobsen, 97-125. Brill’s 
Indological Library. Vol. 37. Leiden and Boston: Brill. 
Fish, Stanley E. 1972. Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth-
Century Literature. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Flood, Gavin. 1999. Beyond Phenomenology: Rethinking the Study of Religion. 
London: Cassell. 
———. 2000. “The Purification of the Body.” In Tantra in Practice. Edited by 
David Gordon White, 509-520. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press. 
———. 2004. The Ascetic Self: Subjectivity, Memory, and Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2006. The Tantric Body: The Secret Tradition of Hindu Religion. London 
and New York: I. B. Tauris. 
———. 2009. “Body, Breath, and Representation in Śaiva Tantrism.” In The Body 
in India: Ritual, Transgression, Performativity. Edited by Axel Michaels and 
Christopher Wulf, 78-92. Paragarana. Internationale Zeitschrift für Historische 
Anthropologie. Band 18, heft 1. Berlin: Akademi Verlag. 
Foucault, Michel. 1970. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human 
Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Frauwallner, E. 1953. Geschichte der indischen Philosophie. Vol. 1. Salzburg: Otto 
Müller. 
Friedlander, Peter G. 2010. “The Body and the World in Buddhism.” In Medicine, 
Religion, and the Body. Edited by Elizabeth Burns Coleman and Kevin White, 51-
67. International Studies in Religion and Society, Vol. 11. Leiden: Brill. 
Fromkin, Victoria A., David Blair, and Peter Collins, eds. 1999. An Introduction to 
Language. 4th ed. Sydney: Harcourt Australia. 
Fynsk, Christopher. 1996. Language and Relation…That There is Language. 
California: Stanford University Press. 
Gachter, Othman. 1983. Hermeneutics and Language in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā: A Study in 
Śābara Bhāṣya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
	   219	  
Galewicz, Cesary. 2010. A Commentator in Service of the Empire: Sāyaṇa and the 
Royal Project of Commenting on the Whole of the Veda. Wien: Sammlung de 
Nobili. 
Ganeri, Jonardon. 2007. The Concealed Art of the Soul: Theories of Self and 
Practices of Truth in Indian Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
———. 1999. Semantic Powers: Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical 
Indian Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Gethin, Rupert. 1997. “Cosmology and Meditation: From the Aggañña-Sutta to the 
Mahāyāna.” History of Religions 36: 183-217. 
———. 2006. “Mythology as Meditation: From the Mahāsudassana Sutta to the 
Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra.” Journal of the Pali Text Society 28: 63-112. 
Geldner, Karl Friedrich. 1889. Vedische Studien. Vol. 1. Stuttgart. 
Gellner, David N. 2008. Review of The Language of the Gods in the World of Men: 
Sanskrit, Culture, and Power in Premodern India, by Sheldon Pollock. Journal of 
the American Anthropological Institute 14: 443-445. 
Geertz, Clifford. 1983. “From the Native’s Point of View: Anthropological 
Understanding.” In Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive 
Anthropology, 55-70. New York: Basic Books. 
Glucklich, Ariel. 1994. “The Sense of Adharma.” New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
———. 2005. “Magic in South Asia.” In The Encyclopedia of Religion, 2nd ed. 
Edited by Lindsay Jones, 5587-5592. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA. 
Gombrich, Richard. 1988. Theravada Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient 
Benares to Modern Colombo. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Gonda, Jan. 1950. Notes on Brahman. Utrecht: J. L. Beyers. 
———. 1955. “Reflections on Sarva- in Vedic Texts.” Indian Linguistics 16: 53-71. 
———. 1963. The Vision of the Vedic Poets. The Hague: Mouton. 
———. 1970. Notes on Names and the Name of God in Ancient India. Amsterdam: 
N. V. Noord- 
Hollandsche Uitgerers Maatschappij. 
———. 1975. A History of Indian Literature. Vol. 1, part 1, Vedic Literature 
(Saṃhitās and Brāhmaṇas).  Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. 
———. 1980. Vedic Ritual: The Non-Solemn Rites. Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
———. 1982. “The Popular Prajāpati.” History of Religions 22(2): 129-149. 
———. 1988. Mantra Interpretation in the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa. Orientalia Rheno-
Traiectina Vol. 32. Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
Gould, Rebecca. 2008. “How Newness Enters the World: The Methodology of 
Sheldon Pollock.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 
28: 533-559. 
Graham, William A. 1987. Beyond the Written Word: Oral Aspects of Scripture in 
the History of Religion. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
	   220	  
Griffiths, Arlo, and Jan. E. M. Houben, eds. 2004. The Vedas: Texts, Language, and 
Ritual. Proceedings of the Third International Vedic Workshop, Leiden 2002. 
Groningen Oriental Series Vol. 20. Groningen: Egbert Forsten. 
Gupta, Sanjukta, and Richard Gombrich. 1986. “Kings, Power and the Goddess.” 
South Asia Research 6: 123-188. 
Haas, George C. O., tr. 1962. The Daśarūpa: A Treatise on Hindu Dramaturgy. 
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
Habermas, Jürgen. 1971. Knowledge and Human Interests. Translated by Jeremy J. 
Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press. 
———. 1999. “From Kant to Hegel and Back Again – The Move Towards 
Detranscendentalization.” European Journal of Philosophy 7(2): 129-157. 
Halbfass, Wilhelm. 1988. India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding. Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
———. 1991. Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought. Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
———. 1992. On Being and What There Is: Classical Vaiśeṣika and the History of 
Indian Ontology. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Hall, David L., and Roger T. Ames. 1987. Thinking Through Confucius. Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
———. 1998. Thinking From the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese 
and Western Culture. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Hallisey, Charles. 1995. “Roads Taken and Not Taken in the Study of Theravāda 
Buddhism.” In Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under 
Colonialism. Edited by Donald S. Lopez, 31-61. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Halperin, Daniel. 1996. “A Delicate Science: A Critique of an Exclusively Emic 
Anthropology.” Anthropology and Humanism 21: 31-40. 
Hamilton, Sue. 2000. Early Buddhism: A New Approach. The I of the Beholder. 
Richmond: Curzon Press. 
Hancock, Mary. 1999. Womanhood in the Making: Domestic Ritual and Public 
Culture in Urban South India. Colorado: Westview Press. 
Hanneder, J. 2002. “On “The Death of Sanskrit.”” Indo-Iranian Journal 45: 293-
310. 
Harpham, Geoffrey Galt. 2002. Language Alone: The Critical Fetish of Modernity. 
London: Routledge. 
Hatcher, Brian A. 2007. “Sanskrit and the Morning After: The Metaphorics and 
Theory of Intellectual Change.” Indian Economic Social History Review 44: 333-
361. 
Heesterman, Jan C. 1981. “Veda and Society: Some Remarks apropos of the Film 
‘Altar of Fire.’” In Proceedings of the Nordic South Asia Conference. Helsinki, 
June 10-12, 1980. Edited by Asko Parpola. Helsinki: Studia Orientalia. 
	   221	  
———. 1984. “The Ritualist’s Problem.” In Amr ̥tadhārā. Professor R. N. Dandekar 
Felicitation Volume. Edited by S. D. Joshi. Delhi: Ajanta Books. 
———. 1985. The Inner Conflict of Tradition: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kingship, 
and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 1993. The Broken World of Sacrifice: An Essay in Ancient Indian Ritual. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 2005 [1987]. “Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas.” In Encyclopedia of Religion, 2nd 
ed. Edited by Lindsay Jones. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA. 
Hertel, Bradly R., and Cynthia Ann Humes, eds. 1993. Living Banaras: Hindu 
Religion in Cultural Context. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Hoffman, Frank J. 1992. “Evam Me Sutaṁ: Oral Tradition in Nikāya Buddhism.” In 
Texts in Context: Traditional Hermeneutics in South Asia. Edited by Jeffrey R. 
Timm, 195-219. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Holdrege, Barbara A. 1994. “Veda in the Brāhmaṇas: Cosmogonic Paradigms and 
the Delimitation of Canon.” In Authority, Anxiety, and Canon: Essays in Vedic 
Interpretation. Edited by Laurie L. Patton, 35-66. Albany: State University of 
New York Press. 
———. 1996. Veda and Torah: Transcending the Textuality of Scripture. Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
Hopkins, Thomas J. 1999. “Some Reflections on Hinduism.” Unpublished 
manuscript. 
Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno. 1972. Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
Translated by John Cumming. New York: The Seabury Press. 
Houben, Jan E. M., tr. 1991. The Pravargya Brāhmaṇa of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka: 
An Ancient Commentary on the Pravargya Ritual. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
———. 1997. “The Sanskrit Tradition.” Part Two in The Emergence of Semantics in 
Four Linguistic Traditions: Hebrew, Sanskrit, Greek, Arabic. Wout van Bekkum, 
Jan Houben, Ineke Sluiter, and Kees Versteegh, 49-145. Amsterdam Studies in 
the Theory and History of Linguistic Science. Series 3, Studies in the History of 
the Language Sciences, Vol. 82. Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company. 
———. 2002. “The Brahmin Intellectual: History, Ritual, and “Time Out of Time.”” 
Journal of Indian Philosophy 33: 463-479. 
———. 2004. “Memetics of the Vedic Ritual, Morphology of the Agniṣṭoma.” In 
The Vedas: Texts, Language, and Ritual. Edited by Arlo Griffiths and Jan E. M. 
Houben, 385-415. Proceedings of the Third International Vedic Workshop, 
Leiden 2002. Groningen Oriental Series Vol. 20. Groningen: Egbert Forsten. 
Humphrey, Caroline, and James Laidlaw. 1994. The Archetypal Actions of Ritual: A 
Theory of Ritual Illustrated by the Jain Rite of Worship. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Jamison, Stephanie W. 1986. “Brāhmaṇa Syllable Counting, Vedic tvác ‘skin,’ and 
the Sanskrit Expression for the Canonical Creature.” Indo-Iranian Journal 2: 161-
181. 
	   222	  
———. 1991. The Ravenous Hyenas and The Wounded Sun: Myth and Ritual in 
Ancient India. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
———. 1996. Sacrificed Wife/Sacrificer’s Wife: Women, Ritual, and Hospitality in 
Ancient India. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 ———. 2007. The R ̥gveda Between Two Worlds [Le R ̥gveda Entre Deux Mondes: 
Quatre conférences au Collège de France en mai 2004]. Publications de l’Institut 
de Civilisation Indienne Série 8, fasc. 74. Paris: Collège de France. 
———. 2011. “The Secret Lives of Texts.” Journal of the American Oriental Society 
131 (1): 1-7. 
Jamison, Stephanie W., and Joel P. Brereton, trs. 2014. The Rigveda: The Earliest 
Religious Poetry of India. 3 Vols. The University of Texas, South Asia Research. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Jamison, S. W., and Michael Witzel. 1992. Vedic Hinduism. Privately distributed by 
authors. 
Jha, Ganganath. 1911. The Prabhākara School of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. Allahabad 
University. 
———, tr. 1916. The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini. Chapters I-III. Sacred 
Books of the Hindus, Vol. 10. Allahabad: The Pāṇini Office. 
Jhala, G. C., ed. 1966. The Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa. Vol. 5. The Sundarakāṇḍa. Oriental 
Institute of Baroda. Baroda: The Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda Press. 
Josi, Ganesasastri Ambadasa, ed. 1971-80. Mīmāṃsādarśana. Mīmāṃsāsūtra with 
the Mīmāṃsābhāṣya of Śabara and the Tantravārttika, Tuptika, and Ślokavārttika 
of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. 7 vols. Poona: Ānandāśrama. 
Jurewicz, Joanna. 2000. “Playing with Fire: The Pratītyasamutpāda from the 
Perspective of Vedic Thought.” Journal of the Pali Text Society 26: 77-103. 
Kaelber, Walter O. 1981. Tapta Mārga: Asceticism and Initiation in Vedic India. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Kasulis, Thomas P., Roger T. Ames, and Wimal Dissanayake, eds. 1993. Self as 
Body in Asian Theory and Practice. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Katz, Steven T. 2013. Mysticism and the Interpretation of Sacred Scripture. Oxford 
Scholarship Online. 
Kaviraj, Sudipta. 2005. “The Sudden Death of Sanskrit Knowledge.” Journal of 
Indian Philosophy 33: 119-142. 
Keith, Arthur Berridale,  tr. 1908. The Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka with an Appendix on 
the Mahavrata. Oriental Translation Fund New Series, vol. 18. London: Royal 
Asiatic Society. 
———, tr. 1909. The Aitareya Āraṇyaka. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
———, tr.1919. Rigveda Brahmanas: The Aitareya and Kauṣītaki Brāhmanas of the 
Rigveda. New York: Gordon Press. 
———. 1925. The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upaniṣads. 2 Vols. 
Harvard Oriental Series. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
	   223	  
Kielhorn, Franz, ed. 1962. The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. Revised edition 
by Kashinath Vasudeva Abhyankar. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research 
Institute. 
King, Robert D. 2008. “Language Politics and Conflicts in South Asia.” In 
Language in South Asia. Edited by Braj B. Kachru, Yamuna Kachru, and S. N. 
Sridhar, 311-24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Knipe, David M. 1972. “One Fire, Three Fires, Five Fires: Vedic Symbols in 
Transition.” History of Religions 12: 28-41. 
———. 1975. In the Image of Fire: Vedic Experiences of Heat. Motilal Banarsidass: 
Delhi. 
———. 2005. “Rivalries Inside Out: Personal History and Possession Ritualism in 
Coastal Andhra.” Indian Folklore Research Journal 2 (5): 1-33. 
Koller, John M. 1993. “Human Embodiment: Indian Perspectives.” In Self as Body 
in Asian Theory and Practice. Edited by Thomas P. Kasulis, Roger T. Ames, and 
Wimal Dissanayake, 45-58. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Kristeva, Julia. 1989. Language the Unknown: An Initiation into Linguistics. 
Translated by Anne M. Menke. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Kubisch, Philipp. 2012. Paippalāda-Saṃhitā Kāṇḍa 20, Sūkta 1-30: Kritische 
Edition, Übersetzung, Kommentar. PhD dissertation submitted to Rheinischen 
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn [http://www.hss.ulb.uni-
bonn.de/2012/3064/3064.pdf]. 
Kulke, Hermann, and Dietmar Rothermund. 1998. A History of India. 3rd ed. 
London: Routledge. 
Kuriyama, Shigehisa. 1999. The Expressiveness of the Body and the Divergence of 
Greek and Chinese Medicine. New York: Zone Books. 
Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1999. Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied 
Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought. New York: Basic Books. 
Lal Sandal, Pandit Mohan, tr. 1923-25. The Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini. Chapters I-
XII. Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. 27. Allahabad: The Pāṇini Office. 
Lannoy, Richard. 1971. The Speaking Tree: A Study of Indian Culture and Society. 
London: Oxford University Press. 
La Porta, Sergio and David Shulman, eds. 2007. The Poetics of Grammar and the 
Metaphysics of Sound and Sign. Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture. 
Volume Six. Leiden and Boston: Brill. 
Larson, Gerald J. 1974. “The Sources for Śakti in Abhinavagupta’s Kāśmīr Śaivism: 
A Linguistic and Aesthetic Category.” Philosophy East and West 24 (1): 41-56. 
Laycock, Steven W. 1999. Mind as Mirror and the Mirroring of Mind: Buddhist 
Reflections on Western Phenomenology. Albany: State University of New York 
Press. 
Lévi, Sylvain. 1966. La Doctrine du Sacrifice dans les Brâhmaṇas. 2nd ed. Reprinted 
with preface by Louis Renou. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
	   224	  
Levman, Bryan. 2008-2009. “Sakāya niruttiyā Revisited.” Bulletin d’Études 
indiennes 26-27: 33-51. 
Lewis, Mark Edward. 2006. The Construction of Space in Early China. Albany: 
State University of New  York Press. 
Lipner, Julius. 1994. Hindus: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Lopez, Donald S., ed. 1995. Curators of the Buddha: The Story of Buddhism under 
Colonialism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Lubin, Timothy. 2010. “Brāhmaṇa as Commentary.” In Forms and Uses of 
Commentary in the Indian World. Edited by François Grimal and Nicholas 
Dejenne, np. Prepublication proofs. Pondicherry: Institut français de Pondichéry 
[http://home.wlu.edu/~lubint/texts/lubin2010commentary.pdf]. 
Lutgendorf, Philip. 1991. The Life of a Text: Performing the Rāmcaritmānas of 
Tulsidās. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
———. 1997. “Imagining Ayodhyā: Utopia and Its Shadows in a Hindu 
Landscape.” International Journal of Hindu Studies 1 (1): 19-54. 
Macdonald, K. S. 1901. The Brahmanas of the Vedas. Sacred Books of the East 
Examined and Described. London and Madras: The Christian Literature Society 
for India. 
Macdonell, Arthur Anthony. 1900. A History of Sanskrit Literature. London: 
William Heinemann. 
———. 1910. Vedic Grammar. Strassburg: Verlag von Karl J. Trübner. 
Mahoney, William K. 1998. The Artful Universe: An Introduction to the Vedic 
Religious Imagination. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Malamoud, Charles, tr. 1977. Le Svādhyāya: Récitation personelle du Veda. 
Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka. Paris: Livre II. 
———. 1989. “Indian Speculations about the Sex of the Sacrifice.” In Fragments 
for a History of the Human Body. Part One. Edited by Michel Feher with Ramona 
Naddaff and Nadia Tazi, 75-103. New York: Zone. 
———. 1996. Cooking the World: Ritual and Thought in Ancient India. Translated 
by David White. French Studies in South Asian Culture and Society. Delhi: 
Oxford University Press. 
———. 2002. “A Body Made of Words and Poetic Meters.” In Self and Self-
Transformation in the History of Religions. Edited by David Shulman and Guy G. 
Stroumsa, 19-28. New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2004. “A Note on abīṣṭaka.” In The Vedas: Texts, Language, and Ritual. 
Edited by Arlo Griffiths and Jan E. M. Houben, 449-455. Proceedings of the 
Third International Vedic Workshop, Leiden 2002. Groningen Oriental Series 
Vol. 20. Groningen: Egbert Forsten. 
Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1964. Coral Gardens and Their Magic. Vol. 2. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
	   225	  
Marriott, McKim. 1976. “Hindu Transactions: Diversity Without Dualism.” In 
Transaction and Meaning: Directions in the Anthropology of Exchange and 
Symbolic Behavior. Edited by Bruce Kapferer, 109-142. Philadelphia: Institute for 
the Study of Human Issues. 
Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 2002. “The Ineffable.” In Mind, Language and World: The 
Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal. Edited by Jonardon Ganeri, 65-71. 
New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Maturana, Humberto R., and Francisco J. Varela. 1992. The Tree of Knowledge: The 
Biological Roots of Human Understanding. Translated by Robert Paolucci. 
Boston and London: Shambhala. 
Mauss, Marcel. 2001. A General Theory of Magic. Translated by Robert Brain. New 
York: W. W. Norton. 
McCarthy, Michael. 2007. “‘We Are Your Books’: Augustine, the Bible, and the 
Practice of Authority.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 75: 324-52. 
McCrea, Lawrence. 2011. “Standards and Practices: Following, Making, and 
Breaking the Rules of Śāstra.” In South Asian Texts in History: Critical 
Engagements with Sheldon Pollock. Edited by Yigal Bronner, Whitney Cox, and 
Lawrence McCrea, 229-44. Asia Past and Present. New Research from AAS, No. 
7. Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2010. The Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by 
Colin Smith. London and New York: Routledge. 
Michaels, Axel, and Christopher Wulf. 2009. The Body in India: Ritual, 
Transgression, Performativity. Paragarana. Internationale Zeitschrift für 
Historische Anthropologie. Band 18, heft 1. Berlin: Akademi Verlag. 
Miller, Jeanine. 1974. The Vedas: Harmony, Meditation, and Fulfillment. London: 
Rider and Company. 
Mitra, Rājendralāla, ed. 1872. The Taittirīya Āraṇyaka of the Black Yajur Veda, with 
the Commentary of Sāyanācharya. Bibliotheca Indica, n.s. Calcutta: Baptist 
Mission Press. 
Morley, James. 2001. “Inspiration and Expiration: Yoga Practice through Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology of the Body.” Philosophy East and West 51: 73-82. 
Morris, Richard and Edmond Harvyey, eds. 1888. The Aṅguttara-nikāya. Vol. 1. 
Pāli Text Society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Müller, F. Max. 1860. A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature. 2nd ed. London: 
Williams and Norgate. 
———. 1869. Rig-Veda-Pratisakhya, das älteste Lehrbuch der vedischen Phonetik. 
Sanskrittext mit Übersetzung und Anmerkungen. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. 
———. 2004. The Hibbert Lectures: Lectures on the Origin and growth of Religion, 
as Illustrated by the Religion of India. 1878. n.l.: Kessinger Publishing. 
Ñāṇamoli, Bhikkhu, tr. and Bhikkhu Bodhi, ed. 2009. The Middle Length Discourses 
of the Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikaya. Boston: Wisdom 
Publications. 
	   226	  
Núñez, Raphael E. 1997. “Eating Soup with Chopsticks: Dogmas, Difficulties and 
Alternatives in the Study of Conscious Experience.” Journal of Consciousness 
Studies 4: 134-66. 
Nussbaum, Martha. 1990. Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. 
New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2001. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2007. The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence, and India’s 
Future. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press. 
Oertel, Hanns. 1899. Review of La doctrine du sacrifice dans les Brâhmaṇas by 
Sylain Lévi. American Journal of Philology 20: 444-447. 
Oldenburg, H., ed. 1879-1883. The Vinaya Piṭakam. 5 vols. The Pāli Text Society. 
London: Williams and Norgate. 
———, tr. 1892. The Grihya-sūtras: Rules of Vedic Domestic Ceremonies. Part 2. 
Sacred Books of the East, vol. 30. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 
———. 1888. Die Hymnen des Rigveda. 1. Teil: Metrische und Textgeschichtliche 
Prolegomena. Berlin: Hertz. 
———. 1919. Vorwissenschatfliche Wissenschaft: Die Weltanschauung der 
Brāhmaṇa-texte. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. 
———. 1962. Ancient India: Its Language and Religions. 2nd ed. Calcutta: Punthi 
Pustak. 
———. 1991. The Doctrine of the Upaniṣads and the Early Buddhism (Die Lehre 
der Upanishaden Und die Anfänge des Buddhismus). Translated by Shridhar B. 
Shrotri. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
Olivelle, Patrick. 1993. The Āśrama System: The History and Hermeneutics of a 
Religious Institution. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. 1996. “Dharmaskandhāḥ and Brahmasaṃsthaḥ: A Study of Chāndogya 
Upaniṣad 2.23.1.” Journal of the American Oriental Society 116: 205-19. 
———, tr. 1998. The Early Upaniṣads: Annotated Text and Translation. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
———. 1999. “Young Śvetaketu: A Literary Study of an Upaniṣadic Story.” 
Journal of the American Oriental Society 119 (1): 46-70. 
———. 2003. “The Renouncer Tradition.” In The Blackwell Companion to 
Hinduism. Edited by Gavin Flood, 271-87. Oxford: Blackwell. 
———. 2006. “When Texts Conceal: Why Vedic Recitation is Forbidden at Certain 
Times and Places.” Presidential Address. Journal of the American Association of 
Oriental Studies 126 (3): 305-322. 
———. 2011. Ascetics and Brahmins: Studies in Ideologies and Institutions. 
Cultural, Historical and Textual Studies of Religions. London: Anthem Press. 
Ong, Walter J. 1967. The Presence of the Word: Some Prologmena for Cultural and 
Religious History. The Terry Lectures. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
	   227	  
———. 1982. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Ortega y Gasset, José. 1957. Man and People [El Hombre y La Gente]. Translated 
by Willard R. Trask. New York: Norton. 
Padoux, André. 1990. Vāc: The Concept of the Word in Selected Hindu Tantras. 
Translated by Jacques Gontier. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Parpola, Asko. 1979. “On the Symbol Concept of the Vedic Ritualists.” In Religious 
Symbols and Their Functions. Edited by H. Biezais, 139-53. Stockhold: Almquist 
and Wiskell. 
Patel, Aniruddh D. 2008. Music, Language, and the Brain. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Pāṭhak, Śrīdhar Śāstrī, ed. 1922. Śāṅkhāyanāraṇyakam. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit 
Series 90. Puṇe: Ānandāśrama. 
Patton, Laurie L. 1990. “Hymn to Vāc: Myth or Philosophy?” In Myth and 
Philosophy. Edited by Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy, 183-213. Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
———. 1994. “Poets and Fishes: Modern Indian Interpretations of the Vedic Rishi.” 
In Authority, Anxiety, and Canon: Essays in Vedic Interpretation. Edited by 
Laurie L. Patton, 281-307. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
———. 1996. Myth as Argument: The Br̥haddevatā as Canonical Commentary. 
Berlin and New York: De Gruyter. 
———. 2000. “Viniyogavijñāna: The Uses of Poetry in Vedic Ritual.” International 
Journal of Hindu Studies 4: 237-60. 
———. 2005. Bringing the Gods to Mind: Mantra and Ritual in Early Indian 
Sacrifice. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Phaḍke, Bābāśāstrī, ed. 1898. Aitareyāraṇyakam. 
Śrimatsāyaṇācaryaviracitabhāṣyasametam. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 38. 
Puṇe: Ānandāśrama.  
Pinch, William R. 1996. Peasants and Monks in British India. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
———. 2006. Warrior Ascetics and Indian Empires. New York, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Pollock, Sheldon. 1985. “The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory in 
Indian Intellectual History.” Journal of the American Oriental Society 105: 499-
519. 
———. 1989. “Mīmāṃsā and the Problem of History in Traditional India.” Journal 
of the American Oriental Society 10: 603-10. 
———. 1990. “From Discourse of Ritual to Discourse of Power in Sanskrit 
Culture.” Journal of Ritual Studies 4: 315-45. 
———. 1993a. “Deep Orientalism? Notes on Sanskrit and Power Beyond the Raj.” 
In Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament. Edited by Carol A. 
	   228	  
Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, 76-133. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
———. 1993b. “Rāmāyaṇa and Political Imagination in India.” Journal of Asian 
Studies 52 (2): 261-297. 
———. 1996. “The Sanskrit Cosmopolis, 300-1300: Transculturation, 
Vernacularization, and the Question of Ideology.” In Ideology and Status of 
Sanskrit: Contributions to the History of the Sanskrit Language. Edited by J. E. M. 
Houben, 197-247. Leiden: Brill. 
———. 2001a. “The Death of Sanskrit.” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, International Quarterly 43: 392-426. 
———. 2001b. “The Social Aesthetic and Sanskrit Literary Theory.” Journal of 
Indian Philosophy 29: 197-229. 
———. 2003. “Sanskrit Literary Culture from the Inside Out.” In Literary Cultures 
in History: Reconstructions from South Asia. Edited by Sheldon Pollock, 39-130. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
———. 2005. The Ends of Man at the End of Premodernity. Twelfth Gonda Lecture, 
held 3rd December  2004. Amsterdam: Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences. 
———. 2006. The Language of the Gods in the World of Men: Sanskrit, Culture, and 
Power in Premodern India. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Potter, Karl. 1988. “Metaphor as a Key to Understanding the Thought of Other 
Speech Communities.” In Interpreting Across Boundaries. Edited by Gerald 
James Larson and Eliot Deutsch, 19-35. New Jersey: Princeton Press. 
Proudfoot, Wayne. 1985. Religious Experience. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Radhakrishnan, S., tr. 1960. The Brahma Sūtra. The Philosophy of Spiritual Life. 
London: George Allen & Unwin. 
Ram, Kalpana. 2013. Fertile Disorder: Spirit Disorder and its Provocation of the 
Modern. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i. 
Rama Sastri, C. Sankara, ed. 1956. Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha. Paricchedas 1 to 6 
with Translation and Notes on Paricchedas 1 to 3. Mylapore: Sri Balamanorama 
Press. 
Rao, Narayana Velcheru, David Shulman, and Sanjay Subrabrahmanyam. 2007. “A 
Pragmatic Response” in “Forum: Textures of Time.” Special Issue of History and 
Theory 46: 409-427.  
Renou, Louis. 1955. Études Védiques et Pāṇinéennes I. Paris: E. de Boccard. 
———. 1956. Histoire de la langue sanskrite. Les Langues du Monde 10. Lyon: 
IAC. 
———. 1960. “Le destin du Veda dans l’Inde.” Études védiques et pāṇinéennes. 
Vol. 6. Paris: E. de Boccard. 
———. 1978. “La valeur du silence dans le culte védique.” In L’Inde fondamentals. 
Études d’indianisme reunites et présentées par Ch. Malamoud. Edited by Louis 
Renou, 66-80. Paris: Hermann. 
	   229	  
Robinet, Isabelle. 1993. Taoist Meditation: The Mao-Shan Tradition of Great Purity. 
Translated by Julian F. Pas and Norman J. Girardot. Albany: State University of 
New York Press. 
Roy, Arundhati. 2009. “Into the Inferno.” The NS Essay, 20th July 2009. The New 
Statesman: 34-39. 
Salomon, Richard. 1998. Indian Epigraphy. New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Samuel, Geoffrey. 2008. The Origins of Yoga and Tantra: Indic Religions to the 
Thirteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 ———. 2010. “Possession and Self-Possession: Towards an Integrated Mind-Body 
Perspective.” In Spirit Possession and Trance: New Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives. Edited by Bettina E. Schmidt and Lucy Huskinson, 35-52. London 
and New York: Continuum International. 
Sanderson, Alexis. 1985. “Purity and Power among the Brahmans of Kashmir.” In 
The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History. Edited by 
Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins and Steven Lukes, 190-216. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sandess, Adéla. 2010. “‘In the Footprint of Il̥ā’: An Early Image of Sacrificial 
Cosmology in Vedic Tradition.” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 39: 509-
21. 
Sarbacker, Stuart Ray. 2012. “Power and Meaning in the Yogasūtra of Patañjali.” In 
Yoga Powers: Extraordinary Capacities Attained Through Meditation and 
Concentration. Edited by Knut A. Jacobsen, 195-222. Leiden: Brill. 
Śāstri, Chinnaswami, ed. 1984. The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa of the White Yajurveda in 
the Mādhyandina Recension. Kashi Sanskrit Series 127. Second ed. Varanasi: 
Chaukhambha Sanskrit Sansthan. 
Sawhney, Simona. 2009. The Modernity of Sanskrit. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Schilling, C. 1993. The Body and Social Theory. London: Sage. 
Sells, Michael A. 1994. Mystical Languages of Unsaying. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press. 
Sharf, Robert H. 1998. “Experience.” Chap. 5 in Critical Terms for Religious 
Studies. Edited by Mark C. Taylor, 94-116. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2012. “Steps Entailed in Foregrounding the Background: 
Taking the Challenge of Languaging Experience Seriously.” In Knowing Without 
Thinking: Mind, Action, Cognition, and the Phenomenon of the Background. 
Edited by Zdravko Radman, 187-205. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Shulman, David. 1993. The Hungry God: Hindu Tales of Filicide and Devotion. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
	   230	  
———. 2001a. “Bhavabhūti on Cruelty and Compassion.” In Questioning 
Ramayanas: A South Asian Tradition. Edited by Paula Richman, 49-82. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
———. 2001b. “First Grammarian, First Poet: A South Indian Vision of Cultural 
Origins.” Indian Economic Social History Review 38: 353-373. 
———. 2002. “Tirukkovaiyār: Downstream into God.” In Self and Self-
Transformation in the History of Religions. Edited by David Shulman and Guy G. 
Stroumsa, 131-49. New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2012. More Than Real: A History of the Imagination in South India. 
London: Harvard University Press. 
Shulman, David, and Guy G. Stroumsa, eds. 2002. Self and Self-Transformation in 
the History of Religions. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Sikka, Sonia. 2012. “The Perils of Indian Secularism.” Constellations 19 (2): 288-
304. 
Silburn, Lilian. 1955. Instant et cause: Le Discontinu dans le pensée philosophique 
de l’Inde. Paris: Libraire philosophique J. Vrin. 
Silk, Jonathan A. 2002. “What, if anything, is Mahāyāna Buddhism? Problems of 
Definitions and Classifications.” Numen 49: 355-406. 
———. 2003. “The Fruits of Paradox: On the Religious Architecture of the 
Buddha’s Life Story.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 71: 863-81. 
Singleton, Mark. 2010. Yoga Body: The Origins of Modern Posture Practice. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Skorupski, John. 1976. Symbol and Theory: A Philosophical Study of Theories of 
Religion in Social Anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Slaje, Walter. 2007. “Yājñavalkya: Brāhmaṇas and the Early Mīmāṃsā.” In 
Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta: Interaction and Continuity. Edited by Johannes 
Bronkhorst, 115-138. Papers of the 12th World Sanskrit Conference. Vol. 10.3. 
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
Smith, Brian K. 1985. “Sacrifice and Being: Prajāpati’s Cosmic Emission and Its 
Consequences.” Numen 32 (1): 71-87. 
———. 1994. Classifying the Universe: The Ancient Indian Varṇa System and the 
Origins of Caste. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. 1998. Reflections on Resemblance, Ritual, and Religion. Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass. 
Smith, Frederick M. 2006a. The Self Possessed: Deity and Spirit Possession in South 
Asian Literature and Civilization. New York: Columbia University Press. 
———. 2006b. Review of Literary Cultures in History: Reconstructions from South 
Asia, edited by Sheldon Pollock. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 74 
(4): 1030-1034. 
Srinivas, M. N. 2002. Collected Essays. New Delhi: Oxford University Publications. 
Staal, Frits. 1979a. “The Meaninglessness of Ritual.” Numen 26: 2-22. 
	   231	  
———. 1979b. “Ritual Syntax.” In Sanskrit and Indian Studies: Essays in Honor of 
Daniel H. H. Ingalls. Edited by M. Nagatomi, Bimal K. Matilal, J. Moussaief 
Masson, and E. Dimock, 119-42. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 
———.1983. Agni: The Vedic Ritual of the Fire Altar. Vol. 1. In collaboration with 
C. V. Somayajipad and M. Itti Ravi Nambudiri. Berkeley: Asian Humanities 
Press. 
———. 1991. “Vedic Mantras.” In Understanding Mantras. Edited by Harvey P. 
Alper, 48-95. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
———. 1993. “Indian Bodies.” In Self as Body in Asian Theory and Practice. Edited 
by Thomas P. Kasulis, Roger T. Ames, and Wimal Dissanayake, 59-102. Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
———. 1996. Ritual and Mantras: Rules Without Meaning. Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass. 
———. 2007. “Artificial Languages Between Innate Faculties.” Journal of Indian 
Philosophy 35: 577-596. 
———. 2008. Discovering the Vedas: Origins, Mantras, Rituals, Insights. New 
Delhi: Penguin Books. 
Streng, Frederick J. 1978. “Language and Mystical Awareness.” In Mysticism and 
Philosophical Analysis. Edited by Steven T. Katz, 141-69. London: Sheldon 
Press. 
Styers, Randall. 2004. Making Magic: Religion, Magic and Science in the Modern 
World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sundar, Nandini. 2004. “Teaching to Hate: The RSS’ Pedalogical Programme.” 
Economic and Political Weekly 39 (16): 1605-1612. 
Taylor, Charles. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Thite, G. U. 1975. Sacrifice in the Brāhmaṇa-Texts. Poona: University of Poona. 
Thompson, George. 1995. “The Pursuit of Hidden Tracks in Vedic.” Indo-Iranian 
Journal 38: 1-30. 
———. 1997a. “Ahaṃkāra and Ātmastuti: Self-Assertion and Impersonation in the 
R̥gveda.” History of Religions 37(2): 141-71. 
———. 1997b. “The Brahmodya and Vedic Discourse.” Journal of the American 
Oriental Society 117(1): 13-37. 
———. 1997c. “On Mantras and Frits Staal.” In India and Beyond: Aspects of 
Literature, Meaning, Ritual and Thought. Essays in Honour of Frits Staal. Edited 
by Dick van der Meij, 574-597. International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden 
and Amsterdam. London and New York: Kegan Paul International. 
———. 1998. “On Truth-Acts in Vedic.” Indo-Iranian Journal 41: 125-53. 
Thompson, John B. 1981. Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul 
Ricoeur and Jürgen  Habermas. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Tilak, Shrinivas. 1994. “The Mīmāṃsā Theory of Text Interpretation.” In 
Hermeneutical Paths to the Sacred Worlds of India: Essays in Honor of Robert W. 
	   232	  
Stevenson. Edited by Katherine K. Young, 138-59. McGill Studies in Religion 
Vol. 1. Atlanta: Scholars Press. 
Tillich, Paul. 1951. Systematic Theology. Vol. 1. Reason and Revelation, Being and 
God. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
———. 1955. Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality. James W. 
Richard Lectures in the Christian Religion 1951-52. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Treitler, Leo. 1993. “Reflection on the Communication of Affect and Idea through 
Music.” In Psychoanalytic Explorations in Music. Second Series. Edited by S. 
Feder, R. Karmel, and G. Pollock, 43-62. Madison: International Universities 
Press. 
Trenckner, V. and Robert Chalmers, eds. 1888-1902. The Majjhima Nikāya. 3 vols. 
London: Pāli Text Society. 
Tull, Herman W. 1989. The Vedic Origins of Karma: Cosmos as Man in Ancient 
Indian Myth and Ritual. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
———. 1991. “F. Max Müller and A. B. Keith: “Twaddle”, the “Stupid” Myth, and 
the Disease of Indology.” Numen 38 (1): 27-58. 
Turner, Bryan S. 1997. “The Body in Western Society: Social Theory and its 
Perspectives.” In Religion and the Body. Edited by Sarah Coakley, 15-41. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tu Wei-ming. 1972. “Li as a Process of Humanization.” On Dharma and Li. 
Philosophy East and West 22 (2): 187-201. 
———. 1973. “Subjectivity and Ontological Reality: An Interpretation of Wang 
Yang-ming’s Mode of Thinking.” Proceedings of East-West Philosopher’s 
Conference on Wang Yang-ming. Philosophy East and West 23 (1-2): 187-205. 
_______. 1994. “Embodying the Universe: A Note on Confucian Self-Realization.” 
In Self as Person in Asian Theory and Practice. Edited by Roger T. Ames, Wimal 
Dissanayake and Thomas P. Kasulis, 177-86. Albany: State University of New 
York Press. 
Varela, Francisco J., Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch. 1991. The Embodied 
Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press. 
Varga, Ivan. 2005. “The Body – The New Sacred? The Body in Hypermodernity.” 
Current Sociology 53: 209-235. 
Van de Walle, Lieve. 1993. Pragmatics and Classical Sanskrit: A Pilot Study in 
Grammatical Politeness. The Netherlands: John Benjamin Publishing Co. 
Van Nooten, Barend A. and Gary B. Holland, eds. 1994. The Rig Veda: A Metrically 
Restored Text with an Introduction and Notes. Harvard Oriental Series 50. 
Cambridge, MA: Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University 
Press. 
Verpooten, Jean-Marie. 1977. “Unité et distinction dans les speculations rituelles 
védique.” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 21: 59-85. 
	   233	  
Visweswaran, Kamala, Michael Witzel, Nandini Manjrekar, Dipta Bhog, and Uma 
Chakravati. 2009. “The Hindutva View of History: Rewriting Textbooks in 
India.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 10 (1): 101-112. 
Watkins, Calvert. 1995. How to Kill a Dragon: Aspects of Indo-European Poetics. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Whicher, Ian. 1998a. The Integrity of the Yoga Darśana: A Reconsideration of 
Classical Yoga. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
_______. 1998b. “Yoga and Freedom: A Reconsideration of Patañjali’s Classical 
Yoga.” Philosophy East and West 48 (2): 272-322. 
 White, David Gordon. 1991. Myths of the Dog-Man. Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
———.1996. The Alchemical Body: Siddha Traditions in Medieval India. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
———. 2003. Kiss of the Yoginī: “Tantric Sex” in its South Asian Contexts. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 2006. “‘Open’ and ‘Closed’ Models of the Human Body in Indian Medical 
and Yogic Traditions.” Asian Medicine: Tradition and Modernity 2: 1-13. 
———. 2009. Sinister Yogis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 2012. “How Big Can Yogis Get? How Much Can Yogis See?” In Yoga 
Powers: Extraordinary Capacities Attained Through Meditation and 
Concentration. Edited by Knut A. Jacobsen, 60-76. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill. 
Whitney, W. D. 1882. “Eggeling’s Translation of the Çatapatha Brāhmaṇa.” 
American Journal of Philology 3: 391-98. 
Wiley, Kristi L. 2012. “Supernatural Powers and their Attainment in Jainism.” In 
Yoga Powers: Extraordinary Capacities Attained Through Meditation and 
Concentration. Edited by Knut A. Jacobsen, 145-194. Leiden: Brill. 
Wittgenstein, L. 1922. Tractatus Logic-Philosophicus. Translated by D. F. Pears and 
B. F. McGuinness. London: Kegan Paul. 
Witzel, Michael. 1979. “On Magical Thought in the Veda.” Leiden: Universitaire 
Pers Leiden. 
———. 1989. “Tracing the Vedic Dialects.” In Dialects dans litteratures indo-
aryennes. Edited by Colette Caillat, 97-264. Paris: College de France, Institut de 
Civilisation Indienne. 
———. 1996. “How to Enter the Vedic Mind? Strategies in Translating a Brāhmaṇa 
Text.” In Translating, Translations, and Translators: From India to the West. 
Edited by E. Garzilli. Harvard Oriental Series. Opera Minora I. Cambridge, MA: 
Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University Press. 
———. 1997a. “The Development of the Vedic Canon and its Schools: The Social 
and Political Milieu. (Materials on Vedic Śākhas, 8).” In Inside the Texts, Beyond 
the Texts: New Approaches to the Study of the Vedas. Edited by Michael Witzel, 
257-345. Harvard Oriental Series. Opera Minora 2. Cambridge, MA: Department 
of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University. 
	   234	  
———. 1997b. “Early Sanskritization: Origins and Development of the Kuru State.” 
In Recht, Staat und Verwaltung im klassichen Indian [The State, the Law, and 
Administration in Classical India]. Edited by Bernhard Kölver, 27-52. Schriften 
des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien 30. München: R. Oldenbourg. 
———. 2004. Kaṭha Āraṇyaka: Critical Edition with a Translation into German and 
an Introduction. Harvard Oriental Series 65. Cambridge, MA: Department of 
Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University Press. 
Yocum, Glenn E. 1973. “Shrines, Shamanism, and Love Poetry: Elements in the 
Emergence of Popular Tamil Bhakti.” Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion 41 (1): 3-17. 
Yuasa Yasuo. 1987. The Body: Towards an Eastern Mind-Body Theory. Edited by 
Thomas P. Kasulis. Translated by Nagatomo Shigenori and Thomas P. Kasulis. 
SUNY Series in Buddhist Studies. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Zarrilli, Phillip B. 1998. When the Body Becomes All Eyes: Paradigms, Discourses, 
and Practices of Power in Kalarippayattu, a South Indian Martial Art. Delhi and 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2004. “Toward a Phenomenological Model of the Actor’s Embodied Modes 
of Experience.” Theatre Journal 56 (4): 653-66. 
Zysk, Kenneth G. 1991. “Mantra in Āyurveda: A Study of the Use of Magico-
Religious Speech in Ancient  
Indian Medicine.” In Understanding Mantras. Edited by Harvey P. Alper, 123-43. 
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
 
 
